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ABSTRACT 
'PROUD PRESTON': A HISTORY OF THE FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 1900-1939 
This thesis is concerned with the growth and development of the Football League in 
the first four decades of the twentieth century. Its major aim is to analyse the League 
as a major early twentieth century sporting and social institution and to account for its 
ideologies and policies in relation to other such institutions. It is not intended to be a 
history of the Football League per se but concentrates on the position and role of the 
League within English society at the time. As such, a comparative perspective is 
maintained throughout by relating the development of the League to that of other 
football and sporting bodies, as well as popular entertainment institutions like the 
theatre, music-imll and cinema. Moreover, the thesis is more than a straightforward 
study of the Football League as an autonomous executive body. It adopts a broader 
conception of the League, encompassing the development of relations among players, 
directors and clubs within the League's jurisdiction and structure, and treating the 
central administrative body as a starting-point rather than the primary focus of 
analysis. 
Previous historical accounts of the Football League in this period have fallen into two 
main categories: 'official' histories which chart and celebrate the 'rise' and 'progress' 
of the League and discuss its development uncritically and with no analytical 
perspective; and academic studies which present a vague and slightly nostalgic picture 
of its 'traditional' past to provide a contrast with the uncompromising elitist and 
commercial agenda of contemporary professional football. Both approaches have had 
the effect of divorcing the Football League from proper historical inquiry by treating 
its historical development as self -evident and unproblematic -a subject essentially 
without need of analysis. The present study is partly envisaged as a contribution to 
correct this situation by subjecting the League's development between 1900 and 1939 
to a critical and detailed analysis. 
it is contended that the history of the Football League in the first four decades of the 
twentieth century is inextricable from the history of professional football in general. 
The League ran the most prestigious competition with the best known players in the 
largest and best equipped stadiums in the country. All the features of the game in 
England at the highest level - from the transfer system to the offside law - were 
established directly or indirectly by the League and its members clubs. Yet the 
League's remarkable public profile and commercial buoyancy by the beginning of the 
Second World War was achieved with little apparent intention or even consciousness 
on the part of its decision-makers. For the most part the Football League was a 
conservative and reactionary body which was slow to exploit commercial possibilities 
and reluctant to broaden its responsibilities beyond straightforward self-protection. 
Chapter 1 provides a broad overview of the origins, the aims and the internal 
organisation of the Football League. It also briefly surveys the relationship with 
external bodies like the FA, the Southern League and the Players' Union, before 
moving on to a detailed biographical analysis of the League's officers and 
Management Committee members. As such, it serves to establish the institutional 
framework and ideological environment within which the Football League developed 
and its policy was constructed. Chapter 2 focuses on the contested process of League 
expansion and the whole debate centred around its transformation into a 'national 
league'. It also looks at the process of electing clubs in the context of the wider 
economic and geographical development of the League. In chapter 3 the institutional 
relationship with the governing body of English football, the FA, is explored, while 
chapter 4 maps out and examines the complex structure of power and decision-making 
existing between the central executive and the member clubs. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the Football League's performers and labour 
force: the players. As well as establishing empirical data on various aspects of the 
employment of players - such as wages, transfer conditions, contracts and insurance - 
these chapters analyse the development of labour relations in both their institutional, 
formalised version and their more spontaneous forms. What is more, they seek to 
determine how players were treated by their employers and to relate this to working 
conditions in industry as well as in parallel sporting and recreational sectors. Chapter 
7 looks specifically at the organisation of the League as a sporting cartel in the context 
of both economic theory and practice. It assesses the importance of the pervasive 
ideology of equality and traces its influence on policy-making at executive and club 
level. The last two chapters focus on the broader issues of the Football League's 
connection with, firstly, international football and, secondly, the 'football' and 
6general' public. Chapter 8 is divided into two sections which consider in turn the 
League's relations with the more immediate Scottish, Welsh and Irish game and with 
football beyond the British Isles, especially in continental Europe. The League's role 
in the promotion of the game both inside and outside football grounds is discussed in 
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INTRODUCTION 
The noble game of football is all the rage you'll own, 
And lately in that kind of sport, Proud Preston she has shown, 
That in her town, she does possess, the men I'm proud to say, 
Who can now play and beat some of the crack teams of the day. ' 
1. The Place of the Football League in English Societv 
Since its inception in 1888 the Football League has held an ambivalent place in the 
national psyche. To many sports enthusiasts its creation was fundamental to the long 
term survival of professional football. A fixed programme of matches between the 
leading clubs appeared to solve the insecurities, financial and otherwise, inherent in 
2 the 'lax and loose system' prevalent before 1888 . Moreover, the system was 
immediately popular among spectators and much of the local and national press. 
Within five months of the inaugural season Athletic News declared that from a 
'financial point of view, the competition has been a distinct success' while others 
agreed that 'inclusion in the League means an almost safe exchequer for the season for 
a club... and a very great addition to the interest in its matches' .3 By 1906 the 
League's founder William McGregor could describe the 'principle' of League football 
as the dominating influence in the game', replicated in competitive sports across the 
globe and even by the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, those bastions of amateur 
ideals. 4 
' Quoted in Tony Mason, 'Football, Sport of the North? ' in Jeff Hill and Jack Williams (eds), Sport and 
identity in the North ofEngland, Keele, 1996, p. 46. The quotation is taken from G. B. Browne's 
music-hall song commemorating the success of Preston North End, the first champions of the Football 
League. Subsequently the phrase 'Proud Preston' slipped into commonly usage, along with the epithet 
'Invincibles', to describe the Preston team of the late 1880s and early 1990s. See, for examples, 
Topical Times, 8 February 1928; Percy M. Young, A History ofBritish Football, London, 1968, p. 180. 
The phrase has been used in this context to illuminate a number of themes relating to the history of the 
Football League as a sporting and social organisation in the 1900-39 period, most obviously its regional 
origins and administrative base but also its jealously guarded independence, pride and perceived 
superiority in relation to other organisations. 
2 William McGregor, 'The Origin and Future of the Football League' in Alfred Gibson and William 
Pickford (eds. ), Association Football and the Men Who Made It, vol. 2, London, 1906, p. 2. 
3 Stephen Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen: The Origins ofProfessional Soccer in England, 
London, 1981, p. 59. 
4 McGregor, 'Origin and Future', p. 1. 
For others the Football League was synonymous with the ascendancy of commerce 
and money over true sport. Critics such as FA vice-president N. L. Jackson 
maintained a vigorous attack on the principles and structure of the League: it was 
decried as a purely commercial and selfish venture conducted without consideration of 
the needs of the smaller clubs and provincial associations-5 As the former amateur 
international G. 0. Smith noted in 1899, 'Opponents of the League describe it as a 
combination founded on self-interest, the members of which are only kept together by 
motives of selfishness and hopes of mutual profit'. 6 According to this view, the 
Football League augmented professional football's negative features. A contemporary 
account described the system as 'bad for the players, worse for the spectators. The 
former learn improvident habits, become vastly conceited, whilst failing to see that 
they are treated like chattels, and cannot help but be brutalised. The latter are injured 
physically and morally'. 7 Even the term 'league' took on a pejorative meaning in 
certain circles. McGregor himself acknowledged the opposition which the League 
attracted as 'an all powerful combination of clubs to which f. s. d. is admittedly the 
most vital consideration'! 
Studies of the contemporary football industry, however, have tended to downplay the 
conflict and change at the heart of the Football League's pre-1945 history. 
Sociologists and cultural theorists have placed particular emphasis on the apparent 
changing perspectives of the governing bodies and the clubs. The notion of 
professional football as a 'family' or 'community' of shared interests, it is alleged, has 
been replaced over the last thirty or so years by a more uncompromising elitist and 
commercial agenda. Two examples of such an approach appeared in an academic 
work, British Football and Social Change, published in 1991. In a study of the 
globalisation of modem English football, Stephen Wagg and Adrian Goldberg 
suggested that traditionally the 'financial arrangements made by the Football League 
5 Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 58; Wray Vamplew, Pay Up and P4 the Game: 
Professional Sport in Britain, 1863-1914, Cambridge, 1989, p. 125; Brian Dobbs, Edwardians at Pla 
Sport, 1890-1914, London, 1973, pp. 45-46. Also see Derek Birley, Land ofSport and Glory: sport 
Y 
and British Society, 1887-1910, Manchester, 1995, p. 36. 
6 G. 0. Smith, 'Origin and Benefits of the League and the Effects of Professionalism on the Game' in 
Montague Shearman (ed. ), Football, London, 1899, p. 17 1. 
7 Ernest Ensor, 'The Football Madness', Contemporary Review, 74,1898. 
1 McGregor, 'Origin and Future', p. 1. 
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have... been collectivist' and the decision-making structure 'at least semi-democratic', 
while Alan Tomlinson indicated that the Football League before 1950 could be 
described metaphorically as a 'family or a friendly society'. 9 
The basis for these assumptions, however, was unclear. Neither author supported 
their arguments with solid historical evidence but appeared merely to juxtapose a 
detailed analysis of the ruptures in contemporary League football with a vague and 
slightly nostalgic picture of its 'traditional' past. This kind of approach is reflected in 
a great deal of the popular and indeed even academic writing on the League, which 
has tended to treat its historical development as self-evident and unproblematic -a 
subject essentially without need of analysis. The case of the League seems to bear 
similarities to John Walton's comments about the fish and chip trade. 'It is presumed 
to be... timeless', says Walton, ' it has always been there, but it has no 'history' in the 
sense of transforming itself, affecting people's lives for good or ill in significant ways, 
or interacting with the... concerns of statesmen or diplomats'. ' 0 Divorced from proper 
historical inquiry, then, myths about the League have been perpetuated and 
assumptions left unexplored. This thesis is partly envisaged as a contribution to 
correct this situation by providing a detailed analysis of the Football League's 
development in the first forty years of this century. 
As a major social and leisure institution, with its own bureaucracy and administrative 
structure, its own rules, regulations and policy imperatives, the Football League has 
had a significance far beyond the bounds of what might be called the football world. 
At the League's Jubilee Banquet in 1938, FA president William Pickford summed up 
the broader role of the League as follows: 
If one thinks of the vast assets of the League clubs in property alone... of 
the huge sums they raise and distribute among players and staffs, the 
Exchequer, the Postmaster General, the railway and transport companies, 
and a hundred and one others, and endeavour to visualise the interest, 
excitement, and pleasure that its competitors bring into the lives of 
9 Adrian Goldberg and Stephen Wagg, 'It's not a knockout: English football and globalisation', p. 242; 
Alan Tomlinson, 'North and South: the rivaby of the Football League and the Football Association', p. 
35, both in John Williams and Stephen Wagg (eds), British Football and Social Change: Getting into 
Europe, Leicester, 1991. 
10 John Walton, Fish & Chips and the British Working Class, 1870-1940, Leicester, 1992, p. 1. 
3 
millions of people, one can begin to form an idea of its importance in the 
life of the nation. ' 1 
While this view of the League may, be hyperbolic, the basic impression it gives is 
nevertheless of some importance. The economic dimensions of the Football League's 
activities are perhaps the easiest to quantify. Political and Economic Planning's 
(PEP) 1951 report revealed that, in the 1937-38 season, 31.43 million spectators, 
paying f. 1.57 million in admission charges, had watched matches in the four divisions 
of the League. In addition, the League was related to a number of ancillary industries, 
most significantly the pools and the sporting press. As The Times commented in 
1937, 'The pools, the transfer system and the amount of money involved in the gates 
have turned football into something like a national industry. 12 Football in this sense 
was synonymous with the Football League. 
One could also put a powerful case for the League as the conveyor of a significant 
cultural phenomenon. Whether or not one accepts the view that football in this period 
represented the working man's religion or was organically linked to the working-class 
community, it clearly mattered to many people and formed an important part of 
English social life. 13 Successful clubs like Aston Villa and Arsenal and players like 
Billy Meredith, 'Dixie' Dean and Alex James represented, especially in the period of a 
proliferating sports-related media and the cult of the cigarette card, a cultural 
reference point which went beyond the local community. Moreover, the Saturday 
afternoon League programme had become a characteristic ritual of professional sport 
in this country. According to Richard Holt, this 'world of clanking turnstiles and vast 
stadia [represented] the most popular and highly organised programme of spectator 
sport in existence'. 14 And, from the early 1930s, millions more were symbolically 
attached to the League through the emergence of the football pools and its sub-culture. 
Quoted in Simon Inglis, League Foothall and the Men Who Made It, London, 1988, p. 162. 
Stephen Jones, 'The Economic Aspects of Association Football in England, 1918-39', BJSH, 1,1, 
1984, p. 288-89. The quotation is from James Walvin, The People's Game: The History offoothall 
Revisited, Edinburgh, 1994, p. 128. 
13 See Nicholas Fishwick, English Foothall and Society, 1910-50, Manchester, 1989, chapter 7; 
Stephen Jones, Sport, Politics and the working class, Manchester, 198 8, pp. 54-5 8. Also Tony Mason, 
, 4ssociation Foothall and English Society, 1863-191J, Brighton, chapter S. "' Richard Holt, Sport and the British: A Modern History, Oxford, 1989, p. 2. 
4 
Aside from the wider economic and cultural implications of its activities, the League 
was a major social institution in its own right. This period saw the development of a 
network of links with sporting, social and governmental bodies and the emergence of 
a distinctive public image. As Pickford's quotation indicates, the League made 
personal and formal contacts with several government departments, lobbied for 
concessions in travel costs and even publicly pronounced its position on the outbreak 
of war in 1914. Indeed, its decision to continue League football up to July 1915 
resulted in what president John McKenna referred to as 
; 'tirade of abuse' from the 
middle and upper classes and even some pressure on the government to ban 
professional football. In its attempts to rehabilitate its public image, the League, 
along with the FA, donated significant amounts of money to charities and the war 
effort; a practice which was extended after the war to include donations to disaster 
appeals. 15 
Unlike other sporting bodies like the MCC, therefore, the Football League was more 
than a private club. By this stage at least, it was a self-consciously public body, whose 
decisions and actions had a resonance in the wider social and political arena. Having 
said this, the League retained in many respects a distinctly private and insular 
perspective. Committee members were often highly suspicious of outsiders, whether 
from within the football world or not, and of extraneous attempts to interfere in 
League affairs. Hence, in 1912 the Management Committee banned people not 
officially associated with League clubs from attending the annual meeting and, 
throughout the period, prevented press access to those meetings considered to be of a 
private and confidential nature. 
16 Correspondence and inquiries from external bodies 
such as the Player's Union, the BBC and the Pool's Promoters' Association were 
often ignored or, at best, merely acknowledged. Furthermore, for much of the period 
up to 1920, and arguably for some time thereafter, the League as a collective 
eschewed any pretensions to act as a governing body of professional football, 
preferring instead to behave in an aloof, self-concemed and parochial manner. It is 
not insignificant that the League was based from 1902 at Preston, or that all four 
Is See chapter 9. A. J. Arnold, "'Not Playing the Game"?: Leeds City in the Great War', IJHS, 1990, 
w. 112-13. p 
Minutes of Football League, 10 May 1912. Some elements of the press consistently complained of 
the secrecy of the League's activities. See Athletic News, 23 September 190 1. 
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presidents in this period, as well as the secretaries and other office staff, were drawn 
exclusively from Lancashire. It could be, at different times, both proud of its regional 
roots and conscious of its wider responsibilities on a national scale. The League thus 
exhibited a complex set of identities: a curious blend of the public and the private, the 
national and the parochial. 
It must be stated here that a case is not being made for the study of the Football 
League per se: James Bradley has explicitly warned historians studying sport of this 
danger, stating that: 'if too much time is spent studying a central organisation it might 
appear that that is the only important element'. 17 An analysis of the League's 
accounts, internal regulations and business practices alone could well produce a good 
business history but will tell us little about the complicated ways in which 
professional football in general interacted with broader social, economic and political 
changes. The scope of this study is thus wider than it might first appear, as it 
encompasses the development of relations among the players, directors and clubs 
within the League's jurisdiction and structure, and treats the central administrative 
body as a starting-point rather than the primary focus of analysis. 
Moreover, the growth of the Football League did not occur in isolation: it had 
parallels in other countries, in other sports and in other sectors of the leisure industry. 
The Scottish Football League and the Northern Rugby Union (later the Rugby League) 
were both partially influenced by the formation and rise of the League, although they 
developed regulations and policies which reflected distinct traditions, values and 
material conditions. " Likewise, as Stephen Jones has shown, professional football 
was one part, albeit a highly significant one, of a more general process of commercial 
leisure expansion beginning in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods and 
continuing throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Industries such as cinema, broadcasting 
17 James Bradley, 'Tbe MCC, Society and Empire: A Portrait of Cricket's Ruling Body, 1860-1914' in 
J. A. Mangan (ed. ), The Cultural Bond., Sport, Empire, Society, London, 1992, p. 44. 
18 For Scotland, see Bob Crampsey, The Scottish Football League. The First 100 Years, Glasgow, 
1990, pp. 1- 16; for Rugby League, Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard, Barbarians, Gentlemen and 
Players. A Sociological Study ofthe Development ofRugby Football, Oxford, 1979, pp. 170-74. Also 
Geoffrey Moorhouse, A People's Game: The Official History ofRugby League, 1895-1995, London, 
1995; Keith Macklin, The History ofRugby League Football, London, 1962; Graham Williams, The 
Code War, Harefield, 1994. 
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and spectator sport exhibited common structural features and experienced 
commercialisation in comparable, yet individually constructed, ways. 19 A comparison 
of labour relations in the Football League with those between music-hall artists and 
proprietors, for instance, is therefore not a futile exercise. Not only were such 
comparisons frequently made at the time, they can also help enlighten us as to the 
beliefs and circumstances which shaped English professional football in the period 
and set it apart from other entertainments and sports. 20 Hence, this study will 
concentrate on the position and role of the League within both the immediate leisure 
environment and English society in general. 
There can be little doubt that the history of the Football League in the first four 
decades of the twentieth century is inextricable from the history of professional 
football in general. The League ran the most prestigious competition with the best 
known players in the largest and best equipped stadiums in the country. All the 
features of the game in England at the highest level - from the transfer system to the 
offside law - were established directly or indirectly by the League and its member 
clubs. But the precise role of the League has been elusive for both contemporary 
observers and historians. It has been seen variously as an employers association, 
intent on setting wage levels, conditions, standards of work and the like 21 ; as a 
business or, more precisely, a commercial cartel22 ; as 'a body of entertainers' whose 
primary aim it was to distract the public 23 ; and as 'the great organiser and controller' 
of the professional game. 24 These perspectives are not, of course, mutually exclusive: 
the League was all these things and often at the same time. 
" Stephen Jones, Workers at Play. - A Social and Economic History ofLeisure, 1918-39, London, 1986, 
chapter 2. 
" See Lois Rutherford, "'Managers in a small way": The Professionalisation of Variety Artistes, 1860- 
1914' in Peter Bailey (ed. ), Music Hall. The Business ofPleasure, Milton Keynes, 1986, pp. 93-119; 
Peter Bailey, 'Custom, Capital and Culture in the Victorian Music Hall' in Robert D. Storch (ed. ), 
Popular Culture and Custom in Nineleenth-Century England, London, 1982, pp. 180-208. For cinema, 
Michael Chanan, 'The Emergence of an Industry' in James Curran and Vincent Porter (eds. ), British 
Cinema History, London, 1983, p. 48; Stephen Jones, The British Labour Movement and Film, 1918- 
39, London, 1987, chapter 3. Also, see William Pickford's comparison of the role of professional 
footballers and other sportsmen and entertainers in Athletic News, 27 March 1911. 
21 Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen. 
22 Vamplew, Pay Up. 
21 Comment by FA president Charles Clegg at the Football League 'Coming-of-Age' Banquet, reported 
in Athletic News, 14 June 1909. 
24 Athletic News, 24 May 1920. 
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2. The League and the Historiography of English Football 
It is not overstating matters to say that the Football League has been left largely 
untouched in the historiography of English football. This might seem perplexing at 
first glance, given Tony Mason's comments that the early history of football has been 
written largely 'in terms of the institutions, players and matches'. 25 There are indeed a 
number of articles, including those by the League's founder William McGregor in the 
1906 Book ofFootball and by journalist and ex-player Ivan Sharpe, which discuss the 
structure and development of the League, while Percy Young's 1968 book, A History 
of British Football, gives some coverage of League affairs. 26 Perhaps this material 
has led professional historians to steer clear of the subject? Whatever the case, 
another of Mason's comments, that football history before the 1970s 'was largely in 
the hands of administrators and journalists' seems particularly pertinent in the case of 
the League. 27 
Essentially the history of the Football League has been written from the inside, 
uncritically and with no analytical perspective. There have been two general histories 
of the League. The first, titled The Story of the Football League, was written in 193 8, 
the League's Jubilee Year, by then president Charles Sutcliffe, secretary Fred Howarth 
and a Preston journalist J. A. Brierley. As might be expected, it is an uncritical 
celebration of the organisation's development which, informative though it is, tells us 
more about the League's public and self-image in 1938 and the preoccupations of its 
authors than anything else. A more recent work is Simon Inglis' League Football and 
the men who made it, published in 1988 as the 'Official Centenary History of the 
Football League'. Inglis, a journalist and architect best known for his writing about 
football grounds, does inform his narrative with an element of social history and 
understands that the League did not develop in isolation but within a wider social, 
economic and political framework. Nevertheless, although it is relatively objective 
25 Tony Mason, 'Football and the Historians', 1JHS, 5,1,1988, p. 136. 
26 William McGregor, 'The League and the League System' and 'The i s. d of football' in Book of 
Football, 1906; Ivan Sharpe, 'The Men who made League Football' in A. H. Fabian and Geoffrey 
Green (eds. ), Association Football, London, 1960, pp. 283-309; Young, History ofBritish Football, 
especially chapters I 1- 13. Geoffrey Green, The History ofthe Football Association, London, 1953, 
deals extensively with relations between the League and the FA in chapter 9. 
27 Mason, 'Football and the Historians', p. 136. 
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for an 'official' history, it ultimately presents a picture of the League as the League 
would want to be seen. As with the Jubilee history, sources are assessed uncritically 
and there is no real attempt to relate the League to its changing social context. 28 
Academic studies have not filled this historiographical gap either. While the work of 
Tony Mason, Nicholas Fishwick and Charles Korr, in particular, has added to our 
understanding of the objectives, composition and management of professional League 
clubs and Stephen Jones has placed the club firmly in its wider economic and 
commercial context, little attention has been paid to the controlling body. 29 Indeed, 
there is an implicit strand of thinking in some of these studies which treats football's 
&ruling class' - club owners, directors, the FA and the League administration - as a 
monolithic group. Steven Tischler, in particular, while admittedly operating within a 
fairly rigid Marxist perspective, uses the terms 'football establishment', 'football 
hierarchy' and 'football authorities' as interchangeable labels to describe any elite 
owner or official . 
30 Although it is true that to some extent those groups were 
interchangeable - club directors were League Committee members and Committee 
members were often FA councillors - it is nonetheless an oversimplification which 
fails to recognise the League as an autonomous institution. 
The application of economic theory to sports history has helped clarify the distinctive 
role of organisations like the Football League. Wray Vamplew's study of British 
professional sport up to 1914 is the essential work in this respect. Drawing on the 
work of North American sports economists, Vamplew sought to analyse the theories 
relating to sporting leagues in an historical context, by perceiving the Football League 
as a commercial cartel 
29 Charles Sutcliffe, J. A. Brierley and Fred Howarth, The Story ofthe Football League, 1888-1938, 
Preston, 193 8; Inglis, League Football, p. vii. There have been other works relating to the League 
which focus mainly on statistics and the achievements of famous players and clubs. See, for example, 
R. C. Churchill, English League Football, London, 1960; Maurice Golesworthy, We are the 
champions: a histo? y ofthe Football League champions, 1888-1972, London, 1972; and more recently, 
Bryon Butler, The Football League. The First 100 Years, Guildford, 1988. 
29 Mason, Association Football, Fishwick, English Football; Charles Korr, West Ham United The 
Making ofa Football Club, London, 1988; Jones, 'Economic Aspects'. 
30 Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen. 
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with a central controlling body setting the economic rules, operating 
quality control via promotion and relegation and other restrictions on 
entry, and... circumscribing the economic freedom of sports labourers in 
an effort to maintain equality of competition. 31 
Yet as his study centred on cricket, horse racing and rugby league as well as football, 
and stretched only as far as 1914, Vamplew was unable to fully analyse the 
problematic development of the League cartel, including conflicting interests and 
changing objectives and policies. Tony Arnold's business history of professional 
football in Bradford has also proved instructive by approaching the issues from a 
regional perspective. For Arnold, the business activity of the Bradford clubs, City and 
Park Avenue, was linked to local trade and economic fluctuations but was, at the same 
time, contingent upon the regulations imposed upon them as members of the Football 
League. League clubs thus displayed dual personalities: as both semi-autonomous 
local sporting institutions and national cartel members. 32 
Yet while a recognition of the often peculiar economic arrangement of professional 
football generally, and the Football League in particular, will inform much of this 
study, its importance should not be overstated. Although economic considerations 
may have been central to League and club officials, the pursuit of profit clearly was 
not. Mason, Vamplew and Fishwick have persuasively argued that club directors and 
shareholders were rarely influenced primarily by the profit motive. Not only did the 
FA restrict the dividend payable to shareholders to 5 per cent before 1914, and 7.5 per 
cent thereafter, they also expressly forbade the payment of directors. Consequently 
Athletic News could assert that 'No one who is out for a business return will look at 
football shares. 33 More fundamentally, concentration on the economic side of the 
League tends to obscure the social, political and purely sporting factors which might 
have led the League to operate as it did. The principles of 'equality of competition' 
and 'fair competition' which became so central to League officials in this period were 
influenced as much by sporting values and conceptions of 'fair play' as by the desire 
31 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 17. 
32 A. J. Arnold, A Game That Would Pay. ý A Business History of Professional Football in Bradford, 
London, 1988. 
33 Quoted in Mason, Association Football, p. 48. Also see Varnplew, Pay Up, chapter 10; Fishwick, 
English Football, pp. 27-32. 
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to increase gate receipts. Profit-maximisation was certainly not a major aim of those 
who ran the League: instead they were motivated by a range of objectives centred 
around the need to secure the survival of the League and enhance its status as a 
competition and an institution. Clearly professional football was a business and the 
Football League acted as a cartel, but never in a conventional sense. 
3. Methods and Sources 
The central sources for the thesis are the archives and records of the Football League, 
the Football Association, the Professional Footballers' Association (the Players' 
Union) and the professional football clubs which were full or associate members of 
the League. Along with the League, the FA and the Player s' Union formed what 
Geoffrey Green called the 'three comers of the triangle' in the administration of 
English football, whose interaction determined the development of the game. 34 The 
minute books of executive, committee and sub-committee meetings have been 
consulted, along with files of correspondence and other records. The Football League, 
however, did not allow access to its private minutes, correspondence or other 
records 35 and so it has been necessary to make use of both the printed version of the 
minutes kept by the FA and the member clubs and the reports of meetings in the press. 
The clubs whose archives have been consulted are intended to reflect a representative 
sample of the League membership, 'both in terms of geography and playing success. 
Aston Villa, West Bromwich Albion, Wolverhampton Wanderers and Walsall from 
the Midlands; Oldham Athletic from Lancashire; Sheffield United and Huddersfield 
Town from Yorkshire; West Ham United from London; and Ipswich Town from East 
Anglia, provided a geographical cross-section 36: in playing terms, they represent a 
mixture of consistent first division clubs, teams who spent time in both the top two 
divisions and, in Walsall and Ipswich Town, clubs from the third division sections. 
The material available at the clubs varied significantly, although there were extensive 
and complete minute books of board meetings, along with correspondence, wage 
34 Green, History ofthe FA, p. 390. 
35 Theonly records made available for consultation were the club attendance books dating from 1925 
and the annual handbooks which included the League's rules, bye-laws and other egulations. 36 Although none of the club's private archives were available, Arsenal FC houses a number of records, 
including journalist James Catton's folders of newspaper clippings, letters and other correspondence. 
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books and the like at Sheffield United, West Ham United and Aston Villa. For this 
reason, the evidence used is to some extent weighted towards the experience of these 
three clubs. 
Newspaper sources are also central to the thesis. Local and national as well as 
sporting and non-sporting newspapers have been consulted. Most important, 
however, is Athletic News, a sporting newspaper published in Manchester from 1875 
to 193 1. Its relevance to students of professional football is explained not merely by 
its circulation figures and popularity, significant though these were. Its quoted 
readership leapt from some 20,000 in 1888, the year in which the Football League was 
founded, to 180,000 by 1896 and Mason has claimed that 'it was without doubt the 
country's leading football weekly in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the 
first fifteen years of the twentieth;. by 1919 weekly sales were at 170,000 and 
declined thereafter until it was taken over by the Sporting Chronicle in 193 1.37 What 
is more important is the reputation it developed before and throughout most of this 
period as a mouthpiece of particular sections of the football establishment, especially 
the Football League. The national scope of its reporting and its serious and sober 
approach to the game gave it the label, before the First World War at least, as 'The 
1,38 Times of football . More than this, its close links with League administrators and 
club directors made it almost the official voice of the League: Inglis has described it 
as 'the League's very own in-house publication'. 39 Thus it has been used extensively 
throughout the following chapters. 
Although the autobiographies or memoirs of some players and administrators whose 
careers coincided with the 1900-39 period have been used, it is necessary to 
emphasise the limits of these sources. In general, though players do make references 
to their relationship with their clubs and sometimes to contract or transfer disputes and 
negotiations, there is rarely any mention of the Football League itself This can 
certainly be interpreted as evidence of the distance between the player and the League 
but it also reflects the fact that there is very little behind-the-scenes discussion in 
" Mason, Association Foothall, p. 19 1; Fishwick, English Football, P. 102. 
33 Fishwick, English Football, p. 102. 
39 Inglis, League Football, p. vi. 
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football players' autobiographies: not surprisingly the game itself is invariably given 
the bulk of the attention. For administrators the main problem is the paucity of 
published memoirs. Not one of the Management Committee members or club 
directors of the period wrote autobiographies, and only William Pickford, Frederick 
Wall and Stanley Rous did so at the FA. Such references as there are to the lives and 
careers of League representatives have had to be pieced together through newspaper 
accounts, obituaries and one or two collective biographies which appeared in Pickford 
and Gibson's Association Football and the Men no Made It and Sutcliffe and 
Hargreaves' History of the Lancashire FA . 
40 Another possible method of inquiry 
which has not been used is the oral interview, because it was found that there were not 
enough living ex-League players or officials to provide an adequate sample for 
research purposes. 
The chronological boundaries of the thesis also need to be explained as they do not 
conform with what might be considered the 'natural, time-span for a study of the 
Football League. Although the League was founded in 1888, the start of the twentieth 
century has been taken as the starting-point because it coincided with a number of 
significant changes in its organisation and policy. Firstly, the introduction of the 
maximum wage in 1901 marked a watershed not only in the management and control 
of football employees but also in the broader approach of the League executive 
towards the idea of equality of competition. The introduction of the system of 
automatic promotion and relegation between the two divisions in 1898 had similar 
implications, while other developments such as the creation of the Inter-League Board 
with Scotland a year earlier led Sutcliffe to regard this period 'as marking a definite 
turn in the League's history'. 41 Secondly, the ostensibly trivial change in secretaries 
from Harry Lockett to Tom Charnley in 1902 actually heralded a significant 
development in that the Football League was established in its first permanent offices 
in Preston. This gave the organisation a central headquarters for member clubs and 
outside parties to contact but also gave the impression that this was a stable, secure 
and permanent body. Previously, one can argue, the League was essentially little 
40 Pickford and Gibson (eds), Association Football, vol. 3; C. E. Sutcliffe and F. Hargreaves, History of 
the Lancashire FA, 1878-1928, Blackburn, 1928. 
41 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 13. 
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more than a mailing or telegraphic address and not a physical entity in its own right. 
While 1900 is the starting-point, however, discussion of the League's development in 
the preceding twelve years is nonetheless crucial as a background to the events of the 
twentieth century. The beginning of the Second World War acts as an obvious 
chronological end for the study as, in contrast with the 1914-18 war, the League 
competition was abandoned immediately and clubs pledged themselves unanimously 
to devote facilities and manpower to the war effort. Regional League and cup 
competitions did slowly reappear but these were recognised as fimdamentally different 
in every respect from peacetime football. 42 Moreover, the basic continuity which 
marked the management of the Football League in the First World War was not 
repeated in the Second: the officials and executive which emerged in 1945 were 
much different from those who had taken the decision to suspend the League 
programme in September 1939. 
4. Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided into thematic chapters focusing on different aspects of the 
Football League's internal structure and development, its relations with others bodies 
in the football world and with its audience and the broader public. While the chapters 
have not been arranged chronologically, it is nonetheless recognised that the period 
can be separated into distinct phases: the most obvious division being first, 1900 to 
1914; second, the First World War; and finally the inter-war period, with the 
depression years of the late 1920s and early 1930s perhaps representing a finther 
chronological departure. There are certainly aspects of the League's activities which 
can be easily separated into these time-fi-ames, but there is also evidence of 
considerable continuity across them and so it was decided on thematic chapters which 
either explicitly or implicitly incorporate this chronology as the most appropriate 
arrangement. Even so, certain chapters are broadly based on these chronological 
periods. Chapters 2 and 3, in particular, concentrate on the pre-1914 period while 
chapters 8 and 9 cover mainly the inter-war years. 
42 See Pierre Lanfranchi and Matthew Taylor, 'Professional Football in Second World War Britain' in 
Pat Kirkham and David Thorns (eds), War Culture: Social Change and Changing Experience in World 
War Two, London, 1995, pp. 187-97. 
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Chapter I provides a broad overview of the origins, the aims and the internal 
organisation of the Football League. It also briefly surveys the relationship with 
external bodies like the FA, the Southern League and the Players' Union, before 
moving on to a detailed biographical analysis of the League's officers and 
Management Committee members. As such, it serves to establish the institutional 
framework and ideological environment within which the Football League developed 
and its policy was constructed. Chapter 2 focuses on the contested process of League 
expansion and the whole debate centred around its transformation into a 'national 
league'. It also looks at the process of electing clubs in the context of the wider 
economic and geographical development of the League. In chapter 3 the institutional 
relationship with the governing body of English football, the FA, is explored, while 
chapter 4 maps out and examines the complex structure of power and decision-making 
existing between the central executive and the member clubs. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the Football League's performers and labour 
force: the players. As well as establishing empirical data on various aspects of the 
employment of players - such as wages, transfer conditions, contracts and insurance - 
these chapters analyse the development of labour relations in both their institutional, 
formalised version and their more spontaneous forms. What is more, they seek to 
determine how players were treated by their employers and to relate this to working 
conditions in industry as well as in parallel sporting and recreational sectors. Chapter 
7 looks specifically at the organisation of the League as a sporting cartel in the context 
of both economic theory and practice. It assesses the importance of the pervasive 
ideology of equality and traces its influence on policy-making at executive and club 
level. The last two chapters focus on the broader issues of the Football League's 
connection with, first, international football and, second, the 'football' and 'general' 
public. Chapter 8 is divided into two sections which consider in turn the League's 
relations with the more immediate Scottish, Welsh and Irish game and with football 
beyond the British Isles, especially in continental Europe. The League's role in the 
promotion of the game both inside and outside football grounds is discussed in 
15 
chapter 9 and the conclusion briefly draws together the main themes and arguments of 
the thesis. 
Finally, it is necessary to explain the use of certain terms in the text of the thesis. For 
the sake of convenience and to avoid too much repetition, certain common terms have 
been shortened or used interchangeably with others. The Football League 
Management Committee is abbreviated in most cases to the 'Management Committee' 
but the terms 'Committee' and 'executive' have also been used. The Football League 
is similarly referred to at times simply as the 'League' and occasionally, in line with 
the practice of diplomatic historians, is identified by the centre of its government (or 
its headquarters) as 'Preston'. Likewise, the FA is also described as 'the governing 
body' or 'the parent body'. The Association Football Players' (and Trainers') Union 
is referred to throughout he text by its popular title, the Players' Union. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AIMS, ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE 
By the beginning of the twentieth century the major features of the Football League's 
internal structure and external relations were already in place. It had evolved from a 
combination of twelve clubs located in the north-west and the midlands in 1888 to 
become a nationwide competition of thirty-six clubs separated into two divisions. 
Major cities like Manchester, Sheffield, Newcastle and London were now represented 
by League clubs and many more sought election annually. The administrative 
structure and machinery had also become firmly established: monthly meetings of the 
Management Committee, regular circulars from the Committee to the clubs, and the 
annual re-election process for clubs and officials were all integral to the way the 
Football League operated. In addition, relations with the Scottish League had been 
institutionalised through the creation of the Inter-League Board in 1898 while formal 
and informal contacts existed with other professional leagues as well as with the FA 
and the Players' Union. As Simon Inglis has commented, the League was beginning 
to show signs of 'substance and permanence'. ' 
Yet although the Football League may have been the most advanced of its type in 
Britain, and even Europe, its administration was still in many respects rudimentary. It 
was in the process of the next four decades that the League really began to take on the 
characteristics of a modem bureaucracy. Any analysis of the organisation of a sporting 
body such as the League must therefore recognise elements of change and 
development rather than viewing it simply as a static structure. This chapter aims to 
outline and describe the basic structure of the Football League in the period. The 
opening section will examine the League's place within the wider sphere of football 
politics, especially its complex and changing relations with the Players' Union and the 
Southern League. This will be followed by a discussion of the League's internal 
administration before turning, in the final section, to a detailed analysis of the social 
composition and collective culture of the central executive body, the Management 
' Inglis, League Football, p. 48. 
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Committee. But first, it is necessary to briefly examine the initial objectives of the 
League's founders. 
1. The OriOns of the Leazue and the Obiectives of its Founders 
In view of the expansion and influence of both the Football League and the League 
system during this century, it has been tempting for writers to overemphasise the 
scope of the original scheme. The suggestion, popularised by the founder William 
McGregor, that the League was initially advocated as a governing body of 
professional football is therefore rather misleading. 2 Although certain club directors 
may have privately envisaged the League as the basis of a professional football empire 
in competition with the FA, its creation was essentially a practical response to a 
number of difficulties in the management of clubs which had arisen following the 
legalisation of professionalism in 1885. The most obvious problem was the lack of a 
pre-arranged and permanent schedule of matches. For clubs with large wage bills to 
meet in addition to other expenses, gate receipts provided no guarantee of a sufficient 
regular income. As McGregor commented, 'fixtures were kept and cancelled in a 
capricious way'. 3 The common arrangement of home and away matches, with the 
host retaining the gate money, was frequently disrupted by unexpected cup 
engagements, incomplete teams or bad weather. Without contractual commitments a 
club either suffered considerable losses or their secretary was forced at the last minute 
'to have to rush about, wire, and write all over the county in order to get a match'. 4 At 
best this rendered fixture lists useless: at worst it could lead to bankruptcy. 
Those matches that were played were often uncompetitive affairs which drew small 
crowds. The leading clubs generally entered as many as four or five cup competitions, 
mainly local or county-based, which could produce unattractive one-sided matches in 
the early rounds or, worse still, blank dates if a club were knocked out. 5 Potentially 
profitable were the periodic friendly fixtures with local rivals and, increasingly from 
2 McGregor, 'The League', 1906, p. 174; Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 125 ; Bill Murray, Foothall: A History 
ofthe World Game, Aldershot, 1994, p. 3 8. 3 McGregor, 'Origin and Future', p. 2. 
4 McGregor, 'The League', p. 17 1. Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 57, gives examples of 
the disputes which arose between clubs as a result of fixture problems. 5 McGregor, 'Origin and Future', p. 2; Churchill, English League Football, p. 15. 
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the mid-1880s, major sides from outside the area. Yet even prestigious opponents 
could not guarantee large attendances: Aston Villa and Bolton Wanderers, both 
founder members of the League, reportedly drew only 4,000-5,000 spectators for their 
matches in pre-League days, compared with attendances of 7,000 to 8,000 less than 
five years later. 6 With the onset of economic depression in 1886 and 1887 the 
financial problems of clubs became even more acute. Attendances fell in 
manufacturing areas and clubs struggled to maintain a programme of regular 
competitive football. 7 As McGregor asserted in his famous letter of 2nd March 1888: 
'Every year it is becoming more and more difficult for clubs of any standing to meet 
their friendly engagements and even arrange friendly matches. The consequence is 
that at the last moment... clubs are compelled to take on teams who will not attract the 
public'. 8 For McGregor's Aston Villa and other clubs this situation had become 
administratively and financially intolerable. 
The solution to these problems - the system of a fixed programme of home and away 
matches - was certainly not a new one in 1888. It was widely believed that the idea 
was taken from American baseball, although McGregor himself claimed that the 
inspiration had come from cricket's County Championship. Even so, cricket provided 
the inspiration rather than the model, as home and away fixtures for the counties were 
not compulsory and McGregor wanted 'a more definite plan of all playing against one 
another'. ' Moreover, the journalist and editor of Athletic News, James Catton, 
asserted at a later date that the League had more modest antecedents in local football 
competitions such as the Scarborough Wednesday League (18 8 1) and the Glossop and 
District Amateur League (1887). It certainly appears that leading sporting 
newspapers, like Athletic News and the Sunday Chronicle, were advocating the use of 
the system in professional football some time before March 1888.11 It is likely 
therefore that most of those clubs whom McGregor circularised in March, and 
6 Tischler, FootbattersandBusinessmen, p. 58; Athletic News, 6 January 1908. 
7 Tischler, Footballers andBusinessmen, pp. 57-58. 
I Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 2. 
9 See McGregor's comments at the League's 'Coming of Age' Banquetý reported in Athletic News, 14 
June 1909. 
'0 Athletic News, 12 February 1906. This information comes from Catton's review of McGregor's 
'Origin and Future' article in Gibson and Pickford, Association Football, written under his pen-name 
'Tityrus'. 
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subsequently attended meetings throughout the spring and summer, were already 
familiar with the broad outlines and principles of the league system. 
An examination of the League's first set of rules indicates the fairly limited objectives 
of McGregor and the original twelve clubs. Above all, the League's significance 
rested on the structure of its programme or the concept of 'fixity of fixtures'. Tbis, as 
the Birmingham Post acknowledged in retrospect, was 'the ruling idea of the 
scherne'. " Member clubs agreed to 'support each other, and bind themselves to carry 
out in the strictest sense the arrangement for matches made between them, and not 
allow them to be cancelled on account of any cup competition or other matches'. 
12 In 
addition, each club was expected to 'play its full strength in all matches' and to ensure 
punctual kick-off times; the latter to avoid circumstances common before 1888 when 
&games tarted 30,40 and even 60 minutes late, often after intending spectators had 
returned home'. 13 Writing in 1901, John Lewis, a director of Blackburn Rovers at the 
time of the League's creation and now a League vice-president, re-asserted these three 
aims as the foundation of the League system. 
14 League rules also provided details of 
administrative structure and procedure, including the system of club representation, 
and the duties and responsibilities of the General Committee and the Management 
Committee. However, apart from the acknowledgement that matches 'shall be played 
under the rules of the Football Association' no reference was made to the League's 
position vis-ii-vis the FA or any other body. 
15 For those involved in its establishment, 
it would seem that the League was primarily perceived as a system of competition 
rather than an administrative or governing body, although the latter was a necessary 
corollary of the former. According to Charles Sutcliffe, a former Burnley director and 
prominent Management Committee member: 'The League at its inception was merely 
a system. It produced arrangement, reliability, and competition, out of chaos, 
unreliability, and mere exhibition'. 
16 
II McGregor's Obituary in Birmingham Post, 21 December 1911. 
12 Quoted in Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 59. 
13 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 1,3,5. 
14 Athletic News, 23 December 190 1. 
11 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 4-5. 
16 Athletic News, II January 1909. 
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A finther implicit aim of the League was, of course, to stimulate gate revenue. As 
well as being the most prominent clubs, the original twelve members were also among 
the best supported. It has been suggested that Everton, for example, a relatively 
modest club in terms of cup success, were selected entirely because of their large 
home attendances. 17 However, this point should not be taken too far. Although good 
gates were clearly an important factor in the selection of clubs, it was assumed that the 
system, rather than the clubs themselves, would assure these. The initial selection 
procedure was certainly more ad hoc than might be supposed; based on existing 
networks of contact between clubs and club officials rather than a systematic analysis 
of gate receipts. Furthermore, it was not altogether clear beforehand that the proposed 
League would be a financial success. Both Sheffield clubs, for example, opposed the 
scheme because they believed it would be too costly for those clubs involved. 
' 8 Only 
with hindsight did both the press and aspiring clubs generally acknowledge the 
financial benefits which League membership conferred. 19 For the -founder members 
the impact of the League on gate receipts was certainly dramatic. Wolverhampton 
Wanderers took just E821 at the gate in their last non-League season but by 1893/94 
this had increased to L3,356; Blackburn Rovers' receipts similarly rose from E1,424 in 
1887/88 to E5,190 by 1901/02. As Catton noted, the establishment of the Football 
League &galvanised the dry bones of club football into life and endowed the game'. 20 
2. The External Relations of the Leazue 
The most significant football organisations in relation to the League were the FA, the 
Players' Union and rival leagues, principally the Southern League. We shall not dwell 
on the League's relations with the governing body, which have been allocated a 
separate chapter (chapter 3), except to say that the FA's hegemony over professional 
football in England became more theoretical than real as the League grew in status 
17 McGregor, 'The League', p. 173; Percy M. Young, Football on Merseyside, London, 1963, p. 29. 
Only three of the founder members - Aston Villa, Blackburn Rovers and West Bromwich Albion - had 
won the FA Cup prior to 1888. 
" Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 2; Percy M. Yo g, Football in She leld, London, 19 , p. 57; Churchill, English League Football, p. 16. 
un ff 64 
19 For press reactions on the League's inaugural season, see Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 
59. 
20 William McGregor, 'The f. s. d of Football' in Book offoolball, p. 62; Catton Folders, E-F, Notes 
for a speech on 'The Football League, undated, p. 500c. 
21 
and power. For this reason, it is more accurate to conceptualise the two during much 
of the period in question as parallel bodies rather than as a dominant governing 
authority in control of a subservient sporting competition. The other two bodies will 
also receive detailed attention in subsequent chapters but it is important at this stage to 
briefly outline their connections and relations with the League. 
While the FA, as we shall see later, could be regarded as both a partner and a rival, 
players' organisations were generally perceived by the League as a threat. This was 
hardly surprising as any attempt to improve the employment conditions of 
professional footballers inevitably implied the alteration of League rules. The first 
contact between the League and the Players' Union came in 1898 when the Union's 
secretary devised a new transfer scheme but, antagonised by the Union's preference 
for dealing with the FA, the League Management Committee refused to enter into 
debate. 21 By the end of 1907 a reconstructed Association Football Players' Union2; 
had been formed to provide legal aid and assistance, to help necessitous members 
financially and to find employment for transfer-listed or disengaged players. The 
Union's primary objective, however, was 'the abolition of all monetary restrictions' 
and it was this aspect of its activities, rather than its benevolent work, which 
ultimately brought it into conflict with the League. 23 At first the League seems to 
have accepted the Union without any hostility: in fact, both John Cameron and John 
McKenna of the League Management Committee were among several club directors 
who initially accepted Union vice-presidencies while Cameron assisted in the 
organisation of a match for the Union's benevolent fund between Manchester United 
and his own club Newcastle United. 24 The situation had changed, however, by 1909, 
when the Union's confrontation with the FA over a number of issues - including the 
former's recourse to court action in its disputes with clubs over arrears of wages and 
21 Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, p. 115; John Harding, For the Good ofthe Game, London, 1991, 
pp. 15-24. 
22 The 1898 body had been called the Association Footballers' Union, while Billy Meredith, one of the 
founders, had originally preferred the title Players' Union and Benefit Society for the 1907 body but 
this was soon changed. In 1919 the name was altered to the Association Football Players' and Trainers' 
Union and in 195 8 it became the Professional Footballers' Association. Harding, Good ofthe Game, 
pp. 11,46; Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 356. 
'-'Harding, Good of the Game, p. 46; Minutes of Association Football Players' Union (henceforth 
AFPU), 14 May 1908. 
24 Minutes of AFPU, 27 January, 29 April 1908. 
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Workmen's Compensation claims as well as its affiliation with the General Federation 
of Trade Unions - and the subsequent proposed players' strike led to serious League 
criticism of the 'manner and policy' of the Union. 25 In 1912 the League clashed with 
the Union more directly after the Union's secretary, Syd Owen, was accused of 
misleading the League Management Committee over a proposed benefit match. Owen 
then publicly attacked the 'honour and honesty of the Football League Management 
Committee' and the League responded by refusing to recognise him as a Union 
representative. 26 The mutual antagonism continued until the League Management 
Committee declared in 1915 that past experience had shown the management and 
policy of the Union to be a hindrance to the clubs and governing bodies: indeed, they 
could 'never imagine the Union being of any practical service to the game'. 27 
Relations improved slightly in the years immediately following the war, particularly in 
1920 when the League agreed to extend the maximum wage to E9 per week (L468 a 
year) and allow talent money of E2 for a win and El for a draw in League and Cup 
matches. 28 Yet only two years later wages were cut again to E8 a week maximum in 
the playing season and E6 in the summer. One delegate at the Union extraordinary 
general meeting to discuss the subject believed that the League's intention dwas not so 
much to take the players' wages, as to attempt to smash the Union... the League 
thought the Union was getting too strong'. 29 From the mid-1920s, however, the 
Union's membership fell significantly and the executive drew back from its twin 
attack on the retain and transfer system and the maximum wage. In fact, negotiations 
between the League and the Union had almost reached a complete standstill: 
throughout the late 1920s and 1930s the Management Committee rejected numerous 
requests to meet a Union deputation to discuss the alteration of League rules (see 
chapter 6). Not until 1938 did the League finally consent to a meeting in order 'to 
25 Brahain Dabscheck, "'A Man or a Puppet? ": The Football Association's 1909 Attempt to Destroy the 
Association Football Players' Union', lJHS, 8,2,199 1, pp. 221-3 8; Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, 
pi 118. 
Minutes of Football League, 22,23 October, IS November 1912; Minutes of AFPU, 28 October 
1912. 
27 Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, p. 122. 
28 Minutes of Association Football Players' and Trainers' Union (henceforth AFPTU), 23 February and 
29 March 1920. The scheme ssentially regulated wages by means of a sliding scale: the maximum for 
new players was fixed at L5 per week with annual rises of II per week to the maximum of L9 per week. 29 Minutes of AFPTU, 23 April and 7 May 1922 (EGM). 
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hear the case of the players' but, even then, the League refused the Union's demands 
completely. Yet the Union stayed resolute and, with the strength of its largest 
membership since 1920 behind it, met the League the following year with a more bold 
and comprehensive set of requests. On this occasion it was only the outbreak of war 
which prevented a major confrontation as the Union promised 'drastic action', 
presumably a players' strike, after their demands had once again been turned down at 
the League annual general meeting. 30 
The League also faced Union opposition to its rules and procedures in the law courts. 
The most significant example of this was the Kingaby case of 1912, in which the 
Union, with FA and League sanction, tested the legality of the retain and transfer 
system. Although the action was formally taken against Aston Villa it was generally 
recognised as a case against the League itself. the latter agreed to instruct the club in 
its defence and indemnify it against all costs. 31 The decision that Villa had no case to 
answer, and hence that the transfer system was legal, had major implications for both 
sides. For the League it was seen as a vindication of their rules and an important 
victory over the Union: had they lost, it was thought they 'would have been at the 
mercy of the Players' Union. The League could not afford to be dictated to by any 
organisation'. Meanwhile, the heavy legal costs effectively crippled the Union 
financially for over a decade and prevented any ftu-ther legal cases against the League 
for some time. 32 While the cornerstones of the League system - the retain and transfer 
system and the maximum wage - remained intact despite much criticism, the League 
did suffer a considerable legal defeat in the Leddy case of 1923. The context of the 
case was the League's wage reductions of 1922 which forced many clubs to alter 
existing contracts with their players (see chapter 5). The Union considered Henry 
Leddy's action against Chesterfield as an opportunity 'to contest the right of the club 
or the Football League to break [a player's] contract under the common law of the 
Minutes of AFPTU, 28 February, 20 April and 22 August 1938 (AGM); 13 March (EGM) and 26 
March 1939; Dabscheck, "'Defensive Manchester: a History of the Professional Footballers 
Association' in Richard Cashman and Michael McKernan (eds), Sport in History, St. Lucia, 1979, p. 
246; Harding, Good ofthe Game, p. 202-03. 
31 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, II October 19 10. 
32 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 2 April 1912; Minutes of Football League, 3 June 1912 (AGM); Minutes 
of AFPU, 8 January and I April 1912; Minutes of AFPTU, 19 January 1920. It was not until August 
1920 that the Union finally paid off all its costs to the League. Minutes of AFPTU, 23 August 1920 
(AGM). 
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land'. 33 The success of the Leddy case, after an appeal, has been seen by one historian 
as a major turning point in the Union's fortunes, by safeguarding the legal rights of 
players and preventing the League from acting with 'total impunity'. 34 
The most important point of contact between the Football League and the Union, 
especially after the Great War, was probably over the question of compensation for 
injury. The machinery for dealing with cases brought by players against clubs under 
the Workman's Compensation Acts in this context had been established in 1912 with 
the foundation of the Football League Mutual Insurance Federation. 35 At first, 
however, the process was haphazard and inconsistent as clubs were not compelled to 
join the Federation and the Union had not established itself as the main channel for 
claimants. Yet over time the two bodies developed a more formal series of 
procedures for settling cases. This was based above all on the personal 
communication between the Federation's solicitor, the ubiquitous Charles Sutcliffe, 
and his Union counterpart Thomas Hinclicliffe. Generally the intention of the Union 
was to persuade the Federation first to admit liability for the injury and then, in place 
of the payment of weekly. compensation, to make the player a lump sum settlement. If 
agreement could not be reached then the dispute moved to litigation, although this was 
36 rare as the Federation generally favoured out of court settlements. By 1925 Sutcliffe 
and Hinclicliffe were corresponding and meeting on a regular basis to discuss 
compensation cases; this at a time when the League and the Union were further apart 
than ever over the fundamental issues of wages and transfers. The number of cases 
dealt with by the Federation increased steadily over the next decade or so. Indeed by 
the late 1930s the Federation was apparently considering over sixty claims each 
season and paying out nearly E15,000 in weekly compensation and lump sum 
settlements. 37 
3' Harding, Good ofthe Game, pp. 149-50; Minutes of AFPTU, 18 September 1922. 
3" Harding, Good ofthe Game, p. 154. 
31 This was preceded in 1907 by ajoint body, the Football Mutual Insurance Federation, consisting of 
representatives of the Football League, the Scottish League and the Southern League. 
36 See, for example, Minutes of AFPTU, Paterson v. Oldham Athletic, 20 August 1923 (AGM); Gough 
v. Sheffield United, 15 October 1923; Kilborn v. Bradford City, 24 August 1924 (AGM). 
37 Minutes of AFPTU, 28 September 1925; Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, p. 129. It is not entirely 
clear how this figure was reached as the Union's own records suggest substantially smaller amounts 
(see chapter 6). 
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If its relations with the Players' Union were business-like but distant, the Football 
League was, not surprisingly, even more aloof in regard to other leagues. Its 
formation in 1888 led not only to numerous imitators but also to some serious 
competitors: the Football Alliance was established later the same year; the Midland, 
Northern and Lancashire Leagues a year later; while the Western-League took form in 
1892 and the Southern League in 1894. The Irish and Scots created their own national 
leagues in 1890. There is little doubt, however, that the Football League was widely 
regarded as the foremost of these competitions and the ultimate goal of any aspiring 
professional club. 38 In 1892 the League was extended to two divisions in order to 
accommodate the election en bloc of the Alliance while other leading clubs were 
regularly elected on an individual basis from rival leagues. 
The most serious problem the League had with non-League clubs at this stage was the 
poaching of its players. To counteract this the League attempted in 1890 to blacklist 
the guilty clubs, thus preventing their arrangement of fixtures with League clubs. This 
ban remained in force until 1896 although the FA successfully convinced the League 
to withdraw it for cup-ties. In the meantime the League had agreed with the Football 
Alliance and the Northern League to limit signing-on bonuses to L 10 and to expel any 
club found guilty of paying more. 
39 This policy of seeking agreement rather than 
confrontation proved successful over the following years as the League made 
arrangements with its competitors over the registration and transfer of players. 
Undoubtedly the most important agreement was that with the Scottish Football 
League in 1897 which not only stopped future misunderstandings by making retain 
and transfer lists binding in both countries but also, through the creation of the 
international League Board (or the Inter-League Board), provided the machinery to 
6co-ordinate matters of mutual interest' between the two. Each League appointed four 
representatives to the Board whilst the presidency was to alternate between the two 
yearly. 40 This agreement proved crucial for the League on at least two subsequent 
See Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 136. For an alternative view, see Patrick MurPhy, John Williams and Eric 
Dunning, Football on Trial: Spectator Violence and Development in the Football World, London, 
1990, p. 45. 
39 Viunplew, Pay Up, P. 136; Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, p. 8. 
1 The quotation is from Inglis, League Football, p. 43. A similar agreement was reached with the Irish 
League in 1914 and the fonnation of the Anglo-Irish Football League Board. Its rules and bye-laws 
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occasions: first in 1899 over its transfer dispute with the FA and then, in 1912, when 
the Scottish League supported it over the Kingaby case. 41 
Good relations with other leagues were also facilitated through the organisation of 
Inter-League representative matches. While the main objective of these games was to 
generate additional revenue for administrative purposes they also had an obvious 
social function. The annual Board meeting was arranged for the eve of the match and 
a luncheon, to which representatives of clubs and the respective national associations 
were invited, generally took place prior to each match . 
42 The first Inter-League match 
was in 1891 against a team representing the Football Alliance. The following year the 
League played the Scottish League in what became an annual sporting and social 
event and, by 1894, the Irish League was also offered a match. The Southern League, 
however, only began competing against the League team in 1911, after the two bodies 
had finally reached agreement over registrations and transfers. 43 
By 1900 the Southern League was the only serious rival to the Football League in 
England. Yet over the next twenty years this rivalry was characterised for the most 
part by mutual distrust and hostility. From early on the Southern League had made 
clear signals of its desire to amalgamate with the League although subsequent 
attempts to convince the League to accept it as a regional second division in 1907 and 
1909 were easily defeated. The League Management Committee relented later in 
1909, by devising its own scheme for the incorporation of the Southern League as a 
third division, but the clubs voted against this as well. 44 Ilie Management Committee 
now appeared willing to work with the Southern League and hence, at the beginning 
of 1910, the two bodies entered into agreement and formed the English League Board 
to deal with any disputes which might arise. Again the bye-laws of the Board allowed 
were similar to those of the Inter-League Board, except hat two representatives, rather than four, were 
appointed from each League. Football League Handbook, 1915/16, p. 59. 
"' Football League Handbook 1899-1900, p. 25; Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, pp. 116,135; 
Athletic News, 10 April 1916. The Scottish League contributed f 150 towards the cost of the Kingaby 
case. 
42 For examples, Athletic News, 23 October 1911; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 28 October 1930. 
43 Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, p. 133; Paul Harrison, Southern League Football- The First Fyiý 
Years, Gravesend, 1989, p. 60. 
`4 The reasons for this refusal by the League clubs and the whole debate around the idea of a national 
league will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter. 
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for the mutual recognition of players' registrations although, by contrast with the 
Inter-League Board, the subordinate position of the Southern League was formally 
recognised in the composition of the Board itself. The League was entitled to appoint 
the president and three other representatives while the Southern League was restricted 
to three. 45 
On the surface relations between the two leagues seemed closer than ever. Inter- 
League matches were arranged, while for the first time joint meetings and consultation 
took place over Players' Union demands. But the underlying bitterness reappeared in 
1911 when the League became involved in a revived proposal for a third division, to 
include a number of Southern League clubs, without prior consultation with, or 
approval from, its southern counterpart. The proposal again failed but not before the 
Southern League had declared it to be 'an unfriendly act'. 46 The war period was a 
critical phase in the respective fortunes of the two leagues. While the League had 
organized a series of relatively successful regional competitions and secured the 
loyalty of its members, the Southern League had rarely met and played no part in the 
administration of the London Combination. Many of the Southern League's more 
ambitious clubs thus inevitably looked to the Football League as a way out. The 
Southern League, however, was not prepared to suffer any further losses to its status 
and hence, following West Ham's election to the League in March 1919, it refused to 
allow either the players of West Ham, or those of other former members Stoke and 
Coventry City, to be registered with the League. Furthermore, it informed the League 
of its decision to withdraw from the 1910 agreement. 
47 Yet by 1920 this rift hardly 
mattered as most of the clubs and administrators of the Southern League had become 
convinced that their future lay with the League. There was therefore only minimal 
opposition to Sutcliffe's plan to admit the first division of the Southern League as a 
League third division southern section. From this point on the Southern League 
ceased to be a rival to the Football League and became merely a secondary 
competition. 48 
43 Football League Handbook 19 10/11, pp. 4245. 
46 Report of Southern League AGM in Athletic News, 19 June 1911. 
47 Athletic News, June to August 1919, passim.; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 17 March 1919. 
48 Minutes of Football League, 31 May 1920 (AGM); Report of Football League AGM in Athletic 
News, 7 June 1920. 
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3. The Administrative Structure of the Leazue 
The two main actors within the decision-making environment were the member clubs, 
under the collective guise of the General Committee, and the Management 
Committee. Although the relationship certainly changed over time it is possible to 
identify a broad distinction of duties and responsibilities. The first official set of rules 
defined the system of control clearly. The central legislative body, the General 
Committee, consisted of one representative of each club who, in turn, elected the 
chairman, treasurer, secretary and Management Committee. The latter was given the 
task of appointing match officials, dealing with infringements of League rules and, 
49 
more generally, conducting 'the business of the League' . So the Management 
Committee acted as executive and judiciary to the General Committee's legislature. 
Yet initially, at least, the activities of the Management Committee were rather 
haphazard and its relationship with the clubs confused. In particular, clubs seemed 
reluctant to distance themselves from direct control over the management of the 
League, regularly calling general meetings to discuss minor issues and individual 
breaches of rule. For example, during the League's second season the question of fog- 
affected matches was believed to be 'of too important a character to be considered by 
the Management Committee' and left over for the clubs to decide. The conduct of 
players on the pitch was also initially dealt with by an unwieldy conference of all 
member clubs, though this did not last long. 50 
Nevertheless, by the start of our period the fundamental division of authority within 
the League structure was widely acknowledged: while the clubs made the rules, the 
Management Committee administered them. Any suggestion that the latter should 
take the initiative in framing or altering rules was strongly rebuffed. 51 In practice, 
however, as the status of the Management Corranittee improved and the clubs grew 
49 Quoted in Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, pp. 4-5. Much of the following is drawn from this work 
and the Football League Rules and Handbooks. 
" Quoted in Sutcliffe, el al., Football League, pp. 6-7; Green, Football Association, pp. 398-99. 
51 For expressions of this opinion see Reports of Football League AGMs in Athletic News, 6 June 1904, 
5 June 1905 and Athletic News, 6 March 1911. At the 1902 AGM almost all the proposals emanating 
from the Management Committee were vetoed. Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 2 
June 1902. 
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confident enough to delegate certain powers, so the Committee became more 
influential in rule-making. Indeed by about 1910 it would appear that the 
Management Committee had become the leading figure in this area, and that any 
revision of League rules required either its support or sanction. At the 1912 annual 
meeting, for instance, the Committee's recommendations for the payment of 
compensation for postponed matches were carried ahead of counter-proposals from 
Hull City and Middlesborough. Proposals brought forward by clubs independently - 
such as Derby County's regular attempts to increase the number of relegated and 
promoted clubs from two to four and Arsenal's proposals for a limit on transfer fees in 
the 1920s - were invariably defeated, as they were perceived as 
lacking official 
approval. 52 Until the 1930s the Management Committee's legislative role was 
legitimised by convention rather than any constitutional right. Only retrospectiveiy 
was it formally given the discretion 'to submit any alteration of Rule thought 
desirable'. 53 
The most important event in the legislative calendar was the annual general meeting, 
held in May or June each year in London, generally during the same week as the FA 
annual meeting. As with any limited company 
54 
, it involved the presentation of the 
balance sheet and the annual report to the member clubs (i. e. the shareholders). More 
importantly, it was also the occasion for the election of clubs and officials and the 
alteration or addition of rules. The election process for clubs and officials will be 
discussed in chapter 2, but as regards rules, it is clear that the system tended towards 
conservatism. This was not least because changes in the League's constitution or 
rules required a three-quarters majority. John Lewis complained in 1902 that this 
precluded experimentation as 'at most annual meetings of the League the majority of 
proposals fall to the ground'. 
55 It has already been noted that representation and 
voting were initially based on fairly egalitarian principles. Until 1920 clubs in all 
12 Minutes of Football League, 3 June 1912 (AGM); 28 May 1923; Reports of Football League AGMs 
in Athletic News, 10 June 1912; 4 June 1923,9 June 1924. 
53 Football League Handbook, 1937/38, Rule 80. 
54 The Football League was converted into a limited liability company in May 1904. 
55 Athletic News, 2 June 1902. 'Tityrus' (James Catton) similarly accused the League at its 1904 AGM 
of pursuing 'a policy of do-nothing'. 'No corporate body that I have ever known can demolish an 
agenda paper with such efficicricy, neatness and despatch, and no society... can resolutely set a face 
against all change, and negative all proposals... '. Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 6 
June 1904. 
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divisions were entitled to attend and vote at any League meeting but the newly 
formed third division northern and southern sections were only bestowed the status of 
associate members, without voting rights or automatic representation at meetings. 
Not until 1929 were they given even minimal representation, and then only two votes 
per section. 
As we have seen, the Management Committee was effectively the executive body of 
the League. The original Committee was made up of just five members, including a 
chairman, secretary and treasurer, but by 1893 it had been reorganised to consist of a 
president, two vice-presidents and a general committee of four. At this point each 
division was represented by two Committee members, and separate meetings of the 
divisional bodies were held, but in 1909 the divisional distinction was abolished and 
club representation as a whole was extended to six. In addition, William McGregor 
had become a Life Member of the League in 1902, with the power to attend and vote 
at Management Committee meetings. Following McGregor's death in 1911, former 
president John Bentley took a similar position until he too died in 1918, after which 
the Committee reverted to nine permanent members. Until 1917 the Committee was 
elected annually but thereafter half the members and the senior vice-president were 
elected together with the presid ent one year, and the other half with the junior vice- 
president the next. This certainly ensured a great deal of continuity in the 
Committee's personnel -a situation aided by the fact that there were no restrictions on 
the time a member could spend on the Committee, despite a proposal by West 
Bromwich Albion that a Committeeman should hold office for only two years. Indeed 
it appears that death and retirement were the major vehicles for change, as clubs rarely 
opted to vote members off the Committee. This only happened to six members in this 
period, two of whom regained their places within a year. Some Committeemen kept 
their places for over thirty years, even after they had ceased to be actively connected 
with their clubs. 56 What is more, for much of the period, especially between the wars, 
the League was dominated by elderly members with long careers as voluntary 
Committeemen and officials in local and national football associations. It was 
considered particularly fitting, for instance, that Arthur Dickinson should die only half 
"' See Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, chapter 9. 
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an hour before a Management Committee meeting after twenty years on the executive. 
As the League's own memorial noted: 'Mr. Dickinson could be said to have grown up 
with the League; he had spent a lifetime in the game and grown old in its service., 
57 
In this sense, the Football League fitted closely with Fishwick's description of junior 
football administration as 'a form of middle-class gerontocracy'. 
58 
The executive was thus an extremely conservative body in terms of its structure and 
personnel. Committee members were expected to be loyal to the League in preference 
to the wishes of their clubs or other associations. When this position of neutrality was 
compromised, or a member became involved in a potential scandal, it was assumed 
that they would resign immediately. It was surely no coincidence, for instance, that in 
1910 Bentley offered his resignation as president (as well as FA vice-president) 
shortly after his position at Manchester United, and the club's general finances, had 
been subjected to an investigation by the governing body. 59 At that year's annual 
meeting he noted that there was 'considerably more opposition than usual' to his 
presidency and cited the influence of medical problems 'and other things' for his 
decision to retire. 60 Likewise in 1927 when Arsenal were fined for breaches of 
League and FA rules, and chairman Sir. Henry Norris suspended for financial 
irregularities, William Hall, Norris' right-hand man and the club's representative on 
the Management Committee, resigned his place immediately. 61 It was crucial to the 
executive that it should be seen as an independent and respectable body of 
administrators whose hands had not been sullied by any serious involvement in rule- 
breaking. 
Under the League's written rules and by convention the Management Committee 
enjoyed a fairly broad scope of control and a wide range of functions. Ilie 
Committee's prescribed duties remained markedly similar throughout the period: to 
57 Minutes of Football League, 5 November 1930. 
5' Fishwick, English Football, pp. 17-18. 
59 FA Report and Recommendation of the Commission Adopted by the Council, re. Manchester United 
FC, 30 March 19 10; Minutes of FA Council, 22 April 19 10. 
60 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 20 June 19 10. The 'other things' almost certainly 
also included his decision to support the deletion of the maximum wage rule at the previous FA annual 
meeting, for which he was publicly criticised by Preston's Tom Houghton. Report of FA AGM in 
Athletic News, 14 June 1909. 
61 Minutes of Football League, 13 September 1927. 
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govern and conduct the business of the League and deal 'as they may think fit' with 
offences or any matters not specified in the rules. 62 In practice, these functions fell 
into five main categories. Firstly, the Committee penalised clubs and players for 
breaching League rules. Clubs could be fined for anything from minor infringements 
like failure to return forms or late payment of the League levy to more serious matters 
such as late kick-offs, fielding weak teams or illegal payments to players. Likewise 
players were suspended for breaking their agreements through insubordination, 
betting, breaching training rules and the like. 63 Secondly, it arbitrated in disputes both 
among member clubs and between clubs and players. In fact, certain meetings were 
set aside specifically to deal with such problems, prompting Bentley to observe that in 
such cases the Cornmittee was transformed into something akin to a County Court. 64 
Dissatisfied parties could also appeal against the Committee's decision to the Board of 
Appeal, an independent body consisting of three FA Councillors. Thirdly, as 
previously mentioned, the Committee gradually became involved in drafting new 
rules, altering existing ones and, through circulars to its members, obtaining a 
collective League opinion on important legislative matters without calling a general 
meeting. Linked to this, the Committee also had an important advisory role. As well 
as providing guidance on fundamental issues of policy the Committee was expected to 
advise clubs privately on individual matters relating, for example, to players' 
agreements, the insurance of players or the use of grounds for non-football related 
activities. 65 Finally, the Committee acted for its member clubs in negotiations at a 
wider level. This included not only a mandate to reach agreement with other football 
associations and leagues but also to lobby railway companies, tax officials and even 
62 For examples and comparisons, ee Football League Handbook 1890/91, Rules 2 and 6; Handbook 
1900-0 1, Rules 3 and 11; Handbook 19 10/11, Rules 3 and 12; Handbook 1919/20, Rules 2 and 12; 
Handbook 1937/38, Rule 15. 
63 See Minutes of Football League, 10 May 1912; Green, Football Association, p. 400. In contrast with 
the Northern Union, the practice of deducting points from clubs for offences was never seriously 
entertained after Notts County forced the Committee to remit a point deducted from them for fielding 
an unregistered player in 1899. The most severe punishment - expulsion from the League - occurred in 
just the unique case of Leeds City in 1919, whose offence was to frustrate a joint League-FA inquiry by 
refusing to hand over key documents (see chapter 4). Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, p. 6; Paul 
Greenhalgh, '"The Work and Play Principle": The Professional Regulations of the Northern Rugby 
Footbalf Union, 1898-1905', 1JHS, 9,3,1992, pp. 364-69. 
64,41hietic News, 29 April 190 1. 
65 For examples, see Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 7 September 1912; Minutes of Football League, 9 
August 1912; 3,24 February 1913; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 28 February, 5 March 1928. 
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government departments in order to secure the best possible terms and conditions for 
its members. 66 
The Management Committee's work was supported by the creation of a number of 
sub-committees. Although certainly not as influential as those of the MCC, the 
League's sub-committees nevertheless proved vital in easing the executive's workload 
and dealing at greater depth with complex policy issues. 
67 Most salient were the 
permanent sub-committees, especially those concerned with the activities of the 
various joint-boards connected with other leagues or with auxiliary bodies like the 
insurance federations (see Table 1.1). Much less is known of the activities of the 
Finance Committee, though the fact that it consisted mainly of junior members of the 
Management Committee seems to suggest that it was afforded fairly low status. Sub- 
committees were also set up from time to time to handle those matters which were 
proving too burdensome for the Committee. Thus, for example, special sub- 
committees dealt with appeals by players for transfer fee reductions and adjudicated 
on the share of transfer fee paid to the player. Moreover, a sub-committee was even 
formed in 1920 to prioritise and filter business for Management Committee 
meetings. 68 Finally, the Committee appointed a number of ad hoc sub-committees to 
consider specific issues. Hence in August 1912 a sub-committee of McKenna, 
Bentley and Sutcliffe was set up to look into the question of insuring players under the 
National Health Insurance Act. After interviewing the Health Commissioners it 
reported to the whole Committee in early September and was subsequently wound 
UP. 69 In addition, temporary sub-committees were frequently established to carry out 
inquiries into alleged offences or irregularities at particular clubs or involving certain 
players. 70 
66 See Athletic News, 17 April 1917,14 March 192 1; Catton Folders, A-B, Letter from Fred Rinder to 
James Catton, 6 October 1919, p. 36. 
6" James Bradley, 'The MCC', p. 3 0. 
63 Mason, Association Football, p. 105; Athletic News, 6 March 1911; Inglis, League Football, p. 123. 
69 Minutes of Football League, 9 August and 9 September 1912; Athletic News, 2 September 1912. 
70 For example, a sub-committee of Sutcliffe, Lewis and Tom Harris was established to look into 'the 
managerial workings of the Chelsea club' in 1912. After two to three months scrutinising deeds and 
documents it concluded that there were no breaches of League rules and the 'club is worked in a 
thorough business-like manner'. Minutes of Football League, 22-23 October 1912; Catton Folders, B- 
C, League Report on Chelsea FC, 28 October 1912, p. 243. 
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Table LI Permanent Sub-Committees of the Football League, 1888-1939. 
Name Years in existence No. of members 
international Football League Board 1898- 4 
English Football League Board 1909-19 4 














Anglo-Irish League Board 1914- 2 
-National Footballers' War Fund 1918- 5 
. YourCe: kOOthall League HanCIDOOKS, 1555-miv; minutes ol 1ý00tball League. 
The highest and most prestigious office in the Football League was that of president. 
Initially the position carried little formal authority. Only in 1893 was the president, 
previously known as the chairman, given the right to vote at all meetings and ex- 
officio membership of all committees. As in many such organisations, however, 
authority derived as much from force of personality and length of tenure as from any 
prescribed duties. As Table 1.2 indicates, the presidents in this period remained in 
office for a considerable time, on average over eleven years each. In fact, the 
president was generally elected unopposed and rarely faced a challenge at annual 
general meetings. When George Leavey of Arsenal was nominated to challenge 
Bentley in 1904 it was viewed by League representatives and the press as an act of 
disloyalty. He was convincingly beaten by thirty-three votes to four and lost his place 
on the Management Committee. 71 In contrast with the MCC, whose president could 
hold office for only one year, the League presidency was conceived as a long-tenn, 
even permanent, position. In 1931 John McKenna was persuaded by a 'strong appeal' 
from the member clubs to continue as president following his decision to stand down 
after 21 years in the post; in the event, he remained as president until his death five 
71 Leavey subsequently argued that his nomination was 'not intended seriously' and that he had 
intended to withdraw it at the AGM but had been unable to do so. In a letter to Athletic News he 
suggested that 'the bare idea of any member of our committee opposing the re-election of our president 
[was] altogether too absurd for one moment's consideration'. Athletic News, 13 June 1904, 
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years later. 72 Stability and continuity were clearly prized here above any aspirations 
for open democracy. Moreover, the president was expected to be active in the 
formulation of policy and the general running of the League. McKenna, for instance, 
was a member of all but one of the permanent sub-committees as well as being 
honorary treasurer from 1912. During the war he also chaired the sub-committee of 
the Lancashire Section and was instrumental in organising the Relief Fund for clubs in 
addition to his regular duties. 73 This is not to say that the president was necessarily an 
autocratic or even a dominant figure. Certainly, by contrast with the control allegedly 
exercised by Charles Clegg over the FA Council, the League president's powers 
appear elatively limited. 74 
Table 1.2 Presidents and Secretaries of the Football League 1888-1939 
President Club Secretary 
1892-94 William McGregor Aston Villa 1888-1902 Harry Lockett 
1894-1910 John Bentley Bolton Wanderers and Manchester United Harry Lockctt 
John Bentley 1902-33 Tom Chamley 
1910-36 John McKenna Liverpool Tom Chamley 
John McKenna 1933-56 Fred Howarth 
1936-39 Charles Sutcliffe (Bumley) Fred Howarth 
1939-49 William Cuff Everton Fred Howarth 
Note: Club in brackets indicates that the president had ceased formal administrative links. 
The president also played an important role as spokesman and figurehead of the 
Football League. At official di nners, banquets and luncheons the president 
represented, and effectively spoke for, the League as a whole. He was expected to 
attend on behalf of the League both the celebrations of championship and cup winners 
and the funerals of leading figures and associates in the football world. Indeed, 
ceremonial duties were perhaps the most time-consuming part of the president's work. 
72 Bradley, 'The MCC', p. 28; Minutes of Football League Shareholders' Meeting (First and Second 
Divisions), 6 March 193 1; Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 8 June 193 1. 
71 Football League Handbooks, 1910-36. 
74 Clegg was chairman of the FA from 1890 to 1937 while in 1923 he also became FA president 
(effectively an honorary position). In 1907 William Bellamy, the FA representative for Lincolnshire 
and one-time Management Committee member, complained that 'for some time... the work and general 
policy of the Association have been almost entirely in the hands of Mr. Clegg, and this is a state of 
affairs which I for one do not agree with. My idea of the duty of the Chairman is that he should preside 
at the Council meetings and not direct and govern the whole business of the Association, and there can 
be no denying that that is what obtains at the present ime... '. Catton Folders, B-C, W. Bellamy to D. 
H. Woolfall, 1907, otherwise undated, p. 277. 
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The opening of new stands was one such duty and a regular occurrence. For example, 
McKenna was asked by West Hmn United to formally open their new stand on 29 
August 1925, but had to decline as he was engaged at Portsmouth on the same day. 
Two weeks later he was opening a new stand at Wolverhampton Wanderers. 75 The 
visit to Wolverhampton clearly indicates the symbolic importance attached to the 
presidency. McKenna and two Management Committee colleagues were invited to an 
official luncheon and greeted with a scoreboard display announcing 'A Hearty 
Welcome to our President and all the League officials'. The club programme joined 
the celebrations by declaring that 'the opening of the stand has been associated with a 
ceremony such as most Clubs crave for but few are privileged to cater for'. 
76 In some 
respects these sentiments were akin to those normally reserved for royal visits and 
certainly the League president's visit served a similar function. 
The secretary was at the administrative core of the League's operations. In common 
with those of the Management Committee and the presidency, the secretary's powers 
were widened as the League grew. Initially the secretary was only required to 
Sconduct the correspondence of the League' but by 1892 the office had been 
amalgamated with that of treasurer and the secretary became a paid official of the 
League. " He thus became formally responsible for the League's finances and the 
general supervision of administrative operations at the League's headquarters. In 
addition, regulations precluded him from voting at meetings or retaining any official 
or unofficial connections with member clubs. It was not until Tom Charriley took 
over as secretary in 1902, however, that the position became full-time and the League 
acquired a permanent office rather than being run from the secretary's private address. 
Indeed, Chamley's predecessor Harry Lockett had attempted to run his own printing 
company at the same time as being League secretary. As Inglis has revealed, this 
proved impossible and Lockett was forced to resign after admitting embezzling 
League funds to aid the expansion of his business. 78 Despite a suggestion that the 
11 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 21 and 28 July 1925; Tony Matthews (with Les Smith), The 
Wolves: An Encyclopedia of Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club, 1877-1989, London, 1989, p. 
27, although it gives the wrong date for McKenna's visit. 
76 Woverhampton Wanderers Programme, 19 September 1925. 
77 Football League Handbook, 1890/9 1, Rule 14. 
7' For a detailed account of Lockett's resignation see Inglis, League Football, pp. 50-52. 
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League's headquarters should be based at Manchester, the first office was situated at 
Winckley Street in Charnley's native Preston. It remained here throughout our period, 
moving to Tithebarn Street in 1905, to Castle Chambers in 1913 and then to an 
address in Winckley Square in November 1926.79 
As the amount of work involved in running the day-to-day affidrs of the League 
increased so it became necessary to enlarge the administrative staff. Clearly it was no 
longer possible for the secretary to run things without assistance as Lockett had done. 
Hence with Charnley's appointment the League took on an office worker, Harry 
Downs, who had been Bentley's assistant and then secretary at Bolton Wanderers. By 
1920 it had become necessary to take on an assistant secretary and instead of 
advertising the post Charnley appointed his son-in-law Fred Howarth. Indeed, the 
League office in the inter-war period remained almost entirely the preserve of the 
Charnley-Howarth family. Tom Charnley junior, a director of Preston North End and 
Charnley's nephew, joined the staff in 1930 and became assistant secretary on his 
uncle's retirement, while Fred Howarth's nephew Eric was employed as a clerk from 
80 1934. In this context it is hardly surprising that the fourth secretary, Alan Hardaker, 
considered on his arrival in 1951 that the League 'had been a family business for half 
a century'. 81 
Although the secretary had no formal power to direct League policy, he could, and 
did, have some influence in the decision-making process. It is certainly evident that 
the position entailed much more than simply drafting the minutes and balancing the 
books. Howarth, in particular, seems to have been fairly outspoken on certain matters 
of policy, particularly the maximum wage, which he defended vehemently against its 
critics. He was also instrumental in the League's ill-fated attempt to destroy the pools 
companies in 1936 and in the establishment and administration of the Jubilee Fund 
from 1938.82 Moreover, as the only official involved with the League's business on a 
79 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 2 June 1902; Preston Trade Directories, 1904, 
1910,1913,1922,1926,1932 and 1940; Minutes of Football League, 5 November 1926. 
" Inglis, League Football, p. 54; Fred Howarth's obituary in Lancashire Evening Post, 12 January 
1972. 
81 Alan Hardaker, Hardaker ofthe League, London, 1977, p. 36. 
82 Lancashire Evening Post, 12 January 1972. 
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daily basis, the secretary effectively controlled the flow of information to and from the 
League's offices. All inquiries from clubs, players, the FA and the press were dealt 
with initially by him. On significant matters of policy he was instructed by the 
Management Committee, but the secretary was still allowed a certain amount of 
discretion and flexibility in issuing circulars, replying to correspondence and dealing 
with other matters arising between Committee meetings. In fact, as Hardaker's 
autobiography indicates, it was even possible for the secretary to manipulate the 
agenda and records of Management Committee meetings. Howarth allegedly removed 
from the official minutes any business, even resolutions, with which he disagreed and 
would also collect the members' private notes at the end of each meeting. According 
to this account, Howarth was able to dominate the Management Committee: 'If Fred 
Howarth did not like an idea it was never implemented - or even recorded' . 
83 Of 
course, Hardaker's recollections are drawn from a slightly later period and it is 
unlikely that Howarth, or any of his predecessors, would have been allowed such 
control at a time when more experienced members like Sutcliffe, McKenna or John 
Lewis were on the Committee. Nevertheless, this evidence does support the assertion 
that the secretary was potentially a powerful figure in the administration of the 
League. 
4. The Social Composition and Collective Culture of the Management Committee 
Any attempt to analyse in detail the social and cultural profile of a body like the 
Football League Management Committee inevitably faces some significant obstacles. 
This is due above all to a lack of solid biographical evidence. First of all, 
administrators of sports like association football and rugby league were rarely 
included in contemporary national or local collective biographies and, in common 
with working-class leaders, they were not prolific memoir writers. 
94 Conversely, in 
the sporting press they were, not surprisingly, featured purely for their activities in 
relation to sport, thus providing little information about their social background, 
business affairs or, indeed, any outside activities. In fact, some obituaries fail even to 
"' Hardaker, Hardaker of the League, p. 4 1. For a detailed description of the administration of the 
League from a much later period, but with inevitable similarities, see Chapter S. Hardaker argues that 
the role of secretary in his era was really more like a 'general manager', p. 64. 
" See Greenhalgh, 'Work and Play Principle', p. 357. 
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mention the occupation of the deceased. 85 Other potentially illuminating data 
regarding education and the father's occupation, both generally recognised as fair 
guides of social class and status, has similarly been difficult to uncover. Of course, 
the paucity of such primary source data does in itself suggest that football 
administrators had yet to attain the widespread social recognition and elevated status 
of local political leaders, town councillors and civic dignitaries. 
A natural starting-point is to consider the occupations of Committeemen in the period. 
For this analysis occupations have been categorised according to Guy Routh's 
Occupation and Pay in Great Britain, 1906-79, which is based in turn on census 
classifications. Seven broad occupational classes, two of which were subdivided, 
were distinguished as follows: higher professional (IA); lower professional (IB); 
employers and proprietors (2A); managers and administrators (2B); clerical workers 
(3); foremen, inspectors and supervisors (4); skilled manual workers (5); semi-skilled 
manual workers (6); and unskilled manual workers (7). 96 Although the descriptions of 
the occupations of Committeemen were often vague and difficult to interpret, some 
conclusions can be drawn. From 1900 to 1939 inclusive, thirty-one men served on the 
Committee and there were four presidents. As Appendix I shows, membership was 
confined exclusively to categories IA, 2A and 2B: higher professionals, employers 
and managers. More specifically, the Committee seems to have been dominated by 
small businessmen, local government officials and solicitors, who together made up 
over two-thirds of the total. Most surprising, perhaps, is the fact that manual workers 
and clerks, both of whom were fairly influential in the early development of 
professional clubs and on club directorships in general, were not represented at all on 
the Management Committee. 97 Large manufacturers and employers similarly appear 
to have been less prepared to become League Committeemen on top of being club 
directors, and even if they did, they rarely sought higher office as vice-president or 
president. Indeed, it is noticeable that none of the most prominent and wealthy club 
owners made any attempt to gain election on the Committee. For men like building 
15 Two examples are Walter Hart's obituaries in the Birmingham Alail, 5 June 1940, Birmingham 
Gazette, 6 June 1940 and Tom Houghton's obituary in the Preston Guardian, 21 September 1912. 
16 Guy Routh, Occupation and Pay in Great Britain, 1906-79, London, 1980, Appendix A. 
'7 On the role of clerks see Tony Mason, The Blues and the Reds: A history of the Liverpool and 
Everton Football Clubs, Liverpool, 1985, pp. 1-2; Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 157. 
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contractor Harry Mears at Chelsea, the brewer J. H. Davies at Manchester United, the 
politicians Samuel Hill-Wood at Glossop and, a little later, Sir. Henry Norris at 
Arsenal, and the mill-owning Crowther family at Huddersfield Town, it would seem 
that the community prestige or psychic income to be gained from patronage of the 
local club could hardly be replicated by a place on the Management Committee. 89 
Table 1.3 Comparison of the occupations of club directors and Football Lea gue Committee members 
Occupational Category FLMC FLMC I st. Div I st. Div Selected Selected 
1900-39 1900-39 1888-1914 1888-1914 1919-39 1919-39 
No. % No. % No. % 
Gentlemen 
- 
19 4.0 2 3.6 
IA 6 20.0 116 24.4 7 12.7 
IB 
2A 15 50.0 256 53.8 27 49.1 
2B 9 30.0 28 5.9 9 16.3 
3 
- - 
29 6.1 4 7.3 
4 4 0.8 
5 24 5.0 6 11.0 
6 
7 
Total 30 100.0 476 100.0 55 100.0 
Unknown or 1 15 6 
unspecified 
Sources: Adapted from Appendix 1; Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, pp. 72-76; Koff, West Ham United, pp. 243-44, 
Arnold, A Game 7hat Would Payý pp. 201-02. 
The work of historians on the occupational composition of club directorates provides 
a useful comparison. On the period before 1914, Mason, Tischler and Vamplew have 
all emphasised the predominance, both numerically and financially, of manufacturers, 
traders and those involved in commerce. 89 As it is the only analysis to deal 
exclusively with Football League clubs, Tischler's modified figures are shown in 
Table 1.3. There seems to have been little change between the wars, although no 
comprehensive studies of this period have been made. Local industrialists continued 
88 Mason, Association Football, pp. 4548; Tischler, Foothallers and Businessmen, p. 74. On 'psychic 
income' see Daryl Adair, 'Psychic Income and the Administration of English County Cricket, 1870- 
1914', The Sports Historian, 14,1994, pp. 66-72. It has been suggested, however, that both Davies and 
Norris exerted considerable influence on the Committee through personal nominees, principally John 
Bentley and William Hall. The assertion is highly debatable in Bentley's case due to his long 
connection with the Committee before joining United but the evidence is more persuasive for 11all and 
Norris, who had been directors together at Fulham before joining Arsenal. See Phil Soar, Official 
History ofArsenal FC, London, 1986, p. ?; Dennis Turner and Alex White, Fulham: A Complete 
Record, 1879-1987, Derby, 1987, pp. 4546. 
39 Mason, Association Football, pp. 4249; Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, pp. 72-76; 
Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 166,168-70. 
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to control the boards of the Sheffield clubs, making up as much as 55 per cent of the 
total, while at West Hain United and the two Bradford clubs, employers and 
proprietors similarly represented almost half the directors. 90 Although employers and 
proprietors were also the largest single category on the Management Committee, they 
tended to be merchants, retailers or small-scale manufacturers rather than 
industrialists. The most striking difference, aside from the non-involvement of the 
working class, was the relatively high proportional representation of managers and 
administrators on the Management Committee. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this. Clearly management positions in local government or business 
demanded the same type of organisational skills and experience of committee work as 
were required for the League. Also, it is likely that such occupations allowed greater 
flexibility to travel long distances to committee or sub-committee meetings, often at 
short notice. 
interesting comparisons can also be made between the occupational composition of 
the Management Committee and other executive bodies. As Paul Greenhalgh has 
indicated, the Northern Rugby Football Union, a body with similar geographical and 
social roots, was also run principally by local employers and professionals, although 
managers and administrators were less involved than in the League. Between 1895 
and 1905 only one leading member of the Union, a works manager, came from this 
category. 91 By contrast, the FA Council, traditionally recruited from the public 
schools, the universities and members of the aristocracy and the upper-middle class, 
maintained a fairly elite presence well into the twentieth century. By 1903, the 
professional classes accounted for approximately 50 per cent of the Council, while 
managers and administrators and clerical workers followed with 26.1 per cent and 8.7 
per cent respectively. Despite the increasing influence of professional, and especially 
Football League, clubs on the decision-middrig process, the Council still only included 
three (6.5 per cent) representatives from the employer and proprietorial bracket. The 
main differential in the occupational composition of the two bodies was thus the 
influence on the Management Committee of business interests of one kind or another, 
90 Fishwick, English Football, p. 27; Korr, West Ham United, pp. 243-44; Arnold, A Game That Iyould 
Pay, pp. 201-02. 
" Greenhalgh, 'Work and Play Principle', pp. 358-59. Also, Dunning and Sheard, Barbarians, 
Gentlemen and Players, pp. 188,203. 
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along with the absence of the aristocracy, whose attachment to amateur ideals could 
be more clearly represented on the governing body. 
It should be noted, however, that occupational analyses of this kind tell us very little 
in themselves about the type of men who joined the Committee. Bare statistics can 
lead to sweeping assertions and over-generalisations about motives and values. For 
instance, solicitors on the Committee were not a monolithic group and may have 
become involved for any number of reasons quite unconnected with their occupation. 
Moreover, occupation, like education, income and other quantifiable criteria, can only 
ever be a partial indicator of social class. As E. P. Thompson and others have pointed 
out, class should not be seen as a form of social stratification but as the embodiment 
of commonly held traditions, experiences and values. 92 The political and religious 
affiliations of Committeemen, their beliefs and, more broadly, their lifestyles, are all 
therefore essential guides to both the class image and the culture of the Management 
Committee as a whole. It is to these broader cultural elements which we now turn. 
Perhaps the most important defining characteristic of the Committee was its regional 
concentration in the north-west of England. Nearly one-third (29 per cent) of 
Committee members were directors or secretaries of Lancashire clubs, as were all four 
presidents in this period, although McKenna was an Irishman, not a native Lancastrian 
(see Appendix 1). In addition, as we have seen, after 1902 the League was based at 
Preston and its secretaries and other office staff were drawn exclusively from within 
the county. The situation became a source of considerable friction and conflict 
between the Committee and some clubs, and led in 1909 to an organised attempt by 
Midland and Southern clubs to secure a larger representation on the Committee. The 
editor of a Sheffield newspaper bemoaned the over-representation of Lancashire clubs 
and the fact that 'the Lancashire representatives on the committee came to regard their 
election year after year as something of a right' (see chapter 4). 93 Whether this 
regional bias was reflected in the way the League was run is a matter for conjecture. It 
is certainly possible to present a picture of the Committee's Lancashire leaders as an 
insular, tight-knit group with similar backgrounds and personalities. Bentley, Lewis, 
92 E. P. Thompson, The Making ofthe English Working Class, London, 1968, pp. 9-11. 
" Football and Sports Special, 12 June 1909.. 
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Sutcliffe and McKenna, in particular, served together for many years on the 
Lancashire FA, the FA Council and various other bodies in addition to the 
Management Committee and seem to have become friends as well as associates. 
Contemporary descriptions also indicate a common thread of personal characteristics - 
bluntness, honesty, respectability and sobriety - although it is difficult to know how 
far these were based on stereotypical images of middle-class Lancastrians, or 
northerners in general. 9' 
Although the evidence concerning the religious beliefs of members is patchy, it is 
possible to detect a dominant strand of non-conformity, again principally amongst the 
Lancashire leadership. Lewis was the son of a preacher and, in common with 
Sutcliffe, McGregor and the secretaries Charnley and Howarth, was an active and 
devout Methodist all his life. 95 William Cuff and his family were prominent members 
of the St. Domingo's Methodist Chapel from which the Everton club originated. His 
father had been a trustee and Cuff continued the association by becoming the chapel's 
choirmaster. 96 Other fragmentary evidence suggests that Amos Brook Hirst, who 
attended the largely non-conformist Huddersfield College, and William Bellamy, may 
also have been MethodiStS. 97 The only Catholics on the Committee in our period, 
McKenna and Dr. James Baxter, were not surprisingly both from Liverpool, a city 
which accounted for approximately one fifth of the country's Catholic population. 
"" See individual profiles in Pickford and Gibson (eds), Association Football, vol. 3, pp. 149-52,159- 
62,209-10 and in Sutcliffe and Hargreaves, History ofthe Lancashire FA, pp. 58-65,157-59,234.35. 
For Bentley see the 'Popular People' series in Lancashire Review, October 1897, pp. 42-44; Windsor 
Magazine, April 1902, pp. 665-70; Frederick Wall, Fifty Years in Football, London, 1935; William 
Pickford, A Glance Back at the FA Council, 1888-1938, London, 1938; Percy Young, Bolton 
Wanderers, London, 1961, pp. 43-46. For Lewis, Mike Jackman, Blackburn Rovers: The Official 
Encyclopedia, Derby, 1994, p. 145. For Sutcliffe, William Cuffs appreciation in Sutcliffe, et al., 
Football League, pp. 166-67. On sporting images and stereotypes of 'northemness' see Mason, 
'Football, Sport of the NorthT, p. 42, and Richard Holt, 'Heroes of the North: sport and the shaping of 
regional identity', pp. 138-39, both in Hill and Williams (ed. ), Sport andIdentity. On the historical 
origins of these northern characteristics see Helen M. Jewell, The North-South Divide: The Origins of 
Northern Consciousness in England, Manchester, 1994, p. 208. 
11 Jackman, Blackburn Rovers, p. 145; McGregor's obituary in Birmingham Daily Mail, 23 December 
19 11; Preston Guardian, 15 February 1936; Lancashire Evening Post, 12 January 1972. 
96 Thomas Keates, History ofthe Everion Football Club, 18 7819-192819, Liverpool, p. 114; Ingl is, 
League Football, p. 17 1. 
9" Section in 'Who's Who' on Brook Hirst in Huddersfield County Borough Directo? y 193 7, 
Huddersfield, 1937; Grimsby Evening Telegraph, 18 April 1945. The denominational intricacies of 
education in the West Riding are discussed in Patrick Joyce, Work Society and Politics: The Culture of 
the Factory in Later Victorian Britain, Brighton, 1980, pp. 30-32. 
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Tom Houghton, often a critic of the executive before his election in 1912, appears to 
have been the only prominent Anglican. 98 
The overwhelming tone of non-conformity on the Committee seems to have been 
reflected in attitudes towards both drink and gambling. McGregor and Sutcliffe were 
both teetotallers and active figures in the temperance movement, as was Lewis, whose 
sister Elizabeth Ann set up the renowned Lees Hall Teetotal Mission in Blackburn. 
Lewis, in fact, was a regular speaker at the Mission while Sutcliffe, too, spoke 
publicly on the temperance question and even gave evidence to a Royal Commission 
on the dangers of alcoholism. 99 Elsewhere, Walter Hart followed his father and uncle 
by supporting the movement and becoming a leading member, eventually a president, 
of the Birmingham Temperance Society. 100 On the other hand, the Committee 
included a number of members directly or indirectly associated with the drink trade. 
John Cameron and Phil Bach, for example, both became publicans after retiring from 
their respective careers. Houghton was for many years licensee at the Volunteer Inn 
in Preston and an agent for William Younger brewers while John Peel Oliver operated 
as a wine and spirit merchant and ran Newcastle's Crown Hotel. 101 Moreover, many 
Committeemen were directors of clubs with close and long-standing connections with 
the drink trade. The most striking example was Bentley's second club, Manchester 
United, which was owned by the chairman of Manchester Breweries and controlled 
almost exclusively by directors and employees of the company. 102 West Bromwich 
Albion, represented on the Committee by Henry Keys and William Bassett, were 
heavily dependent on loans from local breweries, particularly during a number of 
financial crises between 1905 and 1909. Other clubs, such as Tom Sidney and Arthur 
Oakley's Wolverhampton Wanderers and Morton Cadman's Tottenham Hotspur, 
Mason, Blues and the Reds, p. 17; Houghton's obituary in Preston Guardian, 21 September 1912. 
McGregor's obituary in the Birmingham Daily Post, 21 December 1911; Inglis, League Football, p. 
108; George C. Miller, Blackburn Worthies of Yesterdqy. ý A Biographical Ga1wry, Blackburn, 1961, p. 
229. 
100 Birmingham Daily Mail, 23 March 1937 and the obituary in Birmingham Daily Post, 6 June 1940. 
10' Inglis, League Football, pp. 392,393; Barrett's Directory of Preston and FyIde Districts, 190 1; 
Ward's Directory of Newcastle-on-Tyne, 1924. 
102 FA Report and Recommendation of the Commission Adopted by the Council, re. Manchester 
United, 30 March 19 10. 
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leased their grounds from brewery companies. 103 Even the abstaining Sutcliffe was, 
for a little over a year, a director of Oldham Athletic, whose Boundary Park ground 
was owned by the local J. W. Lees Brewery. Both Lees and Manchester Breweries 
were also major shareholders of the club. 104 In reality, then, temperance remained a 
personal issue. The attitudes of certain influential members could make little impact 
on the mutual dependence which characterised the relationship between many League 
clubs and the drink trade. 
The Committee was more unified in its opposition to gambling, mainly due to its 
potentially damaging effects on the game. Primarily, of course, betting on football 
was opposed on moral grounds but, in addition, there was a fear that it would lead to 
widespread corruption, writh players bribed and matches fixed. Significantly, this fear 
was perhaps most apparent in the League heartland of Lancashire. As well as having 
some of the highest conviction rates for street betting, the county boasted a large 
sporting and gambling press and, in Liverpool, the headquarters of the pools 
industry. 105 Hence League Committee members were instrumental in lobbying the 
FA, and on a wider scale, Parliament, to legislate against football betting. Lewis and 
Sutcliffe were both involved in the FA's 1913 inquiry into coupon betting on football 
which, though exonerating players, asserted that such betting remained 'a serious 
menace to the game'. Lewis himself warned the FA Council in 1914 that if 
bookmakers were allowed to increase their influence 'not a single member of that 
Council will remain in control of the game of football'. 106 The League as a body also 
publicly supported the Ready Money Football Betting Act, presented in Parliament by 
the Arsenal chairman and MP Sir Henry Norris. 107 
103 West Bromwich Albion FC Circulars to Creditors, 14 December 1905; 16 March 1907; 30 May 
1908; List of West Bromwich Albion FC Creditors, 28 February 1905; December 1909;, 41hletic News, 
6 March 1905; Bob Goodwin, Spurs: A Complete Record, Derby, 1993, p. 15. 
104 Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 17 July 1906,3 December 1907; Stewart W. Beckett, Team From 
A Town of Chimneys - Revisited. The Official Chronicles of the Oldham Athletic AFC Ltd, 1897-1990, 




Mark Clapson, 'Playing the System: The World of Organised Street Bening in Manchester, Salford 
and Bolton, c. 1880 to 1939' in Andrew Davies and Steven Fielding (eds), Workers'worlds: Cultures 
andcommunities in Manchester andSatford, 1880-1939, Manchester, 1992, p. 157; Mason, 
Association Football, pp. 179-87. 
106 Both quotations are from Mark Clapson, A bit ofaflutter. - Popular Gambling and English Society. 
c. 1823-1961, Manchester, 1992, pp. 168-69. 
107 Athletic News, 14 June 1920. 
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The Management Committee's collective opposition to all forms of betting was 
displayed most clearly in its own measures. Throughout the 1920s the executive took 
action in individual cases to prevent its clubs being associated with coupon betting, 
sweepstakes or other forms of gambling. 
108 In the following decade opposition was 
directed more towards the pools. In theory, the pools represented less of a threat to 
the game as there were fewer incentives to rig matches. But this did not stop the 
Committee enacting measures to distance the League and its clubs from any contact 
with pools companies. In June 1934 the Committee rejected a scheme developed by a 
Liverpool accountant, Watson Hartley, to charge pool companies for copyright on 
League fixtures, by declaring that 'there can be no connection, however vague, 
between the League and betting'. 109 A year later it banned advertisements for the 
pools in club programmes or on grounds and, more significantly, in 1936 initiated the 
so-called 'Pools War' by withholding the publication of fixtures until the last moment 
in an attempt to destroy pools companies. 110 Even after this had failed the Committee 
rejected an offer in 1938 by the Pools Promoters Association to contribute 0,000 per 
year to the League's Jubilee Fund. 
"' Yet although these actions were determined 
above all by ethical and moral motives - all members of the Committee and most club 
representatives agreed that pool betting was a menace, or as William Cuff put it, 'a 
social canker' 112 - this did not insulate the League from attack by more radical anti- 
gambling elements. The Anglican Bishop Welldon, in particular, Dean of Manchester 
and then Durham and a prominent leader of the National Anti-Gambling League 
(NAGL), was a consistent critic of the governing bodies and their failure to rid 
professional football of all associations with gambling. The NAGL was also 
instrumental in prosecuting a number of newspaper publishers, including, in 1901, the 
Hulton Press which produced 4thletic News, for running football coupon 
log See Minutes of Football League, 5 December 1921; 23 October 1922; 5 March 1928. 
109 Cited in Inglis, League Football, p. 146. Also see Daily Mirror, 29 November 1935; Minutes of 
AFPTU, 26 August 1935 (AGM). 
'10 Clapson, Popular Gambling, p. 170; Fishwick, English Football, pp. 128-29. See chapter 4. 
... On this occasion the Committee circularised clubs to gauge opinion on the issue. Sheffield United 
recommended the Committee to reject the offer outright throughout although Oldham Athletic and the 
newly-elected Ipswich Town voted to accept. Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 4 
August 193 8; Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, II May, 27 July 193 8; Minutes of Ipswich Town FC, 2 
August 1938. 
112 Cufrs obituary in The Liverpolitan, February 1949. 
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competitions. ' 13 Athletic News, of course, was closely linked with the League and at 
times employed Committee members: Bentley had been editor up to 1900 while 
Sutcliffe and Lewis contributed regular columns during the next two decades. 
Many Committee members were actively involved in local public life as town 
councillors, magistrates, school or hospital governors and the like. Houghton, for 
example, was a councillor for fourteen years until his death in 1912 and vice-chairman 
of the Preston Conservative Association. Walter Tempest was also a Tory councillor 
(although he had originally been a Liberal) and later became Lord Mayor of 
Blackburn. 114 In line with its religious complexion, however, the Committee seems to 
have been predominantly Liberal. McGregor, Leavey, Baxter and Oakley were all 
acknowledged Liberals, the latter pair representing the party on their respective town 
councils. Sutcliffe, too, was particularly active in local civic life; at different times as 
president of the Rossendale Liberal Party, a town councillor, an alderman and, for one 
year, deputy mayor. 115 Nor were such activities restricted to the politically active. 
Bassett, famous above all as an England international and an FA Cup winner with his 
local West Bromwich Albion club, was appointed as a borough magistrate in 1935. 
He was also on the Board of Management of the West Bromwich and District General 
Hospital. According to his obituary two years later, Bassett 'was not content simply 
with being a football hero; he rendered great service in the social and political life of 
the borough'. ' 16 Freemasonry, also, recognised by historians as an important element 
in the creation of a unitary civic culture, was a popular pastime for Committeemen. 117 
113 Albion News, 22 October 1921,18 November 1922; Clapson, Popular Gambling, p. 163. 
114 Preston Guardian, 21 September 1912; Inglis, League Football, p. 394. 
115 Birmingham Daily Post, 21 December 1911; Inglis, League Football, pp. 108,109,39 1; Oakley's 
obituary in the Wolverhampton Express and Star, 4 July 195 8. Other members of the Committee were 
from families with traditions of involvement in public life. Hart's uncle was an alderman; Keys' father 
was a prominent councillor in West Bromwich; whilst Brook Hirst's father-in-law was a former mayor 
of Huddersfield, an alderman, a county councillor and founder member of the Huddersfield and County 
Conservative Society. Birmingham Daily Post, 6 June 1940; Keys' obituary in Midland Chronicle and 
Free Press, 23 August 1929; Huddersfield County Borough Directory, 1937. 
116 Bassett's obituary in Midland Chronicle and Free Press, 9 April 1937. As well as Bassett, Baxter, 
Tempest and Oakley were local magistrates. 
117 j. M. Roberts, 'Freemasonry, Possibilities of a Neglected Topic', English Historical Review, 84, 
1969, pp. 323-35; Joyce, Work Society and Politics, p. 37; John Lowerson, Sport and the Middle 
Classes, 1870-1914, Manchester, 1993, pp. 21-22. 
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Between 1910 and 1939 the Committee included a coterie of freemasons, notably two 
of the presidents, McKenna and Cuff and one vice-president, Fred Rinder. US 
It is tempting, in view of this evidence, to regard Management Committee members as 
leading civic figures and to see their involvement in football merely as an extension of 
their activities in other areas of local political and social life. Such an interpretation 
fits neatly with what Alice Russell has referred to as 'the overlapping character of 
leadership' in many industrial towns, whereby individuals 'often played several 
decision-making roles concurrently, so that their authority was manifestly multi- 
dimensional'. ' 19 At the club level there is every indication that prominent figures 
regarded a place on the board of the local club directorate as but one aspect of their 
wider civic interests and duties. Whether such involvement was linked to paternalism 
and a selfless benevolence or a more sinister attempt to control workers in their 
recreations as well as their work, the implication is that it was cei tainly not just about 
football itself. 120 The collective culture of the Management Committee seems to offer 
a different perspective. As we have shown, Committee members could be 
nonconformists, teetotallers, councillors or magistrates, but above all they were 
football administrators, or in popular parlance, football legislators. For many 
Committeemen football had ceased to be merely a hobby or an interest long ago: it 
had become a way of life; almost a surrogate profession in itself. 
With few exceptions, football took up most of the spare time of members. As well as 
monthly Management Committee meetings, there were sub-committees, inquiries and 
impromptu conferences on top of the weekly board meetings of one's own club and 
the work involved in organising transfers and other team matters. In addition, most 
members sat on the council of their respective divisional or county FA and on the 
committees of other local leagues and competitions. Sutcliffe, described by 
118 Inglis, League Football, pp. 80,171; Rinder's obituaries in Birmingham Daily Post and 
Birmingham Gazette, 27 July 1938. Houghton, Tempest and Phil Bach of Middlesborough were also 
freemasons. 
119 Alice Russell, 'Local Elites and the Working-Class Response in the North-West, 1870-1895: 
Paternalism and Deference Reconsidered', Northern History, 23,1987, pp. 158,156. Also see Richard 
whipp, Patterns ofLabour. Work and Social Change in the Pottery Industry, London, 1990, pp. 169- 
74. 
120 Fishwick, English Football, pp. 30-32; Korr, West Ham United, pp. 3940; Tischler, Footballers 
and Businessmen, pp. 71-72. 
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contemporary accounts as the 'brains of football', is the most striking example. Apart 
from his League and club responsibilities, Sutcliffe was a leading member of the 
Lancashire FA, becoming its president in 1926, and one of its representatives on the 
FA Council, where he also served on the International Selection, Rules Revision and 
Referees' Committees. He was also president of the Northern Counties Amateur 
Championship, founder of the Referees' Union, chairman, then vice-president, of his 
local Rossendale United club, and a representative on the Appeals Committees of 
approximately twenty other leagues. 
121 Accordingly he spent much of his time 
crushing [at] midnight or early morning to London, Birmingham or Scotland by rail' 
to attend meetings and other football-related activities. 
122 Nor, it seems, was Sutcliffe 
the exception. During the last season before his death, Rinder allegedly travelled over 
1,000 miles a week on football matters and Lewis, a frequent visitor to the continent 
and the colonies on football trips, was said to have once covered 2,200 miles in fiýeen 
days in England. 123 In this context, it is not surprising that the Committee 
increasingly attracted men who had retired from their careers, or were nearing 
retirement, and could hence devote more time and energy to football. 
124 
In some cases, members were able to make a living, or at least subsidise their regular 
earnings, as a result of their connections with the game. We have already noted that 
certain members were part-time, or in Bentley's case full-time, sporting journalists. 
McGregor, for instance, wrote regularly for the Birmingham Daily Mail, Sporting 
Mail, Sports Argus and Birmingham Daily Post after the turn of the century. He also 
gave his name to advertise some of William Shillcock's products, like the 'McGregor 
football' and the 'McGregor lace-to-toe football Boot'. 125 After leaving Athletic 
News, Bentley was engaged by J. H. Davies 'to manage day-to-day football affairs' at 
121 Sutcliffe and Hargreaves, Lancashire FA, pp. 5 8-6 1; Sutcliffe's obituary in Burnley Express, 14 
January 1939. 
122 Sutcliffe and Hargreaves, Lancashire FA, p. 61. 
123 Rinder's obituary in Birmingham Daily Mqil, 27 July 1938; Inglis, League Football, p. 64. 
124 For example, McKenna retired from his job as a vaccination officer in 1922, while Rinder was 
forced to resign from the Birmingham City Surveyor's Staff on reaching the age limit of 65 in the same 
year. Barcroft and Cadman also retired while on the Committee but both took unpaid positions - as 
honorary secretary and managing director respectively - of their clubs. Birmingham Daily Mail, 26 
June 1922; Blackpool Gazette, 13 January 1934; Letter from Andy Porter, Spurs Club Historian, to the 
author, 27 November 1994. 
125 Birmingham Daily Mail, 23 December 1911; Inglis, League Football, p. 85. See also Shillcock's 
obituary in Birmingham Daily Mail, 10 October 1940. 
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Manchester United for E300 per year. 126 Sutcliffe's work as a solicitor also appears to 
have been augmented through his football contacts. As well as acting for Aston Villa 
in the Kingaby case, he represented the League during the West trials in 1917-18; all 
this in addition to his role as solicitor for the Mutual Insurance Federation. It is not 
clear how much money Sutcliffe earned from his football-related work, although the 
impression is that it could be profitable. Indeed, he was paid at least E50 for a few 
months assisting the floatation of Oldham Athletic in 1906.127 However, this should 
not be taken to mean that all Committee members were profiteers. Only the leading 
figures were able to gain financially in this way and, even then, it is unlikely that this 
was sufficient to compensate for the time and money spent on League business. 
128 
Furthermore, most members had been actively involved in other levels of the game, as 
players or match officials. Lewis, for example, proclaimed as the 'Prince of 
Referees', was probably the best known official of his day. He refereed three FA Cup 
Finals between 1895 and 1900 and numerous internationals before retiring in 1905. 
Brought out of retirement to officiate at the 1908 Olympic Gaines in London, Lewis 
was still refereeing at the age of sixty-four, when he was persuaded to take control of 
the 1920 Olympic Final. 129 Sutcliffe was also an established international referee 
while Bentley, the secretary Lockett, Bellamy and Oakley were all at some point on 
the League list of referees or linesmen. 130 While most Committeemen played football 
at some stage in their youth, a number reached fairly high standards. Apart from 
Bassett and Bach, both of whom were ex-professionals, Bentley and Lewis were 
successful county players. Bentley was a regular for one of the leading Lancashire 
clubs Turton, and the Bolton Association, and Lewis appeared for the club he helped 
126 FA Report and Recommendation of the Commission Adopted by the Council, re. Manchester 
United, 30 March 19 10; Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 74. 
127 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, II October 1910,2 April 1912; Minutes of Football League, 3 June 
1912 (AGM); Sutcliffe and Hargreaves, Lancashire FA, p. 61; Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 24 July 
1906. 
128 In fact, prior to 1904 the Management Committee had been collectively liable for any financial 
losses incurred by the League. Sutcliffe and Tom Sidney refused to accept his responsibility and hence 
the clubs were made liable. Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, p. 65. Without access to the appropriate 
fmancial records of the League or the individuals, we can only make suppositions on this point. 
129 Gibson and Pickford (eds), Association Football, vol. 3, p. 159; Jackman, Blackburn Rovers, p. 145; 
Miller, Blackburn Worthies, p. 229. 
110 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 163-65; Sutcliffe and Hargreaves, Lancashire FA, p. 6 1; 
Gibson and Pickford, Association Football, vol. 3, p. 186; Wolverhampton Express and Star, 4 July 
1958. 
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to form, Blackburn Rovers, and Darwen in their amateur days. Among many other 
examples, vice-president Harry Radford and Morton Cadman also made an impression 
initially as leading amateur players with their respective clubs. 131 It is worth noting, at 
this point, the consistent presence, even as late as the 1930s, of Committee members 
who had been instrumental in the formation and development of clubs prior to the 
adoption of professionalism. Far from being hostile towards amateurism, many of 
those who ran the League retained some strong sympathies with elements of the 
amateur ethos. Bentley was unlikely to have been alone in holding 'Pure amateurism 
in every sport... to be the highest state'. 132 Like many others, his experiences of 
football were rooted in the take-off era of the 1870s to 1890s and he remained in 
many ways a product of this late Victorian age. 
If most members of the Management Committee were recognised principally for their 
involvement with football, the leading figures were unquestionably 'League men'. In 
fact, some were only nominally associated with their clubs and acted, in practice, as 
neutral League officials. Lewis severed official connections with Blackburn Rovers in 
the early 1900s, although he attended some games and remained vocal at annual 
meetings, while Sutcliffe restricted his association with Burnley to that of a spectator 
for much of this period. Similarly, the pressure of McKenna's duties as League 
president were instrumental in his leaving the Liverpool board in 1922.133 Moreover, 
on becoming a Life Member of the League in 1912, Bentley acknowledged that 
although he was 'connected with many other organisations... the Football League 
would always be his pet'. Writing in 1906, Sutcliffe expressed similar sentiments: 
'The League's interests are mine. I am a League man, a League lover, and a League 
servant above all'. 134 It would be erroneous to underestimate the importance of these 
statements. For all their occupational, social and political similarities, members of the 
Management Committee were bound together mainly due to their collective passion 
13 1Lancashire Review, October 1897, p. 43; Gibson and Pickford, Association Football, vol. 3, pp. 
160.165; A. Porter to the author. 
132 Windsor Magazine, April 1902, p. 668. 
133 Charles Francis, History ofthe Blackburn Rovers FC, 1875-1925, Blackburn, 1925, p. 195; Gibson 
and Pickford, Association Football, vol. 3, p. 16 1; Burnley Express, 14 January 1939; Mason, Blues 
and the Reds, P. 5. 
134 Minutes of the Football League, 3 June 1912 (AGM); Athletic News, 10 December 1906. 
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for football in general, and the League in particular. It is an obvious and crucial point 
which, nevertheless, is too easily dismissed by historians as an afterthought. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In its essential features, the Football League Management Committee resembled 
countless middle-class organisations, sporting and otherwise, established in the late 
Victorian era. While entry was theoretically open to any club director, administrator 
or (before 1917) paid official, in practice the League was ruled by a small elite group 
with similar backgrounds, interests and affiliations, and, most importantly, with long 
associations (even before 1900) as football politicians or administrators. There was 
no formal blackballing clause but selection nevertheless constituted a lengthy system 
of nomination, canvassing and voting which ensured that only the favoured or the 
acceptable would be admitted. 135 As former professional footballers, it might be 
thought that Bassett and Bach were exceptions to the rule, but both had been 
established for some time as club directors with respectable professional careers. 
Their election was to some extent recognition of the social distance travelled since 
their playing days. Notwithstanding the appearance of democracy, therefore, the 
League executive was a closed oligarchy dominated throughout the first four decades 
of the twentieth century by no more than half a dozen key figures. 
While ensuring stability and continuity, the administrative structure also encouraged 
conservatism and immobility. Radical proposals emanating from individual 
Committeemen or club representatives were invariably quashed or quietly pushed to 
one side by the leading officials. To paraphrase Alan Hardaker, if Sutcliffe, McKenna 
or Cuff did not like an idea, it was never implemented. Moreover, the minutes of 
Committee meetings and annual meetings were carefully recorded so as to marginalise 
signs of dissension and reinforce the 'assumed solidarity' of the League. 136 Loyalty 
and service to the League were highly valued and, in common with other such 
organisations, recognised through a formal 'honours' system of long-service medals, 
life membership caskets and other such titles and related insignia which helped to 
115 For parallels with the MCC see Bradley, 'The MCC', p. 30. 
136 Lowerson, Sport and the English Middle Classes, p. 100. 
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create an integrative understanding of 'tradition' within the Football League. 137 only 
through a close analysis of newspaper reports and club records is it possible to detect 
the signs of internal dissent and independent opinion which were inevitable in a 
collective body of independent sporting clubs or companies. 
137 Sutcliffe et at., Football League, pp. 51-67; Lowerson, Sport and the English Middle Classes, p. 23; 
David Cannadine, 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the 
Invention of Tradition, c. 1820-1977' in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of 
Tradition, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 10 1 -64. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BUILDING AN EMPIRE?: 
THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEAGUE 
The Football League is a living force, and life is growth and makes for progress. 
Charles Sutcliffe, Athletic News, 24 May 1920. 
Writers concerned with the development of the Football League have often viewed the 
historical process back-to-front, almost from a teleological perspective, which takes 
the eventual formation of a national league in 1920 as the starting-point and looks 
backwards to find earlier statements of such an intention. From this viewpoint, the 
Football League was always envisaged as a national competition, even if its founder 
members were geographically restricted to Lancashire and the midlands and the 
process of expansion was often slow and faltering! Yet, only in retrospect is it 
possible to detect a simple and unilinear developmental process of this kind. 
Although the idea of expansion seems to have had an inevitable logic, in reality the 
issue was highly contentious and subject to a number of intricate, and often 
contradictory, considerations. Not all member clubs necessarily desired expansion, 
especially if there was no concomitant guarantee of increased income. In addition, 
there was the fear that the inclusion of more clubs would affect the status and power 
of the older members. Above all, there is no indication that the Football League ever 
adopted policies intended to eliminate its rivals and achieve monopolistic control over 
professional football. Many club directors and League officials believed that the game 
benefited from a co-existence of competing leagues and consequently opposed any 
amalgamation or take-over attempts. In a speech rejecting a proposed merger between 
the League and its Southern counterpart in 1909, Preston's chairman Tom Houghton 
made this point explicitly: 'As to the Southern League we wish them well, and we 
wish them to get on. We want antagonism. We don't want the football world to 
ourselves. 2 
' For an example ofthis viewpoint see Churchill, English League Football, especially pp. 16-17. 2 Report of Football League SGM in Athletic News, 3May 1909. 
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The expansion of the League was therefore not the coherent and logical process 
portrayed by some writers. There was no blueprint or strategic plan to absorb the 
most prominent non-League clubs in order to increase the League's status and power. 
Rather, the League grew in a haphazard manner, increasing its size in fits and starts 
and only attaining a truly national constituency after nearly twenty years of discord 
and a series of failed schemes. The aim of this chapter is to trace the basic 
development of the Football League in this period and to examine the conflicting 
groups of interest which sought respectively to quicken and retard this process. The 
early part of the chapter will look at the whole debate around the idea of a 'national' 
Football League and the related attitude of the League towards both the Southern 
League and its clubs. This will be followed by a detailed examination of the role of 
the Management Committee and the member clubs in determining the composition of 
the League, focusing in particular on the election process for clubs. It will seek to 
determine the relative influence of, and interaction between, geographical, economic, 
sporting and what contemporaries often referred to as 'sentimental' factors in the 
election of applicants. 
1. The Chaotic Growth of the Leaaue, 1888-1900 
In order to understand its expansion in the twentieth century it is necessary to provide 
a broad chronological outline of the League's development down to 1900. Table 2.1 
shows the various stages of expansion from 1888 to 1939 in terms both of the number 
of divisions and the total number of clubs. At first glance, there appears to have been 
fairly rapid growth in the first decade, with a three-fold increase from twelve to thirty- 
six clubs by 1898. Much of this growth was built into the League's original, which 
stated that there should be 'two classes of League clubs - First and Second - each to 
consist of twelve clubs. 3 There is also some evidence that, had it been possible to 
arrange the extra fixtures, the original League would have incorporated three extra 
clubs: Nottingham Forest, Sheffield Wednesday and the Lancashire side Halliwell. 4 
Expansion was therefore on the agenda for many directors and officials from the very 
start. 
3 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 5. 
4 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 3. 
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Table ZI The Growth of the Football League by Clubs, 1888-1939 
Division One Division Two Division 
(South) 
Three Division Th 
(North) 
ree Total Clubs 
1888-91 12 12 
1891-92 14 14 
1892-93 16 12 28 
1893-94 16 15 31 
1894-98 16 16 32 
1898-1905 18 is 36 
1905-15 20 20 40 
1919-20 22 22 44 
1920-21 22 22 22* 66 
1921-23 22 22 22 20 86 
1923-39 22 22 22 22 88 
* Simply called Division Three 
Source: Based on Butler, Football League, p. 33. 
The precise mode of expansion, however, remained undecided. At the 1891 annual 
meeting a scheme to extend the League to thirty-six clubs divided into three sections 
was rejected in favour of a modest increase from twelve clubs to fourteen. 5 A year 
later the second division was finally established by the partial annexation of the 
Football Alliance. Three of the leading Alliance clubs, Sheffield Wednesday, Newton 
Heath (later to become Manchester United) and Nottingham Forest, joined the 
extended first division, while the remainder, together with Sheffield United, Burslem 
Port Vale and Northwich Victoria, formed the new second division. Only 
Birmingham St. George's of the Alliance clubs was denied League membership. The 
formation of a second division had a number of benefits. As well as absorbing and 
thus eliminating a rival competition, the move safeguarded the developing retain and 
transfer laws by subjecting the most active poachers of players to the League's 
authority. In addition, the League gained a number of successful and attractive 
playing sides. Most of the leading clubs and players outside the League were 
associated with the Football Alliance. Wednesday had been beaten finalists in the 
1890 FA Cup Final, and in 1892 Forest reached the semi-finals, taking the eventual 
winners West Bromwich Albion to three replays. Bolton's secretary Harry Downs 
' James A. H. Catton, The Real Footba/L A Sketch ofthe Development ofthe Association Game, 
London, 1900, p. 85. 
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recalled in 1901 that the inclusion of the Alliance was considered extremely 
advantageous - 'a stroke of business' even - to the League by many contemporaries. 
6 
From its inception, however, both the principle of the second division itself and the 
status attached to it were heavily questioned in some circles. Although its clubs had 
equal representation and voting rights, there was a distinct feeling that the second 
division was merely an appendage to the League proper and lacked the glamour or 
prestige of the first division. Blackburn's John Lewis maintained persistent 
opposition to the idea of the second division as an inherent part of the League 
structure, insisting even towards the end of 1901 that it was just 'a means to an end' 
and its only function was as a waiting room for the first division. 
7 The attitude of 
certain other clubs served to confirm the division's inferior position. Even before the 
official inauguration of the second division at the 1892 annual meeting, Liverpool was 
rejected for refusing to consider joining any competition other than the first division. 
After failing in their applications to the first division, Newcastle East End and an 
amalgamated Middlesborough club also rejected assured places in the newly formed 
second division, ostensibly on account of increased travelling costs but, more 
specifically, due to doubts over the standard and appeal of the other applicants! 
There was still much uncertainty the following year when the two defeated first 
division clubs in the initial series of test matches, Notts County and Accrington, were 
reportedly unable to give 'a definite reply as to joining the second division', although 
they both eventually decided to stay. 9 For a number of the League's founder members 
the second division appeared to be a threat to their elite status and exclusivity as well 
as their bank balance. Fear of dropping to the second division was so acute that 
relegated clubs habitually proposed an enlargement of the first division at annual 
meetings as a means of securing their senior rank. And even as late as 1906 William 
" 'Harricus' (A. H. Downs), 'The Football League, 1888-1901', Athletic News, 4 February 1901. 
7 Athletic News, 23 December 1901. As late as 1909, Lewis still distinguished the first division from 
the second by referring to the former as 'the real League'. Football and Sports Special, 16 January 
1909. Also see the comments of James Catton ffityrus') in Athletic News, I June 1908. 
8 Catton, The Real Foothall, p. 88; Arthur Appleton, Hotbed ofSoccer. 7he Story ofFootball in the 
North East, London, 196 1, pp. 83,122. It is worth noting that inclusion in the first division would have 
involved far greater travelling expenses for the north-eastern clubs as there were four additional away 
trips but probably, of course, greater gates to compensate. 
' Quoted in Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 77. 
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McGregor could bemoan the marked inferiority of the second division and the 
weakness, both in financial and playing terms, of a number of its clubs. ' 0 
The creation of the second division also marked the arrival of the principle of merit 
promotion, albeit initially in the form of the flawed test match system. " Prior to 1892 
the constitution of the first division was determined by vote with the bottom four 
clubs each season applying for re-election. This procedure continued for the bottom 
clubs in the second division (with only three clubs seeking re-election from 1896) but 
movement between the divisions was now determined by the result of sudden-death 
matches played on neutral grounds between the lowest three first division and the 
highest three second division clubs. The first series of matches in May 1893 
highlighted the potential inequities of the system. While the second and third placed 
clubs in the lower division both won their matches and thus progressed to the first 
division, champions Small Heath (later renamed Birmingham) were defeated by the 
higher division's bottom club Newton Heath and remained in the second. The 
experience of refereeing test matches over the two previous seasons had convinced 
Committeeman John Lewis by 1895 that the system should be abolished. At that 
years' annual meeting he argued that clubs who had worked their way to the top of the 
divisional table over the course of the season 'deserved promotion without any such 
ordeal'. Moreover, he was concerned that test matches were not true tests of playing 
strength as temporary transfers of players were often made to strengthen weak 
teams. 12 Though the latter of Lewis' points was dealt with through the instigation of a 
short-term residential qualification, the clubs chose to modify rather than abolish the 
system. Instead of meeting in a one-off match, the two bottom clubs in the first 
division and the champions and runners-up in the second competed in a play-off group 
in which each played the two clubs from the other division twice while the pair from 
the same division did not meet at all. The difficulties of this arrangement were clearly 
shown at the end of the 1897/98 season when an allegedly arranged goalless draw 
between Stoke and Burnley assured both of a first division place. According to 
Sutcliffe, a director himself of one of the guilty clubs, this match 'put a stop to a 
" McGregor, 'Origin and Future', p. 6. 
1 Much of the following section is based on Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 77-78 and 'Harricus', 
'Football League', Athletic News, 4 February 190 1. 
12 Catton, The Real Football, p. 93. 
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system which had always been clumsy and often had brought about a perversion of the 
football values of the season's play'. 13 From 1898/99 test matches were discarded in 
favour of an automatic two-up two-down system of promotion and relegation. 
It was also decided at the 1898 annual meeting to further enlarge the League though 
again there were differences of opinion over the exact details. The representatives of 
Woolwich Arsenal and Aston Villa both favoured a regionalised second division; the 
former proposal outlining a 16-club first division and a 32-club second divided 
equally between northern and southern sections and the latter requiring similarly 
organised divisions of 18 and 24 clubs respectively. These fairly radical suggestions 
were, however, easily defeated by Burnley's proposal of a simple increase of each 
division by two. 14 Certainly this enlargement was passed partly to compensate the 
two sides, Newcastle United and Blackburn Rovers, who had suffered because of the 
arranged test mdtch, but there was also an underlying financial motive. Sutcliffe, 
Burnley's representative, supported his proposal with reference to the increased 
revenue from additional 'League matches [which] always paid' as opposed to 
'friendlies [which] never paid'. 15 
The geographical development of the Football League up to 1900 indicates a 
discernible but cautious trend towards spatial expansion. The twelve founder clubs 
were situated exclusively in the north-west and the midlands; six from Lancashire, 
three from Staffordshire and one each from Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and 
Warwickshire. The first expansion was into the north-east with the inclusion in 1890 
of Sunderland while from 1892 the League brought in clubs from South Yorkshire, 
Cheshire, Lincolnshire and Manchester. Nevertheless, this locational spread made 
little impact on the general pattern of membership. The original areas still dominated. 
Of the 32 League clubs in 1899/1900 there were nine from Lancashire and 16 from 
the midlands. As John Bale has noted, the League at this time 'had scarcely spread 
beyond a triangular belt between the Mersey and the Humber'. 16 The most striking 
13 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 77. 
14 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 78. 
15 Quoted in Vamplew, Pay Up. 1988, p. 126. 
16 John Bale, Sport and Place: A Geography OfSport in England, Scotland and Wales, London, 1982, 
p. 28. 
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omission were clubs from London and the south; only Woolwich Arsenal (in 1893) 
and Luton (in 1897) joining before the turn of the century. The reasons for this were 
basically twofold. Firstly, southern clubs were generally slower to adopt 
professionalism which, though not a stated prerequisite for applicants, was closely 
associated with the origins and ethos of League football. 17 Secondly, from the mid- 
1890s most of the leading professional clubs in the south were members of the 
Southern League. Founded in 1894 by William Henderson, secretary of Millwall 
Athletic, the Southern League was originally composed of sixteen clubs separated 
into two divisions, extended by 1900 to a 15-club first division and a nine-club 
second! 8 Southern League clubs seriously began to rival their League compatriots on 
the field towards the end of the century. Southampton were particularly successful in 
the FA Cup, reaching the semi-final in 1898 and the final twice - in 1900 and 1902 - 
while Tottenham Hotspur actually won the 1901 competition. It is therefore hardly 
surprising that sections of the press as well as representatives of both leagues began to 
publicly, and one suspects privately, debate the possibility of amalgamation and the 
creation of a genuinely national league. 
2. Towards a National League?: Problems of Expansion, 1900-20 
it is possible to see the Football League's development from a small to a large and a 
regional to a national phenomenon as reflecting more general changes in English 
society. Firstly, as Jose Harris has suggested, 'the late Victorian period saw a 
subterranean shift in the balance of social life away from the locality to the metropolis 
and the nation. 19 The pivotal change here was in the economic sphere where the 
influence of metropolitan-based finance from about 1870 replaced that of northern 
manufacture. Accompanying this were discernible trends in education, technology, 
17 Clubs from the capital were particularly hampered by the London FA's unyielding opposition to 
professionalism. According, John Bale has estimated a ten-year time-lag in the adoption of 
professionalism in London with most clubs remaining amateur until at least 1900. Bale, Sport and 
place, pp. 25,26 (figure 4.2). See also Birley, Land ofSport and Glory, pp. 4142. 
'a Lionel Francis, Seventy Five Years ofSouthern League Football, London, 1969, pp. 19-23. 
Although the League was devised essentially for professional clubs, four of the nine original members 
of the first division - Reading, Ilford, Clapton Orient and Royal Ordinance Factories - were amateur 
clubs. Harrison, Southern League Football, p. 5. 
" Jose Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: A Social History ofBritain, 1870-1914, Oxford, 1993, p. 
19. 
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cultural life and even language which, taken together, began to restructure society on a 
more uniform, centralised and national basis. For example, by the 1890s the retail, 
advertising and newspaper trades had all assumed a predominantly national character 
beyond the scope of local social and market forces. 20 Secondly, the early part of the 
century, and more specifically the inter-war period, witnessed a profound increase in 
industrial concentration through both amalgamation and the disproportionate growth 
of certain firms. Such trends were clearly evident in manufacturing, banking and 
retailing. In industries such as the railways, meanwhile, where regrouping in 1923 
converted 120 small and medium sized companies into just four large-scale 
enterprises, some firms were able to occupy semi-monopolistic positions. 
21 
It is true that the formation of the League itself provided a framework for greater 
rationalisation and centralisation of professional football and broke down to some 
extent the existing provincial focus of competition. Furthermore, the Football League, 
as the senior and most prestigious league in England and unrestricted by nominal ties 
to specific regions, was widely regarded as the most appropriate agency for the 
development of a national championship. Yet it is misleading to view the process of 
nationalisation as a natural or simple one: an all-embracing league of the type 
envisaged by some progressives raised crucial practical and theoretical issues with 
different implications for clubs of contrasting wealth and status. The problem was 
also shot through with fundamental questions regarding the ownership and 
identification of the League. Should the League be essentially a self-absorbed 
organisation concerned only with the interests of its members or did it have a broader 
responsibilityý for the development of the game in general? Opinion varied, even 
within the Management Committee, where these contesting perspectives were typified 
by the respective attitudes of John Lewis and Charles Sutcliffe. 
20 Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit, pp. 17-23; Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities, London, 1968, p. 48. 
2' Leslie Hannah, The Rise ofthe Corporate Economy, 2nd. Edition, London, 1983, chapter 1; Stephen 
V. Ward, The Geography ofInterwar Britain: The State and Uneven Development, London, 1988, p. 
14; B. W. E. Alford, 'New Industries for Old? British Industzy between the wars' in Roderick Floud 
and Donald McCloskey (eds. ), The Economic History ofBritain Since 1700, voL 2: 1860 to the 1970s, 
Cambridge, 1981, pp. 323-28. 
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From the beginning there were two basic means by which the League could extend its 
boundaries: by increasing the actual number of places available or, alternatively, 
through the piecemeal replacement of unsuccessful or 'weak' clubs. Although during 
the early 1900s neither option proved significantly popular to alter the inherent 
conservatism of the majority of members, there were some signs of a more liberal 
attitude towards the idea of expansion and the inclusion of non-League, especially 
southern, clubs. An important breakthrough in this respect was the appointment in 
1901 of the first representative of a southern club to the Management Committee. 
Woolwich Arsenal's George Leavey was a particularly significant choice due to his 
active commitment to amalgamation with the Southern League. He had previously 
organised a informal meeting in May 1900 between representatives of the two leagues 
and the following February circularised League clubs regarding a proposed 
enlargement of the first division to 20 clubs and a second, southem-based, section for 
the lower division. 22 Although both attempts ultimately failed, Athletic News still 
considered his appointment in May 1901 to be 'a very significant step, for Mr Leavey 
will work might and main for the end he has in view - the union of the parent body 
with its Southern contemporary'. Moreover, the concept of amalgamation had by now 
received endorsement from the League president, John Bentley. At that year's annual 
meeting Bentley reportedly 'hinted that in another twelve months an international 
body (sic. ), meaning... a League embracing the pick of the clubs North and South, 
would be an accomplished fact'. 23 
However, it is unclear at this stage whether the Football League had taken any positive 
steps in this direction. Even at Management Committee level there seems to have 
been some confusion over the subject. In his Athletic News column in late 1901, 
Lewis completely dismissed suggestions that the League was considering the 
incorporation of the best Southern League clubs and that leading members of the 
Management Committee had recently approached their southern counterparts over the 
question. 24 Bentley replied a week later that the Southern League had indeed been 
approached in an unofficial manner and that 'nothing would delight [him] more than 
22 Athletic andSporting Chat, 9 May 1900; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 28 February 1901. 
2'Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 20 May 190 1. 
24 Athletic News, 25 November 190 1. 
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to see the Southern League amalgamated with the Football League'. Apparently 
refusing to accept Bentley's statement, Lewis re-emphasised that in his two years on 
the Committee the question of amalgamation had never been considered either 
formally or informally: indeed, 'If anything had been done in this direction, I should 
have thought I was entitled to hear about it'. 25 
If any schemes to establish a national league were formulated at these informal 
meetings they were never made public. Neither, it seems, was there any organised 
attempt to bring in Southern League clubs on an individual basis, although the 
admission of Bristol City, a highly successful Southern League club, in 1901 had 
appeared to suggest otherwise. Robert Campbell, the club secretary, supported his 
application on the grounds that 'the election of Bristol would be an inducement for 
other Southern League clubs to join, for.... it was absolutely impossible for a few 
strong clubs to exist where there were so many unattractive matches. 26 Yet, possibly 
buoyed by the cup success of Southampton and Tottenham, no club from the Southern 
League, or indeed the south, applied for Football League membership again until 
1905. Indeed, the Athletic News correspondent at the 1903 annual meeting deprecated 
the fact that none of that year's applicants hailed from either the south or the 
Midlands. 27 It is also of some significance that neither of the London clubs who 
joined as part of the League's expansion in 1905 had any prior long-standing 
connection with the Southern League. Clapton Orient had spent just a few seasons 
during the 1890s as well as the 1904/05 season in the second division of the Southern 
League while Chelsea, an entirely new club formed just two months before its 
admission to the League, had actually faced severe opposition to its original intention 
of entering the Southern League, particularly from close neighbours Fulham. 28 
At this time the question of whether the League should be expanded remained quite 
separate from the more general idea of a national Iýague. As we have seen, in many 
cases expansion was advocated as a form of self-preservation for lowly clubs. This 
" Athletic News, 2 December 1901 
26 Report of Football League AGM inAthletic News, 20 May 1901. 
27 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 18 May 1903. 
21 Manchester Evening News, 8 May 1907. Also see Ralph Finn, A History of Chelsea Football Club, 
London, 1969, p. 12. 
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was the case both in 1901 and 1902 when Preston North End led unsuccessfid 
campaigns for a 40-club League: a development which on either occasion may have 
given the club a place in the first division. More importantly, supporters of expansion 
began to argue that it offered two fundamental advantages: greater financial security 
for clubs and increased status and authority to the League as a whole. On the first 
point, it was asserted that a few extra League matches per season, played mid-week if 
necessary, would increase the annual income of the majority of clubs who were unable 
to make extra money from successful FA Cup runs. As many clubs already filled 
blank fixture dates with friendlies or minor cup competitions, why not play more 
League matches, which always guaranteed a more satisfactory gate? Secondly, many 
shared the view of Lincoln City's John Strawson, who believed that in future disputes 
with the FA or any other organisation, a larger and wider-reaching League would be 
more influential: 'the more strength and importance that could be bestowed upon the 
Football League the less danger there would be to it when trouble arose' . 
29 At both 
the 1901 and 1902 annual meetings the majority of delegates voted in favour of an 
increased number of clubs but the proposal fell short of the necessary three-quarters 
majority, though only by four votes on the first occasion. 
in general it was the wealthier clubs who blocked moves to expand. The attitude of 
Aston Villa was probably typical in this respect. Villa's directors consistently 
opposed the enlargement of the first division, though they had no objection to a larger 
second group 'providing some provision be made whereby their voting power should 
not predominate over that of the first division'. 30 The main fear, according to the 
club's representative Fred Rinder, was of 'too much football... there was only a certain 
amount of money to be spent on football, which was essentially a Saturday afternoon 
gameq. 31 Yet opponents revealed that Villa itself often fitted in more than one match a 
week: in fact, the club had played 16 matches in just three weeks during April 1902. 
It seems once again that the real motives were financial. More League matches would 
mean increased compensation to other clubs for loss of League gates when fixture 
dates had to be switched, a situation which successful cup sides like Villa and 
29 Reports of Football League AGMs in Athletic News, 20 May 1901,2 June 1902. 
30 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 28 February 1901. 
31 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 20 May 190 1. 
65 
Sheffield United particularly resented. 32 By 1905, however, opinion had shifted to the 
point where Sutcliffe's proposal of 20 clubs in each division received support from 
leading clubs like Liverpool and Newcastle United. It was passed by 31 votes to six 
without any counter-argument, although Sheffield United amongst others remained 
unmoved in its opposition. 33 
From about 1906 support for the idea of an enlarged national league, in principle at 
least, seems to have become more intense. The impetus for this came as much from 
the growth of professional clubs in rugby-playing areas, especially Yorkshire, as from 
the south. Bradford City had joined the Football League in 1903 and were followed 
two years later by Leeds City and Hull. In addition, a number of Northern Union 
clubs actually abandoned the rugby code in favour of the reputedly more profitable 
association game. 34 Some commentators suggested that the League shoula 
accommodate these new clubs by extending its boundaries. The writer of a letter to 
, 4thletic News 
in April 1906, for instance, advocated a new third division 'as a means 
of promoting football in rugby playing towns'. Later the same month William 
Pickford, an FA Councillor, suggested that room should be made in the League for the 
6young giant professional clubs' developing in rugby areas. He proposed the creation 
of a gigantic Football League with multiple regional divisions; the national champions 
emerging from a series of matches at the season's end between each divisional 
winner. 35 Nevertheless, for most club directors and Committeemen the principle of a 
national league meant expansion southwards. William McGregor, founder and now a 
life member of the League, was the most influential proponent of the idea. The 
6nationalisation' of the League was in his view an inevitable evolutionary process. He 
foresaw 'the gradual bringing in of influential clubs at present outside the organisation 
with the object sooner or later of making the League a truly national body. While it 
32 Clubs were required to compensate their opponents for switching fixtute dates, often from Saturdays 
to Mondays, due to FA Cup ties, which took precedence. Until 1912 there were no fixed regulations 
for compensation and so claims were made but generally opposed, leaving the Management Committee 
to reach a decision. See, for example, Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 29 March, 19 April 1900. 
33 Athletic News, 5 June 1905; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, II May 1905. 
34 Terry Frost, Bradford City A Complete Record, 1903-1988, Derby, 1988, pp. 11-13; A. J. Arnold, A 
Game That Would Pay, p. 4 1; 'The Belated Entry of Professional Soccer into the West Riding of 
Northern England, IJHS, 6,3, pp. 326-30; David Russell, "'Sporadic and Curious": The Emergence of 
Rugby and Soccer Zones in Yorkshire and Lancashire, c. 1860-1914', IJHS, 5,2, pp. 196-20 1. 
35 Athletic News, 9,23 April 1906. A version of this scheme was originally advocated by R. P. 
Gregson, secretary of the Lancashire FA. 
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does not include Southampton, Portsmouth and Tottenham Hotspur, it cannot be said 
to be truly representative'. 36 Sutcliffe similarly considered the Football League's 
ultimate and ideal constitution to be 'a great National League, comprising within its 
borders the best, and all the best, clubs in the country'. 37 
Towards the end of 1906 and in early 1907 Sutcliffe outlined in the press a number of 
possible schemes for the creation of a national league. Notwithstanding the fact that 
his proposals were made independently of the Management Committee, Sutcliffe's 
intervention undoubtedly represented a turning point in the whole debate. Prior to this 
the idea of a national league had existed primarily in the abstract: now it was given 
concrete form by a prominent and respected League Committee member. Sutcliffe's 
proposals brought the issue into the open and placed it firmly on the agenda for 
League directors, officials and the sporting press. Moreover, for the first time these 
schemes provoked a positive response from a number of Southern League clubs. 
Previously the more successftil Southern League clubs had not considered it beneficial 
to apply for admission to the Football League. With only three places open each year, 
and League clubs generally favoured in the election process, the chances of admission 
were extremely slight. Also, the second division of the League was widely considered 
as only comparable to, or even weaker than, the first division of the Southern League. 
Admission thus offered no guarantees of financial or sporting progress: quite the 
opposite, it could mean years of struggle in a modest competition with the burden of 
greater transfer fees and travelling expenses. 38 But inclusion of the Southern League 
en bloc was a different proposition entirely. In March 1907, the Fulham chairman 
Henry Norris wrote a letter to Athletic News in support of Sutcliffe's idea for merging 
the two leagues into what he called 'a Universal League'. 39 He was obviously not 
alone because a week later the Southern League officially called a joint meeting 'to 
enter into arrangements for the formation of a new National League on the basis of 
fusion between the Football League and the Southern League' which, according to the 
latter, would 'end all troubles as to transfers, maximum wages and bonuses'. 40 The 
36 McGregor, 'Origin and Future', p. 6. 
37 Athletic News, 10 December 1906. 
33 Athletic News, 10 December 1906. 
39 Athletic News, 4 March 1907. 
40 Quoted in Inglis, League Football, p. 60. 
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League Management Committee in response gave no opinion for or against but 
instead circularised the clubs to see whether they were willing to negotiate with the 
southerners. Although 26 of the 38 replies favoured meeting the Southern League, the 
Management Committee rejected the idea on the grounds that the necessary three- 
quarters majority had not been reached. 41 
Even though the Southern League publicly asserted an equality with the Football 
League, its subordinate position was increasingly accepted by its leadership and many 
of its clubs. Appendix 2 clearly shows that the successes of Southern League clubs in 
relation to Football League clubs around the turn of the century in the national FA 
Cup competition, and through their provision of players for the England international 
team, had markedly diminished by the mid and late 1900s. What is more, there were 
clear signs at this point of stagnation and of some internal club dissension from the 
Southern League's central policies. Details are relatively scarce but it seems that from 
about 1906 some of the leading clubs - Fulham, Tottenham Hotspur, West Ham 
United and Portsmouth in particular - were urging the Southern League to reform 
drastically and adopt 'a more enlightened policy'. The rejection of 'new' professional 
clubs like Crystal Palace and Chelsea was seen by contemporaries such as the 
Tottenham director G. Wagstaffe Simmons as a sign of the restrictive conservatism of 
the southern body. The Football League, in contrast, was increasingly regarded as a 
model of how to organise a successful and popular competition. For London clubs 
especially, the inclusion of Chelsea and Clapton Orient in 1905 made the League a 
more attractive option. It now appeared to be less of a closed shop than the Southern 
League and, in Simmons' words, to have 'a more catholic outlook'. 42 In this context, 
Fulham's successful application to the Football League in June 1907 had a crucial 
impact on future relations between the two leagues. Unlike the League's other 
southern recruits, Fulham had been an established member of the Southern League for 
some years. It joined in the 1898/99 season and had been champions in the two 
seasons prior to leaving. Hence its secession provoked a defensive response from the 
Southern League executive and its clubs. A motion banning any club applying to the 
41 Athletic News, 18 March, 8 April 1907. 
42 G. Wagstaffe Simmons, History ofthe Tottenham Hotspur FC. Its Birth and Progress, 1882-1946, 
London, 1947, p. 72. 
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Football League from future membership with the Southern League was considered 
but rejected. 43 The following year the Southern League went further, expelling two of 
its leading clubs, Queen's Park Rangers and Tottenham Hotspur, when they applied 
individually to join the Football League. In addition, clubs were prohibited from 
applying for a League place in the future under a severe penalty. Although neither 
club was initially elected, the Southern League remained adamant that drastic action 
was necessary to secure the status and self-respect of their competition. As one 
representative put it, 'the Southern League [will] not allow itself to be made a 
stepping-stone to any other competition'. 
44 
Despite apparent increasing animosity between the two bodies, the idea of 
amalgamation was regularly discussed in official circles and in the press over the next 
few years. In June 1908 the League Management Committee, under instruction from 
its member clubs, invited applications for a proposed third division but this was 
shelved 'owing to the small number of applicants and the calibre of clubs'. 
45 The 
debate intensified again in March 1909 when the Southern League Management 
Committee approached its League counterpart with a proposal to fuse the leagues into 
a sixty-club competition, consisting of a first division of twenty clubs and two second 
divisions, north and south; the latter with equal status, voting rights and chances of 
promotion. Hence the first division of the Southern League would be on a par with 
the second division of the Football League. Representatives and supporters of the 
League dismissed the scheme emphatically. Athletic News argued that the Southern 
League clubs wanted 'power and the prospects of promotion... and they offer 
NOTHING in return'. 46 Even Sutcliffe, who supported the principle of amalgamation, 
warned League clubs that they would 'be making a tremendous concession to a 
weaker organisation if they enter into the suggested agreement'. 
47 The proposal was 
therefore, not surprisingly, rejected unanimously by the clubs but the idea of 
43 Report of Southern League AGM in Athletic News, 3 June 1907. 
44 Report of Southern League AGM in Athletic News, I June 1908. Both clubs were invited to re-join 
the Southern League under certain conditions. Queen's Park Rangers accepted but were forced to play 
all their matches in mid-week but Tottenham refused and were eventually elected to fill a vacant place 
in the Football League at the end of June. Francis, Seventy Five Years, p. 43. 
11 Minutes of Football League, 29 June 1908. 
"Athletic News, IS March 1909. 
47 Athletic News, 22 February 1909. 
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amalgamation through the creation of a third division remained on the table. 48 Indeed, 
further meetings in April between the two leagues led to a comprehensive joint 
proposal for the inclusion of eighteen Southern League clubs as the basis of a new 
third division, with limited rights of voting and representation (see Appendix 3). In a 
circular letter to its clubs, the League Management Committee gave its official 
approval to the scheme, indicating that 'the time was now opportune for the formation 
of a third division'. 49 
In many ways the debates surrounding this proposed third division were related to 
broader problems concerning the role, obligations and identification of the Football 
League in the early twentieth century. Most of this was tied up with either the 
rejection or acceptance of the national league idea and officials, directors and 
journalists were often divided on their attitude to this question. Opponents of 
expansion drew on arguments which remained essentially unchanged throughout the 
period. Firstly, the League was perceived to be a self-concerned organisation whose 
interests were bound up solely with those of the clubs which comprised its 
membership. Anything beyond this, including the development of a national league, 
was therefore considered marginal or even irrelevant. Lewis, one of the most 
vociferous opponents of change, employed this argument frequently in his newspaper 
columns. In April 1905 he informed Athletic News readers that: 
The League has never set itself up as a "national competition", and 
although it embraces clubs as far apart as Newcastle and London, 
Sunderland and Bristol, it has never encouraged the idea which has sprung 
up of late, especially in the South, that it should represent the whole 
country... In the beginning it regarded itself as an association of twelve 
good clubs banded together for mutual advantage, and although it now 
numbers 36 clubs it neither claims to be a "representative national body" 
nor to do anything except regulate its own competition. " 
During the 1909 debate he re-emphasised his view that 'the Football League does not 
aspire to be a National League'51 but expressed a fear that it was in danger of opening 
48 
. 4thletic News, 5 April 1909; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 17 March 1909. 49 Football League Circular to Clubs, 30 April 1909. 
50,4thletic News, 24 April 1905. 
51 Football and Sports Special, 16 January 1909. 
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its doors too widely to ambitious clubs across the country and hence being 'forced into 
the position of a national body'. 52 
Secondly, this argument also became linked to elements of north-south or London 
against the provinces rivalry which, as Mason has indicated, were evident in organised 
football from at least the early 1880s. 53 There was a widely held conception of the 
Football League as a small, selective and geographically restricted competition in 
which the provinces, and Lancashire especially, should be autonomous from 
metropolitan control. The entry of four London clubs after 1905, and subsequent 
proposals of amalgamation with the south, thus appeared to threaten not only the 
existing power structure but also the-identity of the League. As Lewis noted in May 
19 09, 'For some time I have held and expressed the opinion that the Football League 
was in danger of assuming too much of a London complexion'. He went on: 'if a 
Third Division is brought into existence under the suggested scheme it can only be a 
matter of a very few seasons before... a competition which was provincial in its 
inception, and provincial in spirit, will have all its safeguards broken down'. 54 
Moreover, animosity towards the Southern League specifically had been fuelled by 
events of the previous few years. League officials and club directors had clearly been 
incensed by the Southern League's expulsions of 1908 and the subsequent veto placed 
on clubs. This built on the existing bitterness between the leagues over transfer 
problems and the poaching of players as well as the southern body's alleged attempts 
to lure away Woolwich Arsenal, the Football League's senior southern member. 
Accordingly Tom Houghton, chairman of Preston North End, argued that the Southern 
League 'had always been their [the League's] greatest enemies... in a football sense' 
rather than compatriots and should thus be left to organise their own competition. 
Other club directors at the decisive general meeting of 30 April agreed that, while they 
favoured the formation of a third division in principle, certain clubs in the north and 
midlands had stronger claims than the 18 southern clubs whom 'they knew nothing 
about'. 55 
52 Birmingham Sporting Mail, 17 April 1909. 
53 Mason, Association Football, p. 75. Also see Mason, 'Football, Sport of the North? ', pp. 41-52. 54 F otb 11 dS ortS S eCial I Ma 1909. 0a an PptY 5-5 Both quotations from Report of Football League SGM in Athletic News, 3 May 1909. 
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In addition to these major objections to the principle of a national league there were a 
number of practical difficulties. Most significant was the problem of increased 
travelling expenses for those clubs unfortunate enough to be relegated to a 
predominantly southern third division. Most commentators recognised that for 
struggling northern clubs relegation could lead to financial ruin and cited Bradford 
Park Avenue's heavy loss of E1,360 in just one season of Southern League football 
56 during 1907/08. It is worth noting that most Southern League clubs outside London 
were also worried about possible future increases in travel costs. A representative of 
Plymouth Argyle intimated this in an interview during early 1909 while two years 
later the Swindon secretary asserted more directly 'that his club is not in favour of 
travelling about to meet Walsall, Kettering, Chesterfield, or the like when their 
journeys in their own league are economical and convenient'. 57 Equally problematic 
was the fact that an enlarged League contravened FA rules and might cause objections 
from the governing body. The FA's regulations for the sanction and control of 
leagues restricted the size of any league to 40 clubs and required consent for any 
alterations in composition. At a time of serious friction between the two bodies some 
believed that FA approval was far from certain. Stoke's secretary H. D. Austerberry 
thought the governing body would need 'to be satisfied that such an extension was 
necessary, or desirable, and that no serious injury would be inflicted on other 
58 competitions'. Having said this, it must be noted that those more directly connected 
with the procedure and attitude of the FA argued that it would not be inflexible or 
stand in the way of a merger of this type, a point confirmed by the smooth passage of 
the third division through the Leagues Sanction Committee when it was finally 
formed in 1920. 
Those within the Football League who supported amalgamation with the south tended 
to regard it as both a means of strengthening the competition and a way of solving 
existing financial difficulties. Clearly leading figures like Sutcliffe and Bentley were 
at least partly motivated by the increased prestige and power which aggrandisement 
56 Athletic News, 18 January 1909; Arnold, A Game That Would Pay, p. 5 8. By comparison, Bradford 
PA suffered a loss ofjust L500 after election to the Football League the following season and made a 
P rofit in each subsequent season until the first world war. 
7 Athletic News, 25 January 1909,30 October 1911. 
58 Athletic News, II January 1909. 
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brought. The concept of a national league embracing the best clubs in the south as 
well as the north had a powerful hold on Committeemen of this kind who, in contrast 
with the earlier period, were more concerned with the progress of the League as a 
whole than the well-being of individual clubs. More importantly, there was a feeling 
that amalgamation represented a type of panacea for the wage and transfer problems 
afflicting League clubs at the time and that it would enable club directorates to 
exercise tighter control over their employees. Up to this point neither league 
recognised the other's registration rights, which resulted in an unfettered traffic of 
players between the two. This, it was said, would be solved if the whole of the elite 
professional game came under a single authority. In the same way it was rather 
simplistically asserted that amalgamation would end the maximum wage and bonus 
disputes. This was certainly the view of Sutcliffe in February 1907 when he 
supported his proposed scheme by arguing that: 
the wage rule was passed to prevent poaching. The League rules 
safeguarded its clubs from each other, but not from outsiders. 'me League 
had to fear the Southern League clubs and vice versa. But if the Southern 
League joined the Football League then the weakened poorer clubs are 
safeguarded by League rule, better than by any maximum wage rule, or 
limitation... of bonus. 59 
Bentley similarly thought that the proposed third division in 1909 would 4go a long 
way towards stopping the trouble and discontent they had had during... the past 
season. It would make clubs more secure and players more settled'. 60 
There seems little doubt that a concerted effort was made by influential League 
officials, including Bentley and Sutcliffe, to bring the projected national league to 
fruition in 1909. An opponent of the idea even angrily suggested that 'some members 
of the Management Committee... are determined that the Southern League shall come 
in under one pretence or another'. 61 Yet the practical difficulties of achieving a three- 
quarters majority to alter the League constitution, together with the general inertia of 
clubs towards any legislative change, made the task insurmountable. Given that the 
59 Athletic News, 25 February 1907. 
60 Report of Football League SGM in Athletic News, 3 May 1909. 
61 Comment by Tom Houghton from Report of Football League SGM in Athletic News, 3 May 1909. 
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majority of clubs, such as Sheffield United whose representative was left to vote at his 
own discretion, were fairly non-committal on the issue 62 , the attacks launched by 
Lewis in the press and by Houghton, Middlesborough's Colonel Poole and Clapton 
Orient's Captain Wells-Holland at the special meeting proved sufficient to defeat the 
motion by three votes. But the whole episode had certainly helped to cement official 
relations between the leagues because in February 1910 it was finally agreed to 
recognise each other's player registration and transfer rights and establish the joint 
English League Board as an arbitration body (see chapter 1). 
There was a fresh wave of agitation for a national league in 1911, though on this 
occasion the Southern League as a body was left on the margins. In May a small 
group of northern clubs led by Lincoln City asked the Management Committee once 
more to look into the idea of a third division. The Committee responded by calling 
for applicants in the press: twenty clubs replied, five of whom were members of the 
second division of the Southern League. Although the Management Committee had 
made no commitment to forming a third division, and indeed subsequently withdrew 
the idea, the episode still caused acute embarrassment to the Southern League. In 
view of the newly developed understanding and closer relations between the bodies 
the Southern League informed its northern counterpart that the latter's independent 
action in considering the formation of a third division was 'an unfriendly act'. As A. 
J. Darnell, one of the leading southern officials, commented: 'When we entered into 
agreement with the Football League... there was no talk or suggestion of a Third 
Division, and I really think that the least the Football League can do is to consult us on 
63 the matter' . External calls 
for a third division continued into the winter as two 
largely separate movements, based respectively around prominent Southern League 
and northern non-League clubs, emerged to campaign for this end. After considerable 
agitation, a referendum of League clubs again resulted in the overwhelming rejection 
of the idea of a third division, with just twelve out of forty in favour. 64 The reasons 
clubs gave for this decision confirm the feeling of Athletic News that a division of this 
type would 'materially lower the calibre and dignity of the League'. 65 For example, 
" Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 28 April 1909. 
63 Report of Southern League AGM in Athletic News, 19 June 1911. 
64 Athletic News, II and 18 December 1911. 
65 Athletic News, 6 November 1911. 
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the Sheffield United Committee thought a third division was impracticable while 
Aston Villamore directly, replied that 'the clubs were not considered good enough'. 66 
Moreover, by this stage it seems that Preston had grown tired of the incessant appeals 
for action from outside parties. At the next annual meeting the president, John 
McKenna, wearily dismissed as inconsequential the contents of a postcard given to 
him mooting the formation of a third division. 67 
Certainly, there were no serious suggestions of expansion or amalgamation up to or 
during the war. Moreover, by the end of 1918 the Southern League was both 
competitively and administratively weaker than at any other time in its existence. In 
December 1918 the Southern League agreed as a body to apply to enter the Football 
League, either as a third division or a regionalised second division. 68 Yet by this time 
the advantages of amalgamation for the League seemed minimal. Indeed, Athletic 
News called the Southern League's proposal 'a miserable document' and thought its 
clubs should 'set their house in order and save themselves, a much finer ambition than 
to hang on to the coat-tails of their brethren in the Midlands and the North' . 
69 Hence, 
on the direction of the Management Committee, the clubs decided once again not to 
entertain the Southern League's proposals. 
However, the admission of individual Southern League clubs continued. Stoke had 
rejoined the Football League in 1915, Coventry City were co-opted in 1918 and along 
with West Ham United were elected to full membership in March 1919, while an 
70 additional seven Southern League clubs also initially applied . These losses 
evidently proved too much for the Southern League executive, who subsequently 
claimed all rights to the players of its three former clubs. 7 1 Furthermore, Harry 
Bradshaw, the Southern League secretary, argued that his league had been 'treated in a 
most unfriendly manner by the Football League' when West Ham was elected to the 
League without first resigning from its present competition. In the light of this, and 
66 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 13 December 1911; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 12 
December 1911. 
67 Minutes of Football League, 3 June 1912 (AGM). 
6' Minutes of West Ham United FC, 9 December 1918. 
69 Athletic News, 20 January 1919. 
70 Harrison, Southern League Football, p. 57. 
71 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 17 March, 9 April 1919;, 4thletic News, 23 June 1919. 
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other alleged examples of discourtesy and disregard on the part of the League, 
Bradshaw informed the League of the Southern League's immediate withdrawal from 
the 1910 transfer agreement. 72 The League in response stood firm, backing its new 
recruits and telling them to ignore the Southern League's claims. This conclusive 
breach in relations between the two bodies had important repercussions. As well as 
terminating formal connections it clearly weakened the Southern League's claims to 
be treated as an equal partner in the League combine. Athletic News felt that the 
Southern League had now reduced itself 'to quite a parochial organisation' while the 
League was increasingly coming to be perceived, and to perceive itself, as a national 
league. 73 
Yet the eventual absorption of the first division of the Southern League to create a 
national league during 1920 was certainly not the inevitable or logical culmination of 
these events. On the contrary, it was more a product of improvisation on the part of a 
small group of League officials and club directors. In March of that year, Sutcliffe, 
previously the most influential proponent of the idea, had publicly stated that he now 
believed a third division would not strengthen the Football League but hold it back. 74 
Whether this was a ploy intended to generate discussion on the idea must remain a 
matter for conjecture. It is instructive, however, that less than a month later he wrote 
an article in Athletic News advocating a possible scheme for the formation of a third 
division separated into northern and southern sections, the latter to be made up 
entirely of the Southern League first division. But, in contrast to previous schemes, 
the new clubs would only be admitted as associate rather than full members, with no 
voting or transfer rights, and under the guidance and control of the Management 
Committee (see Appendix 4). Although Sutcliffe presented this as 'a scheme for 
discussion, not adoption 75 , there was an immediate response and agitation began 
apace in both the north and south. Within two weeks a group of northern clubs had 
committed themselves to the adoption of Sutcliffe's scheme and a few days later the 
Southern League clubs agreed almost unanimously to re-apply to the League for their 
7' Athletic News, 28 July 1919. 
73 Athletic News, 28 July 1919. 
74 Athletic News, 29 March 1920. 
73 Athletic News, 3 May 1920. 
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election en bloc. 76 By the time of the annual meeting in early June the League had 
received deputations from both groups and Sutcliffe's scheme had been approved by 
the Management Committee, although it was decided to postpone the formation of the 
northern section for at least a year. Not surprisingly, the proposal generated some 
opposition, principally from Everton, whose representative thought the clubs needed 
more time to consider such a 'huge revolution' in the League's composition. Yet 
Sutcliffe's appeal that 'the League should comprise all the great clubs in the country' 
was powerful enough to gain the requisite support. The th ree-quarters majority was 
attained with only eight dissidents. 77 
Within just a month of Sutcliffe's speculative article, then, the national league had 
become a reality: as 'Tityrus' observed, it 'arose like Aladdin's palace' . 
78 Why it 
should have happened at this time, and so rapidly, is not easy to explain. Arnold and 
Benveniste's contention that it was 'a defensive mechanism to prevent the Southern 
League growing in importance' is clearly mistaken. 79 As we have seen, the Southern 
League had been gradually weakened over the previous twenty years by the regular 
loss of its leading clubs to the Football League and, by 1920, was increasingly seen as 
a cul-de-sac offering no long-term future for ambitious clubs. A more plausible 
argument is that expansion was linked to the immediate post-war financial well-being 
of the game in general. In common with other sectors of the leisure industry, and the 
economy in general, professional football experienced a significant post-war boom, 
with the 1919/20 season witnessing the highest attendances on record. Moreover, the 
League itself was more prosperous than it had ever been, enjoying a surplus of L3,600, 
which had been greatly aided by a new half per cent levy on all gates (see chapter 4). 80 
It may have been that in these circumstances the members felt confident enough to 
risk taking on an extra twenty, and subsequently forty-four, clubs without the financial 
or footballing guarantees which were usually required. 
76 Francis, Seventy Five Years, p. 43. - 
77 Minutes of Football League, 29 May, 31 May 1920 (AGM); Report of Football League AGM in 
Athletic News, 7 June 1920. 
71 Athletic News, 7 June 1920. 
79 A. J. Arnold and I. Benveniste, 'Wealth and Poverty in the English Football League', Accounting and 
Business Research, 17,1987, p. 196. 
" Jones, Workers at Play, p. 36; Inglis, League Football, p. 120. 
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VAiile opposition to the idea of a national league amongst League and club officials 
seemed largely to have dissipated by 1920, there were still some vocal critics. The 
attitude of players themselves is of some significance here. For those engaged by the 
newly-elected third division clubs it may have been that their status and potential 
financial opportunities were raised; though a more plausible assumption is that the 
change had little real effect as their immediate relationship to their employers had not 
altered. For players engaged by first or second Division clubs, however, the impact 
was more dramatic. Charlie Buchan retrospectively called the creation of the two 
third division sections 'the biggest mistake in [the Football League's] history. First, 
he believed that it had led to a lowering of playing standards as 'there were not 
enough first-class players to go round'. More importantly, however, Buchan 
suggested that the amalgamation of the two premier league organisations had ftirther 
restricted the players' freedom of movement by precluding those who were 
dissatisfied at League clubs from moving to a Southern League club without transfer. 
The Southern League had been 'an outlet, and a blessing, to the lesser-known second 
team man' but by the summer of 1921 the Football League had finally closed and 
sealed this avenue of opportunity. 81 
3. The Election of Clubs 
The development of the Football League was not simply a matter of expansion. As 
economists of sport have shown, changes in the composition of the agreed number of 
clubs can also act as a means of controlling the quality of a league and ensuring its 
financial viability. Unlike in the United States, the League had no equivalent to the 
franchise system which allowed the league executive to move club franchises from 
smaller towns or less densely-populated areas to ones with a greater crowd potential. 82 
Instead, changes could be made annually via the election system. The clubs with the 
poorest playing records during the season were compelled to apply for re-election, 
together with any clubs outside the League who wanted to join. Member clubs were 
then able to make individual judgements and vote by secret ballot on the applicants 
a' Charlie Buchan, ALifetime in Football, London, 1956, pp. 64,66. 12 P. J. Sloane, 'Restriction of Competition in Professional Team Sports, Bulletin ofEconomic 
Research, 18,1976, p. 5; Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 112. 
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most suitable for admission. This section will look at the whole election process but 
will concentrate particularly on the motives of those voting, which were certainly 
more varied and complex than some previous work has suggested. Tischler, for 
example, has emphasised the exclusive importance of population size and the club's 
ability to draw crowds as factors in the election of clubs. 83 This analysis is more in 
keeping with the view taken by Arnold, which suggests a broad range of influences. 
He argues that voting was made 'by reference to geographical and traditional factors 
as well as the economic or playing attributes of the various applicants'. 84 
The election of clubs had by 1900 become an established part of the proceedings at 
each annual meeting. Aside from resignations, which were rare, the system offered 
emerging clubs outside the League their only chance of admission. Hence, as Table 
2.2 shows, the number of applications tayed relatively high throughout he period and 
existing members were rarely elected unopposed. Initially the bottom four clubs had 
to apply for re-election each season but this was reduced to three in 1898 and then two 
by 1908. From 1921 two clubs from each section of the third division were required 
to retire from, and then re-apply to, their individual sections and this system continued 
to the end of the period. Applications for membership had to be sent in writing to the 
League offices well in advance of the annual meeting - after the First World War, by 
10 May each year - and representatives were then able to address the voting members 
at the meeting for up to three minutes, though, as we shall see, this was dispensed 
with after 1924. If two applicants received the same number of votes, the 
unsuccessful applicants withdrew and a second ballot was taken with each club voting 
just once, and if this was inconclusive the Management Committee made a decision. 
At the beginning of the period it seems that many applicants relied on receiving 
support on the day of the meeting, either through informal canvassing or the formal 
address to voters. Athletic News observed in 1903 the role played by directors at the 
meeting: 'Hither and thither the representatives of the applying clubs flick about to 
secure votes, until those who are safe and sound themselves become bored and readily 
93 Tischler, Foothallers and Businessmen, pp. 81-82. 94 Tony Arnold, 'Rich Man, Poor Man: Economic Arrangements in the Football League' in Williams 
and Wagg (eds), British Football and Social Change, p. 52. 
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promise to vote for all and sundry'. 85 The same newspaper noted two years earlier 
how 'Personality and a pleasing voice primed with confidence go a long way at a 
League meeting when a club is applying for membership. Some speakers, like Henry 
Walker of Middlesborough and Mr. Cook of Doncaster Rovers, were regarded as 
expert orators who could elicit support quite successfully. 
86 Other applicants hoped to 
bolster their claims by enlisting local dignitaries, such as the mayor or MP, to speak 
on the club's behalL 87 Yet although it is undeniable that oratorical skills were an 
advantage it is unlikely that a good speech would get a poor applicant elected. Indeed, 
the fact that clubs were increasingly less likely to rely on securing votes at the last 
moment was underlined by the Management Committee's decision at the 1924 annual 
meeting to stop application speeches altogether in order to save time. These late 
appeals, it was felt, were no longer considered necessary 'as the clubs had presumably 
made up their minds for whom they would vote'. 88 
The minute books of several clubs reveal that long before this time applicants were 
canvassing voters well in advance of the annual meeting. This was normally done 
through the distribution of a circular letter advocating the financial, sporting and 
geographical merits of the applicant. For example, in April 1906 Oldham Athletic 
issued 250 copies of a circular 'setting out the advantages and claims of this club as a 
member of the League'. 89 In common with other clubs, this was supplemented by the 
personal efforts of club representatives. Both Charles Sutcliffe, who was acting as 
solicitor to the company and was soon to join the directorate, and the team manager 
were requested to use their influence at forthcoming meetings of the governing bodies 
to support Oldham's application. " This attempt failed but in March of the following 
season the board appointed a special sub-committee to arrange the details relating to 
the club's next application. This included the distribution throughout the north and 
midlands of an advertisement in the shape of a football with the inscription 'Oldham 
" Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, I June 1903. 
86 Reports of Football League AGMs in Athletic News, 20 May 190 1; 6 June 1904; George F. Allison, 
'The Rise of the Middlesborough FC' in Book offootball. 
27 For examples ee Athletic News, I June 1903 (Southport Central); 5 June 1911 (Grimsby Town); 10 
June 1912 and 7 June 1920 (Lincoln City). 
Minutes of Football League, 2 June 1924 (AGM). 
Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 19 April 1906. 
90 Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 19 April 1906. 
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wants League football', as well as a personal deputation to every voting club. 
91 West 
Ham United similarly sent three directors and the secretary on separate visits to 
Birmingham, Grimsby, Hull, Lincoln, Nottingham and Coventry in support of its 
application in 1919.92 
Table Z2 Applications for Football League Membership, 1900-39 
Year Places Available No. Applications Year Places Available No. Applications 
1900 3 7 1922 4 10 
1901 3 9 1923 6@ 12 
1902 3 4 1924 4 4 
1903 3 8 1925 4 7 
1904 3 5 1926 4 7 
1905 7* 8 1927 4 13 
1906 3 5 1929 4 11 
1907 3 9 1929 4 16 
1908 3 6 1930 4 11 
1909 2 5 1931 4 10 
1910 2 7 1932 4 9 
1911 2 7 1933 4 9 
1912 2 8 1934 4 5 
1913 2 8 1935 4 7 
1914 2 8 1936 4 9 
1915 2 6 1937 4 8 
1919 4* 8 1939 4 not known 
1920 22+ 25 1939 4 not known 
1921 24- 28 
0 League expanded by 4 clubs. 
+ Third Division of 22 clubs added. 
Third Division Northern Section of 20 clubs added. 
@2 clubs added to Northern Section. 
Sources: Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 108-112; Reports of Football League AGMs in Athletic News, 5 June 1905,26 
July 1915. 
The example of Ipswich Town indicates how sophisticated and expensive applications 
to the Football League had become by the 1930s. In November 1936, almost six 
months before the next annual meeting, the board appointed one of its directors to 
begin 'propaganda work on behalf of this club with the Football League clubs' and 
allocated; C200 as an initial sum to a special propaganda account for this purpose. 
93 In 
April 1937, the secretary-manager was instructed to apply formally for admission to 
the third division southern section and to proceed with a brochure for circularisation 
91 Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, II March 1907; Garth Dykes, Oldham Athletic: Complete Record, 
1899-1988, Derby, 1993; Athletic News, 13 May 1907. 
92 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 25 February 1919. 
93 Minutes of Ipswich Town FC, 2 November 1936. 
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amongst all the League clubs. Though the application proved unsuccessful the club's 
Finance Committee reported that E340 in total had been expended on the propaganda 
account. 94 
To have any chance of being elected, then, it was clearly becoming essential to do 
more than simply state your case: the facts could not be left to speak for themselves. 
Prior to the 1920 annual meeting, Athletic News noted that of the seven candidates for 
inclusion in the second division only the four who had 'prosecuted an active canvass' 
had any real hope of success. 
95 The press could be an extremely useful ally in this 
situation. From at least the late 1900s, sporting and general papers began to seriously 
discuss the merits of the various candidates and print parts, or the whole, of their 
circular appeals. Athletic News was certainly devoting a considerable amount of space 
to these appeals on its front page by 1911. It was generally accepted that newspapers 
were important in publicising a club's case. In 1909 the Sheffield weekly, Football 
and Sports Special, lauded one candidate for its close contact with the press 
throughout its campaign and contrasted this with the complacency of a rival club: 'we 
heard practically nothing of what they were doing, or whether they desired any sort of 
help'. 96 
Many applicants also actively sought the support of influential League clubs or 
directors. Friends within the League circle could undoubtedly offer practical 
assistance and give greater weight to the arguments for admission. Middlesborough's 
election to the second division at the first attempt in 1899 was thought to have been 
97 Ithanks to the influence of the Northern delegates. Ipswich Town's successful 
application in 1938 also probably owed a great deal to the personal canvassing of Sir. 
Samuel Hill-Wood, the Arsenal chairman, on the club's behalf. Hill-Wood was an 
acquaintance of the Ipswich chairman Captain J. M. Cobbold and had helped in the 
Suffolk club's preparations the previous season by offering them practical assistance, 
114 Minutes of Ipswich Town FC, 5 April 1937; Minutes of Ipswich Town FC (Finance Committee), 12 
June 1937. 
93 Athletic News, 31 May 1920. 
96 Football and Sports Special, 12 June 1909. 
97 Allison, 'Rise of Middlesborough FC. 
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including a set of tip-up seats for the stadiUM. 98 Thus following the announcement of 
Ipswich's election, the secretary was instructed to write to Hill-Wood 'and thank him 
for all he had done for this club'. 99 Some clubs actually approached members of the 
Management Committee or other League officials directly, even though it was 
customary for the Committee to remain neutral in the election of clubs. Sutcliffe thus 
reported in 1920 that certain clubs had contacted him and other Committeemen to test 
the likelihood of being elected if an application were made. 100 This type of secret 
activity was particularly common amongst clubs who stood to be heavily fined by, or 
even expelled from, their respective leagues if a formal application to the Football 
League was made without due notice. 
More seriously, there was clearly a problem throughout the period of candidates 
offering certain baits or incentives, usually of a financial nature, to voting clubs. 
Chelsea and Clapton Orient had begun this trend in 1905 by agreeing to pay northern 
clubs E20 and midland clubs E15 for each visit to London over a period of three 
years. 101 Following similar promises by Fulham two years later several clubs began to 
feel that such payments constituted a 'bribe', or at the very least gave the payer an 
unfair advantage, and in 1908 it was resolved that 'no club applying for admission to 
the League should be allowed to hold out any inducement whatever in the shape of 
102 travelling expenses to clubs already holding membership'. It is unlikely, however, 
that this prevented applicants from offering surreptitious inducements in order to 
facilitate their election, though there is a lack of solid evidence. The Sheffield United 
directors were certainly aware of improper conduct on the part of certain candidates 
during the 1920 elections and subsequently called on the Management Committee to 
take some action. 103 It appears that nothing was done because by 1931 the president 
had to warn non-League clubs again that the practices of 'touting for votes' or 
'keeping open house' would be punished in ftiture by disqualification. 104 
98 Minutes of Ipswich Town FC, 3 May 1937. 
99 Minutes of Ipswich Town FC, 7 June 1938. 
100 Athletic News, 3 May 1920. 
101 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 5 June 1905; Sutcliffe el al., Football League, p. 
79. 
102 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, I June 1908. 
103 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, I June 1920. 
'04 Minutes of Football League, I June 1931 (AGM). 
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More sinister even than this were allegations that League clubs were being paid to 
resign their membership. Although the contemporary press and clubs vociferously 
denied that dishonourable conduct of this kind ever occurred, it is evident that some 
clubs were so anxious to join the League that they were prepared to pay for the 
opportunity. A perfect example is Oldham Athletic's admission to the League in June 
1907. The club's minutes reveal that on 10 June 1907 the board were informed of the 
financial difficulties of Burslem Port Vale and agreed to offer that club E1,000, 
including the transfer of two of its players, 'on their resigning membership of the 
Football League Ltd., [and] providing this Club is elected to the membership of the 
said League in their place'. 105 Four days later Port Vale notified the League secretary 
of their decision and on 15 June Oldham Athletic were elected according to precedent, 
as they had headed the voting list of unsuccessful candidates at the last annual 
meeting. 106 There were rumours of a similar arrangement between Stoke and 
Tottenham Hotspur the following year, even though Stoke publicly announced that 
their resignation 'had not been influenced in any way by financial inducements from 
any club desirous of obtaining a position in the League'. 107 
Nevertheless, it appears that in the majority of cases there was no hint of any direct 
financial benefit from supporting one candidate over another. Indirect financial 
benefit, of course, was an entirely different matter. Contemporary observers certainly 
believed that financial strength and large potential gates were increasingly becoming 
the deciding factors in the election of clubs. This is difficult to prove conclusively as 
voting took place by ballot and therefore the votes of individual clubs, not to mention 
the reasons behind them, are hard to detect. Club minute books are unfortunately also 
taciturn on this subject, not least because such decisions were often not decided at 
board level but instead were discussed informally or left to the club representative's 
discretion. However, some indication might be provided by studying the type of 
arguments made by prospective members both at the annual meeting and in the 
"' minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 10 June 1907. The club paid Burslem Port Vale L 1,150 in total and 
actually had to take out an overdraft of L400 to do so. Minutes, 12,13 June 1907. 106Manchester Evening News, 14 June 1907. 
'0' Birmingham Sporting Mail, 20 June 1908. Also see the account in Julian Holland, Spurs: A History 
of Tottenham Hotspur Football Club, London, 1957, pp. 74-75. 
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printed circulars which had become commonplace by the mid-1900s. It is firstly 
important to distinguish between clubs applying for re-election and those outside the 
League seeking to gain entry, as they tended to employ distinct forms of reasoning. 
The main tactic of the first group was, not surprisingly, to stress their long connection 
with, and loyalty to, the League. For the major clubs who rarely finished in the 
bottom two or three of the lowest division this was a fairly straightforward matter. 
Thus Burnley's representative in 1903 promised that the club 'would not offend 
again' while Nottingham Forest's appeal for readmission in 1914 was based entirely 
on its 'long and honourable career' and past contribution to the League. 108 But for a 
club like Lincoln City, which was regularly required to justify its League place, the 
need to evoke a sense of tradition and loyalty became crucial. A typical example was 
the club's circular appeal of 1911 which stated that 'Our connection with the League 
has extended over eighteen years and during that period all the duties and obligations 
of League membership have been honourably fulfilled'. It was mentioned, in 
addition, that 'we are also one of the oldest clubs in the country'. 109 
The approach of non-League clubs was completely different. They clearly had more 
to prove and thus tended to adopt more substantial and wider-ranging arguments. 
Oldham Athletic's circular appeal of 1907 (shown in full in Appendix 5) was 
characteristic of the type of document sent to the club electorate. It began by stating 
that the intention of the document was 
to lay before you the reasons why we consider our admittance will be 
beneficial not only to the League, but to Association Football, its 
followers and supporters generally; with the object of gaining your 
assistance and support at the Annual Meeting of the League. 
It then covered a number of areas in which the club was presented as either reaching 
the necessary standards or offering something extra to the League. Firstly, the 
population within the town, the parliamentary borough, and a five and ten mile radius 
were stated, together with details of its geographical accessibility and transport 
facilities. Secondly, emphasis was placed on the pedigree and record of the team in 
"' Reports of Football League AGMs inAthletic News, I June 1903,1 June 1914. 
109 Lincoln City FC Election Circular, quoted in Athletic News, 22 May 1911. 
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their present league competition and in the FA Cup. Thirdly, the club's ability to 
attract good crowds - 'we have been able to obtain 8,000 spectators regularly' - and its 
ground capacity and facilities were noted. Fourthly, the financial basis and security of 
the club were outlined and, finally, the document stressed the role of the club in 
popularising the association code in the area, with the intimation that election would 
quicken and strengthen this progress. 110 By the end of the 1900s this type of format 
had become a blueprint for non-League candidates. Of course, clubs naturally placed 
greater emphasis on what they considered their strong points to be - whether playing 
record, ground facilities or finances - but few chose to deviate from the general 
pattern. Some circulars, like that accompanying Huddersfield Town's application in 
1910, were especially meticulous. In addition to the standard contents, the 
Huddersfield board included a report by the renowned engineer and architect 
Archibald Leitch on the proposed development of the ground, along with a sketch of 
the ground, and even a list of railway tariffs for travelling teams and spectators. "' 
The importance of adequate railway facilities deserves special attention here. While it 
seems too prescriptive to suggest that the growth of the League retraced the growth of 
the national railway system, there was undoubtedly a close link between the two. As 
James Catton remarked in 1919: 
What has been made the first point urged in any application for 
membership of The Football League? The ease with which visiting clubs 
could get to the new centre and away from it. If the proposed new centre 
was served by several railway companies and linked with various lines the 
facts weighed with those who had cast their votes. 112 
For all clubs, a good railway link became an essential prerequisite for admission; for 
some, it was the main selling-point. Those located at the extremities of the country 
were especially anxious to pacify the concerns of the existing members over possible 
transport difficulties. Darlington based each annual application to the League between 
110 Oldham Athletic Circular to Clubs in support of Application for Admission to the Football League, 
AF ril 1907. (Thanks to Garth Dykes for this reference). 
" Huddersfield Town FC Election Circular, quoted in Hudders II Ex ifle dDaiy aminer, 28Apri 19 0. 
The work and influence of Archibald Leitch is discussed in Inglis, Football Grounds, especially pp. 16. 
18. 
112 Athletic News, 13 October 1919. 
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1910 and 1914 on the town's position at 'the centre of the North-Eastern Railway 
system'. It was also emphasised that the 'North-Eastern Railway Company are 
making [Darlington] their headquarters, and are transferring their works from 
Gateshead and York'. ' 13 Though not a 'railway town' in the same sense as 
Darlington, Carlisle United's successful 1928 circular noted that the town was 'one of 
the best served railway centres in the British Isles'. York City's address to electors in 
the same year stated that the city was 'situated on the main line between London and 
Newcastle served by a railway service second to none'. 114 Furthermore, as the railway 
network expanded in the first two decades of the century, and competition between 
companies increased' 15, so most club grounds became served by two or more stations 
or lines (see Appendix 6). For example, clubs or supporters destined for either of the 
Bradford clubs in 1910 could travel on the Midland, the North Eastern, the Lancashire 
and Yorkshire, the Great Northern or the Great Central Railways. Ten years later a 
connection had been added by the London and North Western Railway. 
Until the 1920s there were no minimum standards or requirements for entry laid down 
by the League, although it seems likely that member clubs judged applicants 
according to their own informal criteria. This changed with the formation of the third 
division, and particularly the northern section, which was thought by many to include 
a number of unknown clubs with unproven track records. At the 1920 annual meeting 
the Management Committee had postponed the formation of a northern section for 
one season because it felt that the suggested clubs were 'not strong enough both 
financially and in playing strength'. ' 16 This uncertainty led the following season to 
the Committee vetting all applications for the first time, through a process of ground 
inspections and questionnaires. Prospective candidates were required to have dressing 
rooms with proper facilities attached to their grounds and suitable accommodation for 
officials rather than the haphazard arrangement of changing at hotels and the like 
113 Darlington FC Election Circular, quoted in Athletic News, 8 May 1911. Darlington were not 
admitted into the League until 1921 as part of the newly-formed third division northern section. 114 Carlisle United FC and York City FC Election Circulars, quoted in Athletic News, 4 June 1928. 
York were elected to the third division the following season. 115 See P. J. Cain, 'Railways 1870-1914: the maturity of the private system' in Michael J. Freeman and Derek H. Aldcroft (eds), Transport in Victorian Britain, Manchester, 1988, pp. 115-18. 116 Minutes of Football League, 29 May 1920. 
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which was prevalent at the time. 117 In addition, the Management Committee sent each 
candidate a list of questions 'which are so searching as to obtain complete information 
with reference to applying clubs'. It inquired into the condition and status of the club; 
its financial position and future prospects; the gate money received; and the nature and 
holding capacity of the ground, enclosure and stands, while Athletic News advised 
candidates to add details concerning the size of the local population and catchment 
area. 118 Again in 1924 the Management Committee examined the credentials of 
outside applicants and recommended only those clubs that were felt to reach the 
necessary standards. But it was not until 1927 that these entry qualifications finally 
became formalised. Tbereafter, applicants were required to supply the Committee and 
clubs with balance sheets from the previous two seasons, details of the members and 
shareholders, average attendances for both first and second team fixtures and 
particulars of the ground capacity, location and dressing-room facilities. ' 19 
The impression given in both the circular appeals and these more formal guidelines is 
that the financial strength and potential of clubs underpinned the whole election 
system. In particular, the population of the town, city or area of the club was regarded 
by observers in the press as the decisive factor in the selection of one candidate over 
another. As early as the 1905 annual meeting, Athletic News noted that 'the tone was 
of big populations and money'. At the same time, Lewis stressed his objection 'to the 
elbowing out of old clubs to make room for new ones with no recommendations but 
money, and the fact that they are in bigger centres of population'. 120 In November 
1911, Athletic News again reported the opinion of an ex-club director that 'no town of 
less than a population of 250,000 could run a first-class professional team, although 
the paper then went on to list seven first division clubs situated in towns of less than 
200,000 and a further two in less than 100,000.121 Certainly the 1900s and early 
1910s saw the replacement of a number of small town clubs with those from larger 
industrial centres. As Appendix 7 shows, there were dramatic changes in the 
composition of the League, as relatively new clubs from Bristol, London and the West 
117 Sheffield United FC Programme, 6 September 1920. 
"a Minutes of Football League, 10 January 1921; Athletic News, 17 January 1921. 
119 Minutes of Football League, 12 May 1924; 8 April 1927 (SGM); Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 
99. 
120 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 5 June 1905;, 41hletic News, 24 April 1905. 
121 Athletic News, 6 November 1911. 
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Riding of Yorkshire were admitted in place of their counterparts in places like 
Loughborough, Burton and Gainsborough. In the five years between 1903 and 1908 
alone, four clubs from the capital had been elected together with two clubs from 
Bradford, England's eighth largest city, and one from the fifth largest, Leeds. 122 
Clubs were undoubtedly less conservative in their voting than they had been in the 
early years and were often accused of being unsympathetic to the claims of those 
seeking re-election. As Stoke's H. D. Austerberry told his fellow representatives in 
1908: 
the face of football politics had vastly changed during the past few years, 
and whether they wished it or not, they knew very well that a little 
struggling club that came to the annual meeting and applied for admission 
would not stand the slightest chance. 123 
Tottenham Hotspur's election in place of Lincoln City in 1908 is perhaps the best 
illustration of this tendency. Tischler has used this case to exemplify the way in 
which the poorer clubs from smaller cities were unceremoniously discarded in favour 
of wealthier and better situated clubs. He quotes the opinion of a writer in a Lincoln 
newspaper who saw it as contemptible that the club 'should go under before the 
encroachment of clubs with their ignoble and sole consideration of the "big purse9'9 . 
124 
Clearly there was an element of this but the reality was far more complex. Tottenham 
had an impressive playing record both in the Southern League and the FA Cup, which 
they actually won in 1901, whereas Lincoln had finished in the bottom three on a 
number of occasions, including the two previous seasons. Athletic News believed that 
Lincoln had received sufficient 'warning' and had appealed for help too often: 'The 
members of the League can grow tired of re-electing a club in an age where the 
tendency is to concentrate the best professional football in the largest centres". In 
addition, it was noted that the widespread feeling that Lincoln acted as a nursery club 
for Chelsea may have lost it considerable support. 125 In contrast, the press generally 
agreed that Tottenham were a more attractive side who would draw large crowds and 
122 See Arnold, 'Belated Entry', pp. 326-27. 
123 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, I June 1908. 
124 Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 82. 
125 Athletic News, 8 July 1908. 
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could easily survive in either division. 'Whilst feeling much sympathy with Lincoln', 
opined a writer in the Birmingham Sporting Mail, 'I cannot help thinking that the 
presence of a powerful club like Tottenham will be for the general advantage of the 
competition'. 126 The Yorkshire Post agreed that 'Tottenham always play good 
football and they will be an attraction wherever they play'. 127 
The benefit of voting for clubs likely to attract large attendances became more 
obvious with the introduction of gate pooling during the war. From 1919 the home 
club was obliged to pay 20 per cent of its gate to the visitors, which meant that the 
home gates of applicants as well as their drawing power away from home became 
significant. Thus, two clubs from huge industrial conurbations, Leeds United and 
Cardiff City, were convincingly elected to the first division in that year ahead of well 
established rivals. Athletic News backed the cause of the outside applicants 
unreservedly: 
In these days of big towns' football and gate sharing, the claims of Cardiff 
City and Leeds United stand out pre-eminently. League football in these 
great centres would be a source of strength to the fellow members. The 
proposition needs no argument. Sentiment is one thing; practicality is 
another. League football is more and more a matter of revenue. 129 
The point had been put even more explicitly following the admission of Coventry 
City, West Ham United, South Shields and Rotherham County the previous March: 
The election was decided, whether consciously or not, on the doctrine of 
the survival of the fittest. Financial fitness was the test. The League 
cannot afford to carry clubs which need help... Obligations to players and 
the cost of football generally in the future imposes a burden that can only 
be met by those clubs which will be powerful allies, and which are likely 
to hand over substantial cheques to the visitors. Little doles as between 
club and club... will be of no use in the days to come. 129 
During the 1920s good gates appeared to assure League status regardless of on-field 
performances. James Catton, for example, argued in 1923 that Aberdare Athletic 
126 Birmingham Sporting Mail, 4 July 1908. 
127 Quoted in Sinimons, Tottenham Hotspur, p. 75. 
129 Athletic News, 24 May 1920. 
129 Athletic NeWS' 17 March 1919. 
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deserved re-election 'as their gates have been excellent, in spite of reverses, and they 
have more then paid their way'. 130 The electorate evidently agreed because Aberdare 
were duly re-elected without a single dissentient. The question of gate money was 
probably also significant in Oldham Athletic's decision in 1939 to support a non- 
League candidate in the event of Hartlepools United finishing in the last two of the 
third division northern section. Hartlepools had, after all, attracted Oldham's lowest 
crowds both home and away that season. 
131 
Throughout the inter-war period, however, voting clubs became less willing than 
before to change the composition of either section of the third division. After 1922 
the Management Committee agreed to allow each third division group to recommend 
the clubs to be elected, a recommendation which would then 'carry weight with the 
League in any decisions arrived at'. 132 Invariably self-protection and group loyalty led 
to support for the retiring members at the expense of outside applicants. In the 
northern section, for example, Barrow finished bottom on four occasions between 
1923/24 and 1929/30 but were re-elected every time. Sometimes the full members 
decided to ignore the wishes of their lower brethren, as when Aberdare Athletic were 
narrowly voted out in 1927, but in the main the first and second division members 
favoured maintaining the status quo. This policy generated severe press criticism, 
particularly from Athletic News, which accused the League of turning itself into a 
4close corporation' for which 'no outsiders need apply'. In one particularly strong 
attack it condemned the League's 'narrow, unprogressive policy' of re-electing the 
bottom clubs, which automatically ruled out 'ambitious centres, and possibly stronger 
centres'. 133 In response, the Committee continually denied any intention of closing 
the door to aspiring clubs: they 'wanted the strongest competitions, but the clubs of 
the Third Division should know what was best for themselves'. 134 In 1929 the 
collusive, self-perpetuating policy of the third division was exposed by revelations 
that representatives of the two retiring clubs had been present throughout the southern 
section's private meeting and that the recommendation to the full members was 
110 Catton Folders, B, Newspaper cutting on Aberdare and Frank Bradshaw, 7 May 1923, p. 153. 131 Minutes of Oldharn Athletic FC, 3 May 1939. 
132 Minutes of Football League (Third Division Southern Section SGM), 6 March 1922. 
133 Athletic News, 4 June 1928. Also see 12 March 1928. 
134 Minutes of Football League, 30 May 1927 (AGM). 
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decided not by secret ballot but a show of hands. Under the circumstances, one non- 
League club official regarded the whole affair as 'a waste of time'; Athletic News 
considered such action to be conservative, selfish and 'all too sentimental'. 135 
While money, crowds and 'sentiment' were thus all important in the election of clubs, 
geographical and strategic factors cannot be ignored. At the beginning of the period, 
in particular, there is some evidence that the League, either at Management 
Committee level or through the collective wishes of the clubs, made a conscious effort 
to extend its boundaries by penetrating areas of rugby league dominance. One author 
has referred to the 'aggressive recruitment' of clubs from these areas and another 
suggests that by the early 1900s the League had begun plotting 'the colonization of 
136 England at the expense of every other rival organization in both football and rugby'. 
The bare facts seem to support these statements: Bradford in 1903, Leeds City and 
Hull in 1905, Oldham Athletic and Bradford Park Avenue in 1907 and Huddersfield 
Town in 1910 were all drawn from towns with both deep rugby traditions and strong 
rival Northern Union clubs. Moreover, in each of these clubs' applications for 
membership much emphasis was placed on local competition between the two codes. 
For instance, the Bradford Park Avenue representative supported his claim by 
declaring that the club's decision to take up the Association code &meant the 
extinction of Northern Unionism... in Yorkshire'. 137 Indeed, even Grimsby Town's 
election circular of 1911 played the rugby 'card', stating that 'Grimsby is being 
threatened with an invasion by the Northern Rugby Union. By having League 
football... this invasion can be stopped altogether'. 139 
Whether all this constituted a strategic policy on the League's part is less clear. There 
were certainly some suggestions that 'undue influence' had been put on clubs by the 
Management Committee to vote for Bradford City in 1903 and the local press were 
also convinced that assurances had been made by the League to admit Bradford as 
early as February, before the club had even been fonnally constituted. 139 The club's 
135 Athletic News, 20 May 1929. 
136 Williams, The Code War, p. 125; Inglis, League Foothall, p. 56. 
137 Manchester Evening News, 31 May 1907. 
138 Grimsby Town FC Election Circular, quoted in Athletic News, 8 May 1911. 
139 Athletic News, I June 1903; Amold, A Game That Would Pay, p. 25. 
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success in securing the highest vote at the annual meeting, eleven more than founder 
members Burnley, lends weight to the collusion theory. And it has been suggested 
that two years later Leeds City was also given 'private undertakings' by the League 
that its application would be successful. 140 But it must be remembered that clubs 
ultimately voted on a free and individual basis and thus the extent to which they could 
be directed by the wishes of the Committee or any other party was strictly limited. 
This was evident in the failed application of the amateur London-based Argonauts 
club in 1928. Some five months before the annual meeting, R. W. Sloley, the founder 
and representative of Argonauts, met the FA secretary Frederick Wall and then the 
League executive to discuss the possible admission of the club. Wall informed Sloley 
of his belief that the League 'would regard the application favourably' and the 
Committee itself told him that while 'the matter was one which the Clubs would have 
to decide... they would welcome such a Club". 141 In addition, Athletic News noted in 
late May that 'an emphatic impression, decidedly favourable to the amateur club, has 
been created in Football League circles' by the Argonauts decision to play at 
Wembley Stadium rather than at White City. 142 Yet despite this apparent backing, the 
club was easily defeated with only 17 votes in the election ballot. 
In the same way it is doubtful whether the election of clubs from London or the south 
of England was linked to any broad policy initiative. Certain members of the 
Management Committee and club directors may indeed have wanted to establish a 
broader base for the Football League in the south but, as we have seen in relation to 
the Southern League, individual enmities and jealousies tended to preclude the 
achievement of this sort of long-term goal. The pattern of Welsh membership is also 
better explained by changing economic fortunes than by any overarching central 
policy. Thus while in the early 1920s there were six Welsh clubs in the League 
drawing relatively good gates, by the early 1930s severe economic depression and 
unemployment in the coalfields of South Wales had necessitated the replacement of 
140 See Arnold, 'Belated Entry', pp. 326-27. 
14 1 Athletic News, 2 January 1928; Minutes of Football League, 16 January 1928. Sutcliffe's 
interpretation of the meeting was slightly different. The Committee, in his view, had informed Sloley 
that they 'would show no prejudice' against the Argonauts but 'could make no guarantees'. Topical 
Times, 28 January 1928. 
142 Athletic News, 21 May 1928. 
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Aberdare Athletic and Merthyr Town and the temporary exclusion of Newport 
County. 143 In such circumstances, the search for any clear policy or strategy is 
ultimately futile. We can never know for sure what went on at the annual meeting or 
in private discussions, and clubs were rarely prepared to discuss such issues in the 
press. If a recognisable policy developed here, as it appears to have done during the 
1900s, it probably did so informally through the private agreement of club 
representatives rather than the initiative of the executive. 
In addition, more localised geographical factors could have a bearing. This occurred 
in London especially, where the proposed admission of a new club invariably led to 
opposition from existing members anxious not to lose spectators. Hence, both 
Fulham and Tottenham faced strenuous opposition from League clubs in the capital 
when they applied for admission and, nearly twenty years later, Brentford and Queen's 
Park Rangers formally objected to the provisional arrangement for Argonauts to play 
&so near at hands' at White City. 144 The West Ham board, amongst others, agreed not 
to support the Argonauts 'in view of the position of other West London clubs'. 
145 The 
East London club became embroiled in a particularly bitter dispute in 1930 with 
neighbouring third division applicants Thames FC. In a circular letter to first and 
second division clubs, the West Ham board contended that Thames was merely a 
subsidiary company of the West Ham Greyhound Racecourse organisation and was, 
moreover, 0,000 in debt. Thames denied these allegations and demanded a 
withdrawal and though they were subsequently elected on the back of the southern 
section's recommendation, the first division club's circular undoubtedly cost them a 
number of votes. 146 Furthermore, there are hints that other more complicated motives 
were at play during election time. According to Athletic News, it was actually known 
for members to consciously vote for weak playing sides or 'clubs which they could 
143 Gareth Williams, 'From Grand Slam to Great Slump: Economy, Society and Rugby Football in 
Wales during the depression', Welsh History Review, 11,3,1983, pp. 34648. Ilie gates at most of the 
Welsh clubs dropped drastically in this period. Cardiff City, cup finalists in 1925 and winners in 1927, 
had attendances ofjust 2,000 by the time it had been relegated down to the third division south in 
1931/32 and Merthyr Town was reportedly only able to give visiting clubs LI as their share of the gate 
by the time the club was voted out of the League in 1930. 
'" Manchester Evening News, 8 May 1907; Athletic News, 29 June 1908; Minutes of Football League, 
30-31 March 1928. 
143 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 20 March 1928. 
146 Athletic News, 26 May, 2 June 1930. 
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keep below them' so as to ensure their own status. 147 This may explain the habitual 
re-election of some struggling clubs at the beginning of the period and then again 
during the 1920s and 1930s. 
4. Conclusion 
In the course of two decades the Football League was transformed from an 
organisation based around professional clubs in the north and midlands of England to 
a national body, with a membership encompassing an entire southern division, ten 
London clubs and even four representatives from Wales. Yet the road to a national 
league did not consist of a series of ordered steps undertaken with a clear end in sight: 
there was never a consensus either within the League executive or amongst its 
member clubs favouring expansion on a national scale and so the growth of the 
League was largely piecemeal and ad hoc, its trajectory uncertain. Sutcliffe, in 
particular, has sometimes been lauded as an empire-builder; the mastermind behind 
each stage of the League's expansion who remained wedded throughout to the 
ultimate goal of a huge, multi-divisional national body. But the 'little lawyer' was, 
like many others, really an opportunist who was able in 1920 to successfully tap into 
the discontent of the Southern League clubs and to present the idea of the national 
league as the culmination of the hard work and achievements of the Football League 
members, and a reflection of their superior status and financial and playing strength. 
Along with the major stages of expansion, the Football League's membership was 
under constant modification through the end-of-season election process. The 
preceding discussion has shown that while the guarantees of large crowds and 
financial security were probably the most important criteria for the inclusion of new 
members, they remained part of a broader collage of interlocking motives and 
interests which vied for prominence in the minds of club representatives. Above all it 
is crucial to recognise that the Football League executive did not have the power, as 
American sports bodies and team owners did, to discard a club and move it to another 
city when it had ceased to be a financial benefit to the competition, even if some of 
147 Athletic News, 13 November 1911. 
95 
the exits and entries of members during the first decade of the century do hint at an 
informal franchise system. Clubs were elected and voted out by the membership, 
whose decisions could be influenced by local connections, loyalty and even 
straightforward sympathy. Certainly the continual re-election of bottom-of-the-table 
sides and the third division's operation of a virtual 'closed shop' for much of the inter- 
war period went against the gain of simple economic considerations and can only be 
understood in terms of these broader motivating factors. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
'AN UNRULY BOY IN THE HOUSE': 
THE LEAGUE'S RELATIONS WITH THE FA 
For some years, as the League grew in strength and power, some of us at the Football 
Association were not too easy in our minds with such a big, and, as we sometimes 
thought, unruly boy in the house. But, today, I look upon the League as a strong arm and 
reliable ally at the service of the national body. Any fears that we had have proved 
groundless. 
The League and all connected with it have the welfare of the game at heart, and realise 
the importance of one control over it. We are,... and I am sure always will be, a happy 
family party. 
William Pickford, FA President, in a speech given at the Football League's 
Jubilee celebrations in 1938.1 
... the League and the FA have been laying about each other for the best part of a century. It is a cold war, of course. No triggers are squeezed, no blood is ever drawn, but it is a 
war which has been spitting away ever since the Football Association's muddled attitude 
to professionalism back in the 1880s led to the birth of the Football League. 
Hardaker, Hardaker oftheLeague, p. 126. 
In their eagerness to contextualise the development of professional sport by relating it 
to wider trends in society, historians have tended to pay insufficient attention to the 
internal dynamics and conflicts which have always existed within and between ruling 
bodies. A thorough understanding of the administrative structure of football is 
particularly necessary as the game was effectively governed from the late nineteenth- 
century not by a single unified body but by two distinct organisations - the Football 
Association and the Football League. Certainly, the distinct origins and identities of 
the two have generally been recognised by academics, even if this has sometimes been 
presented as a rather crude antithesis between south and north, amateurism and 
professionalism and upper-middle versus entrepreneurial middle-class. 2 What has 
generally been overlooked in previous accounts, however, is the fact that power 
relations between the League and the FA have not been historically static but subject 
to considerable change over time. Indeed it will be argued in this chapter that by 
1910, when the FA handed to the League formal control over the financial dealings 
between its clubs and players, relations between the two were no longer those of 
1 Printed as an introduction in Sutcliffe el al., Football League. 
2 See Tomlinson, 'North and South', p. 26; Wagg, Football World, pp. 6-7,30. 
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parent to son but of brothers, with the younger League increasingly independent and 
often able to dictate to its elder sibling. 
This chapter will focus briefly on the contrasting functions and responsibilities of the 
two bodies, and then consider the League's relations with the governing body in two 
distinct periods: first, the era marked by conflicts over the transfer system and the 
payment of players which lasted from the creation of the League in 1888 to 1910; and 
second, the thirty years from 1910 until the Second World War, which witnessed the 
development of the League as an increasingly powerful and autonomous 
representative of professional football within the broader authority of the FA. 
1. The League and the FA: Functions and Responsibilities 
From a strictly theoretical standpoint, the fimctions and responsibilities of the League 
and the FA are easy to differentiate. Founded in 1863 -a quarter of a century before 
the League - the FA was instrumental in codifying and standardising the laws of the 
game. From its early years it also concerned itself with the development of the 
national FA Cup competition, established in 1871, and the organisation of the national 
team. In addition, the FA was responsible for the administration of the game as a 
whole: from the grass roots level of junior, district and county associations through to 
professional football. Acting as an umbrella body, it authorised competitions and 
leagues throughout the country, including the Football League. Thus, in theory, the 
League acted only in accordance with, and under the licence of, the FA, annually 
applying to the FA Leagues Sanction Committee for permission simply to continue or 
to alter its own constitution. From the start, the FA's position as the supreme football 
authority in the country was therefore widely recognised: Geoffrey Green has, at 
different times, called it 'the monarchy' and 'the highest parliament in English 
football'. 3 
League officials publicly acknowledged this position from the beginning, even if some 
club directors harboured private ambitions to wrest control of the professional game 
3 Green, History ofthe FA, p. 391; 'The Football Association' in Fabian and Green (eds), Association 
Football, vol. 1, p. 47. 
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from the FA. William McGregor soon realised that 'when the League meet, they are 
actuated by the interests of the League clubs. The general good of the game is not 
their chief concern' and hence that 'it is best for the whole government of the game to 
be in the hands of the Football Association'. 4 Another future League president, 
Charles Sutcliffe, made the point more succinctly: 'In football the FA is omnipotent. 
It is a dominating, while the League is a subservient, body. ' In a separate article he 
compared the governing powers of the FA to those of the MCC in cricket and the 
Jockey Club in horse racing. 5 In practice, however, relations were considerably more 
complex. The respective ftmctions of the two bodies were never delineated at birth 
nor enshrined in any joint agreement but remained contingent upon their changing 
power relations. Hence as the League grew in size, prestige and power it became 
increasingly difficult to avoid conflicts of authority and jurisdiction. Moreover, 
although the League saw its role as limited to 'look[ing] after its own affairs 6, this 
desire for self-government created inevitable contention with the FA, as the bodies 
shared the membership of clubs and the registration of players. League interests also 
extended beyond its own competition to the FA Cup and the international team, for 
which it contributed the premier clubs and the majority of players: in fact, after 1920 
almost every full England international was employed by a Football League club. By 
the Second World War, then, the League was hardly a subordinate body: it had 
emerged 'much more in the position of a central control over the business and 
financial side of football than... the Association'. 7 
Notwithstanding the emphasis placed by commentators on the 'two distinct spheres of 
operation for League and Association'g, lines of authority were often unclear and 
relations muddled. This was evident, firstly, in relation to the registration of players. 
Players were obliged to register with both the FA and the Football League before 
being eligible to play in League competition (see chapter 5). Yet there was no 
standard procedure for registration and often players did not sign concurrently with 
the two bodies. Indeed, in 1931 McKenna and other League officials revealed to an 
4 McGregor, 'The League', p. 174. 
5 Athletic News, 30 January, 9 October 1911. 
" McGregor, 'Origin and Future', p. 6. 
7 'The Football Industry - 1', Planning, 17,195 1, p. 163. 1 Athletic News, 20 March 1905. 
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FA standing committee that since its inception the League had permitted member 
clubs to register and transfer professionals who were not on the FA's books, although 
FA registration was always secured before the professional played a match. While 
this was unknown to all committee members 'other than the League representatives', 
the League was nevertheless given permission to continue the practice. 
9 There were 
also some inconsistencies in the cancellation of registration forms. Generally the 
League acted in accordance with the governing body by terminating the registration of 
players who had been suspended or otherwise de-registered by the former while, 
conversely, the FA scrapped the agreements and registration forms of players found 
guilty under League rules of 'palpable inefficiency' (see chapter 5). 
10 In 1929, 
however, following Oldham's attempt to sign a player still registered with Bolton, the 
Management Committee informed clubs that 'cancellation of forms by the FA does 
not affect the Football League form signed by the player'. 
" Such an assertion of 
autonomy on the League's part was not uncommon and often led to considerable 
confusion among clubs and players who were subject to this dual system of authority. 
The on-field discipline of footballers certainly came more clearly within the FA's 
sphere of responsibility. Initially the League 'assumed the right' to deal with issues of 
misconduct and indiscipline on as well as off the pitch but this did not last long. 
12 
The main problem was that individual club interests could compromise the necessary 
even-handedness of any League disciplinary forum, especially as the first conferences 
involved representatives of all the member clubs. Thus the League and its clubs soon 
restricted their role to reporting disciplinary offences to the FA, and in late 1899 the 
FA Council explicitly stated that 'League Committees must not deal with offences 
committed on the field of play by their own Clubs and players, or inflict 
punishments. ' 13 From this point on, discipline was widely acknowledged as the 
9 Minutes of FA Rules Revision Committee, 30 November 193 1. The FA had passed a resolution in 
1894 to ensure that all players signed FA registration forms before signing club agreements or League 
forms and in 1900 had recommended that 'League registrations shall be concurrent with registrations 
with the FA' but neither initiative appears to have been followed in practice. Green, History ofthe FA, 
p 404; FA 'Transfer of Players': Further Report, 15 April 1900. 
1ý See Minutes of Football League, 31 May 1924; FA Report of the Rules Revision Committee and the 
Leagues Sanction Committee on Powers to Terminate Agreements Between Clubs and Players, July 
1913. 
11 Minutes of Football League, 18 February 1929. 
12 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 4. 
" Minutes of FA Council, 18 December 1899. 
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prerogative of the governing body: indeed Athletic News was confident that the 
League would never consider threatening the FA's 'impartial control' in this area. 14 
As we shall see later, the respective duties of the League and FA were less clearly 
defined in relation to the broader issues of misconduct and breach of rules by clubs 
and officials. But between the wars co-operation was formalised in this area, too, 
with joint inquiries and commissions established to tackle the most serious cases. 
It is also noteworthy that only FA Cup ties, replays and England international matches 
were allowed to disrupt the otherwise sacrosanct Football League programme. 
Moreover, the FA theoretically controlled the schedule for the League's own 
representative fixtures and club tours, although they rarely denied permission for such 
matches to be played. Nonetheless, the League Management Committee and the clubs 
were obliged on every occasion to make formal applications to the FA Council, an 
arrangement which clearly led to underlying resentment in Preston and a degree of 
confusion amongst the clubs. In 1900, for example, the FA avoided a potential 
dispute with the League by eventually sanctioning the scheduled Scottish Inter-League 
match, while at the same time asserting its authority by informing the League that in 
future the fixture could not be played 'within a month' of the England-Scotland 
international. " Member clubs were slow to recognise that only the FA could 
officially sanction continental tours, even though from 1912 the League itself required 
details of the financial arrangements. 16 Usually the FA simply rubber-stamped such 
requests but occasionally it could use its sanction as a punitive device. Hence 
Wolverhampton Wanderers was prevented from touring the continent during the 
summer of 1937 because of its poor disciplinary record over the previous two 
seasons. 17 
The financial well-being of the two bodies was fundamentally interlocked from the 
1890s onwards. The FA's income has always depended 'primarily on the activities of 
14 Athletic News, 20 March 1905. 
15 Minutes of FA Consultative Committee, 8 October 1900; Minutes of FA Council, 12 November 
1900. 
16 Minutes of Football League, 9 August 1912; 20 December 1920,7 March 192 1. 
17 Minutes of FA Council, 30 April 1937. 
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professional football'", principally through international and FA Cup matches. While 
accurate figures for the pre-First World War period are difficult to find, it appears that 
the bulk of the FA's revenue was derived from the gate receipts of the Cup semi-finals 
and final and, to a lesser extent, the international fixtures with Scotland, Wales and 
Ireland. Increasingly, however, it was considered unfair that the successful Cup semi- 
finalists should be asked to bear 'practically the whole cost of running the Football 
Association' 19 and so from the early 1900s the FA levied 5 per cent on the gate 
income of all matches from the first round to the fourth. After this stage, the 
governing body took one-third of the net receipts of the semi-finals and the final and 
divided the remainder between the competing clubs in both subsequent rounds. In 
1909 the FA received E3,353 from international matches and nearly L4,000 from the 
Cup semi-finals and final out of total receipts of E18,959. In contrast, the 1926 
balance sheet shows that E14,360 was taken via percentages from the Cup competition 
and over L8,000 from international matches, including a record E5,867 derived from 
the Scotland fixture at Old Trafford. Certainly by the mid-1920s the FA was a 
relatively rich organisation, with assets of E66,544 in 1924 compared with a League 
sum of just f. 10,618.20 League representatives criticised what they saw as the FA's 
obsession with creating a large investment fund and pointed out that 'many of the 
clubs who are taking part in the Cup competition could ill-afford and could do with 
the percentage that was taken from them'. 
21 Indeed in 1946 a Football League 
deputation explicitly indicated its dissatisfaction 'that prior to the war the assets of 
The Football Association increased annually' with little or no concomitant benefit to 
its member clubs. 22 The FA's dependence on cup and international gate receipts had 
been shown clearly during the war period when, in the absence of both these sources 
of income, the League stepped in with a direct grant of L1,000 to offset the FA's 
21 debts. The tables were turned somewhat between the wars. The FA claimed, rather 
vaguely, that it had 'always responded' to specific appeals by the League in this 
period. More specifically, there is evidence that it agreed in 1937, after consultation 
with the League, to contribute E5,446 from its Benevolent Fund to pay off the deficit 
's PEP, English Professional Football, 32,496,1966, Appendix 4. 
'9 Athletic News, 15 January 1906. 
20 Football andsports Special, 5 June 1909; Athletic News, 31 May 1926,26 May 1924. 
21 Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 9 June 1924. 
22 Green, History ofthe FA, p. 393. 
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of the Football League Mutual Insurance Federation and a fin-ther E660 annually from 
the receipts of replayed Cup ties for the next four years (see chapter 6). 24 
2. Amateurs Versus Professionals: The Struggle for Control over Professional 
Football, 1888-1910 
It is important to recognise that relations between the Football League and the FA in 
the early twentieth century were fundamentally shaped by the whole debate over 
amateur and professional football. Various historical studies have established that the 
legalisation of professionalism in 1885 was less an attempt by the FA to embrace the 
phenomenon than to restrain and control it. 25 Indeed, stringent birth and residential 
qualifications were initially imposed on professional players, although these were 
soon relaxed and by 1889 had been abolished entirely. 26 Yet the FA still intended to 
'keep professionalism at arm's length 1,27 through the barring of professionals from 
club or association committees and the inauguration of a separate amateur cup 
tournament (in 1893). In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Football 
League was effectively marginalised at first by the governing body. When Charles 
Alcock, an old Harrovian and secretary of Surrey County Cricket Club as well as the 
FA, published his Football Annual for 1890, the League merited only a paragraph of 
copy along with the final championship table. In contrast, the activities of the 
provincial associations occupied 27 pages while the results and descriptions of public 
school football and rugby took a full 30 pages. And though he recognised that the 
League system was 'not without its advantages', Alcock warned that 'if carried to 
excess, as it undoubtedly is in many parts, [it] is calculated to do harm to, rather than 
benefit the game'. 28 
23 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 23. 
24 Green, History ofthe FA, p. 393; Minutes of FA Finance and General Purposes Committee, 8 March 
1937. 
25See Mason, Association Football, chapter 1; Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, pp. 51-5 9; Holt, 
S ort and the British, pp. 106-07. Dr, Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 192, Appendix 2d; Young, History ofBritish Football, pp. 173-74. 
27 Holt, Sport and the British, p. 106. 
28 Dobbs, Edwardians at Play, pp. 45-46. 
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The struggle over professionalisation, and the establishment of the Football League as 
its monument, certainly created deep divisions within the amateur elite which ran the 
FA, leading in 1890 to the resignation of the Old Etonian president Major Marindin 
and five vice-presidents from southern amateur clubs in reaction to the 
aforementioned abolition of the 'stringent conditions' on professionals. Equally, 
representatives of the League clubs were undoubtedly more numerous and prominent 
on the FA Council by the mid-1890S. 29 Despite this, the amateur-professional 
tensions did not disappear with the arrival of northern administrators like chairman 
Charles Clegg, a Sheffield solicitor, and Birmingham's Charles Crump, at the higher 
echelons of the FA. In fact, Clegg and Crump differed from those they replaced in 
terms of tactics rather than sentiment. They were still amateurs first and foremost but 
were prepared to tolerate the Football League providing it recognised its inferior status 
and subordinated itself to the FA's absolute rule. 
From the beginning, then, relations between the League and the FA were underpinned 
by issues of power and control and driven by the inherent arnateur-professional 
conflict. During the 1880s and 1890s they clashed on a series of matters, from the 
trivial to the fundamental. Sutcliffe's Jubilee History reveals that disagreements 
emerged within months of the League's creation, firstly over the FA's proposal to 
replace studs with bars on players' boots and then concerning the failure of some 
League clubs to affiliate to local associations before entering the FA Cup 
competition. 30 More seriously, however, in 1891 the governing body stepped in after 
the Management Committee had prohibited members from organising fixtures with 
non-League clubs found guilty of poaching League players. The FA saw this as an 
attempt by the League to extend its jurisdiction to outside clubs and forced a formal 
climb-down, though the blacklist apparently continued to operate surreptitiously. 31 As 
we have seen, the League's own representative fixtures also became a major source of 
tension, particularly because they initially competed directly with the FA-organised 
intemationals in the football calendar. As well as objecting to the date of the League 
29 B irley, Land ofSport and Glory, P. 36. 
30 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 4. 
" Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 8; Green, History ofthe FA, p. 398. The League's blacklist also 
had dangerous implications for the FA Cup as it might preclude ties between League and non-League 
clubs. 
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fixture with its Scottish counterpart in 1900, the FA 'kicked against' the League's 
decision to advertise an Inter-League match as 'an International' at around the same 
time. 32 
A perfect illustration of the contrasting League and FA conceptions of the professional 
side of football can be derived from the crisis precipitated by Queen Victoria's death 
in January 1901. On hearing of the monarch's passing, the FA Emergency Committee 
consisting of Clegg, Crump and Alcock, unilaterally postponed the following 
Saturday's FA Cup first round ties. This action was greeted with almost uniform 
criticism by the League Management Committee and club directors, firstly because it 
meant that two sets of gate-receipts would be lost as the Queen's funeral was to take 
place the subsequent Saturday, but, more significantly, because the decision had been 
taken without consulting the League. John Bentley, the League president, felt that a 
decision which affected thousands of spectators, hundreds of players and the finances 
of scores of professional clubs 'ought to have been left to... a more representative 
body than the Emergency Committee, who have little or no connection with club 
33 
management and, consequently, hardly realise what it means'. In a letter to Athletic 
News, Committeeman Charles Sutcliffe objected to the fact that the Football League 
6consisting of 26 of the 32 clubs in the ties, were not consulted upon the most 
important and far-reaching resolution passed for many years'. While he was enot 
jealous of the FA', Sutcliffe believed that the League (and indeed the Southern 
League) were 'sufficiently important... as to entitle them to some respect, 
consideration, and even deference'. 
34 Bentley had indeed attempted to persuade the 
League clubs to oppose the FA's resolution but while only three out of 36 supported 
the action of the governing body, half were willing under the circumstances to 
acquiesce. There can be little doubt, however, that most would have agreed with the 
sentiments of 'Grasshopper' that the Emergency Committee had 'treated the whole 
matter from an entirely amateur point of view'. 
The whole question shows more plainly than ever the necessity of a 
separate government being acquired for the professional branch of the 
32 Tarricus' (Harry Downs), 'The Football League, 1888-1901', Athletic News, 4 February igoi. 
33 Athletic News, 28 January 190 1. Also see Manchester Evening News, 24,26,28 January Igo 1. 
34 Charles Sutcliffe letter to the editor, dated I February 190 1, in Athletic News, 4 February 190 1. 
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sport. The surroundings are so vastly different from the amateur section, 
who I repeat are supposed to play without any regard for the financial side 
of the question, that its requirements can only be properly dealt with by 
men who are perfectly conversant with them. If the present friction leads 
to the establishment of special Committees or Councils in the Football 
Association who shall have full control of the professional and amateur 
clubs respectively, it will not have been in vain. I shall be very sorry to 
find the professional clubs cut themselves adrift from the FA, but it does 
not require the mantle of Elijah to foretell that this will happen at no very 
distant day if the business considerations are ignored in the future, as they 
appear... to have been in the past. 35 
In fact, while hard evidence is understandably difficult to come by, there is some 
indication that at this time the dissatisfaction of League clubs with their treatment at 
the hands of the FA was spilling over into serious consideration of mass secession. In 
League circles it was felt that a clique within the FA Council was intent on 'being 
antagonistic to the professional clubs' and the former Bolton secretary and journalist 
Harry Downs, for one, was in no doubt that the two bodies were (slowly and gradually 
drifting apart' and that a split in the near future was likely. 36 
Sutcliffe's retrospective account of his early years as a member of the Management 
Committee is particularly revealing of the mutual distrust between the League and the 
FA around the turn of the century. Sutcliffe remembered that a prominent FA 
Councillor had encouraged him to reform the League's executive body because 'The 
FA has no love for the Management Committee of The League. It is no credit to the 
game'. He went on to describe the League's attitude towards the FA: 
... I 
found a bitter feeling not merely amongst members of the ... 
Management Committee but among many clubs against the FA (sic. ) ... 
The League was face to face with a supercilious autocratic bearing on the 
part of some members of the Council of the FA that was obnoxious. The 
League was regarded as of no moment in football. As the mainstay of the 
system of professionalism in football it was looked upon as corrupt and 
degrading. The professional element of the FA was too easily outvoted 
and overridden by the amateur element. The vote and influence of minor 
county associations who knew nothing of the then requirements of 
3' 'Southem Notes' by'Grasshopper' in Athletic News, 28 January 1901. 
36 Manchester Evening News, 2 February 190 1; 'Harricus' (Harry Downs), 'The Football League, 
1888-1901', Athletic News, 4 February 1901. 
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spectacular and popular football governed the game. These things rankled 
in the minds of the League clubs and the League Committeemen. 37 
The over-riding conflict between the League and the FA in this period, however, 
centred on the financial arrangements between clubs and players, and more 
particularly the issues of transfers and wages. The retain-and-transfer system had 
certainly been a bone of contention from the early 1890s. In 1894 Clegg proposed a 
scheme to regulate some of the financial dealings between clubs and players, which 
included a clause effectively abolishing transfer payments. 38 Tbough this was never 
implemented, Clegg returned to the issue in February 1899 when he aAed for the 
opinion of various leagues on 'the general question of the transfer of players' and 
called a conference to which representatives of the leagues and other interested parties 
(including the recently formed Players' Union) were invited . 
39 Following the 
conference, Clegg issued a circular suggesting that the 'objectionable system' of 
buying and selling players should in future be prohibited. Not surprisingly, the 
League reacted strongly against what it considered to be 'a deliberate threat to end 
transfers' and instead proposed some minor modifications of its own . 
40 Not to be Put 
off, however, the FA Council set up a special emergency sub-committee which 
recommended in November that transfer payments should be discontinued and that the 
only monetary transaction between clubs should be for nominal expenses of LIO 
maximum. The single exception was to be in cases where fees had already been paid - 
these players could be sold on but no profit was to be made. 41 Again the Management 
Committee signalled its resolute opposition to the FA's recommendations on the 
familiar grounds that they would allow the richer clubs to acquire the best talent 
without the necessity of compensating the club losing the players' services (see 
chapter 7). Yet the issue was really one of power and control: the League was 
anxious to ensure autonomy in what it considered to be its own affairs. Tle questions 
of transfers, wages, bonuses and all matters of finance should, it was argued, 'be the 
37 Athletic News, 24 February 1919. 
38 Green, History ofthe FA, pp. 404-05. 
39 Minutes of FA Consultative Committee, I February 1899; Harding, Good ofthe Game, P. 26. 
40 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 114. 
41 FA Emergency Committee Report on 'Transfer of Players', 13 November 1899. 
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concern solely of the League'. 42 As Bentley noted: Me serious battle will be fought 
on what the League considers a principle and that is being allowed to work its own 
particular competition in its own particular way whilst at the same time observing the 
43 
rules of the parent body' . With the Scottish 
League's support, the League was able 
to resist the FA and prevent an agreement on the abolition of transfers, while 
subsequent FA reports and conferences during 1900 met with a similar fate. " 
At the same time, the FA took steps to regulate the payment of players. Although the 
League had attempted to impose its own wage limit in 1893, it was left to the FA, in 
1900, to introduce a maximum wage of E4 per week (L208 per annum) and to ban the 
payment of bonuses for wins and draws. This decision was vehemently contested at 
the next FA annual meeting by the representatives of Aston Villa and Liverpool, who 
attempted to rescind the rule. Opponents of the wage rule again argued that it gave 
the amateurs of the FA unwarranted control over the private affairs of League clubs. 
Villa's Fred Rinder believed that 'the Association should not interfere with the 
internal finances of the clubs, but simply devote itself to making laws and seeing 
that... contracts entered into between clubs and players were loyally complied with 9.45 
Yet not all League clubs opposed the maximum wage: Rinder's arguments in 1901, 
and at subsequent annual meetings, were rejected by influential members of the 
League, notably Bentley and Sutcliffe. In addition, representatives of Preston North 
End, Sheffield United, Newton Heath, Sunderland and Wolverhampton Wanderers, 
amongst others, all spoke out in favour of the rule. 46 On the other hand, many 
amateur as well as professional representatives on the FA Council remained 
dissatisfied with the maximum wage rule in principle and in practice. An 
investigation by the Rules Revision Committee in 1903-04 concluded that the rule 
should be modified rather than deleted entirely, with a sliding scale of wages based on 
Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 116. 
Quoted in Harding, Good ofthe Game, p. 27. 
44 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 116; FA 'Transfer of Players': Further Report, 15 April 1900; 
'Transfer of Players': Further Report of the Representatives of the Association, 12 November 1900. 
45 Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 27 May 190 1. 
46 Reports of FA AGMs in Athletic News, 27 May 1901,5 June 1905,1 June 1908. John Bentley and 
former amateur international C. B. Fry both noted that it was Football League clubs who had effectively 
instituted the maximum wage, albeit through the machinery of the FA. Sport Argus, 4 March 1905. By 
1909 Bentley had changed his mind and came out in support of the abolition of the maximum wage, a 
reversal which critics argued was due to his new position as a director of wealthy Manchester United. 
Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 14 June 1909. 
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service and seniority, but this too was rejected by the Council and the League. 47 The 
two bodies therefore appeared to have reached a stalemate on both issues, with the 
Management Committee (notwithstanding its support for the wage rule in theory) 
keen to take full control of internal matters and the FA 'loath to surrender... what was 
probably looked upon as their prerogative of control'. 48 
The accounts of both Sutcliffe and Green place considerable emphasis on the so- 
called breakthrough of 1904, when the FA finally agreed that the responsibility for 
financial dealings between clubs should rest with the League. Henceforth, the FA was 
to restrict itself to the role of arbiter between the club and player and to detect sharp 
practice by clubs. It is difficult, however, to identify any obvious shift in relations 
between the two bodies after 1904. The decision seems to have been informal and un- 
minuted and whether it really represented a 'vital change' in FA policy, as Green has 
claimed, is a matter for conjecture. 49 Certainly, though it was now more cautious and 
conciliatory, the FA continued in its attempts to intervene in the operation of the 
transfer system and the remuneration of players. Those amateur epresentatives who 
were tiring of the governing body's association with the regular scandals and rumours 
of underhand dealing in League football led the way here. E. L. Holland made two 
unsuccessful proposals to the Council in 1904 aimed at amending what he regarded as 
the unsatisfactory 'regulations and conditions affecting the employment of 
professional players'. 50 The following year recommendations firstly by Alcock and G. 
S. Sherrington of the Suffolk FA to wipe the wage and bonus regulations from the rule 
book, and then by the Rules Revision Committee to revive the sliding wage scale 
concept, were both rejected. But the latter's idea for a E350 ceiling on transfer fees 
was passed, even though when the rule came into effect three years later it was easily 
evaded and lasted only three months. 51 
The FA made one final effort during the summer of 1908 to bring the League clubs 
into line when it offered an amnesty for previous breaches on the condition that they 
47 Mason, Association Football, p. 100; Green, History ofthe FA, p. 409. 
"' Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, 116. 
49 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 116; Green, History ofthe FA, p. 409. 
10 Minutes of FA Council, 29 August, 7 November 1904. 
5' Minutes of FA Council, 31 March 1905; Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, I June 1908. 
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observed the rules and reported suspected misdemeanours in the future. But the clubs 
were reluctant to take up the offer and continued to discuss possible bonus schemes 
and other plans to alter the FA's infamous Rule 3 1. In fact, it was not until the 
following February that the League clubs, prompted by Bentley, replied to the FA with 
a collective acceptance of the amnesty. At the same time, the League formally assured 
the FA that it knew nothing of alleged abuses of the transfer regulations but, if these 
could be substantiated, it would be prepared 'to assist the FA to remedy the evil in any 
well-considered way that may be suggested'. 52 However, despite such public 
declarations of solidarity and co-operation, relations were now strained almost to 
breaking-point. There is, in fact, some evidence that a meeting of League clubs in 
September 1908 considered the possibility of seceding from the governing body if 
their proposals to allow player bonuses for wins and draws were not met. Fulham's 
then chairman Henry Norris similarly suggested that as many as 20 League members 
were prepared to break away from the FA if their attempts to remove wage restrictions 
proved unsuccessful at the 1909 annual meeting. 53 Indeed, by this stage the FA faced 
League hostility on at least two fronts: from the richer and more successftil clubs who 
wanted to wipe away all laws relating to the financial nexus between employers and 
employees and those weaker members (and League officials like Sutcliffe) who 
considered the FA to be applying its rules half-heartedly and allowing offenders to 
break regulations almost at will. 
The weight of these criticisms, buttressed by a particularly bitter annual meeting in 
1909, finally persuaded the FA to formalise its 1904 decision by passing over the 
responsibility for club finances to the League in early 1910. The influence of Clegg 
was undoubtedly central to this decision. It is significant, for instance, that at the 
1908 annual meeting it was the FA Council itself, with Clegg as its spokesman, which 
proposed the deletion of the maximum wage rule. The proposal failed but the 
following year the FA chairman tried again. Clegg's principal argument touched upon 
the previous assertions of Rinder and others that the FA was not the appropriate body 
to deal'with issues of this kind. 
52 Sutcliffe et aL, Football League, pp. 117-18; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 19 
August 1908,9 January, 10 February 1909. 
" Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 2,9 September 1908; Athletic News, 22 February 
1909. 
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The majority of clubs and players throughout the country were not 
personally concerned in those [wage and bonus] regulations. Why should 
members of the Council be troubled over them? Why should men who 
belonged to an amateur club, and only to an amateur club, be troubled to 
look after these matters and regulations... Those who were involved in 
those financial matters were surely the best persons to make the necessary 
arrangements for protecting their own interests... The Council wished to 
leave each section free to control money matters in accordance with their 
own desires. 
Yet despite support from the wealthier League clubs, the FA was not allowed to 
withdraw quietly. Sutcliffe, in particular, clashed directly with Clegg and William 
Pickford over the issue of illegal payments and accused Clegg of stigmatising every 
Football League club with his allegations of irregularities. 54 The opposition of 
Sutcliffe and the pro-wage limit members was sufficient to bring about a narrow 
defeat of the FA's motion but by the end of the year definite steps had been taken to 
settle the question. On 10 January 1910, the FA issued a circular signalling its 
intention to delete all its rules relating to the financial arrangements between clubs 
and players, with the exception of the maximum wage, on the grounds that such 
concerns were 'incompatible with the position of The Football Association as the 
55 governing body of a national sport'. This was finally achieved at an extraordinary 
general meeting in April. As commentators were quick to recognise, administrative 
power in the professional game had now shifted significantly from the FA to the 
League. 56 
3. ChanizinLy Relations, 1910-39 
As a turning-point in relations between the two bodies, 1910 was considerably more 
important than 1904. At the Football League's 'Coming of Age' Banquet in 1909, FA 
vice-president Charles Cnimp had differentiated between the FA as a magisterial body 
and the League as a body of entertainers: 'The duty of the Association was legislative 
and administrative, and the duty of the League was to provide attractive football for 
5" Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 14 June 1909. 
55 FA Circular on Financial Affangements Between Clubs and Players, 10 January 1910. 
16 Minutes of FA Extraordinary General Meeting, 22 April 19 10. 
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the country. 57 Such a distinction could not be justified after 1910. The Management 
Committee's newly-defined authority over the financial dealings of its clubs heralded 
a burst of activity aimed at detecting breaches of rule. Sutcliffe admitted to the 
readers of his Athletic News column that the League had previously been dormant in 
this respect but promised that this would no longer be the case. Indeed within the 
period of a few weeks during 1911 there were separate reports of Sutcliffe and League 
secretary Tom Charriley visiting Glasgow and Cambuslang to investigate rumours of 
6a well-known Lancashire club' paying excessive signing-on fees and of McKenna 
travelling to Teesside to follow up other allegations concerning illegal payments. 58 As 
the journalist Ivan Sharpe noted in his memoirs, prominent League representatives 
like Sutcliffe, McKenna and John Lewis spent much of their time playing Sherlock 
Holmes. 59 
There still remained a certain amount of confusion over the respective duties of the 
League and the FA in relation to misconduct and breach of rules by clubs, officials 
and players. As many cases affected both League and FA rules the matter of 
jurisdiction was a complex one. Writing in January 1911, Sutcliffe attempted to 
clarify the situation by distinguishing between complaints against League clubs which 
pertained only to the League competition and rules and those which affected 'the 
game in general, its character and good name'. He suggested that the latter should be 
investigated either by the FA alone, or by a joint commission. This was not just 
because the FA had wider powers of inquiry but also because it could call upon a 
more complete machinery for these investigations. The League has no 
Emergency Committee, and the Management Committee only meets 
monthly. The President has no special executive powers... The FA has 
long been the great judicial power in football, and its rules have been 
gradually built up to answer all the requirements suggested by long 
experience. 60 
The common practice before this time had been for an FA commission to pass 
sentence and the League subsequently to consider any breaches of its own rules. 
57 Report of Football League 'Coming of Age' Banquet in Athletic News, 14 June 1909. 
58 Athletic News, 6 March, 29 May, 12 June 1911. 
59 Sharpe, 40 Years in Football, p. 159. 
60 Athletic News, 30 January 1911. 
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There are some examples ofjoint FA-League commissions, such as that established to 
consider the reconstruction of the Newton Heath club in 1902, but these were 
comparatively rare and were always established on the initiative of the governing body 
so as to facilitate its investigation. 61 However, in 1905, following Alf Common's 
sensational E1,000 transfer from Sunderland to Middlesborough, the League 
Management Committee decided to instigate its own inquiry independently of the FA 
and, a year later, another League commission investigating irregular transfers to the 
Middlesborough club effectively reversed the situation by uncovering and reporting a 
number of breaches of FA rules. 
62 It appears that even club officials were unsure 
where one body's jurisdiction ended and the other's began: Manchester City in 1906 
and Sheffield United in 1911 were both censured by the League for reporting 
complaints over transfers to the FA secretary instead of the Management 
Committee. 63 
A formal agreement was obviously necessary and this was reached in December 1911. 
Firstly, the distinction advocated by Sutcliffe months earlier was formalised by 
allowing the FA 'full authority' to inquire into suspected breaches of its rules relating 
to all affiliated clubs and registered players but giving the junior body power 
whenever possible to deal independently with 'Money claims between Clubs 
belonging to the Football League in League matters'. Secondly, the agreement 
established 'a general principle in the problem ofjoint discipline': henceforth any FA 
commission investigating a League club was to include members of the Management 
Committee who were also FA Couricillors. 64 Indeed, from this point onwards, the 
concept of joint investigations and administrative co-operation became established 
practice over a range of issues. In 1912 the Management Committee accepted that 
joint FA-League commissions 'should have full power to act on behalf of the Football 
League 65 and, over the next ten years or so, such commissions dealt with questions 
61 Minutes of FA Council, 24 February 1902. 
62 Inglis, League Football, p. 57; Report of Football League Commission into Middlesborough FC in 
Athletic News, 4 June 1906. 
63 On the Manchester City case see Athletic News, 15,22 October 1906. On the Sheffield United case, 
Athletic News, 18 September 1911; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 26 April 1911. 
" Agreement between The Football Association and The Football League, 4 December 1911, printed in 
Green, History ofthe FA, p. 401. 
`5 Minutes of Football League, 2 December 1912. 
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involving the Players' Union, the illegal approaching of players, match-fixing and 
bribery and even the regulations affecting club shareholders. 66 When the League 
conducted an investigation into the alleged fixing of a match between Liverpool and 
Chelsea at the end of the 1912/13 season, it withheld its report until the FA's inquiry 
was completed so that consultation could take place and a joint report be agreed 
upon. 67 Even in cases where the League was not officially involved, the FA would 
forward its report to Preston and the Management Committee would decide whether 
to punish offenders on the basis of the FA's conclusions. 68 Thus, Green is right to 
suggest that after 1911 the League tended not to undertake independent full-scale 
inquiries, even if it continued to look into matters of a financial nature among its 
membership. 69 In this area, as perhaps in no other, relations between the two bodies 
were necessarily close. 
The inter-war period also witnessed a considerable strengthening of the position of the 
Football League within the FA's own administrative structure. From the League's 
inception, many of its officials and committeemen were also FA Councillors, although 
they were elected through their local FAs or regional divisions rather than through any 
connection with the League. As it grew in size and significance, however, it was 
argued that the League should have a more permanent influence on the decision- 
making of the FA and, for this reason, League president John Bentley was nominated 
in 1902 as an FA vice-president. At the annual meeting Tom Sidney, the 
Staffordshire delegate and League vice-president, suggested that 'as the Football 
League, directly and indirectly, had really been the means of the Association 
occupying its present commanding position, the League should be honoured by their 
president becoming an officer of the Association'. Bentley lost the vote narrowly, 
mainly as a result of opposition from the amateur clubs and county associations: in 
fact, one reporter commented that the contest was not 'one of League v. Association, 
66 See Minutes of Football League, 4 November, 2 December 1912; Minutes of FA Emergency 
Committee, I January-31 March 1918; Athletic News, 7,11 June, 26 July 1920. 
67 Minutes of Football League, 4,18 April 1913. 
68 See, for instance, the report on financial dealings at Arsenal after which Sir Henry Norris was 
suspended from future involvement in club management by the FA Commission. Minutes of Football 
League, 13 September, 17 October 1927. 
69 Green, History ofthe FA, p. 40 1. 
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but rather of professionalism v. amateurism'. 70 Nevertheless, three years later the 
articles of association were changed specifically so as to allow his admittance as an 
additional vice-president. 71 Appendix 8 shows that the influence of League 
Committeemen on the standing committees of the FA also increased steadily. This is 
reflected not so much in the actual number of places allocated but the fact that by the 
1920s the League had at least one member on most of the important committees. As 
an officer of the FA, the League president was in a particularly good position to 
influence policy and decision-making. For instance, for the 1919/20 season, 
McKenna was appointed to the Consultative, Finance, International Selection, 
Leagues Sanction and Appeals Committees and additionally took the vacant place on 
the International Football Association Board, which was responsible for co-ordinating 
the actions of each FA in the United Kingdom as well as proposing changes in the 
laws of the game. 72 By the mid-1920s, McKenna had also become a member of 
perhaps the most exclusive and powerful FA sub-group - the Emergency Committee - 
which controlled the Association's business, in conjunction with the secretary, in- 
between meetings of the Council. 
Yet what the League really wanted was direct representation on the Council similar to 
that enjoyed by distinct interest groups like the army, the public schools and Oxford 
and Cambridge Universities. While it be could claimed that those Management 
Committee members on the legislative body of the FA were League representatives 
first and foremost, technically they remained attached to their particular club or 
association. Even as a vice-president McKenna, for instance, was linked officially 
with Liverpool FC, while Sutcliffe and Lewis nominally represented Rawtenstall and 
the Lancashire FA respectively. But it was not until April 1929 that the Management 
Committee resolved to tackle the issue. It issued a circular to its clubs with the 
intention of eliciting opinions on the degree of representation it should agitate for and 
organised a conference with the FA Council to discuss the whole question. 73 The 
request was supported by the now familiar argument that 'the income of the Football 
70 Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 2 June 1902. 
71 Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 5 June 1905. ' Minutes of Meeting of the FA Officers, 14 April 1919; Minutes of FA Emergency Conunittee, 1-26 
May 1919. 
73 Minutes of Football League, 12 April 1929. 
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Association depended largely upon the Cup-ties in which the League clubs took part' 
and that 'the League contributed all the players in the International matches not only 
for England, but practically all for Wales and many for Scotland and Ireland 74 (see 
chapter 8). As it happened, the FA took little persuading, allowing the League four 
seats on the Council by right and a free choice of its own representatives. A year later 
League representation was increased to eight, which meant that the entire 
Management Committee automatically became members of the Council. 75 Although 
there is some dispute over its precise implications, this was unquestionably a 
significant step for the Football League. A later League secretary, Alan Hardaker, has 
argued that the move was a clever ploy by the FA to divide the loyalties of 
Committeemen, but Simon Inglis is surely more convincing in his view that this rule 
change 'made the League the single most powerful group within the FA' and tied the 
administration of the two bodies closer together than ever before. 
76 Certainly, most of 
the evidence points to the enhancing rather than the diminishing of League power as a 
result of its new status and the data from Appendix 8 seems to indicate that the policy 
process and internal functioning of the FA was increasingly subject, in one way or 
another, to League input during the 1930s. 
If relations between the League and the FA were closer from 1910 than they had been 
before, they were not necessarily more cordial. Administrative settlements could do 
little to disturb the deep-seated resentment and antagonism which was undoubtedly 
prevalent on both sides. Much of this was fuelled by a distinct absence of diplomacy, 
particularly on the part of the FA. For example, the governing body's failure to 
provide the League with an official invitation to its Jubilee Banquet in 1913 was 
regarded as a snub by the Management Committee, who subsequently refused to 
attend in their individual capacities. 
77 According to Sutcliffe, League representatives 
were for many years also denied complimentary pavilion tickets for FA Cup Finals 
and international fixtures, a situation which generated considerable bad feeling. 
' Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, p. 33. 
75 Minutes of Football League, 10 May 1929; Athletic News, 7 June 1930. 
76 Hardaker, Hardaker ofthe League, pp. 130-3 1; Inglis, League Football, p. 134; Dabscheck, 
'Defensive Manchester', p. 229. Hardaker's account is inaccurate as well as idiosyncratic, as he claims 
that Stanley Rous initiated the whole incident. Rous, in fact, did not become FA secretary until 1934. 
77 Minutes of Football League, I October 1913. 
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Perhaps the invitation to the members of the FA International Selection to attend the 
Inter-League fixture between the English and the Scots in 1920 was a subtle attempt 
by the League to remind the FA of its previous discourtesy. 78 More significantly, 
there is some indication that the relationship between the two bodies suffered from the 
personal animosity between certain officials. Hardaker's autobiography reveals that 
there was 'no love lost' between secretaries Fred Howarth and Stanley Rous, partly 
due to the fact that Howarth had applied, but lost out to Rous, for the FA position after 
Frederick Wall's retirement in 1934. 'The two men, unalike in every way, were 
always very polite to each other, but they simply did not get on together. Their 
relationship, behind all the civil words, was a poor thing'. 79 
The experience of the First World War, in which the FA had effectively closed down 
while the League struggled on with its regional competitions, clearly soured relations 
between the two. In early 1919, one club official was reported to have remarked: 
The Football Association had better take care. What has the FA done for 
us during the war? A lot of clubs are ready to break away at a moment's 
notice. The League can do very well without the FA, but the latter would 
be badly off without the League clubs. 80 
Sentiments of this kind were compounded in February 1919 when these bodies 
clashed again over the question of the League's representative matches. The 
disagreement stemmed from a meeting in late 1918 at which the FA had declined to 
arrange international fixtures for the season but gave its consent to the proposed Inter- 
League matches. 81 But when the League forwarded its formal application to the FA 
secretary, it was told that only provisional consent could be given for its match with 
the Scottish League as the FA was now organising international matches which would 
take precedence on the fixture calendar. In response to this development, Sutcliffe 
wrote an extended article in Athletic News outlining the history of League-FA 
conflicts while accusing the governing body of reopening old sores and needlessly 
78 Sutcliffe also recalled how he had often been forced to wait outside the Crystal Palace ground on Cup 
Final day while the FA secretary tried to find him a seat. 'Time after time I have paid for a ticket rather 
than beg for a seat. ' Athletic News, 24 February 1919; Minutes of FA International Selection 
Committee, 29 March 1920. 
79 Hardaker, Hardaker ofthe League, p. 128. 
'0 Athletic News, 24 February 1919. 
a' Minutes of FA Emergency Committee, 30 September-31 December 1918. 
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belittling the League. To his mind, the League should have been treated as an equal 
rather than a subordinate: 'It makes The League wonder where their rights end and 
favour steps in. Today it is necessary for every member of the FA to recognise the 
power and value of The Football League. 82 A glance at the minutes of the League in 
the 1920s indicates, however, that the FA's sanction over the dates of Inter-League 
matches was still used on occasions when these affected its own international fixture 
schedule. In such instances, the League generally bowed to the FA's wishes in order 
to avoid conflict. 83 This type of conciliatory stance was also evident when the 
Management Committee convinced a group of member clubs to withdraw a proposal 
to modify the rule relating to the release of players for international fixtures 'as a 
gesture of friendliness to the FA'. 84 
If it was still dictated to over Inter-League matches, the League was increasingly 
influential by the inter-war period in some of the established areas of FA authority, 
especially where changes in the laws of the game were concerned. We shall see later 
the precise role played here both by the League as a collective and by individual 
officials, but for now it is sufficient to recognise that the League was often the 
driving-force behind these developments. The best illustration of this was the 
modification of the offside rule in 1925. The Management Committee experimented 
with the proposed law of two instead of three defenders in a number of trial and 
benefit matches at the start of the year. Subsequently, it was Fred Rinder and Sutcliffe 
- two members of the Committee - who were most prominent in successfully 
advocating acceptance of the new rule at the FA annual meeting in June" (see chapter 
9). It is indeed noteworthy that League clubs, as well as the executive, were more 
prepared to pass resolutions pertaining to changes in the laws of the game by the 
1930s. 86 The notion that these matters were outside the League's sphere of influence 
had been dismissed by this point. 
82 Athletic News, 24 February 1919. 
93 See Minutes of Football League, II August 1927. 
94 Minutes of Football League, 2 June 1930 (AGM). 
85 Minutes of Football League, 12 January, 3 April 1925; Report of FA AGM in4thlefic News, 15 June 
1925. 




This chapter has examined the major developments which the League-FA relationship 
underwent before 1940. The lines of authority between the two bodies were not 
prescribed in any constitutional document but were subject to constant change and re- 
evaluation, particularly after the League's assumption of financial control over its 
members in 1910. Significantly, however, the FA leadership continued throughout 
this period to be purveyors of an amateur conception of football and to see the 
professional elite, embodied in the League, as an ideological burden (if also a 
financial necessity). The amateur domination of the FA is indeed evident from the 
fact that of 57 Council members in 1909, over 40 had no connection with the 
professional side of the game. 87 Moreover, personally and ideologically there 
remained a vast gulf between the League and the FA. Men like Sutcliffe had little 
acquaintance with, or affinity towards, the southern (and indeed the northern) 
amateurs on the FA Council. As Ivan Sharpe noted, Sutcliffe contrasted in 'type and 
mannerism' from FA leaders like Clegg and Wall, and the same could have been said 
88 of many of the League's Committee members and club directors. 
In many ways, in spite of the increased power and influence which the League could 
wield, the FA continued to look upon the professional body as a junior partner, 
offering it neither respect nor parity. In this respect, the family metaphor was a 
particularly apt and well-trodden one. At the League's 'Coming of Age' Banquet in 
1909, Clegg had remarked that 'tomorrow, so far as the League is concerned, there 
will be a man in the house... May I express the hope now that, having become a man, 
you will put away childish things'. 89 Yet in the eyes of Clegg and the FA, the Football 
League remained a mischievous boy. 
'7 Report of a speech by Clegg at a meeting of the Sheffield and Hallamshire FA, 27 July 1909, quoted 
in Green, History ofthe FA, pp. 412-14. 
Sharpe, 40 Years in Football, p. 157. 
Report of Football League 'Coming-of-Age' Banquet in Athletic News, 14 June 1909. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE LEAGUE AND ITS MEMBER CLUBS 
Writing in 1926, the journalist and former Athletic News editor James Catton 
described the relationship between the Football League executive - the Management 
Committee - and the clubs in the following terms: 
The Committee lead. The clubs look to these men for guidance and they 
get it. They consider the problems of the game and generally they give a 
considered opinion. But if the subject is so full of thorns and prickles, and 
they are not unanimous, they leave the matter to the clubs. They generally 
agree to take no action in such circumstances and the prevailing state of 
affairs remains, as in the case of all attempts to limit the question of 
transfer fees. If the Management Committee cannot see a way out, the 
clubs give it up. It is the perfect relationship - of trust on one side and of 
no abuse of power on the other. This is I 
the system that has made the 
League so harmonious and so co-operative. 
While this undoubtedly represents a glorified and unproblematic picture of relations, it 
nevertheless clearly illustrates the extent to which the Management Committee had by 
the 1920s successfully developed a powerful interventionist role in the management of 
its member clubs. In its first decade the Committee had struggled to establish a 
central position in the decision-making process, with clubs resisting central control 
and continuing to assert their independence of general League rulings and Committee 
decisions. Writing in 1938, Sutcliffe argued that the attitude of clubs in this initial 
period was characterised by recalcitrance and disloyalty to the League: 'Rules were 
broken almost with impunity, and when the offenders were taken to task they took 
steps that go to show how slack was the sense of discipline, steps that would be not 
merely unconstitutional today but would create a feeling of astonishment at their 
audacity'. ' Most clubs regarded themselves as autonomous organisations tied loosely 
to the Football League structure rather than League clubs first and foremost. Arguably 
the onset of war in 1914 and the development of mutual support schemes to ensure the 
economic survival of all member clubs in the absence of a comprehensive league 
competition was fundamental in inculcating clubs with a sense of commitment to the 
All Sports Weekly, II September 1926. 
2 Sutcliffe t al., Football League, 193 8. 
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League itself And during the inter-war period the scope of the League executive's 
powers were extended further as it developed tighter regulatory control over its 
constituent clubs. As Political and Economic Planning's (PEP) 1951 report noted: 
It regulates its member clubs in such matters as wages, bonuses, transfers 
and percentages of gates to be paid to visiting clubs, lays down conditions 
under which matches take place, and determines many other club 
activities. This is a wide authority, covering many points of procedure 
from international transfers... and disciplinary action against players and 
clubs, down to the colour of linesmen's flags. 
3 
Indeed, unlike the FA, by the Second World War the Football League was no longer a 
suzerain but was increasingly perceived by the press, and sometimes even by member 
clubs, as almost an autocratic ruler. 
These changes in the relationship between the executive and the clubs reveal a more 
fundamental shift in the function and purpose of the Football League. In the 1890s 
and the first few years of the twentieth century the League could be understood as 
little more than a kind of rudimentary voluntary association, with 'a set of rules, a 
declared purpose and a membership defined by some formal act of joining'. 4 
Basically, the League had little meaning as an body independent of the clubs forming 
its membership: it was a competition organiser and an arbiter in the event of possible 
disputes but did not in any sense determine the decision-making of the clubs. 
Gradually, however, the Management Committee came to wield centralised control 
over its membership in all issues affecting the running of the competition - from 
players to referees and grounds to ticket prices - in an effort to ensure the maintenance 
of its primary ethos: the notion that the League should be, as far as possible, a fair 
competition between equals. In this sense the Committee developed into more than 
just a regulatory power: by 1939 it was initiating policy and setting the parameters for 
decisions made in every boardroom in the League. 
3 'The Football Industry - V, p. 163. 
4 Morris, 'Clubs, societies and associations', p. 395. 
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1. The Constitutional Division of Power 
The constitutional division of power between the clubs and the Committee remained 
basically unchanged from 1888 until the Second World War. According to the 
League's first set of rules each member club was entitled to appoint a representative to 
the General Committee, which normally met annually but could be convened on the 
wishes of the Management Committee or by requisition of at least half of the clubs. 
At annual meetings the club representatives elected the League officials - the 
chairman, treasurer and secretary - as well as the Management Committee and only at 
these general meetings of clubs could League rules be changed. The prescribed role 
of the Management Committee was, in contrast, not to make rules but administer 
them: it appointed match officials, regulated transfers between clubs and conducted 
the general business of the League through periodic (normally monthly) meetings. In 
addition to these executive powers the Committee acted as the League's judiciary; 
settling any disputes arising between, or complaints from, clubs or players and with 
the discretionary power 'to deal with any offending club or clubs, player or players, as 
they may think fit, and to deal with any matter not provided for in [the League] 
rules'. 5 During the first few seasons, however, the clubs were reluctant to relinquish 
collective control over disciplinary issues to a central authority such as the 
Management Committee. General assemblies of club representatives were called to 
discuss matters ranging from the conduct of players on the field to the abandonment 
of fog-affected matches and, in certain cases, clubs were even successfill in 
overturning Committee rulings. 6 One writer has noted that until the late 1890s 
The League's disciplinary powers remained... feeble... The Management 
Committee was being constantly reproached for being timorous in its 
dealing with clubs, but the plain fact was that it did not feel strong enough 
to deal drastically with the delinquents. 7 
5 Football League Handbook, 1890/9 1. For the League's original rules see Sutcliffe et al., Football 
League, pp. 4-5. 
' Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 4,6. 
7 King, Popular History ofAssociation Football, p. 30. 
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The key problem was that, though the Committee could issue fines and other 
disciplinary measures, the scope of its judicial authority remained unclear and 
ultimately subject to club sanction. Only in 1910 were the Committee's powers of 
inquiry clarified and extended further. Henceforth it was empowered to look into 'all 
financial arrangements between clubs and players' and, by 1913, this included any 
breaches of League rules by clubs, players and officials. Moreover, the Committee 
was now able to compel witnesses to attend special commission hearings and to order 
the production of related documents. Additionally it was entitled to publish all 
proceedings and findings 'whether the same shall or shall not reflect on the character 
or conduct of any Club, official, player or spectator'. 
8 
If League clubs were increasingly prepared by the beginning of the twentieth century 
to accept the Management Committee's independent judicial authority, they were less 
ready to relinquish legislative and even administrative control. In 1902 the clubs 
resisted the Committee's wishes that it should be free to appoint the successor to 
departing secretary Harry Lockett and instead carried out its own elections for the 
post, while collectively deciding on the salary to be paid-9 The appointment of 
referees and linesmen was another area in which the executive and the clubs briefly 
battled for supremacy. From the start clubs were able to nominate officials but it was 
the Committee's task to chose the final lists. This system generated considerable 
criticism, particularly in December 1904 when the Stoke programme editor suggested 
that some referees were chosen 'not through merit but through favouritism, and 
because they are particular nominees of some member of the Committee'. 10 
Consequently, the following summer Aston Villa successfully introduced a revised 
scheme allowing the Committee to appoint only six referees to the list with the clubs 
nominating and electing the remaining 30 or so. With the reduction of the size of the 
referees list two years later the Committee's influence was limited to completing the 
lists if insufficient officials had been elected and also appointing an emergency list of 
ten referees. Yet by 1912 widespread dissatisfaction with the system amongst clubs - 
who were often pestered by officials touting for votes - led them to revert to selection 
' Football League Handbook, 19 10/11, Rule 12; Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 2 
June 1913. 
' Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 2 June 1902. 
10 Quoted in Inglis, League Football, p. 77. 
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by Committee and to restrict themselves to nominating three (later reduced to two and 
then just one) linesmen. ' 1 It should also be noted that throughout he period it was the 
Committee who controlled the match-by-match appointment of officials. Clubs were 
entitled to make formal complaints against officials, and were even obliged by the 
Committee to award referees 'points' based on assessments of their performance in 
each match, but it remained difficult for individual clubs to prevent referees they 
disliked from officiating. When Aston Villa objected to the appointment of Sutcliffe 
himself for a League match during 1902/03 (the one season in the period in which he 
had not been elected to the Committee) on the grounds that 'he has never previously 
given satisfaction', the Committee declined to replace him despite informally agreeing 
that he was 'physically incapable' of doing the job. An appeal by Sheffield United to 
ban the renowned J. T. Howcroft of Bolton from referring any of the club's League 
engagements was similarly dismissed by the Management Committee. 
12 
Clubs were even less prepared to surrender the legislative initiative to the 
Management Committee, at least during the early 1900s. Although there was no 
specific regulation preventing the Committee, along with 'clubs, from proposing 
reforms and rule changes, there is some evidence that clubs resented executive 
intervention in this area. Committee member John Lewis complained that at the 1902 
annual meeting the vast majority of Committee proposals had been vetoed by the club 
electorate and in 1904 Athletic News could report that 
The attitude of the clubs generally towards the management committee 
has been to mind their own business. The clubs think they should make 
the rules and the committee administer them... the clubs would not be told 
what to do by the committee. 
13 
Yet towards the end of the decade clubs began to delegate certain responsibilities, 
particularly regarding matters of major constitutional change such as the creation of a 
third division. On a number of occasions between 1907 and 1911 the Management 
" Reports of Football League AGMs in Athletic News, 5 June 1905; 3 June 1907; Minutes of Football 
League, 3 June 1912 (AGM). 
12 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 30 October, 6,20 November 1902; Minutes of Sheffield United Football 
Committee, 20 December 1905. 
" Reports of Football League AGMs in Athletic News, 2 June 1902; 6 June 1904. 
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Committee was 'instructed' by a resolution of clubs to consider the advisability of 
expanding the League and then to report back, leaving the final decision in the hands 
of the members. 14 This and other instances represented a significant shift in the 
Committee's role from a reactive judicial body to a more proactive legislative one, 
increasingly perceived by clubs as having both the time and expertise to develop 
major policy initiatives. Certainly, from this point the majority of successful schemes 
and reforms at annual meetings began to emanate from the Management Committee 
rather than the clubs and it became rare for a Committee proposal to be vetoed. In 
fact, it was increasingly difficult for a club representative to secure support for a 
proposed reform without some form of collaboration with, or approval from, the 
executive. Hence after Arsenal's independent proposals to limit transfer fees failed in 
1922 and 1923, the Management Committee was formally re quested by the Arsenal 
representative 'to take the matter into earnest consideration and report to the next 
annual meeting the result of their deliberations'. While agreeing with the proposal in 
principle, the Committee, after consultation with all member clubs, had to report that 
'there is no need to interfere with the present rule... [and] no such desire for limitation 
as would justify them in formulating any scheme'. 15 However, it must be recognised 
that the Committee did not merely act as a filter for the proposals of its members but 
increasingly took the initiative in developing new schemes and altering existing rules. 
While this had long been accepted in practice by member clubs, it was only given 
constitutional legitimacy during the mid-1930s with the introduction of a clause 
giving the Committee 'power in their discretion to submit any alteration of Rule 
thought desirable'. 16 
2. Financina the Leazu 
The first decade of the twentieth century was also a crucial period in the debate over 
the financial obligations of member clubs towards the League. Clubs had been 
reluctant from the start to make anything more than minor contributions to the 
League's general administrative funds, and even by 1900 annual subscriptions were 
just DO 10s. for first division members and half that amount in the lower division. 
14 See, for example, Reports of Football League AGMs inAthletic News, I June 1908; 5 June 1911; 
Football League Circular to Clubs, 30 April 1909. 
15 Minutes of Football League, 28 May (AGM); 17 December 1923. 
16 Football League Handbook, 1937/38, Rule 80. 
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Additionally, re-elected clubs and those joining the League paid an entrance fee of E5 
5s., as did clubs promoted from the second division to the first. Subscriptions and 
entrance fees were thus a relatively minor source of income for the League. During 
the 1900/01 season just over E3 00 was raised in this way, representing approximately 
28 per cent of the total League income as compared with E743 (67 per cent) from that 
seasons' two Inter-League matches; these percentages had changed little by 1905/06 
with just over 23 per cent from subscriptions and entrance fees, nearly 9 per cent from 
fines and 66 per cent coming from the representative fixtures. 17 
The precarious nature of the League's finances, which relied so much on unfixed and 
insecure sources of income such as representative match receipts and, to a lesser 
extent, club fines, began increasingly to alarm members of the Management 
Committee. League rules did entitle the Committee to organise special fund-raising 
matches or make additional levies on members, as they did at the beginning of the 
1901/02 season, to cover any substantial deficit but this did not affect the general 
belief that the funding of the League was, in president Bentley's words, 
sunbusinesslike and unsound', a situation further exacerbated by the fact that on a 
number of occasions in the early 1900s Committee members were required, as club 
directors often were, to sign guarantees for bank overdrafts. 18 This unsatisfactory 
state of affairs led the Committee to suggest in 1901, and then again at the next two 
annual meetings, the introduction of a half per cent 'tax' on all League gates -a 
proposal which was vigorous opposed by the majority of clubs on each occasion. 
Advocates of 'taxation' insisted that it was a club's duty to contribute to the working 
expenses of the League. 4thletic News, for one, noted that 'The League has made the 
clubs into wealthy organisations, and the clubs should see that the League does not 
suffer financial embarrassment. 19 For critics like Liverpool's future League president 
John McKenna, however, the scheme placed an unfair financial burden on first 
division clubs, who would be responsible for well over two-thirds of the overall cost 
of running the League. Yet in reality it was not the amount of 'taxation' so much as 
the principle to which many clubs objected. Revenue, especially gate money, seems 
Inglis, League Football, pp. 48-50; Athletic News, 28 May 1906. 
Athletic News, 13 May 190 1; Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 65.. 19 Athletic News, 18 May 1903. 
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to have been regarded by clubs as the product of their individual endeavour, even 
though visiting teams provided the necessary competition and the League itself gave 
the fixture context and meaning. Thus few representatives were yet prepared to 
voluntarily hand over 'their' hard-earned money to cover the administrative costs of 
the executive body. 20 
While League members continued to reject a 'tax' on gates, the Committee searched 
for an alternative means of increasing revenue. The solution came in 1908 with the 
decision to alter the entrance fee for clubs joining the League from a mere five guineas 
to E300, out of which up to L200 could be granted to the club losing its membership. 
The feeling within the Committee was that 
the income of the League was not consistent with its dignity and its 
position... its finances ought to be in a sure and satisfactory state. The 
derivation of an income from Inter-League matches was a fickle source, 
and sometimes it proved false. The League ought to have a settled 
income... and it was for that reason that... the entrance fee should be 
made considerable larger. 21 
The steady financial improvement which resulted partly from this change temporarily 
silenced the calls for a more comprehensive form of club funding. Indeed, the League 
recorded its largest profit ever in 1912/13, making f-1,567 on the season with over half 
of this derived indirectly from club fines, and was able for the first time to enter into 
an external business investment by engaging E1,000 in the Sheffield Gas Light 
Company. 22 
But it was to be the onset of war and the obvious difficulties this generated for League 
finances which became crucial factors in the eventual introduction of the 'taxation' 
principle. During both the initial 1914/15 season, when the Football League 
programme had continued in the face of widespread public criticism 23 , and the second 
wartime season of largely regional competition, the Committee had still been able to 
20 Reports of Football League AGMs in Athletic News, 20 May 190 1; 1 June 1903. 
2' Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, I June 1908. 
22 Minutes of Football League, 26 May 1913 (AGM). 
23 See Colin Veitch, 'Play Up! Play Up! and Win the Wafl: Football, the Nation and the First World 
War 1914-15', Journal ofContemporary History, 20,1985, pp. 363-78. 
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call on some established sources of revenue. Subscriptions still provided over E300 in 
1915/16 and a similar amount had been donated by the Inter-League Board to partially 
cover the revenue previously drawn from the Inter-League matches which ceased at 
the start of that season. It was anticipated that these sources, however, were to end or 
be seriously reduced the following season and thus the Management Committee was 
faced with trying to find alternative funding to cover annual expenses estimated at 
E880 plus. 24 Ironically on McKenna's suggestion, then, the Committee introduced at 
the 1916 annual meeting a one per cent 'tax' on the net gate and stand receipts of 
member clubs in order to pay for management expenses. According to one 
Committee spokesmen, the financial contribution of clubs was essential to save the 
League from bankruptcy and was justified because the executive 
had never hitherto placed upon the clubs a tax beyond the usual annual 
subscription and an occasional levy. They had generally managed to pay 
their way through the kind-heartedness of clubs which (sic. ) seemed to 
view misdeeds from another standpoint than the Management Committee, 
and by means of fines and other little 'offsides' the League had managed 
to live. [He] never felt it was a very creditable way. 25 
The scheme seems to have received significant support, particularly from Athletic 
News and club directors such as Bradford's T. E. Maley, who both advocated the 
continuance of 'taxation' after the war. It was also a financial success, yielding over 
E101 in its first full month of operation and even securing support from the League's 
former London members, who despite competing under the aegis of the London 
Combination during the war still agreed voluntarily to forward their contributions to 
the Committee. 26 By the end of the 1918/19 season the League's finances had 
recovered sufficiently to show a balance of E2,136 achieved with the aid of E1,200 
from the gate 'tax'. 
The system continued immediately after the war, with each member club now 
contributing a half rather than one per cent, and remained for 1920/21 with the 
proviso that contributions could be suspended during the season by the Management 
24 Athletic News, 29 May 1916. 
25 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 24 July 1916. 
26 Athletic News, 10,24 July, 9,16 October 1916. 
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Committee if sufficient ftinds became available. In fact the League's finances were 
stable enough to allow the Committee to discontinue 'taxation' midway through both 
the 1921/22 and 1922/23 seasons, although it is notable that clubs were still required 
to send the League secretary details of their match takings and payments. 27 Moreover, 
the income derived from the gate receipts of first and second division clubs was 
evidently considered substantial enough on its own to spare the newly incorporated 
third division associate members any similar financial contribution. This changed,. 
however, in 1924 when the Committee introduced a new percentage scheme covering 
both the League's working expenses and the insurance of players. Henceforth first 
and second division clubs were to contribute one per cent of their net and stand 
receipts from League matches while those in the third division southern and northern 
sections gave IV2 and two per cent respectively (see chapter 6). No additional 
subscriptions or levies were demanded and the following year the scheme was 
extended to include a similar 'tax' on cup-tie gate receipts. From this income the 
Committee proposed to direct a little under half - an estimated L5,000 per annum. - to 
ran and administer the League. 28 However, by the late 1920s the financial liabilities 
of the insurance scheme had clearly eclipsed those of the League itself and while over 
El 1,000 was directed annually to cover compensation claims, E2,500-4,000 was 
considered sufficient to account for the League's modest expenditure. Nevertheless, 
during the inter-war period club funding via gate 'taxation' represented the primary 
source of revenue, accounting for somewhere between 65 and 80 per cent of annual 
income as compared with 10-20 per cent from the Inter-League fixtures. 29 
3. Executive Control, Regulation and the Question of Club Autonomy 
The creation of the Football League naturally represented a crucial step towards the 
weakening of club autonomy, irrespective of the clear financial and organisational 
benefits it brought. Henceforth, as League members, clubs had less freedom to choose 
whom they played, where and when, and under what circumstances. The club 
17 Minutes of Football League, 31 May 1920 (AGM); 5 December 192 1, IS December 1922. 
" Minutes of Football League, 2 June 1924 (AGM); 10,12 March 1924 (SGM of Third Division 
Southern and Northern Sections); Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 9 June 1924. 
29 See Annual Financial Statements of Football League and Football League Mutual Insurance 
Federation (FLMIF). 
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secretary's role of arranging the season's fixtures was superseded by the process of 
annual fixture meetings and any subsequent disputes which arose were settled by the 
League secretary and ultimately the Management Committee. Friendly matches were 
still occasionally arranged when a club had no prior League or cup commitments but 
this became increasingly less common with the gradual enlargement of the divisions 
to 16,18,20 and then 22 members by the end of the First World War. Moreover, 
from the early 1890s complex regulations were developed which precluded member 
clubs from arranging friendly fixtures (often with non-League clubs) which might 
affect the gates of fellow members. 
30 While these regulations were subsequently 
simplified, the principle underlying them remained and the Management Committee 
occasionally prohibited the playing of such matches. Hence Plymouth Argyle was 
ordered to cancel a visit to the amateur Corinthians club on the same afternoon as a 
scheduled League fixture between Crystal Palace and Barnsley. It was believed that 
the close proximity of the two grounds and the substantial support still enjoyed by the 
Corinthians 'would materially affect the gate' at Palace. 3 1 After 1927 the rules were 
changed to explicitly prohibit any club 'improperly interfering' with another clubs' 
home fixtures: Bristol Rovers' request to host a lucrative Good Friday match against 
Dutch opponents was rejected for this reason. 32 Kick-off times were also brought 
closer into the executive's sphere of influence when it was agreed in 1921 that 
Saturday matches should begin no later than 3-15 p. m. Previously kick-off times had 
ranged from I p. m. to 5 p. m. and some clubs had given themselves greater flexibility 
by not even advertising a scheduled time of kick-off (see chapter 9). From the 
following year clubs could apply to begin matches later than the standard 3-15 but this 
was to be decided in advance and at the discretion of the Committee. 33 
In other areas the transfer of power and responsibility from club to League was a 
much more gradual and complicated process. The control of players is a case in point. 
Although players were recruited, contracted and paid directly by their clubs, they were 
30 For example, see Football League Handbook, 1893/94, Rule 15. 
31 Minutes of Football League, 17 November 1922. For a detailed exploration of the incident, and 
particularly the response of The Times and other supporters of amateur football, see Simon Inglis, 
Soccer in the Dock. A History ofBritish Football Scandals, 1900 to 1965, London, 1985, chapter 4. 
31 Inglis, Soccer in the Dock, p. 6 1; Minutes of Football League, 16 February 193 1. 
31 Minutes of Football League, 20 December 1920; 11 May, 30 May 1921 (AGM); 29 May 1922 
(AGM). 
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also required to register with the League (and the FA) before they could play in 
League competitions. The sanction of the executive was required for the movement 
of players between member clubs and the introduction of retain and transfer lists 
during the early 1890s allowed the Management Committee increased power to 
regulate the transfer market centrally. By about 1897 the League had also taken on the 
role of arbiter between clubs who were unable to agree on the price for a transferred 
player and later began to alter those fees which (on the players' request) were 
considered unreasonably high. 34 Moreover, it was actually the League and not the 
club who owned players' registrations. When a club left the League the registration of 
its players automatically became the possession of the Committee, which was then 
entitled to fix transfer fees and negotiate the sale of players on the club's behalf. The 
most salient example of this was the so-called 'auction' of Leeds City's entire playing 
staff following the clubs' expulsion from the League in October 1919. The 
Committee organised for the representatives of any interested members - 30 attended - 
to meet at a hotel in Leeds where each player was sold to the highest bidder along 
with club equipment such as nets, goal-posts, boots and kit. 35 In these circumstances, 
the money received legally belonged to the League although the Committee normally 
paid a discretionary sum to the exiting club and sometimes to the transferred player as 
his accrued share of presumed benefit. 
We have seen that over the opening two decades of the century the League developed 
a series of rules and guidelines to regulate the financial arrangements between clubs 
and their employees. This was begun, of course, not directly by the League but 
through the machinery of the FA with the introduction of the maximum wage law and 
the outlawing of bonuses in 1901. In 1904 the FA unofficially passed over to the 
League all responsibility for financial dealings between its clubs and players and by 
1910 the governing body had formally scrapped all such rules except the maximum 
wage and given the League jurisdiction to 'alter their Rules to include provisions for 
the engagement of Players in accordance with the wishes of their members'. 36 In 
March of that year the Committee introduced its first comprehensive scheme to 
34 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 128. 
35 Martin Jarred and Malcolm MacDonald, Leeds United: A Complete Record, 1919-1989, Derby, 
1989, p. 347-48; Athletic News, 20 October 1919. 
36 FA Circular on Financial Arrangements Between Clubs and Players, 10 January 1910. 
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regulate the payment of wages, re-signing bonuses, talent money, benefits and accrued 
benefits for transferred players. 37 By 1920 stipulated match bonuses for League and 
cup-ties were also established and a ceiling was placed on benefit payments for both 
first and second team players. At the same time the introduction of a sliding scale 
allowed closer central control over wage levels, with fixed maximums for new players 
and annual rises over four years to an overall maximum. Additional earnings such as 
tour allowances and even removal expenses and wedding presents were also subject to 
Committee approval and in all cases official sanction had to be obtained before any 
wage rise or benefit payment could be granted by the club. This is not to say, of 
course, that boards of directors were prevented from establishing individual club wage 
structures and other earnings policies within the limits prescribed by League rules; the 
clear gap in basic wages between clubs in the top and lower divisions and the 
difference in approach towards benefits and other discretionary payments (see chapter 
5) shows this. There was certainly nothing approaching uniformity in players' 
earnings across the League. Yet compared with the situation at the beginning of the 
century, clubs in the inter-war period were less free to reward their players as they 
chose and the League executive had effectively replaced the board of directors as the 
chief regulator of employee earnings. 
While there was clearly some feeling that the 'domestic' affairs of member clubs 
should remain outside the influence of the Management Committee, in reality the 
dividing line between matters of club and League concern became increasingly 
blurred and open to interpretation. The Committee was generally reluctant to become 
directly involved in the internal management of clubs, though it was often able to 
wield considerable indirect influence. Committee members were particularly opposed 
to clubs being effectively managed and controlled by a single wealthy individual - the 
so-called 'one man club'. 38 Yet, despite widespread criticism both in the press and in 
official reports, J. D. Davies (Manchester United) and Samuel Hill-Wood (Glossop) 
continued to dominate their clubs for the fifteen years prior to the First World War 
39 without any attempt by the League executive to force internal reconstruction. When 
" See Thomsen's Weekly News, 19 March 1910. 
39 See Athletic News, 4 Sp tember 1911. 
3, 
P 
9 FA Report and Recommendation of the Commission adopted by the Council re. Manchester United 
FC, 30 March 19 10; Mason, Association Football, pp. 4849. 
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the question of the dual control of clubs was first raised in 1913 the Committee was 
similarly eager to avoid direct involvement. Sutcliffe rejected the suggestions of rival 
London clubs that the Committee should intervene to preclude Henry Norris' control 
of both Arsenal and Fulham by insisting that there was no rule which empowered it to 
deal with such matters. 40 However, when in 1931 Arsenal took a financial and 
administrative interest in third division neighbours Clapton Orient, with the 
surreptitious intention of transforming the club into a nursery for its young players, the 
executive immediately intervened. It rejected Arsenal's proposal for the 
reconstruction of the bankrupt Orient club and, with FA assistance, formulated its own 
scheme ensuring that the debts be paid off and the club be managed independently by 
its own board of directors. 41 Yet in the main the Committee seemed anxious not to 
overstep its authority. When the Aberdare Athletic Supporters' Club asked the 
League executive to prevent the amalgamation of their club with Aberaman, they were 
informed that the Committee 'do not... interfere with the domestic arrangements of 
Clubs so long as the Rules and Regulations of the Football Association and the 
Football League are observed and the Clubs properly conducted'. 42 There had been 
similar caution over an internal dispute within the Bristol City directorate but when it 
became clear that League regulations had been infringed the Committee launched an 
inquiry which eventually led to the permanent suspension of six directors. Even then 
the Committee was unsure about how closely to involve itself in the restructuring of 
the club and the election of a new directorate. Three members including the president 
agreed to attend the subsequent meeting of shareholders because, in Sutcliffe's words, 
'Although I had gave doubts as to the possibility of being of service to the club, I felt 
that -the shareholders... should 
know the wishes and intention of the League 
Management Committee. A3 
That the Committee was not always prepared or able to maintain a laissez-faire 
attitude towards the management of its member clubs is clear from the debate 
40 Minutes of Football League, 26 May 1913 (AGM); Report of Football League AGM in Athletic 
News, 2 June 1913. 
41 Minutes of Football League, 24 August, 14 December 193 1,11 January 1932; Minutes of FA 
Emergency Committee, 17 March-I 6 April 193 1; Jimmy Seed, The Jimmy SeedStory, London, 1957, 
pp. 21-22. 
42 Minutes of Football League, 13 December 1926. 
43 Topical Times, 16 June, 28 July 1923; Minutes of Football League, 14-15 June 1923. 
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surrounding the future of Huddersfield Town in 1919.44 The club had struggled to 
make financial ends meet since its admission to the League in 1910 and had survived 
largely as a result of the support of local mill-owning brothers J. Hilton and D. Stonor 
Crowther who, according to some estimates, had subsidised the club with payments of 
up to E40,000. But by the beginning of the 1919/20 season, competition from the 
town's highly successful rugby league club had contributed to meagre gates at Leeds 
Road; a midweek fixture against Bury raised only F. 49 and 2,500 spectators paid just 
E90 for the visit of Fulham on I November. Within a week of the Fulham match 
provisional arrangements had been made with the apparent support of Hilton 
Crowther and the Huddersfield directors for the complete transfer of the whole 
operation - players, liabilities and league position included - to nearby Leeds. 
Although it quickly emerged that there was in fact widespread opposition to the Leeds 
move from spectators, shareholders and even directors of Huddersfield Town, the 
Management Committee appeared to align itself immediately with the Crowther 
camp. The evidence of poor attendances and gate receipts convinced McKenna 'that 
Huddersfield people... do not want Soccer football' while Sutcliffe believed that as a 
Football League town 'Huddersfield has failed' and hence the Committee should (and 
would) endorse the requested move to Leeds. 45 The Committee eventually ruled that 
the club had until 8 December (later extended until the end of the month) to repay the 
E25,000 debt due to Crowther, failing which the transfer to Leeds would go ahead. 
But opponents of the move, led by the newly-formed Shareholders' and Supporters' 
Committee and its chairman Amos Brook Hirst, informed the Committee that the 
application to move had been made without prior consultation with either the club's 
directors or shareholders. 46 In their view, Crowther had acted independently and 
against the wishes of the club and his application was therefore void. The League 
executive's dismissal of these claims, together with the perceived bias of the Leeds 
and Manchester press (especially the League mouthpiece . 4thletic News), convinced 
one Huddersfield director that there was 'a conspiracy' against the club. 47 In the end, 
44 For detailed chronological accounts of events see George S. Binns, Huddersfield Town. 75 Years 
On, Huddersfield, 1984, pp. 30-69; Terry Frost, Huddersfield Town: A Complete Record, 1910-90, 
Derby, 1990, pp. 39-46. 
45 Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 10 November 1919; Athletic News, 8 December 1919. 
46 Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 8 December 1919. 
47 Opinions of T. H. Kaye and Captain Moore, reported in Huddersfield Weekly Examiner, 20 
December 1919. 
134 
the financial assistance of three local benefactors along with a profitable promotion 
campaign and FA Cup run proved sufficient to clear the debt and keep the club at 
Huddersfield. The episode certainly disproved the notion that the Management 
Committee could always remain impartial and taciturn in the affairs of its member 
clubs. As the non-Huddersfield press was keen to point out, gate money was no 
longer a purely domestic issue after the wartime introduction of pooling policies but 
affected the finances of visiting clubs and the health of the League as a whole (see 
chapter 7). In this way, the Committee's preference for the Leeds scheme can be seen 
as a logical - but ultimately unsuccessful - attempt to maintain the quality of 
membership. 
The location and standards of club grounds were other areas in which executive 
control was slow to develop before the inter-war period. Although the League agreed 
as early as 1891 not to allow entry to any club with a ground closer than three miles to 
that of an existing member, clubs were otherwise able to move grounds as and when 
they wished without receiving prior Committee approval . 
48 As most changes of this 
kind involved switching to a location within one or two miles of the previous ground - 
and always in the same town or city - there was rarely opposition from any party. 
However, when in 1913 the Arsenal club proposed to move from Woolwich to a 
stadium 14 miles away in north London, immediate objections were raised by 
Tottenham Hotspur and Clapton Orient, whose grounds were situated within 2 V2 
miles of the proposed site. These clubs pressed the Committee to stop the move but it 
was decided to take no action as 'there is ample population and opportunity for three 
League clubs within the area' and, more importantly, 'that under the rules and practice 
of the League there is no right to interfere' . 
49 This clearly enraged the opponents of 
the move, who remained convinced that even without a precedent for its action it 
would have been within the Committee's power to intervene. At the next annual 
meeting Orient's Captain Wells-Holland successfully proposed a rule change ensuring 
that 'each club shall register its ground with the secretary, and no club shall remove to 
"s Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 137. 
49 Minutes of Football League, I March 1913. Also see Simmons, History ofthe Tottenham Hotspur 
FC. 
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another ground without first obtaining the consent of the Management Committee'. 
50 
The League's own minutes suggest that ground moves were initially passed by the 
Committee with little debate or investigation but by the early 1930s Committee 
members were invariably sent to inspect the proposed ground and stipulate any 
necessary alterations. Queen's Park Rangers and Clapton Orient were notable for the 
number of times they were forced to move during this period. In March 1930, for 
example, Orient gained permission to relocate to the Lea Bridge Speedway Stadium 
but after failing to fulfil the executive's instructions to extend the playing area to 
allow sufficient room between the touchlines and perimeter fences they were then told 
in November that no more League matches could be played on the ground. Another 
proposed move to the Spotted Dog ground in East London was rejected by the 
Committee after an inspection and the club spent the next month at temporary home 
venues, including two visits to Wembley and one to Arsenal's Highbury stadium, 
before returning to Lea Bridge where the landlords had agreed to add the extra turf. 
51 
During the first twenty or so years of the League, clubs were generally left to build 
and develop their grounds as they wished. Only where issues of crowd control were 
concerned did the Committee seek to intervene, and even then it was reluctant to 
order clubs to make alterations. Significantly, clubs were only advised to erect fences 
or railings around the pitch to prevent crowd encroachment and to provide dressing- 
room accommodation for officials and visiting teams enabling them to leave the field 
without fear of assault. 
52 The number of members who actually followed the 
Committee's advice in cases of this kind is hard to determine. It was reported in 1913 
that both Bolton Wanderers and Oldham Athletic were building new dressing-room 
accommodation 'to be completed to the satisfaction of the League, 
53 but these may 
have been isolated instances and certainly did not prevent the continued issuing of 
5c) Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 2 June 1913; Minutes of Football League, 26 May 
1913 (AGM). 
5' Minutes of Football League, II March, 5 November 1930; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 25 
February, 17 November 1930; Inglis, Football Grounds, p. 26 1. 
52 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 11; Athletic News, 9 December 1901,12 March 1906. If the club 
failed to follow the executive's advice and crowd disturbances resulted, however, it was obviously 
liable to ground suspension or other punitive action by the governing body. On this see R. W. Lewis, 
'Football Hooliganism in England before 1914: A Critique of the Dunning Thesis', 1JHS, 13,3,1996, 
Vp. 310-39. 
.3 Minutes of Football League, 9 May 1913. 
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recommendations rather than commands relating particularly to inadequate provision 
for visiting teams and match officials. 54 The influx of the new associate members in 
the early 1920s, however, led the Committee to develop tighter controls over the 
standard of ground facilities. Prospective candidates for the third division northern 
section were expected to replace inadequate accommodation for spectators and 
provide comfortable dressing-room facilities attached to the ground. Regular visits 
and reports by Committee members ensured that Wigan Borough, Accrington Stanley, 
Halifax Town and Walsall amongst others undertook re-building projects to bring 
their grounds up to the standard required by the Committee before the start of their 
first League season. In 1927 each club applying for membership was instructed to 
send details of its ground's holding capacity, stand and covered accommodation and 
dressing-room facilities. Any candidate failing to meet the Committee's recognised 
standards - uncodified but established by convention over previous years - was 
unlikely to be recommended at the annual elections. 55 The executive was also known 
to step in to ensure that the standard of the playing field itself was maintained. Poor 
pitch conditions on a number of grounds at the end of the 1928/29 season led the 
Committee to insist that 'during the close season there shall be no sub-letting or usage 
of the ground which will interfere with the playing pitch'. This undoubtedly cost 
many clubs an important source of extra revenue: West Ham was not the only club 
forced to forego a substantial offer - E2,500 in this case - to host summer speedway 
racing at its ground. 56 
Indeed, in other respects, too, the Committee monitored the commercial activities of 
its members, especially when these involved association with that perennial bugbear 
of the football authorities: gambling. League officials had from the early days 
followed the lead of the FA in condemning any direct or indirect association with all 
forms of betting. Before the First World War expressions of general opposition to 
coupon betting and sweepstakes were common but it was left to the FA to take more 
54 See Minutes of Football League, 13 January 1913. 
" Sheffield United FC Programme, 6 September 1920; Minutes of Football League, 10 January, 1-2 
July 1921,8 April 1927 (SGM); Inglis, League Foothall, p. 125. 
56 Topical Times, 17 March 1928; Minutes of Football League, 5 March 1928; Minutes of West Ham 
United FC, 28 February, 6 March 1928. 
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direct action against perpetrators. 
57 Yet after the war the Committee appears to have 
clamped down more strongly on any club activity associated with betting. 
Sweepstakes for fund-raising or other purposes were explicitly forbidden and 
advertisements for pools companies on Crystal Palace's ground and in Newport's 
programme were ordered to be removed. 
58 The emergence of dog racing as a popular 
working-class sport in the late 1920s and early 1930s presented new problems. Some 
clubs in financial difficulties were keen to take advantage of the added income that 
could be generated from staging regular greyhound racing and either rented out their 
ground to separate companies or, in the case of the east London Orient and Tbames 
clubs, actually moved to greyhound stadiums as tenants. After initially advocating the 
prohibition of greyhound racing on members' grounds in line with its Scottish 
counterpart, the FA Council in conference with the League Management Committee 
ultimately agreed 'that it was a domestic matter [for] the clubs' . 
59 However, this did 
not stop the Committee independently condemning dog racing as 'a menace to our 
game' and, on the instruction of the majority its members, allowing only clubs with 
established agreements by 1932 to continue staging racing. 
60 
From 1890 the Committee set a minimum admission price of 6d. (boys under 14 and 
women excepted) for ground entry which rapidly became a standard charge across the 
League. Higher entry fees were of course charged for grandstand seats and clubs 
invariably increased prices across the board for important cup-ties, though rarely for 
comparable League games. 
61 But the available evidence indicates that the majority of 
spectators from London to Newcastle paid the same 6d. to watch League matches, a 
price which was increased to 9d. in 1917 to cover the new Entertainment Tax and then 
rose to Is. after the First World War. Deviations from the League minimum were 
rare. Cardiff City briefly flirted with an increased entry fee of Is. 3d. at the beginning 
of the 1920s in order to cover increased wages and travelling expenses but the 
Clapson, Popular Gambling, pp. 168-69; Minutes of Football League, 24 February 1913. 
5' Minutes of Football League, 5 December 1921,23 October 1922,17 October 1927. 
59 FA Minute Books, Minutes of Evidence of Royal Commission on Lotteries and Betting, I December 
1932; Minutes of FA Council, 25 June, 10 October 1932. 
60 Inglis, League Football, p. 137; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 7 November 1932; Minutes of 
Sheffield United Football Committee, 9 November 1932. 
61 Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 81-82. 
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Committee reftised on this and subsequent occasions to force changes centrally. 62 On 
the other hand, some clubs faced considerable pressure to reduce prices for the 
unemployed during periods of industrial hardship. In 1921 Barrow were cautioned for 
admitting unemployed spectators free of charge, a decision which led to crowd 
disturbances as fences were broken down by groups intent on forcing entry to the 
ground. This experience probably influenced the executive's decision to reject the 
request of several clubs who wanted to allow reduced admission on the production of 
unemployment cards. 63 During the 1930s the Sheffield clubs among others cut prices 
where they could to offset the impact of local economic depression. Boys were 
admitted for 3d. rather than 4d. at first team matches at both Hillsborough and 
Brarnall Lane from late 1932 and similar reductions were made in stand and season 
ticket prices for the 1933/34 season, but efforts to reduce prices for workless adults 
were obstinately opposed at Committee level. When Sheffield United proposed to 
halve prices for the unemployed at League matches in 1933 the Committee informed 
the club of its objection in advance and only three members backed the proposal at the 
annual meeting. United joined the campaign instigated by the Southampton 
Supporters' Club for a 'sixpenny' gate the following year but failed again to receive 
sufficient club support. 64 Other clubs were evidently less affected financially by the 
loss of unemployed spectators and were thus less willing to move away from 
established pricing structures. When faced with calls to cut admission the West Ham 
directors pleaded that they were powerless to act as their prices were 'fixed by the 
associations under which we play'. 65 
At times the executive was accused of acting in the manner of a press censor by 
controlling the supply of information from the club to the broader Public. A major 
target of this censorship was the official club programme, notwithstanding the fact 
that clubs often disclaimed responsibility for what was printed by the nominally 
independent programme editor. For example, in 1905 the Committee forced the Stoke 
62 Athletic News, 9 August 1920,26 May 1924. 
"' Minutes of Football League, 23 September, 4 November, 5 December 1921,29 May 1922 (AGM). 
Also see comments in Albion News, 27 August 192 1. 
64 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 6 December 1932; 29 March, 2 May, 7 June, 3 July 
1933; 6 February 1934. Also see Fishwick, English Football, p. 50. 
"s Minutes of West Ham United FC, 2 April 1935. 
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programme editor and club secretary H. D. Austerberry to withdraw the charges he 
had made of bias in the appointment of League referees. The Committee's action did 
not escape criticism: Austerberry felt he had 'as much right as members of the... 
Committee to write generally on a system to which he objected' and Athletic News 
expressed its amusement at 'the extremely autocratic attitude' of the executive 
towards a small, private football publication. 66 Similar retractions and apologies were 
demanded when first Hull City in 1912 and then West Ham in 1921 used the club 
programme to criticise the playing methods of opponents. 67 The Committee was 
again denounced by critics for its autocratic action, following a series of incidents in 
1920. First, Chelsea was brought to book for printing 'an offensive paragraph' in the 
club programme relating to the workings of a League Commission. " Second, clubs 
were instructed not to disclose their gate money to the public and, finally, two clubs 
were fined for breaching League rules by providing meals for match officials. For the 
Bolton newspaper Football Field the Committee's behaviour was unnecessary and 
tactically ill-judged: 'It is possible to rule with too hard a hand'. 69 
While Football Field's perception of the Management Committee as an increasingly 
autocratic body was not universally shared, there can be little doubt that League clubs 
between the wars were more tightly-regulated than ever before. In addition to laying 
down conditions relating to the fundamentals of club management - players' transfers 
and payments, grounds and commercial activities etc. - the executive also sought to 
monitor and control the minutiae of club life. From the beginning of the period club 
colours; had to be registered with the League secretary and from 1909 goalkeepers 
were required to wear a jersey in one of three (later four) colours and distinct from the 
shirts of both competing teams. Initially these regulations seemed either to be ignored 
or not taken seriously by clubs and match officials but the Committee began to issue 
small fines and warned in late 1913 that 'in future all clubs not complying with the 
rule will be severely dealt with' . 
70 At the start of each season clubs could apply to 
change their official colours but playing in unauthorised colours without permission 
66 Athletic News, 6 February 1905. 
67 Minutes of Football League, 2 December 1912,17 January 192 1. 
68 Minutes of Football League, II October 1920. 
61 Quoted in Sheffield United FC Programme, 30 October 1920. 
7' Minutes of Football League, 3 November 1913. 
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became a disciplinary offence in the same bracket (though not with the same 
punishment) as more serious misdemeanours uch as unauthorised 'payments to 
players. 71 Perhaps the most important aspect of any members clubs' identity - its 
narne - was also subject to registration by the Committee, with alterations needing 
Committee approval. Although the Committee rarely did more than simply rubber- 
stamp name changes, this itself could be a convoluted affair, as when the newly- 
elected Boscombe club applied to alter its name to Bournemouth United but within a 
month requested another name change to Bournemouth and Boscombe Athletic. 72 By 
the 1930s, then, substantial and crucial areas of club activity were subject to central 
regulation and many decisions taken by a club's board of directors had first to be 
registered and sanctioned by Preston before being put into motion. And while clubs 
such as Aston Villa and Accrington Stanley were clearly very different organisations 
so far as playing success, financial resources and administrative influence were 
concerned, they were nevertheless increasingly directed by common standards and 
procedures which in certain respects undermined the essential specificity of clubs. An 
indication of this emphasis on standardisation within the Football League is provided 
by the decision of the Management Committee to make the use of elliptical goal posts 
mandatory for the 1939/40 season, significantly over six years before the FA officially 
approved of their use. 73 
The most visible strand of the Committee's power over clubs was probably its 
disciplinary function. Here again the executive became less hesitant and arguably 
more severe in its treatment of clubs after the First World War. While fines imposed 
for simple administrative slackness, such as the late arrival of result slips or transfer 
documents, remained fairly constant, penalties for more serious breaches of rule rose 
sharply. For example, FA Cup finalists Everton and Newcastle United were both 
fined E50 for fielding 'unrepresentative' teams for League matches towards the end of 
the 1905/06 season; by 1912 flOO and E150 were more common penalties. 74 Indeed, 
before 1924 League rules prohibited the Committee issuing fines exceeding E 150 but 
when Newcastle were found guilty of playing weak teams in no less than seven 
" See, for instance, Minutes of Football League, 15 November 1912; 22 September 1922. 
72 Minutes of Football League, 14-15 June, 6 July 1923. 
73 Minutes of Huddersfield Town FC, 25 April 1939; Inglis, Football Grounds, p. 55. 
74 Athletic News, 23 April 1906; Minutes of Football League, 10 May 1912. 
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League fixtures during their victorious FA Cup run, a massive ; E750 fine was imposed 
and the Committee was henceforth given the freedom to exact 'such fine as they shall 
think fit'. 75 This incident reflected a distinct tightening up on matters of club 
discipline, a policy which had been explicitly revealed by McKenna at the previous 
annual meeting. He told club representatives that 
there were some members who abused the rules and tried to evade them. 
In the past there had been some drastic sentences, but he was confident 
that they were only forerunners of greater unless the rules were kept. Any 
club that could not carry out the rules must suffer, and so far as he was 
concerned they would suffer severely if found guilty. (Applause)76 
In theory, the expulsion of a club from the League was a matter for the members 
collectively. A simple majority at the annual meeting could vote to exclude any club 
whose conduct was deemed 'objectionable'. Yet as in many other areas, in practice 
such matters were left for the Committee to investigate and ultimately decide. There 
is little doubt that expelling a club was considered a drastic measure and a last resort: 
only one club suffered this fate before 1939 and then under peculiar circumstances. 
Following a series of fines and suspensions in 1911, Middlesborough was formally 
warned by the Committee that further offences would mean immediate expulsion but 
despite some newspaper pressure it was always likely that the club would be given a 
reprieve. " When the executive did actually expel a member - Leeds City in 1919 - it 
was not so much for breaking League rules as for challenging its authority. 78 A tip-off 
from a former Leeds player led the League and the FA to organise a joint commission 
to investigate alleged illegal payments to players during the war. Such investigations 
were certainly not uncommon and, if the allegations had been proven, it is likely that 
certain directors and players would have found themselves heavily fined and 
temporarily suspended. There would have been no precedent, however, for expelling 
the club itself. The reason for this was undoubtedly the refusal of club directors to 
hand over a set of documents, including the accounts from 1916-18, as required by 
75 Athletic News, 26 May 1924; Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 9 June 1924. 
76 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 4 June 1923. 
77 Football League Conunission report on Middlesborough FC, printed in Athletic News, 5 June 1911; 
Athletic News, 19 June 1911. 
7' see Arnold, 'Leeds City'; Jarred and MacDonald, Leeds United, pp. 34448. 
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both League and FA rules. As Athletic News noted in its editorial, by refusing to obey 
the commission's orders Leeds City had 'automatically suspended themselves'. 79 
Some critics of the expulsion, notably the Lord Mayor of Leeds, Joseph Henry, 
believed that the League representatives on the commission were instrumental in 
persuading the FA members to expel rather than fine the club, partly as a result of 
pressure from the aspiring Port Vale club who hoped to fill Leeds' place. 
80 In his 
investigation of the affair, Arnold explained the commission's action as &a dramatic 
gesture by men who knew they had badly misjudged the political symbolism of 
professional soccer in the early years of the Great War'. 
81 While both explanations 
probably contain elements of truth, the decision on the League's part, at least, was 
entirely in keeping with the Management Committee's emerging self-confidence and 
disciplinary zeal. For a Committee increasingly intent on asserting its authority and 
stamping out irregularities, member clubs could certainly not be allowed to ignore 
established procedures and, more importantly, publicly defy commands. 
4. Breakaways, Division and the Problems of Loyalty 
It is hardly surprising that division and disunity emerged as perennial problems for an 
amalgamation of sporting clubs, or a business cartel, as large and diverse as the 
Football League. What is in fact notable is that the League managed to avoid the type 
of split in its membership which the Northern Rugby Football Union experienced in 
1901", as well as the almost annual secession of individual clubs which plagued the 
rival Southern League throughout the period. The role of the Management Committee 
was important in this respect due to its relative success in quickly identifying sources 
of discontent and ruthlessly suppressing consequent dissension. 
During the 1890s and the early twentieth century the League authorities were 
confronted with several breakaway scares among its member clubs. Most of this 
agitation came from Lancashire, whose major clubs appear to have taken some time to 
become convinced of the organisational and economic merits of League membership. 
79 Athletic News, 20 October 1919. 
"Football and Sports Special, I November 1919. 
" Arnold, 'Leeds City, p. 117. 
92 See Moorhouse, A People's Game, p. 60. 
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As early as 1891 Blackburn Rovers, Accrington, and (according to one account) 
championship leaders Everton, were all called upon to deny press remarks that they 
were intending to leave the Football League to form a separate Lancashire 'super 
league'. The inquiry established to investigate the claims resolved that 'in future any 
alleged grievances be brought forward in a constitutional and regular manner' and 
warned potential malcontents that 'any similar occurrence will be dealt with the 
utmost severity'. 83 Three years later the Blackburn chairman Dr. Morley still 
maintained that the League 'had not been an unmixed blessing. With one or two 
exceptions there was hardly a League club who could pay 20 s. in the pound when 
called upon in an emergency'. 
84 1895 witnessed another major crisis after a secret 
meeting of midlands clubs led to an alleged attempt at regional en bloc voting at the 
annual meeting. Reaction within Lancashire again included suggestions of 
withdrawal and the creation of a district league with less travel and lower wage bills 
but the League executive acted quickly to condemn both movements and urge loyalty 
and the preservation of Unity. 
85 While these instances may have realistically 
threatened the existence of a still relatively young organisation, by the turn of the 
century the idea of a mass breakaway of Lancashire clubs, at least, had become less 
viable. Indeed, when Councillor Booth-Sharples, president of the Lancashire League, 
attempted to persuade the Football League's red-rose members to secede in late 1901, 
his suggestion was dismissed as undesirable and impractical by the press and seems to 
have been barely considered by the clubs themselves. 86 
There were also occasional fears that southern clubs were intent on leaving the 
League, which for the most part centred around the activities of a single club: 
Arsenal. Arsenal held a particularly important - almost symbolic - position amongst 
the League membership as the first southern-based club to join (in 1893) and, before 
1905, the sole representative from the capital. For this reason rumours of secession or 
alleged attempts to lure the Arsenal away to the Southern League were fairly common, 
particularly during the 1890s and early 1900s, although there is little evidence 
11 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 7; R. W. Lewis, 'The Development of Professional Football in 
Lancashire, 1870-19141, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Lancaster, 1993, p. 213. 
Catton Folders, B, Report of Blackburn Rovers FC Annual Meeting, 22 June 1894, p. 89. 
Catton, The Real Football, p. 93; Lewis, 'Professional Football in Lancashire', p. 215. 
86 Athletic News, 16 December 190 1. 
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available to indicate how seriously the club itself regarded the idea. To take just one 
example, during the summer of 1901 the Arsenal executive and shareholders were 
called upon to publicly profess their loyalty to the Football League amid press 
statements that they were on the verge of resigning their membership. 87 But perhaps 
more serious than this was the position of those clubs who became members of the 
London Combination during the First World War. While some authors have 
speculated wildly with limited evidence that the metropolitan clubs were prepared to 
split from the League in early 191988, there were nevertheless ome signs of a growing 
independence manating from London at this time. The five London clubs had 
certainly acted against the wishes of Sutcliffe and other Committee members when 
initially deciding to compete in the London Combination in 1915: Arsenal's chairman 
Henry Norris had explicitly asserted their collective right 'to play under the 
jurisdiction of that league without asking anybody'. And, while voluntarily 
contributing to the League's depleted funds and pledging their continued loyalty to 
that body, they still resisted a number of requests to rejoin League competition during 
the hostilities. 89 However, it is doubtful whether the idea of a post-war London 
League was ever really more than a bargaining device to help certain clubs regain first 
division status in an enlarged competition. There was certainly the feeling, expressed 
by some London newspapers, that a failure to allow Chelsea to retain a first division 
place, after being relegated as a result of an 'arranged' match prior to the war, might 
encourage a movement towards independence; Arsenal, too, had shown a degree of 
sympathy for the wage and contract demands of the militant London Players' Union, 
which suggested to some a potential break from the League if the club were not 
elected to the first division. Other clubs, though, including Tottenham Hotspur, 
publicly denied any intention of wishing to join a new London League and the idea 
rapidly disappeared when both Chelsea and, more controversially, Arsenal were 
admitted to the top division. 90 
More common than breakaway movements or threats were less conspicuous 
expressions of independence such as unofficial meetings of clubs. The organisation 
87 Athletic News, 20 May, 3 June 190 1. 
" See particularly Inglis, League Football, pp. 113-14. 
89 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 26 July 1915; Athletic News, 10 July 1916. 
90 Harding, Good ofthe Game, London, 199 1, p. 126; Athletic News, 3 February 19 19. 
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of meetings which allowed League members to discuss FA rules and related matters, 
often culminating in an agreed collective policy, were well established by the start of 
the century but really came to the fore in the context of the debates over wage and 
bonus payments in the 1900s. In May 1904, for example, Everton called a meeting to 
discuss bonus payments to players; almost three years later Manchester City convened 
a ftirther series of meetings to attempt to resolve that issue and the related maximum 
wage question but agreement could not be reached and it was decided that 'clubs must 
take independent steps in the matter. 91 For the most part these meetings were 
arranged independently and without the necessary sanction or even the knowledge of 
the League executive and there seems to have been little attempt by the latter to 
orchestrate such forums or influence their outcome. An exception to this was 
Bentley's personal inteýection in early 1909 over the collective response to the FA's 
proposed amnesty to clubs making illegal payments to players. Following six months 
of wavering and unsuccessftil conferences, Bentley issued a circular calling an 
informal meeting of club representatives - he emphasised that it was not an official 
League meeting - to resolve the issue, which eventually led to unanimous acceptance 
of the amnesty. 92 
Meetings called to discuss League rather than FA matters naturally elicited a very 
different response from the Management Committee. As we have seen, there were 
established constitutional procedures whereby member clubs could band together to 
request a full League meeting to discuss important issues and the Committee therefore 
reacted angrily on the rare occasions when clubs chose to meet outside its jurisdiction. 
A notable example came in 1909, when two private and unauthorised meetings of 
midlands and Yorkshire clubs were arranged prior to that season's annual meeting. 
The main purpose of the gatherings, it would appear, was to agree on a collective 
approach towards the Management Committee elections and to remedy the perceived 
dominance of Lancastrian representatives. 93 Echoing the events of 1895, the 
9' Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 17 May 1904; 27 February, 20 March, 2 April 
1907. 
92 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 26 August 1908,10 February 1909; Athletic News, 
1,8 February 1909. 
93 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 4 May 1909; Athletic News, 17 May 1909; Foothall 
and Sports Special, 5 June 1909. 
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Lancashire clubs followed with their own regional meeting and the London contingent 
were reported to have done likewise. This separatist activity was strongly condemned 
by the executive. For Bentley, there could be no objection to clubs gathering to 
discuss League matters which directly affected them 
but when it came to a section of the clubs convening a meeting which 
comprised the majority of the League clubs to settle certain matters in 
connection with the management of the League.... it was a grave affair... 
As a matter of principle, such proceedings are entirely wrong. 94 
Little had changed when a clique of midlands and Yorkshire clubs met in 1913 under 
similar circumstances at Leeds 'to consider the question of better representation on the 
Management Committee'. 95 
The machinery of official League meetings appears to have successfully contained 
even the more dissident directors and club officials for most of the 1920s but by 1930 
the dilatory nature of decision-making had sparked another wave of independently 
organised club gatherings. This time the meetings were neither secret nor restricted 
along regional lines. In April of that year two leading clubs, Arsenal and Huddersfield 
Town, issued a joint circular to all full members (i. e. first and second division clubs) 
calling a meeting to consider issues ranging from the release of players for 
international matches through to the voting power of third division clubs and even the 
reform of the throw-in law. Though these covered FA as well as League matters, the 
seven resolutions carried by the meeting were sent initially to the Management 
Committee for consideration; the Committee accepted them all in principle and 
adopted or agreed to act upon those within its jurisdiction. 96 However, when the most 
significant of these resolutions - the discontinuance of ýaturday dates for all but the 
England-Scotland international fixture - was debated at the annual meeting in June the 
Committee surprisingly withdrew its support which, after a club vote, forced the 
backers similarly to retract from this proposed alteration of FA rules. 97 But the matter 
was not allowed to rest there. In December Huddersfield's opinionated chairman 
94 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 14 June 1909. 91 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 29 April 1913. 
96 Report of Meeting of Football League Clubs, First and Second Division, 4 April 1930. 
91 Minutes of Football League, 2 June 1930 (AGM). 
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Amos Brook Hirst, who had previously crossed swords with the Management 
Committee as a result of his club's financial crisis of 1919, organised another meeting 
of League clubs ostensibly 'to discuss matters generally'98 but with the real purpose of 
re-opening the debate over the release of international players. In the opinion of the 
Committee this was a serious offence which threatened disorder and questioned its 
overall authority within the League. In a letter to Brook Hirst the Committee 
expressed its view that the meeting 
may be regarded as lacking in courtesy to the President and the Committee 
and... be thought suggestive of disloyalty and... lead to difficulty with 
matters under the consideration and jurisdiction of the Committee... As 
the members of the Management Committee have not been invited there is 
the ftuther impression that their presence at the meeting is not desired. 
If the clubs had wanted such a meeting, the letter went on, it was surely the 
responsibility of the Committee itself to arrange it. 99 Some clubs evidently shared the 
executive's misgivings. Sheffield United had initially refused to send a representative 
to the meeting and even though two Committee members were then persuaded to 
attend, the club later informed Brook Hirst that 'the matter would be better settled if 
the Management Committee would call a Special Meeting of the Clubs to consider the 
same when the whole of the Clubs would be present'. 100 A settlement was eventually 
reached between the League and the national associations in January 1931 which 
partially fiilfilled the stated demands of the leading clubs, although Saturday 
internationals remained (see chapter 8). Yet the important point here is that these 
events set a precedent for independent club meetings which, while still generally 
opposed by the executive, nonetheless became an accepted practice among 
discontented groups of clubs, especially (as we shall see) during the so-called 'Pools 
War' of 1936.101 
98 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 2 December 1930. 
9' Minutes of Football League, 5 December 1930. 
11 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 2,10,30 December 1930. 
... Take, for instance, the meetings of League clubs instigated by Manchester City in 1935 to discuss 
issues including broadcasting and the Committee's proposed two referees system'. Minutes of 
Sheffield United Football Committee, 24 April, 7 May 1935. 
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The First World War was undoubtedly a crucial period in the development of relations 
between the League and its clubs, although Inglis' view that the League emerged in 
1918 as a more tightly-bound and unified organisation than ever before is highly 
debatable. 102 The evidence for this seems to be based largely on the proclamations of 
the Committee itself and especially the habitual references to the 'loyalty' of members 
towards the League. In a circular to clubs in September 1914, for instance, the 
Committee launched its Relief Scheme aimed to help members in financial distress 
through mandatory contributions from clubs and players into a common fund. 
Reflecting broader sentiments about the commitment of individuals and groups to the 
national cause in wartime, the circular suggested that: 
The loyalty of the League clubs cannot be questioned. At heart we are 
faithful adherents to the League spirit. In a critical period in the history of 
the game devotion to the League is of paramount importance. Our 
personal and individual interests must be sacrificed to the common 
good. 103 
Yet in many ways the language of 'loyalty' disguised some fundamental conflicts and 
differences of opinion which persisted throughout the war years. Above all, it needs 
to be remembered that a small but significant group of leading clubs took no part 
whatsoever in the League's modified system of regional competitions from 1915/16. 
The west midlands triumvirate of Aston Villa, Wolverhampton Wanderers and West 
Bromwich Albion, in particular, felt from the beginning that the Committee's pleas 
for 'loyalty' ought not to distract clubs from more pressing concerns: 'There came a 
time when there were greater interests either than The League or football. In their 
opinion such a time had now arrived'. At the 1915 annual meeting Villa's chairman 
unsuccessfully moved 'That no matches be played under the auspices of The Football 
League during the continuance of the war, and that The League clubs be allowed to 
play what matches they desired'. 104 So along with Sunderland and Middlesborough 
these clubs effectively closed down for the duration of the war. And if we add the five 
London clubs who achieved a kind of semi-autonomy as members of the London 
102 Inglis, League Football, p. 10 1. 
"" Quoted in Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 83. 
104 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 26 July 1915. 
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Combination, it is it hard to see how the League could be regarded at this point as 'a 
strong, confident organisation with almost complete mastery of its members'. 105 
Indeed, there was only limited support for the wartime organisation of the League 
even among those clubs who continued to participate in its competitions. While the 
majority of clubs at the critical 1915 annual meeting agreed 'that some kind of 
football should be played', many also expressed their preference for organising their 
own fixtures with local opponents rather than participating in competitions run by the 
League. Everton's representative W. R. Clayton thought that the League 'should close 
their doors until the war was over, but clubs should have the liberty to make their own 
106 arrangements irrespective of The League or any other organisation'. Despite 
subsequently accepting League control over the regionalised wartime tournaments in 
principle, some clubs were more reluctant than before the war to acquiesce to the 
central authority of the Management Committee in practice. Certainly, if Sutcliffe and 
others expected their schemes for the financial relief of necessitous clubs and the 
pooling of gates to automatically bind the members tighter to the League structure 
they were to be disappointed. At the 1916 annual meeting a group of the richer clubs 
led by Everton effectively held the League to ransom by threatening to withdraw and 
form a separate section if the pooling system introduced the previous season was not 
abandoned. This was no idle threat as Everton, Liverpool, Manchester City and 
Blackburn Rovers from the Lancashire section along with Sheffield United and 
Wednesday, Bradford City and Park Avenue and Birmingham from the Midlands had 
all apparently intimated willingness in private correspondence to form an independent 
competition which would allow them to retain all of their own gate receipts. 107 On the 
other hand, the move away from gate pooling led to agitation among some of the 
poorer clubs, including a conference organised by the Bury directors and attended by 
McKenna in which it was claimed that many members would not be able to survive 
without the extra financial income derived from the League 'pool'. The Barnsley 
board actually informed its counterparts in the Midlands Supplementary Competition 
105 Inglis, League Foothall, p. 10 1. 106 
Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 26 July 1915. 107 Report of Football League AGM inAthletic News, 24 July 1916; Athletic News, 7 August 1916. 
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that they would reftise to take part if pooling was not re-introduced. 108 Further 
conflict was avoided when the richer clubs agreed to gate pooling as a temporary 
wartime measure but even then Everton and other Lancastrian clubs refused to pool 
gate receipts across both sections: Clayton, for one, was 'not prepared to finance the 
Midland clubs; they must look after themselves'. 109 Even in wartime, then, loyalty to 
the League was never unconditional and the Committee's control over its membership 
was often fragile. 
The creation of the third division southern and northern sections at the beginning of 
the 1920s produced a particular set of tensions between the Committee and the new 
associate members. These clubs were not initially entitled to vote or be represented at 
general meetings, although subsequently the Committee allowed each section to send 
two representatives to meetings in which issues directly affecting them were to be 
discussed. The Committee also managed the general affairs of each section, ran each 
competition and had the power to allocate clubs to the respective sections after the 
relegation and promotion issues had been settled and new clubs had been elected by 
the full members. " 0 The problems inherent in such an arrangement were foreseen by 
one first division director even as the southern section clubs were admitted in June 
1920. He 'thought the spirit of democracy would demand that the members of the 
Third Division should eventually take a part in the control of the organisation, and 
they had to consider whether it was advisable to have any access of voting strength'. 
Yet while Sutcliffe accepted that more participation by associate members in the 
running of their own divisions and the League in general would 'evolve with time', 
this did not prevent a growing dissatisfaction with their treatment by the 
Committee. "' In 1925 moves to increase the number of clubs promoted from the 
third to second divisions and exempt associate members from the early qualifying 
rounds of the FA Cup were scotched by the Committee before either matter could be 
brought before the full members. 112 
log Athletic News, 1,15 January 1917; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 14 March 
1917. 
109 Athletic News, 17 July 1917. 
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This simmering tension finally boiled over the following year. Both sections had 
formed independent executive committees and submitted finther schemes for the 
reorganisation of the FA Cup competition which the Management Committee 
regarded as 'palpably prejudicial' to the interests of the clubs of the top divisions. 
Moreover, the northern section's executive had evidently issued a circular stating that 
so long as voting rights were denied 'our decision as to membership is entitled to be 
very seriously considered'. ' 13 In the course of a lengthy statement to its full members, 
the Committee responded with whatAthlefic News described as a 'severe castigation' 
of the third division clubs. 114 Voting and representation rights, it was stated, would 
not enable third division clubs to change League policy or the constitution but they 
could 'effectively clog the wheels of progress and thwart changes desired by the first 
and second division clubs'. The Committee's conclusion was unambiguous: 
Unless the Clubs of the Third Division are content with the Rules 
governing them and the control and government exercised by us, and 
frankly express their intention to remain loyal to the League and its 
Management Committee, the obvious course is to decline to continue their 
connection with you as Associate members. These Sectional Committees 
might be helpful but if their policy has to be critical and interfere with our 
control we must ask for their immediate disbandment. ' 15 
Though the southern clubs in particular thought the Committee had been 'somewhat 
unkind' to them, they had little choice but to fall in line with these demands and 
pledge their loyalty to the League. 116 
Nevertheless, the associate members continued to risk the wrath of the executive by 
pressing for their ultimate goals of full membership and direct representation. The 
lead now came mostly from the south, as the senior, more financially secure and self- 
confident of the two sections. In 1928 Millwall, newly-promoted to the second 
division, proposed that the top five clubs in the southern section be granted a vote at 
all League meetings. This, argued Millwall's chairman Tom Thorne, was justified by 
... Minutes of Football League, 7 June 1926 (AGM). 
'"Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 14 June 1925. 
... Minutes of Football League, 7 June 1926 (AGM). 
" Minutes of Football League, (Third Division Northern and Southern Section Fixture Meetings), 7 
June 1926. 
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the general practice in other organisations - including the FA - where associate 
members were automatically promoted to full membership after a stipulated period so 
long as their conduct had been satisfactory. For Tborne, the continual denial of third 
division representation reflected the autocracy of the League leadership: 'No other 
sporting body do I know where such clubs... would be treated as though they were not 
to be trusted to have a voice in the management'. 117 McKenna ruled the proposal out 
of order but the reasons given seem to indicate a softening in attitude towards the 
issue. There was no explicit objection to the proposal in principle but it was 
explained that it would breach those FA rules which restricted the size of a league to 
44 Rill members! " In fact the following year it was the Committee itself who 
brought forward a scheme to give each section two representatives 'with power to 
speak and vote' at general meetings. 119 Although passed by the League, the scheme 
failed to gain FA approval and it thus took finther pressure - this time from the first 
and second division clubs - to finally force a change in the FA's regulations for the 
sanction of leagues to allow associate members even this limited representation. 120 
On balance it is clear that the relationship between the Management Committee and 
the clubs was relatively harmonious and conflict-free. Grievances at certain 
Committee decisions were of course not uncommon but in general these do not seem 
to have given rise to a more widespread dissatisfaction with the management of the 
organisation. Indeed, the idea of passing a formal vote of censure on the Committee 
was never seriously considered at any point in this period. When in 1911 a 
Manchester City director attempted to pass a resolution criticising the Committee's 
interpretation of the rule concerning transfer deadlines he was forced by the president 
and other representatives to either move a vote of censure or back down. The 
resolution was immediately withdrawn with the proposer disclaiming 'any idea of 
censuring the Management Committee'. 12 1 The events surrounding the so-called 
'Pools War' of 1936 certainly provide the most revealing example of open conflict 
117 Athletic News, 28 May 1928. ' 
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between the League executive and a group of member clubs. It is not necessary here 
to detail the precise chronology of events or to examine the attitudes of those involved 
22 towards the football pools in particular and betting in general. ' What is of interest, 
however, is the virtual breakdown of relations within the League for a little over a 
fortnight as a result of the Committee's attempts to destroy the pools companies. In 
purely constitutional terms the Committee did seem initially to have a mandate for its 
action. At a private meeting of clubs on 20 February 1936 the Committee was 
formally empowered 'to take such steps as it deems expedient to bring about the 
suppression of betting'. 123 At the same time Sutcliffe outlined his plan to change the, 
original fixtures-lists and withhold the alterations for long enough each week to 
prevent the pools companies from printing and distributing coupons. Yet although the 
large majority of clubs - 64 of the 85 present - had voted to allow the Committee to 
proceed with this plan, there were voices of dissension raised almost immediately. 
The Leeds United board, led by the most vocal of the malcontents Alderman Alf 
Masser, issued a public statement decrying the Committee's action of cancelling 
fixtures as 'futile'; Manchester City resolved to oppose the proposals at future 
meetings 'in every shape and form'. Sunderland, Derby County and a number of 
anonymous club directors all joined the criticism and there was some talk of collective 
action to reverse the original decision. 124 
More serious perhaps than this straightforward condemnation of the Committee's 
plans was the suggestion by Masser and others that the decisions reached at the 20 
February meeting contravened a number of the League's own rules. At a conference 
of those northern clubs who had already expressed their opposition to the Committee - 
Manchester City, Stoke, Blackburn Rovers and Newcastle United as well as Leeds and 
Sunderland - Sutcliffe was accused of breaching three separate rules. First, the 
intention to rearrange fixtures which had already been confirmed at the annual fixtures 
meeting would be a breach of Rule 23. Second, despite the fact that associate 
members could only vote collectively under Rule 3, the Committee had allowed 
122 For detailed accounts of this kind, see Inglis, Soccer in the Dock, chapter 7 or an almost identical 
account in his League Football, chapter 14. Also see Archie Ledbrooke and Edgar Turner, Soccerfrom 
the Press Box, London, 1955, pp. 70-74. Much of the following is based on these sources. 
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124 Daily Mirror, 22,24 February 193 6; The Times, 26 February 193 6. 
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individual votes to each third division club representative. Finally, by calling the 
meeting at less than the required seven days" notice, and without a full agenda 
available to clubs in advance, Rule 80 had also been broken. Some clubs argued that 
they had therefore not been fully prepared to consider such an important question. 
The fact that the Committee had also rejected the request of those representatives 
'who desired the opportunity of conferring with their co-directors on proposals of 
such a revolutionary character' particularly vexed certain members. 125 
As a direct challenge to the Committee's policy, then, these clubs called a rebel 
meeting of all full members for the following Monday, March 2, at Leeds Town Hall - 
scheduled purposely for the same day as a Committee gathering in London. 
Opposition to the League gathered pace with no less than 36 of the 44 member clubs 
sending representatives to Leeds, including, ironically, seven clubs associated with 
Committee members. The experience of the first Saturday of rearranged fixtures had 
ftirther embittered a number of clubs whose attendances were either well down or - in 
the case of five clubs whose new opponents were due to play in FA Cup ties - had no 
fixture at all. While maintaining the rhetoric of 'loyalty' to the League and the 
Management Committee and showing appreciation of 'the great services rendered by 
them' 126 , the clubs showed determination and virtual unanimity in their objective to 
reverse League policy. With no votes against and just ten abstentions, the meeting 
resolved 'that while they accepted that the Management Committee had been given a 
mandate to scrap the fixtures, the clubs now urged the restoration of the fixtures and a 
return to the status quo ante bellum'. 127 In these circumstances there was little the 
Committee could do but bow to the collective will of its membership. At an official 
League meeting a week later the Leeds resolution was unanimously passed and it was 
agreed that the original fixtures be immediately resumed. 
Although this was the only major confrontation between the Committee and the clubs 
in the period, the events surrounding the 'Pools War' can nevertheless be seen as clear 
evidence of the (usually latent) collective power of the clubs. More than any other 
125 The Times, 26,27 February 1936. 
126 Inglis, Soccer in the Dock, p. 107. 127 Inglis, League Football, p. 154. 
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factor, including the widespread press and public opposition 129 , it was the orchestrated 
protest campaign of Masser and others which forced the Committee to backdown. 
Without the active support of the majority of its members - and regardless of the 
apparent backing for its policy given at the 20 February meeting - it became 
impractical for the executive to successfully take on the pools industry. As Catton's 
quotation at the beginning of the chapter indicates, the Committee was trusted in most 
instances to make an accurate assessment of the position of the majority of its member 
clubs and take the lead in initiating policy developments. Yet the events of February 
and March 1936 show that League clubs were far from taciturn and impotent when 
they felt their views were not being represented. Certainly, the assertion that the 
Management Committee effectively 'led' the Football League and its clubs needs to 
be qualified by a recognition of the checks and balances available to clubs through 
both the formal mechanisms of annual meetings and rule changes and the less formal, 
independent and impromptu action such as the anti-Committee movement of Masser 
and others. 
5. Conclusion 
It is not overstating matters to suggest that between 1900 and 1939 the Management 
Committee's role and influence vis-ii-vis the League clubs was completely 
transformed. From a forum reflecting the collective opinion of its members, the 
Committee developed into an autonomous body with the primary role in the League's 
decision-making process. Standardisation and regulation may have circumscribed 
club policy and discouraged individual initiative but were also perceived as 
fundamental to the League's future prospects and economic viability. The dominant 
ideology of fair competition demanded the creation of a 'level playing field' and the 
executive's intervention in more and more areas previously regarded as the preserve 
of the individual club can be interpreted as part of this process. 
Yet, as most contemporary observers realised, the 'level playing field' was never more 
than a myth. In the 1920s and 1930s particularly, the differentials in status, wealth 
See George Orwell's oft-quoted assessment of the public reaction in Yorkshire in his The Road to 
Wigan Pier, London, 1937. Also Fishwick, English Football, p. 129. 
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and public support between the top and bottom clubs increased and conceptions of the 
Management Committee's functions and duties polarised. In certain respects, the 
executive's relationship with the member clubs was constitutionally differentiated. Its 
responsibility for the administration and policy of the third division sections, together 
with their absence of full representation and voting rights, created a dependent 
relationship in which the Committee acted as protector or guardian of the clubs' 
interests. In the words of one journalist, the 'weaklings' had been 'carried on the back 
of the League mother' since they joined. 129 The wealthier clubs, however, did not 
need such consideration and support and the protective tendencies of the Committee 
were often interpreted by them as interference. This led, as we have seen, to a number 
of minor power struggles and flash points during the 1930s, through which the clubs 
sought to check Preston's unfettered authority to act on its members' behalf when 
major issues were concerned. 
4 
129 Athletic News, 12 March 1928. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PLAYERS AND EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS 
Many contemporary observers as well as historians have regarded the peculiar 
employment conditions within the Football League as somehow unique in British 
industrial relations. In particular, the twin pillars of the League system - the retain- 
and-transfer system and the maximum wage - have been seen as tantamount to a form 
of wage slavery by denying the player the basic freedom enjoyed by any other 
employee to leave his employment when he liked, and to sell his labour to the highest 
bidder. The secretary of the Players' Union remarked that 'the professional player is 
the slave of his club and they can do practically what they like with him'; and the 
historian Nicholas Fishwick has similarly described professional footballers between 
the wars as 'obedient servants'. ' Yet this emphasis on player acquiescence and the 
master-servant relationship provides not only a rather distorted and partial picture of 
the complex ways in which the labour market operated up until the Second World 
War but also has the effect of isolating the experience of employees in the football 
industry from wider social developments. Hence, a dominant theme of this and the 
next chapter will be the trend towards what Savage and Miles have described as 'the 
bureaucratisation of the labour market' from the late Victorian era. 2 In the Football 
League this took the form of the gradual development of central regulation and 
formalised control over conditions relating to the employment, pay, movement, 
discipline, standards and welfare of players. The chapter will also recognise that 
relations between player and club were in fact cross-cut by a complex and often 
contradictory set of relationships involving the player, the Players' Union, the club, 
the FA and the Football League executive. This chapter will focus on three important 
areas of the employment of League footballers: the recruitment of players and their 
movement between clubs; contracts and transfer conditions; and the payment of 
professionals. It will explore the extent to which the opportunities of football 
employees were constrained by the artificially constructed labour market. How free 
were players to move where and when they wished and what say did they have in the 
conditions of their employment? In addition, we shall consider not only how much 
I Green, History ofthe FA, p. 419; Fishwick, English Football, chapter 4. 
2 Mike Savage and Andrew Miles, The Remaking ofthe British Working Class, 1840-1940, London, 
1994, pp. 48-56. 
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players were paid but also how this was determined. Did earnings differ substantially 
from player to player and club to club and how did this compare to rates of pay in 
comparable occupations? 
1. Recruitment 
Historians have all agreed on the difficulties of establishing precisely the number of 
players, both professional and amateur, involved in top level football. This has been 
complicated by a failure to distinguish between registered players - those who sign 
registration forms with the FA and League - and contracted players, who additionally 
sign agreements with their clubs. The Football League's own figures reveal that 502 
players were registered with the twelve member clubs in 1891, and this total increased 
to 675 in the sixteen clubs in 1896. Athletic News listed 997 players registered to 
thirty-nine of the forty League clubs by 1911; and by 1925 at least 2,123 players were 
engaged by eighty-eight clubs in the League's four divisions. In 1938, the Players' 
Union reckoned that there were approximately 2,500 top-class professionals, most of 
whom were attached to Football League clubs; a higher figure of 3,000 was quoted in 
correspondence with the League and the Union in 1934.3 Squad sizes varied 
considerably over time and from club to club. Aston Villa considered that its staff of 
30 professionals and 'a few good amateurs' was sufficient for the 1907/08 season, 
especially as the club was choosing not to run a third team. 4 As Table 5.1 reveals, the 
average first division squad in 1911 consisted of nearly 29 part-time or full-time 
professionals whilst clubs in the second division employed just over 2 1. By the 1920s 
the leading clubs generally signed between 25 and 35 players in May of each year and 
often engaged an additional few before the season commenced in September. 5 The 
Football League's own statistics reveal that during the 1930s a relatively successful 
club like Manchester City registered between 35 and 43 players each season (Table 
5.3). 
'Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 207; Mason, Association Football, p. 89; Athletic News, 14,28 August 1911 
and 3,10,17,24 August 1925; Minutes of AFPTU, 27 February 1939 (EGM); PFA, File 33, Watson 
Hartley to Jimmy Fay, 21 August 1934. 
4 AV, 47/82, Ramsay to Mr. Harper, 4 May 1907. 
Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 1933-39, passim; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 
1923-39, passim. 
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In the lower divisions squads were markedly smaller, with clubs signing fewer full- 
time professionals and relying more on the services of part-time or even amateur 
players. Third Division Walsall employed a core of between 19 and 31 professional 
players each season during the 1930s but could also call on a large pool of local 
amateurs, mainly to man its second and third teams (Table 5.2). Durham City was 
probably less typical in having just nine professionals compared with twenty amateurs 
on its books in 1925, yet most third division clubs, and many in the higher divisions, 
regularly included a number of amateurs and part-timers, presumably as a means of 
keeping wage bills low. 6 In 1923 the Management Committee had actually advised 
those northern section clubs in financial difficulties to reduce the number of 
professionals engaged. 7 Thus it was not uncommon to find clubs in the north giving 
some players free transfers as a, short term cost-cutting measure; Swindon Town 
similarly economised on its wage bill by E30 per week towards the end of the 1931/32 
season by reducing the professional staff to just 17.8 
Table II Average Squad Sizes in the Football League 
Division One Division Two Division 
(Soutb) 
Tbree Division Three 
(Nortb) 
1911 28.70 21.15 - 
1925 30.05 26.77 22.36 21.41 
Source: Athletic News, 14,28 August 1911; 3,10,17,24 August 1925. 
Table 5.2 Player Registrations at Walsall FC, 1932/33- 1939/40 
Season Professional Registrations Amateur Registrations Amateurs signing Football 
League forms 
1932/33 24 45 5 
1933/34 21 33 8 
1934/35 19 20 3 
1935/36 28 25 10 
1936/37 29 45 10 
1937/38 27 62 13 
1938/39 31 73 12 
1939/40 24 14 11 
Source: Players Registration Book of Walsall FC, 193246 
6 Athletic News, 3 August 1925. 
1 Minutes of Football League (Ibird Division Northern Section SGM), 21 March 1923. 
8 Daily Mirror, 4 January 193 6; Daily Mail, 7 April 1932. 
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Table 5.3 Player Registrations and Transfers at Manchester City FC, 1931/32-1939/40 
Season Registered Players Transfers Out 
1931/32 35 10 
1932/33 35 9 
1933/34 37 9 
1934/35 39 11 
1935/36 37 6 
1936/37 41 10 
1937/38 43 10 
1938/39 40 4 
1939/40* 36 1 
Up to 21 December 1939 
Source: PFA, File 35, Statistics required from the Football League in the cases Corbett v. Inland Revenue and Dale v. Inland 
Revenue, 1939. 
Yet official figures of registered players are misleading if one wishes to determine the 
numbers actively involved in League football on a regular basis. As Vamplew has 
pointed out, a large percentage of registered professionals - often over 40% each 
season before 1914 - never actually played a League match. 9 This was partly the 
result of competition within clubs but can also be explained by the common practice 
of labour-hoarding. Many clubs technically retained players who had not received 
wages at all, or for some time, and had drifted towards a lower standard of football or 
even different employment entirely. Despite an attempt in 1899 by the Management 
Committee to introduce a six months' time-limit within which a club had to pay or 
play its registered professionals, clubs continued to hold large numbers of inactive 
players on their retained lists. In 1901 West Bromwich Albion reportedly held 120 
retained players, of whom little more than 30 would have been legitimate club 
employees. In these circumstances, it is difficult to know exactly how many careers 
followed a path similar to that of Aston Villa's Knight. He had signed for Villa in 
1905 and played in a single match for the junior team before spending five seasons in 
junior football. During this time Villa neither approached him nor offered him an 
engagement but he was nevertheless kept on the club's retained list and was hence 
theoretically still its player. Eventually, in 1911, a Southern League club offered 
Knight an engagement, and the League Management Committee decided to fine Villa 
; E25 for not removing him from their retained list-10 The Management Committee 
9 Varnplew, Pay Up, p. 207. 
'0 Athletic News, 4 March 1901,9 October 1911; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 10 October 1911. 
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obviously regarded statistical inaccuracy relating to League players as presenting 
administrative and practical problems, noting in a circular to clubs 'that many players 
who have long since finished football are still included in such [retain-and-transfer] 
lists'. 11 
The recruitment of players by League clubs underwent significant changes in this 
period. The use of press advertising and football agents, both of which had been 
important means of finding players in the early days of League football, had clearly 
declined by the 1900s. Agents, in particular, were increasingly regarded with 
suspicion by club and League officials and the FA actually prohibited clubs engaging 
players through agents, although some, like the Football Players' Agency based in 
Birmingham and C. F. Caswell of Cardiff, undoubtedly continued to operate 
surreptitiously as middle men between player and club. 12 Advertisements in sporting 
papers did continue to be a popular recruitment strategy, especially for clubs in the 
lower divisions, though this was gradually overtaken by more sophisticated and 
reliable methods. Nevertheless, in the 1920s and 1930s successful first division clubs 
like Sheffield United still occasionally considered it beneficial to advertise in Athletic 
News for first class players. 13 Advertising declined in importance as clubs began to 
develop their own scouting networks. Although hearsay and informal 
recommendations were perhaps still the most important ways of finding new players 
before 1914, many clubs were beginning to employ itinerant scouts on small fees to 
scour parts of the country for talent. In its first season in the League, for example, 
Oldham Athletic employed a local man 30s. weekly expenses to scout for players. 14 
Scouting networks became increasingly sophisticated in the inter-war period. By the 
early 1930s Sheffield United had developed an organised and co-ordinated scouting 
network covering Lancashire and Cheshire, Birmingham and District, Lincolnshire 
and the north-east. Each scout was paid fI per week plus aI Os. allowance for lost 
time if required to watch mid-week matches. This was supplemented by the 
11 Athletic News, 8 May 1911. 
12 See Minutes of FA Consultative Committee, 22 November 1909; Minutes of FA Emergency 
Committee, 23 August-3 October 192 1. On the activities of agents during the 1890s, see Mason, 
Association Football, pp. 92-94. 
11 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 13 April 1927,10 June 193 1. 
14 Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 30 December 1907. 
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established practice of appointing a number of senior club professionals, including the 
famous ex-England international Ernest Needham, to 'look out for players', 
presumably at both local and national levels. 15 Reports on players were sent to the 
board of directors for consideration and generally a director or the club's senior scout 
would be sent to watch the-player again before any attempt was made to sign him. At 
West Ham United, all such scouting reports were systematically filed and recorded for 
future reference. 16 Even for the less wealthy clubs it was increasingly necessary by 
the 1930s to organise a national scouting network enabling them to chose from the 
widest possible pool of talent. Thus newly-elected Ipswich Town immediately 
appointed four scouts to cover respectively the south of England, the midlands and the 
north, Manchester and Scotland. 17 
Few scouting networks were confined to England. The leading clubs certainly 
regarded international and Inter-League fixtures as a major recruiting opportunity but 
they also kept an eye on regular club games. Thus Aston Villa's representative at 
Linfield and Glentoran matches in March 1925 could inform his board of the presence 
of scouts from Burnley, Liverpool and Everton. 18 The correspondence files of Villa's 
secretary George Ramsay also reveal that he kept in regular contact with the club's 
Scottish scout McIlroy ('Mac'), even gently censuring him for his poor rate of 
successful recommendations: 'When the Directors notice so many Scotch players 
coming this way they ask me when our turn is coming'. 19 Other clubs looked even 
ftirther afield. Huddersfield Town received occasional recommendations from a 
contact in Ontario, Canada and sometimes invited the suggested player over for a trial; 
20 Aston Villa, too, benefited from Canadian 'scouting'. 
However, this does not mean that clubs neglected local players: on the contrary, local 
junior football remained the most fertile source of new talent for League clubs 
" Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 15 August 1934; 16 August 1922,7 August 1923,2 
October 1928. 
"' Minutes of West Ham United FC, 5 December 1932. 
17 Minutes of Ipswich Town FC, 3 January and 5 September 1938. 
Is Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 24 March 1925,20 April 1926. 
19 AV, 52/82, Ramsay to Mcl troy, 19 August 192 1,1 February 1922. 
21 Minutes of Huddersfield Town FC, 13,21 December 1938; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 7 September 
1920. But these 'scouts' were not part of any formalised network but simply former players or fans 
who thought they could do their old club a favour. 
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throughout this period. Former employees, directors, schoolteachers and even local 
journalists often acted as informal talent spotters and occasionally established 
personal contacts with League clubs. 
21 Villa sent its former player Jimmy Logan a 
cheque for E20 in 1927 'in appreciation of his past services' and instructed him 'to 
book any junior of the right build etc. he thinks good enough for us'. 
22 More 
importantly, prominent amateur clubs were often adopted formally as nurseries by 
their local professional counterparts. Such agreements, increasingly common by the 
early 1910s, enabled League clubs to test, and secure priority on, promising local 
players in return for financial subsidies. In addition, they would also sometimes use 
nursery clubs to farm out any promising but immature players of their own. Sheffield 
United, for example, agreed to pay grants of E20 and ; ESO in 1929 and 1930 
respectively to the Norton Woodseats club on the condition that it could 'have first 
claim on any of their [the Woodseats'] players'. 
23 West Ham'United established 
similar agreements with Park Royal and Colchester; Blackburn Rovers did likewise 
with Victoria Cross; and Aston Villa had a long-standing association with 
Stourbridge. 24 No doubt these relationships could be exploitative: 4thletic News 
accused Villa of occupying 'a position of dictatorship' with regard to its nursery clubs 
and, in particular, claiming 'little less than actual ownership' over Stourbridge. 
25 
Certainly, League clubs often regarded nursery club players as their own, even 
including them on their official retained lists. Yet, in general, such agreements were 
mutually beneficial, and continued to be sought by amateur clubs in financial 
difficulties. 
Some clubs were particularly keen to assert the local character of their team and 
pursued regional recruitment more vigorously than others. The policy of 
Wolverhampton Wanderers directors only to sign players within a 50-mile radius may 
originally have been to reduce costs but came to represent a defining characteristic of 
the club before the First World War. The press similarly applauded West Bromwich 
21 See Fishwick, English Football, pp. 6,41-42. 
22 minutes of Aston Villa FC, 26 April 1927. 
23 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 27 March and IS May 1929,26 and I April 193 0. 
24 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 26 March 1935; Athletic News, 3 July 1911; Minutes of Aston 
Villa FC, 24 August 1911,2 July 1912. 
25 Athletic News, 9 October 1911. 
164 
Albion for winning the 1919/20 championship with a squad composed entirely of 
Englishmen and with all but four members born within a dozen miles of the ground. 26 
By the mid- I 920s at least, however, predominantly local recruitment of this kind was 
increasingly recognised as an unobtainable ideal by the most successful League clubs. 
As Table 5.4 shows, in' 1910 well over half of League players were bom outside the 
region in which they played. The percentage had increased by 1925, although poorer 
clubs in the third division northern section made far greater use of local talent (Table 
5.5). 
Table 5.4 Geographical Recruitment of Football League Players, 19 10. 
Division One Division Two 
Area of Origin No. % No. % 
Local (10-12 miles) 116 22.0 45 13.1 
Within Region 122 23.1 85 24.8 
Distant 289 54.8 213 62.1 
Total Traced 527 343 
Source: Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 206, Table 13.2. 
Table 5.5 Geographical Recruitment of Football League Players, 1925. 
Division One Division Two Division Three (S) Division Three (N) 
Area of Origin No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Local (10-12 miles) 125 24.7 136 25.7 72 16.0 139 30.0 
Within Region 69 13.6 80 15.1 56 12.4 124 26.8 
Distant 312 61.7 313 59.2 323 71.6 200 43.2 
Total Traced 506 529 451 463 
Source: Athletic News, 3,10,17,24 August 1925. 
This tendency to look further afield for new players can be partially explained by the 
growth, and increasing importance, of the transfer market. The anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the number of transfers and the amounts involved increased significantly 
over the period, and rose particularly sharply in the mid-1920s. By 1928 observers 
could refer to the 'transfer stampede' which took place immediately before the 
transfer deadline every March: that season it was reported that no fewer than 50 
players moved in the last ten days permitted and that over 00,000 changed hands in 
deals involving 40 League clubs. Another correspondent categorised the 1920s as 'the 
age of transfers' in which long service to clubs was increasingly rare and where 
26 Matthews, 'The Wolves, pp. 18,20; Athletic News, 5 April 1920. 
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players like the Cock brothers, Jack and Donald, could turn out for 12 different 
League clubs between them in less than nine seasons. 27 The available data, however, 
suggests little change in the total number of annual or seasonal transfers over the 
period. While the Football League recorded 195 players transferred in 1904, this had 
risen to 337 by 1910 and stayed at an average of 318 in the five seasons from 1931/32 
to 1935/36.28 At individual clubs like Manchester City in the 193 Os as many as 10 or 
II players might move each season, representing up to 28 per cent of the professional 
staff, but more generally the figure rarely rose above 20 per cent (see Table 5.3). 
Furthermore, by the 1920s more directors and managers began to adopt the policy of 
buying established players rather than training and developing their own. Clubs like 
Ar senal and Newcastle United were especially renowned for spending large transfer 
fees to help build winning sides. By 1924 Arsenal was not atypical amongst top 
division sides in paying over E5,000 a season on transfers and four years later was 
responsible for the first E10,000 fee when it bought Bolton Wanderers' David Jack. 
Newcastle expended E14,666 on transfer fees in 1925/26, including E6,500 on the 
Scottish international Hughie Gallacher. 29 Villa's secretary explicitly told one of the 
club's scouts that 'we want someone good and experienced enough to go into one of 
our teams, not to have to make them'. 30 And the pressure to buy players in order to 
achieve success on the field was not confined to the highest division. Philip Kelso, 
manager of second division Fulham, remarked in 1922 that his directors lacked the 
patience to allow youngsters to develop, preferring to resort to the transfer market. 31 
As Table 5.6 indicates, by 1939 first and second division clubs were spending 
seasonal averages of E6,545 and E3,682 on transfers and even those in the third 
division south were net buyers rather than sellers in the transfer market. But it must 
be remembered that poorer clubs, especially those in the third division north, 
continued to rely on the income derived from transfers to help alleviate financial 
difficulties. 
27 Topical Times, 24 March, 21 April 1928. 
28 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 214, Table 13.5; PFA, File 35, Statistics required from the Football League in 
the case Corbett v. Inland Revenue and Dale v. Inland Revenue, 1939. 
29 Catton Folders, A-B, Arsenal FC Directors' Report 1924, p. 5; Wolverhampton Wanderers FC 
Programme, 25 February 1933. 
30 AV, 52/82, Ramsay to Jack Webster, 7 September 192 1. 
31 Catton Folders, E-F, Philip Kelso to Catton, 27 July 1922, p. 504. 
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Table 5.6 Football League Transfer Payments in 1939 (f) 
First Division Second Division Third Division (S) Third Division Total 
(N) 
Paid Out 144,000 81,000 35,000 12,000 272,000 
Average Per Club 6,545 3,682 1,591 545 
Received 55,000 26,000 20,000 22,000 123,000 
Average Per Club 2,500 1,182 909 1,000 
Source: Calculated from data in 'The Football Industry - V, p. 177. 
All these factors contributed to the development of a large and highly regulated 
internal market for transfers within British football in general, and the Football 
League in particular, by the Second World War. The circulation of transfer lists, 
together with informal contacts between clubs, supplemented the work of scouts in 
this area. At the end of each season, the League secretary would circulate a list from 
each club indicating the names of players it was prepared to transfer. The fees 
required for these players were not included but could be obtained by any interested 
club on application to the League secretary and the club was then entitled to approach 
and sign any player on the list without the consent of the selling club. Disengaged 
players were also expected to take an active role in this process: like applicants at the 
recently established labour exchanges, they had to prove 'willingness to work' and 
4genuine employability'. 32 McKenna was adamant that players should not 'sit[ting] 
down and wait[ing] for clubs to come to them' and Sutcliffe noted that it was 'no 
business of the Management Committee... to find players jobs... The player must 
make an effort for himself'. What was more, the executive actually informed players 
that applications for reductions in transfer fees would not be considered before an 
effort had been made to find employment: 'They considered it was the duty of every 
player to try to find a place for himself. 33 Thus many unemployed players continued 
throughout the period to write directly to club secretaries in the hope of being engaged 
or at least watched in a trial match. 34 Clubs also developed independent networks of 
contact and information regarding players. For instance, a club on the look out for a 
full-back or an outside-left would often inform other clubs of its requirements and ask 
32 Geoffrey Finlayson, Citizen, State, and Social Wetfare in Britain, 1830-1990, Oxford, 1994, p. 184. 33 Topical Times, 2,23 June 1923; Minutes of Football League, 8 June 1925 (AGM). Also see 
Minutes, 26 May 1923. 
34 See AV, 47/82,52/82, passim. 
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for assistance: hence, in 1933 the West Hain United chairman reported receiving a 
letter from West Bromwich Albion suggesting one of the latter's inside-rights 'as a 
likely player for us'. 35 This type of co-operation, though hardly altruistic on either 
side, may well have saved money on scouting expenses and helped facilitate the 
recruitment and redistribution of players within the League. 
It must be remembered, however, that there remained a vast reserve army of football 
labour throughout he period. The FA reported that there were about 5,000 registered 
professionals in 1939, half of whom were part-timers, and probably thousands of 
amateurs played at a high enough level to attract the interest of League SCOUtS. 36 Yet, 
even taking into account places for professional players in other leagues, and the 
expansion of the League itself to 88 clubs by 1922, there were clearly always players 
unable to find work. Some probably drifted into other types of employment or to the 
junior leagues, but many simply regarded themselves as unemployed footballers and 
continued to search for work. Unemployment became a particular problem during the 
depression when declining attendances forced some clubs to reduce the size of their 
playing staffs. A further source of player recruitment which developed in this context 
was the Unemployment Bureau organised by the Players' Union from 1929, which 
acted as an intermediary between player and club. The Union had considered one of 
its roles from the beginning as that of an informal employment agency. The first set 
of rules from 1907 declared that a key objective was 
To keep a list of all Members who are on the Transfer list, disengaged, or 
unsettled, with particulars of their positions on the field of play, their 
abilities, the clubs they have played for and any other necessary 
information with a view to obtaining suitable engagements for them. 37 
The correspondence files of the first secretary Herbert Broomfield indicate that the 
Union did indeed send members' details to Football League, Southern League and 
Scottish League clubs in the hope of securing them an engagement. 38 Yet such action 
Minutes of West Ham United FC, 3 April 1933. 
Fishwick, English Football, p. 70. 
37 PFA, File 11, Rules of the Association Football Players' Union, 1907. 
38 See, for example, PFA, File 8, Broomfield to Dick Allman; Broomfield to F. C. Metcalf, both I July 
1909. 
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remained a relatively minor part of the Union's activities and dependent upon the time 
and energy of the secretary himself. In contrast with these ad hoc arrangements, the 
Bureau was a more permanent and systematic venture. Although it initially operated 
on a fairly small scale, by 1934 the Bureau was distributing full lists and details of 
disengaged players to every League club and even to interested Irish and French 
clubs. 39 There are no details on the actual number of players assisted by the Bureau 
but both the Union and several club managers evidently regarded it as a 'a great 
success... in bringing clubs and players together 9.40 
2. Contracts and Transfers 
When joining 4 League club a player became subject to the authority not only of his 
club but also of the Football League itself and the Football Association. As well as 
signing his particular club agreement, he was required to register with both these 
bodies before being allowed to play competitively. Moreover, from 1912 the League 
ordered all agreements between clubs and players to include a clause making the 
player subject 'to the rules, regulations and bye-laws of the Football League, Football 
Association... and any other Association, League or Combination of which the club or 
Football League shall be a member'. 41 Indeed, it was technically the League rather 
than the club who owned players' registrations. Hence when a club left the League 
for whatever reason, as Gainsborough Trinity did in 1912, the registration and transfer 
rights of its players automatically became vested in the Management Committee of the 
League. 42 
in common with the majority of first-class cricket counties, League clubs were rarely 
prepared to offer contracts lasting over a year. 43 According to both Mason and 
Vamplew, the Management Committee actually forbade longer contracts in 1891 but 
this may have been merely an informal instruction as there is no trace of a rule to this 
39 Minutes of AFPTU, 20 August 1934 (AGM); Harding, Good ofthe Game, p. 178. " Minutes of AFPTU, 26 August 1929 (AGM). 
41 Football League Handbook, 1912/13, Rule 11. 
42 See Minutes of Football League, 3 June 1912. 
43 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 92; Tony Mason, 'Football' in Tony Mason (ed. ), Sport in Britain: A Social 
History, Cambridge, 1989, p. 16 1. 
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effect. 44 The archival evidence indicates that a formal ruling on the matter may not 
have been necessary. Sheffield United gave George Utley a five-year engagement in 
1913 but this was part of an exceptional offer to convince the Barnsley player to join 
United: the Board rejected a request by another player for a four-year contract a few 
months later and maintained a general policy that 'no player would be signed on for 
more than 12 months'. After briefly offering one of its senior professionals a two-year 
contract, local neighbours Sheffield Wednesday took -a similar decision. 
45 Billy 
Meredith noted at the same time that the Manchester clubs, Burnley, Aston Villa, 
Newcastle United, Sunderland and Blackburn Rovers had all signed agreements 
lasting over a year with certain players, despite pressure from Wednesday and other 
clubs to grant only annual contracts. 46 The Player's Union had indeed been arguing 
for some time that, in order to ensure greater job security, contracts should be 
extended to two years and beyond but the League considered it 'undesirable that 
players should be signed for extended periods' and in 1914 limited the contract period 
to less than two full playing seasons. 47 From 1922 the length of League agreements 
were explicitly tied to FA rules, which allowed for three specific time-scales: a trial 
period of four weeks; a full season or the remainder of a current playing season; or the 
last three months of a playing season together with the following season. 48 But club 
minute books suggest that the customary one-season contract remained pervasive in 
each of the League's four divisions. 
VVhile there was no standard FA or League contract, written agreements between 
clubs and players were relatively straightforward and rarely differed fundamentally 
from club to club. They generally stated the inclusive dates of the contract, the 
weekly wages to be paid and most included a clause requiring the player to follow 
training instructions, keep himself fit and serve the club to the best of his ability (see 
Appendices 9& 10). 49 Some contracts went further by stipulating where the player 
" Mason, Association Football, p. 104; Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 227. 
45 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 17 November 1913,29 April 1914; Vamplew, Pay 
up, p. 227. On Utley's offer see Fishwick, English Football, p. 77. 
46 Thomsen's Weekly News, 28 June 1913. 
47 Minutes of AFPU, 15 December 1915 (AGM); Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, I 
June 1914. 
48 See Minutes of FA Council, 30 January 1922. 
49 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 126. 
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could live or, increasingly by the 1920s and 1930s, precluding him from involvement 
in potentially dangerous pursuits such as motor-cycling or aviation. Aston Villa and 
Sheffield United were probably not the only clubs whose contracts prevented players 
residing in, being employed by, or indeed owning a public house. Individual contracts 
also sometimes included conditions relating to specific circumstances, such as the 
clause in Harris' 1924/25 agreement giving the Sheffield United Board immediate 
powers to cancel the agreement if the player failed to recover fully from a leg injury 
50 sustained the previous season. Yet by this time contracts had become increasingly 
standardised throughout the League, as clubs were compelled by League rules to 
include sections relating to the termination of agreements - notably the 'palpable 
inefficiency' clause - as well as the payment of wages and benefits. Notwithstanding 
the legal and administrative significance of contracts, there is fragmentary evidence 
indicating that clubs continued to employ some players on a casual, non-contractual 
basis. Derby County was fined E2 by the FA in 1909 for entering into a verbal 
agreement with a player; the Players' Union were certainly aware three years later that 
6certain players had no agreements with their clubs' although it is not clear whether 
this was regarded as simple negligence or a wilful contravention of League rules. 51 
The previous year, a League commission had reported on Middlesborough's failure to 
properly complete and sign all of its player's agreements, seeing it as carelessness on 
the part of the club administration. 52 Such carelessness may well have been 
eliminated by the increasing tendency of the Management Committee to arrange 
impromptu inspections of club records. 
The breaking or termination of contracts was another element of the professional 
insecurity which many League players undoubtedly felt. Although the FA rules from 
1894 theoretically protected players from dismissal during the playing season 53 , the 
League developed a series of conditions to circumvent these and potentially handed 
clubs the power to cancel agreements at will. The most significant and contentious of 
these was the 'palpable inefficiency' clause, which was introduced by the 
so Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 7 and 15 October 1924. 
" Minutes of FA Emergency Committee, 3 December 1908-13 January 1909; Minutes of AFPU, 9 
August 1912 (AGM). 
52 Athletic News, 5 June 1911. 
53 See Green, Foothall Association, p. 405. 
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Management Committee in April 1910. It allowed clubs to terminate any contract on 
fourteen days' notice 'where a player proves palpably inefficient or is guilty of serious 
misconduct or breach of disciplinary rules'. 54 As Fishwick has noted, this was 
potentially 'a catch-all clause that might mean anything from missing a penalty to 
losing a leg'; the Union representative and Newcastle half-back Colin Veitch opposed 
it as a one-sided arrangement which could lead to the dismissal of a player undergoing 
a temporary loss of form at the whim of his directorate. 55 In general, however, clubs 
used it as a means of ridding themselves of idle or troublesome employees. Any 
player given notice of dismissal was entitled to appeal to the Management Committee 
free of charge, and if unsuccessful, to a fixther appeal before the Appeals Committee 
on depositing E5. However, the appeals procedure was heavily weighted against the 
player. Whereas he was denied the right to legal representation, the club tended to 
support its case with a multitude of witnesses: Stockport County had its chairman, two 
directors, trainer, a referee and four other witnesses give evidence in one case. 5' In 
the vast ma ority of cases players preferred to accept dismissal reluctantly rather than 
engage in a lengthy and often futile appeal, during which time they were jobless and 
received no wages. 
Nevertheless, as Table 5.7 shows, many of those who actually chose to fight were 
victorious. In 1913 a Barnsley player, Hunter, appealed successfully against the club's 
action in dismissing him on the grounds of his 'failure as a player'. After pointing to 
his exemplary character and conduct, emphasising that his playing history disproved 
the allegations and noting that he had received no prior complaint as to his play, 
Hunter's appeal was sustained by the Management Committee and the club ordered to 
pay costs. 57 Yet it is unclear what future prospects, if any, a player had in League 
football under these circumstances. A number of players whose appeals were upheld 
agreed to leave the club on a free transfer but even then the club's accusations are 
unlikely to have made it easy for them to obtain fin-ther engagements. In other cases 
the Management Committee encouraged the club and player to come to some mutual 
54 Minutes of AFPU, 26 April 1910; Football League Handbook, 1910/11, Rule 11. 
" Fishwick, English Football, p. 87; Thomsen's Weekly News, 19 March 1910. 
16 Minutes of Football League, 15 November 1912. 
51 Minutes of Football League, 13 January 1913. 
172 
settlement whereby the latter would be de-registered in return for a lump sum 
payment. 58 
Table 5.7 Player appeals to Management Committee against termination of contract for 'Palpable 
Inefficiency', 1912-32 
Year Appeal Sustained Appeal Dismissed Mutual Agreement Total 
1912* 0 21 3 
1913 1 00 1 
1920* 1 00 1 
1921 1 10 2 
1922 0 10 1 
1923 2 00 2 
1924 4 10 5 
1925 5 00 5 
1926 2 00 2 
1927 0 20 2 
1928 0 12 3 
1929 0 01 1 
1930 0 10 1 
1931 0 01 1 
1932 0 40 4 
From May 
Source: Calculated from Minutes of Football Ltague 
The League introduced a further clause in 1915, allowing clubs to cancel agreements 
son any reasonable ground on four weeks' notice in writing being given to the 
player'. 59 Though it was justified as a temporary wartime measure which gave clubs 
the flexibility to dispense with labour if financial conditions deteriorated, the Players' 
Union attacked it as 'too drastic' and felt that 'this rule will give to clubs, by its vague 
wording, an opportunity to get out of their contracts should they be disposed to do so, 
and that it could open the door for unreasonable acts by clubs'. 60 The clause stayed on 
the rule books throughout the inter-war period and may have been used by clubs in 
financial difficulties to break contracts and thus reduce wage costs. The Ipswich 
Town board were probably more typical in utilizing the rule to clear out its unwanted 
players a couple of months before the end of each season, often with a lump sum 
payment in lieu of wages. 61 There are also occasional references to such cases in the 
" See Minutes of Football League, 9 November, 14 December 1925; 15 October 1928; 12 January 
1931. 
"' Football League Handbook, 1915/16, Rule 11. 
60 Minutes of AFPU, 12 April 19 IS. 
61 Minutes of Ipswich Town FC, 6 March and I May 1939. 
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Players' Union minutes 62 but, on balance, it remained a less popular and controversial 
6 get-out' clause for clubs than 'palpable inefficiency'. 
In addition, on two separate occasions, in 1914 and 1922, clubs were compelled by 
League rules to breach contracts already entered into with players. Both episodes 
involved the introduction of wage reduction schemes due to alleged financial 
difficulties among clubs and, on both occasions, the players were initially advised by 
their Union not to sign fresh agreements but eventually backed down. 63 However, in 
1922 one player, aided by the Union, decided to 'contest the right of the club or the 
Football League to break his contract under the common law of the land'. The player, 
Chesterfield's Henry Leddy, had signed a contract in March 1922 which guaranteed 
him 0a week until May 1923; a month after signing, his agreement was cancelled by 
Chesterfield and, on instruction from the Management Committee, a new one was 
offered with the reduced maximum wage terms of E8 in winter and E6 in summer. 64 
Leddy refused the new contract and embarked on an arduous court case against the 
club which, after appeal, was decided in his favour. The League's intervention had 
been justified by reference to a section of League Rule 12 which empowered the 
Management Committee 'to cancel agreements with players which are contrary to the 
Rules of the League' and hence, in this case, to retrospectively change existing club 
contracts. At first glance, certainly, the judgement seemed to restrict the League's 
control over the making and breaking of contracts, even proving, according to the 
Union secretary Henry Newbould, 'that the Courts will not allow the breaking of 
players' agreements by either Clubs, Leagues or Associations' . 
65 But while it is true 
that such comprehensive wage cuts were never attempted by the League again, the 
impact of the decision with respect to contracts was limited by the subsequent passage 
of a clause assuring that all player agreements be construed as if conforming 
automatically with League rules 'as amended or altered from time to time'. 66 
62 For example, Minutes of AFPTU, 22 August 1927 (AGM). 
63 PFA, File 19, H. J. Newbould Circular to Club Representatives, 10 October 1914; Minutes of AFPU, 
9 October and 2 November 1914; Minutes of AFPTU, 23 April and 7 May 1922 (both EGMs). 
64 Harding, Good ofthe Game, pp. 149-50; Minutes of Football League, 28 April 1922. 
63 Minutes of AFPTU, 20 August 1923 (AGM). 
66 Minutes of Football League, 28 May 1923 (AGM). 
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The breaking of contracts was not entirely one-sided: it was fairly common for 
agreements to be cancelled by mutual consent or even on the player's wishes. 
Amateurs or professional players on low wages were more likely to be freed in this 
manner as less money in wages and transfers had been invested in them. Thus, for 
example, West Ham United were prepared to release Murray less than five months 
into his contract during 1919, while Oldham Athletic did likewise with Jones in 
1938.67 Other players were compelled to buy themselves out of contract if they 
wished to stop playing football. This happýened in October 1906 when McNaught paid 
his club, Sheffield United, L40 to release him from his contract so that he could return 
home and concentrate on his medical studies. United accepted this, on condition that 
if he wanted to play football again that season he had to pay the club a further E60 to 
cover the money it had already paid him in wages. 68 And in this situation, as with all 
broken contracts, the club still held registration and transfer rights over the player and 
was thus able to prevent him moving elsewhere to play top-level football. 
If some players faced contractual difficulties with their clubs, a more significant 
problem surrounded the conditions governing the movement of labour and, in 
particular, the controversial retain-and-transfer system. Historians, along with many 
contemporary critics, have recognised that the system theoretically represented a basic 
and unique contravention of labour rights by denying the player the freedom to move 
where he wanted and to chose his own employer. 69 Even president John Bentley 
acknowledged the fundamental hardship in '[compelling] players to remain with 
particular clubs'. 70 As we have seen, all players were registered with the Football 
League and the FA and mobility of labour between clubs required the permission of 
both these bodies, as well as the consent of the player himself and the buying and 
selling club. But clubs could not be forced to transfer a player, which meant that the 
club with whom the player was registered possessed a monopoly over his services. 
When contracts expired in April and May of each year, clubs and players were 
67 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 15 September 1919; Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 12 January 
1938. 
68 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 2 October 1906. 
69 Peter J. Sloane, Ile Labour Market in Professional Football', British Journal ofIndustrial 
Relations, 7,1969, pp. 183-89; Mason, Association Football, pp. 104-06;. Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 126- 
28,212-13; Korr, West Ham United, pp. 171-73. 70 Athletic News, 10 June 190 1. 
175 
involved in the complicated process of re-signing. In short, after internal board 
discussions, clubs forwarded to the League a list of players they intended to retain and 
a separate list of those 'open to transfer', the latter generally with a corresponding fee 
which buying clubs were expected pay. From the early 1890s, the League secretary 
began to circulate such lists to all its member clubs. Once the club's decision was 
made a player had very few alternatives and limited bargaining power. If a retained 
player wanted to leave he could reject the terms offered and apply to the Management 
Committee to consider his case, but this was often a long process which would mean 
losing several months' pay and, in any case, there was no guarantee that the appeal 
would be upheld. Indeed, as long as the player had been offered the FA's stipulated 
retaining wage, or what League rules referred to as 'reasonable wages', the decision 
was likely to go in the club's favour. Transfer-listed players could similarly find 
themselves entrapped by the system, especially when unrealistically high prices were 
placed on their heads. They too were entitled to appeal to the Management 
Committee to have the fee reduced, but even if successful there was no assurance that 
another club would be prepared to pay the fee. 
In practice, the operation of the system could often depend on how flexible the League 
and the clubs were in their interpretation of the rules. Particularly infuriating to some 
players was the widespread practice amongst clubs of retaining players on terms 
unchanged or even reduced from the previous season. The problem became 
increasingly acute from the early 1920s, as the maximum wage rose without a 
corresponding increase in the retaining wage. Indeed, while the maximum wage stood 
at Ha week from 1922, pressure from the League, especially the third divisions 
clubs, led to a reduction in 1923 of the retaining fee from E260 a year (0 per week) to 
L200.7 1 The Players' Union mounted a particularly bitter campaign during the late 
1920s and 1930s against what it regarded as 'the harsh and unfair treatment' 
experienced by many of its members as a result of this rule. 72 It claimed that clubs 
were able to retain long-serving players while drastically cutting their wages. 
Goalkeeper Tommy Allen, for instance, had been employed by Southampton on the 
71 Minutes of Football League (Third Division Southern and Northern Sections SGMs), 21,26 March, 
1923. 
72 Minutes of AFPTU, 25 August 1930 (AGM). 
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maximum wage for five years - playing in 192 of the 208 League matches between 
1920 and 1925 - before the club reduced his terms to the retaining wage. He refused 
to re-sign and the club stopped his wages and reported him to the FA, leaving him 
'debarred from earning his livelihood' until the case was settled. 73 The FA was 
pressurised into loosening the rule in 1934, but this did not change the fact that many 
cases still depended on what the FA believed constituted a 'reasonable wage'. 74 
Indeed, the issue was complicated by the League's decision in 1922 to alter its long- 
standing definition of a 'reasonable wage' as either the maximum wage or the player's 
previous wage and thereby allow poorer League clubs to legitimately retain players on 
reduced terms. As Jimmy Fay, the Union secretary, pointed out in a letter to his 
League counterpart in 1938, the 'reasonable wage' rule allowed League clubs to 
'absolutely ignore' the FA retaining wage. 75 
High transfer fees, too, could represent a major obstacle to the free movement of 
labour. The number of players appealing for reductions in transfer fees - approaching 
300 annually by 191076 _ indicated the scale of the problem, as did the Management 
Committee's recognition in 1911 that 'in many instances fees are fixed that the clubs 
can never hope to realise'. 77 The Players' Union believed the situation was so bad 
between the wars that some players were being prevented from earning a living and 
78 were even forced 'to go out of League Football, or to leave the country'. Cases like 
those of Sheffield United's Gough lend support to this view. Gough, an ageing ex- 
England international, was suspended during August 1924 for breaking his contract 
with United by taking a public house and was subsequently put on sale for a price of 
E2,000. Although the fee was certainly too high for a player of Gough's age, and 
despite the fact that United no longer wished to employ him, the club refused for over 
a year to reduce the price and thus in effect temporarily halted his career. Eventually 
he was sold in October 1926 - over two years after the cancellation of his contract - to 
73 Minutes of AFPTU, 28 September 1925; G. Chalk and D. Holley, The Saints: A Complete Record, 
1885-1987, Derby, 1987, pp. 65-73,26 1. 
74 Minutes of AFPTU, 20 August 1934 (AGM). 
75 Minutes of International Football League Board, 18 March 1922; PFA, File 35, Fay to Fred Howarth, 
21 January 1938. 
76 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 214 (Table 13.5). 
77 Athletic News, 8 May 1911. 
71 Minutes of AFPTU, 21 August 1933 (AGM). 
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Preston North End for a nominal fee Of just ; C500.79 Gough was more fortunate than 
other players whose careers were ended for good. For example, Taylor had been 
placed on Liverpool's transfer list in May 1937 but, with no prospect of being signed 
until the beginning of the 1938/39 season, he turned his back on football and applied 
successfully to the Union for a small loan to help him in a drapery business he had 
80 acquired. In fact, for the old or less talented player, a transfer fee of any kind made 
finding another engagement particularly difficult. Hence during the early 1930s, when 
a number of clubs were experiencing financial difficulties, the Player's Union 
appealed to clubs publicly at signing-on time to give free transfers to players they did 
not want to retain, and implored the Management Committee to reduce or remove all 
fees. 81 
Yet the rhetoric of 'slavery' which permeated contemporary criticism of the retain- 
and-transfer system, especially that of the Union, has probably led historians to 
overemphasise the oppressive elements of the system and neglect examples of its 
practical operation. Gough's case shows that clubs could be obstructive towards 
players who had broken the rules but, in general, they did not stand in the way of those 
who were determined to move. It was widely recognised that players were valuable 
assets and that it was in the club's interests to reach agreed terms or to move the 
player on as quickly and as profitably as possible. Nobody wanted a discontented 
player at their club. West Ham United informed one of its transfer-listed players that 
4anything possible would be done toward helping him to get a job' and in many 
instances clubs were prepared to voluntarily reduce the original fee, especially if 
another club had shown an interest in the player. 82 The Union's propaganda 
concerning free transfers also seems to have had some effect: Sheffield United gave 
nine of its playing staff free transfers in 1934 and Oldham Athletic similarly released 
93 seven in 1938. Moreover, if negotiations with the club were unsuccessful, the 
Management Committee could step in to help the player. Official figures show that 
79 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 13 August, 4,12 November 1924; 19 August, 3 
November 1925; 13 October 1926. 
'0 Minutes of AFPTU, 16 May 1938. 
81 Minutes of AFPTU, 20 April 193 1,8 August 1932,24 April 1933. 
82 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 25 April 1933. 
83 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, I May 1934; Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 4 
May 1938. 
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the majority of cases before the Committee led to reductions in transfer fees favouring 
the player and, in addition, League representatives worked on an informal basis to iron 
out disputes. 11bus in 1913 the League president successfully intervened by requesting 
Sheffield United to grant Wilkinson a free transfer 'in consideration of his length of 
service with the club'. 84 If the official mechanisms failed it was still sometimes 
possible for a player to persuade or coerce the board to let him leave. It was not 
unusual for clubs to accede immediately to transfer requests precipitated by a player's 
demotion to the second team, or his being generally 'unsettled', although it could take 
months for a satisfactory move to be negotiated. 85 And as we shall see in the next 
chapter, clubs rejecting transfer requests were occasionally faced with absenteeism, 
non-cooperation or other forms of disruptive behaviour. 
Most analyses of professional football have emphasised the unique nature of the 
employment restrictions embodied in the retain-and-transfer system. The usual 
comparison here is with industries such as coal-mining, building, textiles and other 
occupations traditionally associated with the employment of industrial workers where, 
regardless of the inherent hardships and dangers, employees were always theoretically 
free to move between jobs and employers as they pleased. This parallel is hardly 
surprising given the socio-economic and occupational background of the majority of 
professional footballers and directors and the apparent duplication of employer- 
employee relations from the factory to the football club. 96 Yet as a result, 
comparisons with the employment conditions in more closely-related areas, 
particularly other sports and sectors of the entertainment industry, have been rather 
neglected. While it is true that no other industry exhibited such tight and strictly 
regulated restrictions on an employee's freedom of contract, there were clearly some 
comparable practices. There is some evidence that rugby league clubs were able to 
prevent their players moving on, although they had no retaining rights similar to those 
in the Football League. Players wishing to change allegiance in county cricket were 
11 Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 214 (Table 13.5), 24 1; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 21 
May 1913. 
" See Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 3 October 1911; 15 January 193 1; 25 February 
193 1; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 3 October 1911. 
36 Korr, West Ham United, p. 17 1, makes a similar point. Also see Tony Mason, 'Stanley Matthews', 
EUI Colloquium Papers, Florence, 1989, pp. I -18. 
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also probably deterred by the qualification rule, which required players to have two 
years residence in their new county. 87 Looking beyond sport, Lois Rutherford has 
indicated how music-hall proprietors attempted to assert ownership over 'their' 
performers by barring them from performing at rival establishments within a certain 
area and for specified periods both before and after each engagement. Although these 
restrictions were generally compensated for by higher salaries and increased job 
security, it still meant that all but the few star artistes were denied genuine freedom of 
88 contract. Moreover, it is worth noting the similarity of language used by critics of 
the barring system in the music hall and the retain-and-transfer system in League 
football. One variety artiste's suggestion during the music hall strike of 1907, that his 
fellow professionals were treated like a 'chattel and a machine that can be turned on 
and off, ordered here or there according to the fancy of the managers', was clearly 
echoed by the Union's description of the professional footballer as 'a bonded man' 
and a 'tool' or 'puppet' in the hands of the clubs, League and FA. 89 
3. Waaes and Remuneration 
Studies of the remuneration of League footballers have tended to suffer from a paucity 
of systematic data which, consequently, has meant that conclusions have been partial 
and largely impressionistic. In view of this, it is perhaps surprising that football club 
archives have been largely neglected in research and that no effort has been made to 
compare the evidence on player's earnings by drawing on the experience of a range of 
clubs. Hence this section of the chapter is partly based on data from a number of club 
minute books, wage books and ledgers - some previously unused by historians - and 
attempts to show the way in which earnings became increasingly regulated and 
determined centrally from Preston. 
87 Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 148,211-12; Ric Sissons, The Players: A Social History ofthe Professional 
Cricketer, Sydney, 1988, pp. 85-89. 
" Rutherford, 'Managers in a small way'. pp. 105,110. 
'9 Quoted in Rutherford, 'Managers in a small way, p. 94. On the Union's language of slavery see 
Broomfield's correspondence during the 1909 dispute in PFA, Files 6,7 and 8. Also Syd Owen's 
comments in Athletic News, 8 May 1911 and Braham Dabscheck, 'Defensive Manchester'; also 'Man 
or a Puppeff, pp. 221-38. 
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The absence of hard evidence is less surprising for the period before the introduction 
of the maximum wage in 1901, when wages, bonuses and other payments were not 
regulated at all by the League or the FA but determined by each club individually and 
could therefore vary substantially over time and from club to club. The evidence 
which exists suggests that by the turn of the century the best players were receiving as 
much as E5 per week, excluding bonuses, while regular second teamers could be 
guaranteed as little as 10s. to Ll, with possible increases if picked for the first 
eleven. 90 Income undoubtedly varied considerably and it is clear that few could 
expect the V weekly wage throughout the year which Beats and Baddeley of 
Wolverhampton Wanderers were reputed to receive. 91 In addition, most players 
would have received a smaller wage over the 15 or so weeks of the close season and 
some were probably not paid at all in the summer. The passing of the maximum wage 
rule has been seen in this context as a significant turning point, heralding a general 
standardisation and equalisation of wages across the League. The wage books of 
Sheffield United for the early 1900s (Table 5.8) certainly seem to support the claim 
made by Aston Villa's chairman, Fred Rinder, that the maximum wage soon became a 
standard wage for the top professionals. 
92 Only five of United's players were 
guaranteed over E4 per week in 1899/1900, whereas by the second season of the 
operation of the wage limit, in 1902/03, fourteen were receiving the maximum. Other 
clubs may not have been able financially to offer the maximum to so many of their 
leading players: the Stoke secretary revealed that only three players at his club were 
given the maximum in 1906 while Blackpool had nobody on E4.93 And Table 5.8 also 
shows that the maximum wage did little to substantially alter the wage differentials 
within a club as, at Sheffield United at least, the maximum seems to have been 
restricted to the first team. Nevertheless, according to the FA's figures, by 1910 573 
Football League and Southern League players were receiving the maximum, 
suggesting that, at a modest estimation, a third of all registered League players (there 
were approximately 1,000 at this time) were on L4 per week. 94 
90 See Mason, Association Football, pp. 96-98. 
9' Matthews, The Wolves, p. 18. Liverpool, first division champions in 1900/0 1, were also paying some 
of their players 17, which with bonuses could reach L 10 per week. Athletic News, 27 May 1901. 
9' Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 4 June 1906. 
93 Comment by H. D. Austerberry from Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 4 June 1906; J. Rawcliffe, 
'Blackpool Football Club: From Lancashire League to Second Division' in Book offootball, p. 176. 
94 FA Circular on Financial Arrangements Between Clubs and Players, 10 January 19 10. 
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The idea that the maximum wage had an overall equalising effect on wages is rather 
simplistic as it ignores the extent to which gradation and hierarchy were built into the 
legislation, particularly in the inter-war years. From 1910 it was agreed that clubs 
could pay players an extra 10s. per week above the maximum after two years service 
and a ftu-ther 10s. after four years, giving elite players'a potential new wage of L5 per 
week (L260 a year). Although it is difficult to know exactly how many players 
benefited from this, minute books suggest that most clubs took advantage of the rule, 
thus stretching the wage gap slightly and establishing a distinct hierarchy within clubs 
based on continuity of service as well as talent. 95 In 1920 the wage structure was 
finther reformed, partly as a result of pressure from the Players' Union to increase 
wages 'to cover the extra cost of living' and allow annual wage rises 'according to 
merit'. 96 Wages were henceforth to be regulated according to a sliding scale, ranging 
from a maximum of L5 per week for new players with annual rises of El weekly over 
four years to a final ceiling of L9 per week. Moreover, all payments were now based 
on a 52-week period rather than the previous 39 weeks, which amounted to a possible 
maximum of E468 a year. 97 The emphasis on payment by length of service ahead of 
merit, however, caused considerable discontent among certain players. According to 
the Union the sliding scale was unpopular: 'We know that is the opinion held by 
players in the North and Midlands. It is frequently pointed out to us by our members 
that while men in first teams are receiving E6, others in the second teams are in receipt 
of 0 to L9'. 98 Two years later the maximum was reduced to E8 during the 37-week 
playing season and L6 in the remaining 15 weeks of the close season. The sliding 
scale was retained but clubs were additionally permitted to increase the wages of 
players picked for the first team and, likewise, reduce those of players dropped 
through loss of form. 99 Hence merit was now recognised alongside seniority as an 
essential element of wage determination. 
93 Minutes of Football League, 23 October, 15 November 1912; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 9 April 
1912; Minutes of Sheffield United FC, I October 1912. The resolution did not come into operation 
until 1912 and was not officially adopted as a League rule until 1914. 
96 Minutes of AFPTU, 23 February 1920. 
" Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, p. 123. 
98 Minutes of AFPTU, Letter from H. J. Newbould to J. McKenna, 2 March 192 1. 
99 Sutcliffe, et al., Football League, p. 124. 
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Table S. 8 Basic Winter Wages of Sheffield United Players, 1899/1900-1904/05 
Weekly Wage 
(f s. d. ) 1899/1900 1900/01 1901/02 1902/03 1903/04 1904/05 
4.10.0 1 2 
4.0.0 4 8 13 14 12 12 
3.10.0 1 
3.5.0 1 
3.0.0 4 4 4 4 
'6 
4 
2.15.0 2 1 
2.10.0 5 1 1 3 
2.5.0 2 1 
2.0.0 3 2 3 2 5 
1.15.0 1 2 1 2 
1.10.0 1 1 1 2 
1.5.0 1 3 1 3 
1.0.0 2 3 5 5 4 4 
15.0 4 5 1 3 1 
12.6 1 1 
10.0 1 
Source: Wage Books of Sheffield United FC. 
The sliding scale gave clubs a certain amount of freedom to alter a player's weekly 
wage subject to the terms of his contract and the sanction of the Management 
Committee. In particular, it was increasingly used as an incentive for players to reach 
the first team and thus intensify competition within the club. This could be done, 
firstly, by applying directly to increase the wages of a reserve player regularly making 
the first team, although the Management Committee would reftise such requests 
unless the player had enjoyed a lengthy run - normally at least ten matches - at the 
higher level. 100 Alternatively, wages could be altered on a weekly basis according to 
which team the player was picked for. Aston Villa, for one, decided in 1921 to pay all 
players receiving less than the maximum an extra LI per week if they made the first 
team. Sheffield United adopted a more comprehensive incentive scheme during the 
1930s, often guaranteeing its best players a weekly wage of just L6, with L2 extra 
providing they kept their first team place. 101 At many clubs the maximum wage 
therefore remained effectively a first team wage, a policy made explicit by the West 
100 For example, see Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 31 October 1934. 
101 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 13 September 192 1; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 
28 April 1937,3 May 193 8. West Ham United, Ipswich Town, Walsall and Oldham Athletic all 
developed variations of the same basic wage structure during the 1930s. 
183 
0 
Ham board in 1927.102 Not surprisingly, many players objected to this as it increased 
the pressure to perform consistently each week while denying them a constant and 
secure wage. Topical Times believed that the weekly sliding scale actually created 'a 
feeling of unsettlement which... upset a team's spirit and efficiency' but this did not 
prevent its general adoption across the League by the mid-1930s., 
03 
Tbus even at the more wealthy and successful League clubs the maximum wage was 
reached only by a minority, although the precise size of this minority is difficult to 
gauge. According to the Players' Union, fewer than 10 per cent of professionals were 
on the maximum by 1939 although the figure may have been higher at more 
prosperous times, especially the immediate post-war years. Sheffield United, for 
example, signed II of its 18-man squad at the E9 maximum for the 1921/22 season 
but by 1934 this figure had dropped to four. 104 At many second and third division 
clubs the maximum was probably unattainable even for the top players. The highest 
possible weekly wage at Ipswich Town during their first season in the third division 
south was V, while Ratcliffe, captain of Oldham Athletic in the northern section, was 
heading his club's scale in the late 193 Os at just E4.1 Os. winter and ; E4 summer wages 
with an extra EI in the first tearn. 105 
Below the top earners at each club were a range of veteran, reserve and youth players 
moving up or down the scale depending on circumstances. As Tables 5.9,5.10 and 
5.11 indicate, basic wage differentials were still considerable both within and between 
League clubs in the inter-war period, although the wage range within a club like West 
Ham was noticeably smaller by the 1930s than it had been at the beginning of the 
1920s. At the bottom end of the wage scale many professionals undoubtedly 
struggled to make a living, especially in the lower divisions where unemployment and 
the absence of summer wages caused persistent problems. Indeed, while wages were 
limited at the top of the scale there was no corresponding stipulated minimum to 
102 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 19 April 1927. 
103 Topical Times, 10 April 1926; Minutes of AFPTU, 23 August 1937 (AGM); Seed, Jimmy Seed 
Story, p. 84; Jimmy Guthrie, Soccer Rebel. The Evolution ofthe Professional Footballer, Pinner, 1976, 
p. 32. 
`4 Minutes of AFPTU, 27 February 1939 (EGM); Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 3 
May 1921,1 May 1934. 
"' Wage Books of Ipswich Town FC; Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 12 April 1939. 
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which League clubs were expected to comply. Sheffield United's lowest terms were 
offered to part-time nursery or 'A' team players who received ; EI per week with 
increases of El if picked for the reserve or first teams. At Sunderland in 1908 wages 
of f 142 per week were received by players employed in other occupations throughout 
the week but this had risen to E34 when Raich Carter joined the club in 1931 as a 
part-time footballer and electrical engineering apprentice. 106 Young players were also 
often engaged on the groundstaff for minimal wages until they were able to sign 
professional forms at seventeen: future manager Ted Fenton was the first to be given 
such a post at West Hain in 1930, although the practice was to become 
commonplace. 107 Problems of low pay increased with the onset of the depression and 
the need of many clubs to economise by reducing wage bills. This often manifested 
itself in the stoppage of summer wages through releasing players in May and re- 
engaging them in August in time for the new season. Third division Swindon, for 
instance, released almost three-quarters of its squad for this reason during the summer 
of 193 1.108 Moreover, in certain districts footballers were categorised as 'seasonal 
workers' and denied unemployment benefit, ' although the independent Umpire 
eventually decided in favour of the player in 1932 after considerable Union. agitation 
at government level. 109 Nevertheless, problems of low pay continued throughout the 
mid-1930s: in fact, the majority of third division north players were allegedly on such 
low wages by 1936 that they could not even afford the small Union subscription 
fee. 110 
106 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 9 September 193 1,1 March 1933; PFA, File 6, F. 
Means to Broomfield, 25 October 1908; Raich Carter, Footballer's Progress, London, 1950, pp. 36, 
39. 
107 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 31 March, I June and 5 August 1937; Minutes of 
West Ham United FC, 25 March 1930. On Fenton, see Koff, West Ham United, pp. 98-100. 
'08 Wolverhampton Wanderers Programme, 14 April 1933; Fishwick, English Football, p. 78. 
109 Minutes of AFPTU, 8 and 22 August 1932 (AGM). 
"0 Minutes of AFPTU, 24 August 1936 (AGM). 
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Table 5.9 Basic Winter Wages of West Hmn United Players 
Weckly Wagc (L s. d. ) 1920/21 1924/25 1929/30 1934/35 
9.0.0 6 
8.0.0 8 3 
7.10.0 1 
7.0.0 4 3 8 2 
6.10.0 4 1 
6.0.0 6 4 4 7 
5.10.0 1 1 1 
5.0.0 8 6 5 13 
4.10.0 1 1 
4.0.0 2 2 
Source: Minute Books of West Ham United FC. 
Table 5.10 Summer Wages of West Ham United Players 




6.0.0 4 13 12 6 
5.10.0 6 1 
5.0.0 10 4 5 7 
4.10.0 1 1 2 
4.0.0 1 2 2 7 
3.10.0 1 2 
3.0.0 2 
2.0.0 1 
Source: Minute Books of West Ham United FC. 
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Table 5.11 Basic Winter Wages of Football League Players. 
Shcffield United Ipswich Town Oldham Athletic 
Second Division Third Division South Third Division North 
Weekly Wage (f. s. d. ) 1938/39 1939/39* 1939/40 
8.0.0. 
7.0.0. 1 
6.0.0. 15 7 
5.10.0. 1 
5.0.0. 6 13 
4.10.0. 3 10 
4.0.0. 5 1 2 
3.10-0. 1 
3.5.0. 1 1 




* Week ending I October 1938. 
Sources: Minute Books of Sheffield United Football Committee, Wage Books of Ipswich Town FC, Minute Books of Oldham 
Athletic FC. 
While the weekly wage remained the basic form of remuneration for all League 
players in this period it was increasingly augmented by a number of other possible 
financial rewards. The most important of these was probably the benefit, a practice 
borrowed most directly from county cricket but also with a long history in the theatre, 
music hall and other sectors of the entertainment industry. "' From 1901 the FA 
permitted clubs to grant a benefit match at the end of a player's career or after five 
years' continuous service and subsequently allowed a second benefit after ten years. 
Initially special friendlies were organised for this purpose but increasingly players 
began to receive partial or entire proceeds of League matches: a policy which 
Sheffield United had adopted as early as 1905.112 In addition, directors tended to 
guarantee minimum sums, a practice which guarded footballers from the risks 
associated with benefits in the theatre, music hall and county cricket, where vast 
expenses or poor attendances could seriously affect the amount raised. ' 13 From about 
... Sissons, The Players, pp. 12940; Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 221-22; Keith A. P. Sandiford, 'The Birth 
of the Professional Cricketer's Benefit Match', IJHS, 8,1,199 1, pp. 111-23; Michael Baker, The Rise 
ofthe Victorian Actor, London, 1978, pp. 122-23; Bailey, 'Community of Friends', pp. 4147. Also see 
Bailey, 'Custom, Capital and Culture', pp. 191-93. 
11 Minutes of FA Consultative Committee, 17 December 1900; Athletic News, II September 1911; 
Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 8,3 0 August 1905. 
... See Baker, Victorian Actor, p. 123; Bailey, 'Community of Friends', p. 44; Sandiford, 'Professional 
Cricketer's Benefit Match', pp. 113,12 1. 
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1920 most clubs dispensed altogether with the practice of allocating matches and 
instead guaranteed each player a fixed sum. In fact, although the benefit was initially 
regarded as a gift from club to playerrather than a contractual right, it had developed 
by the 1920s into an essential aspect of the bargaining process between the two and 
represented the main supplement to the player's basic earnings. In this sense football 
benefits differed fundamentally from their cricket counterpart and were treated as such 
by the Commissioners of Inland revenue who taxed the former but not the latter. The 
High Court judged in 1923, and then again in 1941, that as benefits were specifically 
provided for by Football League regulations they should be regarded as a payment for 
a players' services just like his wage, bonus and talent money. 114 Thus when rumours 
began circulating in 1934 that Wolverhampton Wanderers was withholding benefits 
from its players, the board inserted a notice in the club programme assuring spectators 
that 'benefits have been paid immediately they were due... and the Directors will 
follow the same principle in the future'. ' 15 Clubs were not compelled to grant benefits 
but they were likely to have a dissatisfied workforce if they refused. 
The actual sum received via the benefit could depend on the status of the player as 
well as the financial position of the club. The archival evidence suggests that the 
average pre-First World War benefit at Sheffield United and Wednesday raised 
somewhere between E100-000, while wealthier Aston Villa was able to grant sums 
of 0004450 in 1912 and even paid E500 to its England inside-left Joe Bache. 116 
Charles Sutcliffe testified that L200 was a typical figure but added that some players 
were able to get L500 and, in exceptional cases, E1,000.117 In 1920 Sheffield United 
did allow club captain Utley to receive a benefit of nearly f 1,100 through the proceeds 
of a chosen League match, though this precipitated a collective response from other 
squad members who complained of 'preferential treatment' and the board 
subsequently set the standard benefit at E500 for first teamers. 118 After 1920 the 
League Management Committee itself limited benefit payments to E500 (increased to 
114 Maurice Golesworthy, The Encyclopaedia ofAssociation Football, London, 1957, pp. 25-26; 
Athletic News, 30 May 1927. 
115 Wolverhampton Wanderers Programme, 3 March 1934. 
116 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 1905-14, passim; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 23 
January, 16 April 1912. 
117 Athletic News, 22 March 1909,11 September 1911. 
1" Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 11,25 February, 2 March 1920. 
188 
E650 in 1924) for regular first team players with a proportionately smaller sum for 
other players. Thus while Sheffield United paid Birks the usual E500 in 1930, a 
reserve like Stevenson could only expect E350.119 Like wages, some benefit payments 
were also linked to individual or collective performance. Examples include West 
Ham giving Hodgson and Moore a definite E300 benefit each, to be increased to E400 
if the majority of their appearances in that season were for the first team; and the same 
club offering Collins E350 'which could be increased at our discretion if his play and 
our financial and league position warranted such' or a guaranteed ; C400.120 There is no 
doubt that some players increased their earnings substantially through the benefit 
system. West Ham's Jimmy Ruffell received four benefits of E650, E500 twice and 
E200 in the course of his eighteen years playing with the club, which effectively added 
f 100 to his annual wage. 121 However, clubs in financial difficulties were often forced 
to delay or suspend non-obligatory payments such as benefits. In 1921 the Stockport 
County directors issued a public appeal to enable them to raise the E3,000 owed in 
benefit monies to their players. 122 Sheffield United's decision to suspend benefits 
from 1933 to 1936 'until finances of the Club have improved' 123 was probably not 
exceptional; and it was also common for clubs in temporary financial difficulties to 
postpone benefits until the following season. Nevertheless, we can see from Table 
5.12 that by the 1930s a significant proportion of League players were granted benefits 
each season and most of these received E400 and above. 
Table S. 12 Benefit Payments to. League Players, 1931/32-1935/36 
Year Under f 100 f 100-200 L200-300 L300-400 L400-500 L500-650 Total 
1931/32 15 13 7 3 29 67 
1932/33. 10 11 11 10 30 72 
1933/34 9 10 12 22 45 101 
1934/35 1 16 15 10 32 74 
1935/36 7 11 7 14 38 77 
Total 3 42 61 52 59 174 391 
Source: PFA, File 35, Statistics required from Football Ltague on cases Corbett V. Inland Revenue and Dalc v. Inland Revenue, 
1939. 
'19 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, I April 1930. 
120 Minutes of West Hain United FC, 19 April 1927,2 May 1933. 
121 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 13 April 1926,15 May 1933; Korr, West Ham United, p. 184. 
122 Minutes of AFPTU, 26 September 1921 (AGM). 
123 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 22 February 1933. 
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Theoretically the benefit was a reward for loyal service or 'a sign of the bond between 
[the player] and the club' 124 but in practice it often became a source of conflict 
between the two. One such case was the dispute between Christopher Buckley and 
Aston Villa in 1911. Like many other players, Buckley signed an agreement entitling 
him to the proceeds of a League match with a minimum guarantee of E450. 
Subsequently, according to Buckley, the Villa secretary promised him the match 
against FA Cup holders Bradford City; the board repudiated this and instead offered 
him the choice of the Liverpool, Preston or Sheffield United games - all less attractive 
ties with early kick-offs. After meeting with the board Buckley decided that 'if he 
could not have the Bradford match he would have none at all' and refused to play in 
the next League match. He was then suspended sine die 'until such time as he 
expresses regret for his action'. 125 In Buckley's view the club had acted in a 
parsimonious manner by restricting his potential benefit income: indeed, 'It was 
common talk among the Villa players... that nobody got a benefit from the club 
without a row, and then the player only got what they cared to give him'. 126 Yet 
ultimately there was little Buckley could do: three weeks later he eventually backed 
down, apologised for his action and accepted the Sheffield United match., 27 Even 
though clubs increasingly accepted the benefit as a fundamental player's right, there 
could still be conflict over the amount given. West Ham, for instance, refused Vic 
Watson's request for a maximum E650 benefit just a few weeks after publicly 
congratulating him on his performance in an international match and he later accepted 
the standard first team payment of E500.128 Moreover, there is some evidence that up 
to 1910 certain clubs avoided paying benefits altogether by transferring players shortly 
before their benefits were due, thereby denying them possibly several hundreds of 
pounds and ensuring them merely the f 10 signing-on bonus for their new club. 129 
However, from 1910 League rules entitled a player transferred before completing his 
five years qualification for a benefit to receive an accrued share of it: that is, a sum 
124 Korr, West Ham United, p. 186. 
125 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 14,28 November 1911. 
126 Athletic News, 4 December 1911. 
127 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 19 December 1911. 
129 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 7,29 April, 6 May 1930. 
129 See Athletic News, II March 1907. 
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commensurate to the length of his qualifying service and the amount which he would 
have received if not transferred. Initially the amount the player could receive was 
regarded as a share of the transfer fee and was given in proportion to the increased fee 
made by the selling club, but in practice the Management Committee tended to link 
such payments to presumed benefits rather than the size of the transfer fee. 
130 In ideal 
circumstances the player was adequately recompensed by his former club for loss of 
benefit. West Ham United was certainly happy to pay its star forward Sid Puddefoot 
E390 (as a three year percentage of the expected E650 benefit) on his transfer to 
Falkirk for E5,000 in 1922 -a new record for a player moving from a Football League 
to a Scottish League club. 131 Yet where the transfer fee was minimal, or the player 
had left the club in acrimony, such amounts were less likely. Sometimes requests by 
players were refused outright, as was the case with Radford at Sheffield United and, 
132 
after protracted contract and benefit negotiations, Hampson at West Hain. Indeed, 
players adjudged to have precipitated the transfer had no entitlement to the accrued 
benefit payment under League rules: Frank Barson's move from Aston Villa to 
Manchester United was one such example where 'the player, by his conduct and his 
demands on the club, had practically forced [them] to transfer him' and therefore 
received nothing. 133 In addition, the League Management Committee often intervened 
to reduce what it considered to be inflated sums already agreed between clubs and 
players. This practice became particularly contentious during 1921 when the Players' 
Union wrote to the League asking them to reconsider a number of cases in which 
transferred players had had their guaranteed payments severely cut by the Committee. 
According to Union chairman Charlie Roberts, 'the player being transferred is in a 
blind alley - everything is subject to the consent of the Football League, and they, as 
representatives of the clubs, keep the amount the player receives down as far as 
possible'. 134 
"0 See Sutcliffe et al., Foothall League, p. 119; Athletic News, I June 1914. 
131 Minutes of West Hain United FC, 13 February 1922; Korr, West Ham United, p. 59. 
132 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 16 July 193 1; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 
14 December 1925. 
113 Minutes of Football League, 18 December 1922. 
134 Minutes of AFPTU, 2 February 1921. 
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Other important aspects of the League's 1910 financial package included the 
introduction of talent money and the legalisation of bonuses for Cup tie wins. Clubs 
finishing in the top five of both divisions were henceforth 'entitled to distribute 
amongst their squads sums ranging from ; E275 for the first placed club to E55 for the 
fifth and corresponding amounts for FA Cup success. From 1920 a flat rate bonus of 
L2 for a win and El for a draw in all League matches and cup ties was adopted, with 
smaller bonuses of El and 10s. respectively for third division clubs. Reserve players 
could also theoretically receive small bonuses (initially 10s. and 5s. but doubled in 
1921) although certain clubs and reserve leagues refused to sanction such 
payments. 135 Talent money and bonuses had initially been advocated partly as a 
means of rewarding exceptional players 'who received no more... than the mere 
mediocrity' under the maximum wage rule. 
136 Most League clubs accepted such 
payments as 'tantamount to a commission in addition to salary in commercial life' but 
some agreed with the FA's William Pickford that bonuses for match results 
constituted a form of bribery and meant paying the player twice over for the same 
Work. 137 In 1908 the Players' Union had suggested a marks system based on the 
'good conduct and skill' of players, similar to that operated by first class cricket 
counties, but most clubs opposed the idea of individual rewards in an essentially 
collective team sport. 138 Notwithstanding initial pockets of opposition, most clubs 
good enough to win matches, cups and championships were prepared to let their 
employees share financially in the success. Yet when clubs reftised to do so, as 
occurred with a recently transferred member of the 1912/13 Preston promotion side, 
the Management Committee had no powers of compulsion. 139 Furthermore, as the 
Players' Union pointed out in 1937, these extra payments affected only a small 
minority of the professionals engaged by the 88 Football League clubs. Even within 
the most successful clubs, talent money was related exclusively to the performance of 
I's Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 119; Minutes of AFPTU, 23 February 1920; Minutes of Football 
League, 13 September, II October 1920. 
136 Report of meeting of Football League Clubs inAthletic News, 23 May 1904. 
131 See Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 4 June 1906. Also the series featuring opinions on the 
bonus system. Athletic News, 8,15 and 29 January 1906. 
138 Minutes of AFPU, I April 1908. 
139 Minutes of Football League, 26 May 1913. 
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the first team and, as we have seen, the extension of match bonuses to reserve team 
players was only partial. 140 
For the best players there were a number of additional opportunities to make money. 
International match fees were Ll at the turn of the century, rising to E4 in 1907, E6 in 
1921 and finally E20 by 1939 but this was still a relatively small sum given the 
infrequency of such matches - generally fewer than five each season - and the large 
revenue internationals generated for the respective FAs. 14 
1 Continental tours, at both 
representative and club level, could bring some return either in the form of extra pay 
or gifts like the silver medals given to members of the Nottingham Forest team during 
their visit to Argentina in 1905.142 However, from 1912 the Management Committee 
decided that players 'must not be allowed to make a profit' on such tours and closely 
monitored their financial arrangements. Thus while some players had previously been 
paid as much as El per day in addition to their regular wage, daily allowances of only 
5s. to cover expenses were common during the inter-war period. 143 As Mason and 
Wagg have both noted, some of the better players could also theoretically boost their 
incomes through advertising and the endorsement of goods, especially football 
equipment and new leisure products like cigarettes, as well as through writing 
newspaper columns. 144 Yet it is misleading to assume, as Jones does, that financial 
benefits inevitably flowed from such commercial contacts. In fact in many cases 
players were used to endorse products without their knowledge, let alone any prior 
agreement, and were therefore unlikely to significantly increase their incomes in this 
way. Members of the triple-championship winning Arsenal squad of the early 1930s, 
for instance, were often featured in advertisements for which they were either unpaid 
or received merely a token gift, while 'Dixie' Dean, who claimed that throughout his 
career he had received just one ex-gratia payment of E50 from a cigarette firm for the 
use of his image, considered himself particularly exploited by advertisers. 145 In 
addition, all gifts from either club committees or supporters were closely monitored 
140 Minutes of AFPTU, 23 August 1937 (AGM). 
14 ' Green, Football Association, p. 415. 
142 Tony Mason, Passion ofthe People?: Football in South America, London, 1995, p. 18. 
143 Minutes of Football League, 9 August 1912; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 8 May 1923. 
'44 Mason, Association Football, pp. 97-98; Wagg, Football World, p. 14. 
145 Jones, 'Economic Aspects', p. 294; John Harding, Alex James, London, 1988, pp. 165-68; Nick 
Walsh, Dixie Dean, London, 1977, p. 69. 
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and regulated by the Management Committee. Presentations or collections, such as 
those organised by Everton supporters for their FA Cup winning team of 1906 and by 
'admirers' of Sheffield United and Ireland forward Gillespie during a match in Belfast 
in 1923, were generally prohibited, although from the early 1920s clubs were 
permitted to give wedding presents not exceeding a specific sum and pay for the 
removal expenses of new signings subject to Management Committee approval. 
146 
Illegal payments and inducements must also be recognised as an important element of 
the informal financial relationship between League clubs and players. The precise 
extent of the practice is difficult to calculate although there is no doubt that the 
inquiries and commissions instigated by the League and FA touched only the tip of the 
iceberg. Fred Rinder told the FA Council in 1908 that the rules restricting wages, 
signing-on fees and bonuses 'were being broken daily' and the Players' Union agreed 
that 'nearly all Football League... clubs had broken the rules for their own 
aavantage'. 147 Even Sheffield United, whose committee - chaired by puritanical FA 
president Charles Clegg - was known for its high moral stance, was accused of paying 
illegal bonuses and wages in 1905 and 1910 respectively and had its books inspected 
for financial irregularities by a League commission in 1921, though in each case 
nothing was proven. 148 Stars like Billy Meredith could certainly benefit substantially 
from illegal payments of this kind. As a Manchester City player between 1902 and 
1906, Meredith apparently received L6 per week (L2 above the maximum) and in 
excess of E50 a year in bonuses. Similar payments seem to have been made to 
Meredith while he was with Manchester United through a special account in his name 
and that of another team mate. An FA commission found that as much as E598 had 
been paid into the account during a four-month period in 1907 alone. 149 Meredith was 
fined and suspended in both cases but other leading players and clubs were clearly 
more fortunate in escaping detection. However, for the majority of players in the 
146 Athletic News, 30 April 1906; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 24 October 1923; 
Minutes of Football League, 7 March 192 1. 
147 Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, I June 1908; Minutes of AFPU, 15 December 1908 (AGM). 
148 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 29 November 1905; 9,23 March 19 10; 4 October 
1921. 
149 Report of FA Commission into Manchester City FC in Athletic News, 4 June 1906; FA Report and 
Recommendation of the Commission adopted by the Council re. Manchester United FC, 30 March 
1910. 
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lower divisions, whose objective was probably to attain the legal maximum, illegal 
payments of this nature were far less likely. 
Nevertheless many observers both inside and outside football clearly believed that 
League professionals were well paid. In the opinion of John Lewis: 'a man who gets 
E4 for five years, and then a E350 benefit, followed by another after a second five 
years, does uncommonly well for himself, and... makes a far better start in life than 
ninety-nine hundredths of those in a similar station'. 
150 Fellow Committee member 
Sutcliffe believed that players 'want all the wages, all the bonuses and all the transfer 
fees they can get', and one critic agreed that 'the professional is endeavouring to make 
out of the commercial side of the game'. 
15 1 Reactions of this type partly reflected the 
concentration of the press and, increasingly by the 1930s, the electronic media on the 
activities of the top players and clubs: the Players' Union certainly thought that such 
distorted coverage gave the public an impression that 'the player was doing 
152 
wonderfully well'. Yet it has been widely recognised by historians that, in 
comparison to other broadly defined working-class occupations, professional football 
did indeed offer substantial remuneration. 153 As Table 5.13 indicates, the basic 
earnings of a first or second division footballer on the maximum wage - excluding 
benefits or other extra payments - easily outstripped the average salary of clerks, 
skilled and semi-skilled workers and even supervisors and foremen throughout the 
period. Thus, for instance, a professional with Stoke or Burslern Port Vale in 1906 
who earned up to E4 per week was clearly better off than a worker in any part of the 
region's pottery industry, with the possible exception of those at the peak of the wage 
hierarchy, such as firemen. Fishwick has also correctly noted that players with 
Sheffield United or Wednesday between the wars were earning from two to three 
times the wage of workers in the local steel industry. 154 Those further down the wage 
structure, like Fletcher and Richmond (Table 5.13), were closer to the foremen 
"0 Football and Sports Special, 27 February 1909. 
151 Athletic News, II January 1909; Catton Folders, E-F, T. W. Annal to William Pickford, 13 
September 1909, p. 501. 
152 Minutes of AFPTU, 27 February 1939 (EGM). 
153 See especially Mason, Association Football, pp. 10 1 -03. 134 Whipp, Patterns ofLabour, pp. 58-63; Fishwick, English Football, p. go. 
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category, but even they would probably have taken home more when extra payments 
are considered. 
Table S. 13 Comparison of Average Annual Earnings of Clerks, Foremen, Skilled and Semi-Skilled 
Workers with Football League Professionals, 1906-35 (in pounds). 
1906 1924 1935 
Clerks 182 192 
Foremen, Supervisors, inspectors 113 268 273 
Skilled Workers 97 182 197 
Semi-Skilled Workers* 63 126 134 
Football League Professional (Maximum Wage) 208 386 386 
(Fletcher, West Ham United FQ 260 
(Richmond, Walsall FC) 211 
Including agricultural occupations. 
Source: Routh, Occupation andPay in GreatBritain, pp. 92,98,101.109; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 28 April 1924; 
Walsall FC Players' Registration Book, 193246,522/1/66. 
In many respects, however, such comparisons are less appropriate than those with 
employees in other football leagues, sports and entertainment industries. For a first 
team player at a leading Football League club, there was really nowhere to go to 
improve one's earnings. - The Scottish League had no maximum wage but generally 
only Rangers, Celtic and Hearts offered its players more than the equivalent maximum 
in England. At the other end of the scale, players in the second and short-lived third 
divisions were commonly part-timers and could receive as little as I 5s. and in some 
cases 7s. 6d. weekly. 155 The Southern League operated similar maximum wage 
restrictions to those of the League prior to amalgamation in 1920 and were subject to 
the same FA rules regarding extra payments. In 1920 it decided to abolish wage limits 
and, for a short time, some clubs evidently offered terms far exceeding Football 
League levels: Athletic News reported that one player who had been left off both the 
retain and transfer lists of his League club was given an agreement for E600 a season 
(almost E16 weekly in the playing season) by a Southern League rival. 156 Overseas 
clubs could also often offer higher basic salaries although leagues abroad were slower 
to develop, smaller and generally less stable than the Football League. Nonetheless, 
the soccer section of the New York Giants baseball club was reputedly able to offer 
Everton's 'Dixie' Dean E25 per week in 1928 while unemployed League players were 
obtaining agreements with French clubs during the depression on terms 'far in excess 
... Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 224; Crampsey, First 100 Years, p. 79. 
156 Athletic News, 19 July 1920. 
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of maximum wages in England'. The maximum wage in the French League was set at 
2,000 Francs per month in 1933, exactly double the wage of a skilled French worker 
but equivalent to just E5 a week in England. Bonuses and illegal payments could 
swell this figure considerably, however. 157 
In cricket, the parallel national sport, the earnings of the top players were not 
markedly dissimilar from those in football. At the turn of the century a good cricket 
professional playing for a relatively prosperous county could make about E275 a year 
with possible increases in the form of test match pay, benefits or talent money. Lesser 
players might only receive basic gro 
, 
undstaff wages and be deprived of winter pay, 
though most counties had introduced it in some form by the 1900s. By the inter-war 
period county professionals could make up to a maximum of ; E440 per annum, though 
most received under E400.158 Earnings were considerably higher in more 
commercialised sports like horse racing, boxing and baseball. Top flat jockeys often 
received several thousand pounds a year in retainers, riding fees and other gifts and 
even moderate jockeys at the turn of the century could make fl, 000 in a season: 
national hunt riding fees were even higher - five guineas for a losing ride and ten for 
winning throughout the period - but retainers were scarcer and fewer meetings often 
led to periodic unemployment for some. 159 Purses in major professional boxing 
contests varied from flOO to fl, 500 and more for international and world title fights. 
But even these figures were dwarfed by those open to baseball players in America. 
The average annual salary was $3,000 in 1910 but rose to $5,000 in 1923 and had 
reached over $7,500 six years later - incomes which compared favourably to those of 
dentists, doctors, lawyers, professors and other upper-middle class occupations. The 
star players, meanwhile, earned much more: Pittsburgh's Honus Wagner was paid 
$18,000 in 1911 and Detroit's Ty Cobb made at least $20,000 in 1915.160 According 
to Wagg, entertainers became a key reference group for the leading footballers only 
157 Topical Times, II August 1928; Minutes of AFPTU, 26 August 1936 (AGM); Alfred Wahl and 
Pierre Lanfranchi, Les Footballeurs Professionnels, Hachette, 1995, pp. 63-67. 
"I Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 218-22; Jack Williams, 'Cricket' in Mason (ed. ), Sport in Britain, p. 125. 
Also see Sissons, The Players, pp. 93-125,205-2 1. 
119 Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 216-18; Roger Munting, Hedges and Hurdles: A Social and Economic 
History OfNational Hunt Racing, London, 1987, pp. 13 0-34. 
160 Stan Shipley, 'Tom Causer of Bermondsey: A Boxer Hero of the 1890s', History Workshop Journal, 
15,1983, pp. 43,48; Steven A. Riess, 'Professional Baseball and Social Mobility', Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, 11,2,1980, pp. 23940. 
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during the 1940s and 1950s, but there is plenty of evidence to suggest that this 
perspective had in fact developed by the 1920s and 1930s (see chapter 9). 
161 Yet star 
footballers' remuneration did not come close to the E50 plus a week which actors in 
the upper range could earn before 1914. Film work could pay stars as much as 0- 
5,000 per picture in the 1920s and even more with the introduction of sound, although 
stage work might only guarantee L20 a week. However, earnings were extremely 
uneven in the acting profession, with estimates putting the average weekly income of 
actors in 1914 at E2 or even 27s.: a level of pay equivalent to the very bottom of the 
wage scale at most League clubs. 162 
4. Conclusion 
The role of the Football League in the field of players' contracts, earnings and 
transfers has been largely overlooked in previous work but it remains vital in forming 
a complete understanding of the operation of the labour market in top-level football. 
Clubs were, of course, the employers of players and the first port-of-call in contract or 
wage negotiations but directorates were themselves constrained by League regulations 
and the policy of the executive, which set the boundaries of players' earnings, 
sanctioned all payments and transfers and, in the final analysis, effectively owned 
players through its control of their registration. By 1939 the autonomy of clubs in all 
financial matters regarding its employees had been strictly limited: though it hardly 
controlled the purse strings of its members, the Management Committee had an 
effective veto on how players were rewarded. 
The League acted therefore as both a regulator of the labour market and a referee in 
disputes between clubs and players. The extent to which it was an impartial referee 
remains inconclusive, although the assumptions of Tischler, Dabscheck and others 
that the League was one part of a powerful 'triple alliance' along with the clubs and 
the FA intent on enslaving players and restricting their earning and employment 
opportunities needs to be discarded. 163 The retain-and-transfer system and other 
"" Wagg, Football World, p. 102. 
"12 Michael Sanderson, From Irving to Olivier: A Social History ofthe Acting Profession in England, 
1880-1983, London, 1984, pp. 79-86,217. 
163 See Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, pp. 105-22; Dabscheck, 'Defensive Manchester. 
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contract regulations were clearly weighted against the player but it is instructive to 
note that the League often ruled in favour of the player when disputes arose and that 
both the executive and clubs were often prepared to loosen the restrictive hold of both 
the retain list and high transfer fees in order to help players get another job. Under 
their most extreme interpretation the League's regulations could indeed be highly 
oppresive, but Committeemen, directors and players worked in an environment which 
was perhaps less oppositional and antagonistic than the factory or the shop floor and 
in which the horizontal allegiances of footballers to their fellow workers had to be 
married with vertical loyalties to the club and the directors. 
199 
CHAPTER SIX 
PLAYERS AND LABOUR RELATIONS 
The ways in which Football League clubs treated their employees, dealt with labour 
disputes and tried to establish workplace compliance, and the corresponding attitude 
and behaviour of players, have been topics barely touched by historians. We have 
some idea of the rise and significance of the Players' Union but little sense of how 
football unionism could be complemented by other less institutionalised forms of 
protest. More than this, existing accounts of relations between the player and his 
employers have tended to apply the notion of paternalism without sufficient 
explanation or conceptual precision. According to Mason, clubs exhibited 
a strange kind of paternalism in which the players were treated rather like 
some Victorian middle-class wives; stifling their independence perhaps, 
but cushioning them from some of the natural contingencies of life which 
most working people could rarely face with equanimity. ' 
And Korr's study of West Hain United has similarly suggested that the club tended to 
$assume the dual role of employer and parent towards its players'. 2 The main 
difficulty with these and other references to paternalism as a managerial strategy is 
that they tend to emphasise one facet of the concept - that involving kindness and 
benevolence - as its defining characteristic when, in fact, ideas of firm rule including 
disciplinary and punitive measures as well as guidance and supervision were arguably 
more important. 3 Moreover, the use of paternalism as a tool for understanding the 
nature of labour relations is clearly more appropriate to the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century periods of Mason's and Vamplew's work than the whole period up 
to 1939 discussed here. By the turn of the century, welfarism was competing with, but 
more often complementing, paternalism within Football League boardrooms in the 
same way as it was outside, and the moral responsibility of the director towards 'his 
boys' tended to operate alongside a new legal obligation towards the worker. 
Mason, Association Football, pp. 106-07. 
Korr, West Ham United, P. 17 1. 
3 David Roberts, Paternalism in Early Victorian England, London, 1979, pp. 5-6. 
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Above all, it should not be assumed that club directors and League officials always 
displayed in their values and actions a generous concern for the well-being of players. 
Rather, this chapter accepts Joseph Melling's observation that most welfare policies 
and other examples of paternalism 'were devised by employers with a rational concern 
for efficiency and profitability in the enterprise rather than being the result of 
spontaneous and altruistic gestures'. 4 Indeed it will be argued that while most League 
employers did gradually come to realise the imperative, both in a financial and 
sporting sense, of looking after their players, this was often prompted by the desire to 
safeguard the club rather than the player. 
1. Control and Discipline 
in League football, as in other areas of industry, the control and discipline of 
employees was a crucial aspect of labour relations and here paternalistic strategies 
seem to have been most clearly evident. The first example of this was in the treatment 
of injured or sick players - especially at the start of the period and before the 
standardisation of welfare provision - which will be examined in detail in the final 
section of this chapter. Secondly, it was reflected in the involvement of some clubs in 
the financial affitirs of their players. Loans to players in debt were particularly 
common although such applications were always vetted and often rejected. For 
example, in 1910 the Sheffield United board reluctantly agreed to clear Walton's 
debts, including those to a money lender, 'on condition he disclosed all his liabilities 
and promised he would not [again] get into debt', and, eighteen years later, supervised 
the repayment from Chandler's wages of subscriptions he had embezzled while acting 
as Player's Union collector for the club. 5 There were also instances of clubs loaning 
small sums of money to help players purchase houses or partake in other investments 
" Joseph Melling, 'Employers, Workplace Culture and Workers' Politics: British Industry and Workers' 
Welfare Programmes, 1870-1920' in Joseph Melling and Jonathan Barry (eds. ), Culture in History: 
Production, Consumption and Values in Historical Perspective, Exeter, 1992, p. 112. The earliest 
expression of this argument can be found in Roy Hay, 'Employers and Social Policy in Britain: The 
Evolution of Welfare Legislation, 1905-14', Social History, 4,1977, pp. 43 5-55. 
3 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 14 December 19 10; 31 October, 4 November 1928. 
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but these were less common and, in any case, such loans were regarded as an advance 
of wages, to be repaid in weekly instalments at an agreed rate. 6 
Some clubs similarly assisted their part-time professionals in obtaining employment, 
both directly and indirectly. Club directors occasionally employed players in their 
own businesses or, more commonly, were assisted by local firms who considered 
themselves 'supporters' of the club. 7 Charles Buchan was promised a job by Fulham 
in his chosen profession as a teacher if he signed professional forms with the club; on 
a gander scale, Alex James was lured to Arsenal by the assurance of a sports 
demonstrator's job at the famous West End store Selfridges. 8 In 1908 Aston Villa 
wrote to the owner of Ansell's brewery in an attempt to secure a clerkship at about 
30s. a week for James Logan, one of its Scottish imports, and went so far as to issue 
the following circular to local employers in 1912: 
As several of our players are particularly anxious to obtain some kind of 
employment, we shall be glad to know whether you or any of your friends 
could assist us in finding them situations. Some of them can write 
shorthand, use a typewriter and have had considerable experience in law 
and commercial work, as well as in travelling. Others are suitable as 
warehousemen etc ... 
9 
Yet, as we have noted, while paternalism clearly inferred kindness and benevolence, it
also involved contradictory strategies of punishment and discipline. 10 Players could 
be censured, fined and even suspended for failure to carry out their 'work', in the form 
either of training or competitive matches. Most League clubs required their full-time 
professionals to train mornings and afternoons at least three times a week and drafted 
specific training rules with which players were expected to comply. At Millwall 
players were required to clock-in by signing the Training Book each morning and 
6 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 30 August 1905,9 November 19 10,1 February, 9 
May 1928. 
7 See Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 17 September 1902. Sunderland's success 
during the 1890s has been partly explained by their ability to find employment for their players. 
Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 94; Mason, Association Football, pp. 95-96. 
' Buchan, Lifetime in Football, p. 16; Harding, Alex James, pp. 100-0 1. 
9 AV, 47/82, Ramsay to Mr. Ansell, 16 August 1907; Huddersfield Weeldy Eraminer, 31 August 1912. 
" See Russell, 'Local Elites and the Working-Class Response', pp. 154-55. 
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afternoon and to obtain the manager's or trainer's permission before leaving. " In 
1902 the Sheffield United Committee informed its players that neglect of training in 
future would lead to fines but when several players did break the rules they were given 
only nominal fines of 2s. 6d., and even these were later rescinded. 12 From 1923 
League regulations formally recognised the club's power 'to suspend or fine players 
guýlty of misconduct or breach of disciplinary rule' and in minor cases punishments 
were restricted to 14 days suspension or an equivalent fine. 13 Prolonged absences and 
non-attendance at matches were viewed more seriously. When Simmons went absent 
without leave from West Ham in October 1921 he was immediately suspended sine 
die and reported to both the League and the FA. In late January 1922 the club lifted 
his suspension and played him in a series of first team matches but by April he had 
gone missing again, forcing the board to effectively sever his connection with the club 
by suspending him until the end of the season. 14 Birmingham chose to cancel the 
agreement of Charles Sprigg with 14 days notice in 1913 for breaching disciplinary 
rules by failing to report for pre-season training. 15 In general, however, even players 
who missed games received only small fines - El for three West Ham reserves in 
1922 16 _ or temporary suspensions and were unlikely to find their future career 
prospects permanently damaged. 
More severe punishments were dealt to Players found guilty of dishonesty or 
insolence. The Management Committee's action in sanctioning Barnsley's 
suspension of George Travers sine die for 'absence from training and using insulting 
language to the directors' 17 was fairly typical but in extreme cases, like that of Aston 
Villa's Buckley, the full weight of the punitive system was brought to bear on the 
player. Buckley had claimed that a Villa director offered him a E250 bonus on re- 
signing to make up for his disappointing benefit and when the board refused to pay he 
threatened not to play for the club again. Not surprisingly, the League Conunission 
11 See Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 7 August, 4 September 1906; PFA, File 35, Millwall FC Rules 
to Players, 1933 (Appendix 11). 
'2 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 6 January, 11,18 February 1903. 
13 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 4 June 1923. 
Minutes of West Ham United FC, 4 October 192 1, IS January, 18 April 1922. 
Minutes of Football League, I September 1913. 
Minutes of West Ham United FC, 6 November 1922. 
17 Minutes of Football League, 2 February 1914. 
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investigating the affair rejected the player's version of events and judged that no 
bonus had been offered to the player. As Buckley's demand was contrary to League 
rules and, in view of his general insubordinate attitude, the Commission fined him E24 
and suspended him for two seasons -a sentence which remained in force despite 
numerous protestations by Buckley to both Villa and the Management Committee. 18 
The League could use other methods to punish players who were believed to be 
dishonest. For instance, O'Doherty's application for a reduction of his transfer fee 
was put on hold until he apologised to the Management Committee and his club 'for 
deliberately making misleading statements to both Committees'. 19 The most serious 
penalties, however, were reserved for alleged match-fixers. Billy Meredith was 
suspended for the 1905106 season after offering an opponent ElO to let Manchester 
City win a crucial championship decider, although Athletic News considered that 
Meredith had been treated extremely leniently and that the offence 'ought to have 
ended his football career'. 20 Fulham's Bernard Travers was not'so fortunate when he 
was 'permanently suspended from taking part in football' by the FA after approaching 
a South Shields player with a monetary offer to throw their second division match. 21 
The discipline and control of employees on the field of play was also a pervasive 
concern of club directors and the football authorities. Directors, or secretary- 
managers, may have controlled the selection of tearns but at most clubs the playing or 
tactical element, such as it existed, remained in the hands of trainers and senior 
players for much of the period. Perhaps the most significant tactical innovation of the 
era, the offside trap, was unquestionably introduced and perfected by players: first, by 
the full-back pairing of Morley and Montgomery at Notts County, and then by Bill 
McCracken of Newcastle United. 22 The position of captain, in particular, often 
carried with it considerable authority. The captain was normally a senior professional 
who acted as players' spokesman in negotiations with the board. At Aston Villa, for 
example, captain Joe Bache could request that the first team 'be sent away for a week 
11 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 7,10 September, I October, 17 December 1912; Minutes of Football 
League, 26 May, 3 November 1913. 
19 Minutes of Football League, 26 July 1920. 
20 Athletic News, 4 June 1906. On Meredith see John Harding, Football Wizard- The Story ofBilly 
Meredith, Derby, 1985, pp. 93-115. 
21 Minutes of FA Emergency Committee, 21 March-22 April 1922. 
22 Buchan, Lifetime in Football, pp. 29-30; Sharpe, 40 Years in Football, p. 108. 
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as he thought some of them were stale'. Two months later the board acceded to the 
request by sending the team for special training at Southport. 23 Significantly, 
however, the captain could also be used by the directors as a type of overlooker on the 
fieldofplay. One clause in the agreement of Small Heath players from the mid- I 890s 
stipulated that 'The said player shall always obey the captain of the team in which he 
is playing, and shall be obedient to his orders and commands. 24 In 1924 the West 
Ham board expressly acknowledged the captain's right to alter the formation and 
tactics of the team on the field and the Millwall players were likewise informed that 
while the manager and trainer determined the 'general plan of play' before the match, 
the 'control of tactics on the field is in the hands of the captain'. 25 Moreover, while 
players undoubtedly enjoyed relative freedom to do as they pleased during matches, 
their play and conduct were ultimately subject to close scrutiny by their employers. 
Indifferent performances or improper conduct on the field often led to the player being 
warned or brought before the board of directors. Villa's James Logan found himself 
in trouble on two occasions during 1911: first for alleged bad captaincy in a reserve 
match in March, and then for unsatisfactory play in a first team fixture in December. 26 
Earlier the same year another Villa player was summoned to see the directors and 
severely cautioned 'for dirty play and foul language', while West Ham took 
immediate action when its England international forward Vic Watson was reported to 
have kicked an opponent in an FA Cup tie by dropping him for the following League 
match. 27 
Clubs were expected to control the behaviour of their players as far as possible but 
even FA spokesmen like William Pickford recognised that ultimately 'a club cannot 
answer for a player when he has stepped on to the field' . 
28 As we saw in Chapter 3, 
the FA rather than the League was the main authority for the disciplining of foul play 
and other on-field misconduct, regularly issuing fines and suspensions to players 
found guilty. Fishwick has noted that such penalties became progressively stiffer in 
" Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 28 February, 18 April 1911. 
21 PFA, File 2, Small Heath FC Players' Agreement, 1896/97 (see Appendix 9). 
25 Minutes of West Ham United FC, II February 1924; PFA, File 35, Millwall FC Players' Weekly 
Diary, 1933. Also see Stanley Cullis, All For The Wolves, London, 196 1, p. 14. 
16 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 7 March, 21 December 1911. 
21 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 3 January 1911; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 2,9 March 1925. 
28 Athletic News, 15 March 1909. 
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the inter-war period, rising from an average of one to two weeks suspension before 
1914 to two to four weeks by 1930/3 1. Furthermore, the number of players punished 
almost doubled with the creation of the FA Disciplinary Committee in 1936, leading 
the Players" Union to protest that players were being suspended for 'trivial offences' 
which had often not even led to a sending-off . 
29 Dodds' two week suspension and E8 
fine for a reported 'incident' was thus not an uncommon punishment in the late 
1930s. 30 In most cases this type of discipline represented only a temporary financial 
and professional setback for a player but it could lead to far more serious 
consequences, as the case of William Cook shows. Cook's refusal to leave the pitch 
after being dismissed by the referee led to the abandonment of a League match 
between Oldham Athletic and Middlesborough in 1915. The FA suspended him for 
one year on account of his 'misconduct on the field and gross misconduct in refusing 
to leave the ground when ordered by the referee' and, in addition, a League 
Commission excluded him from any involvement in League football indefinitely and 
ordered him to pay the entire costs of the inquiry. 31 
Attempts to control the off-field activities of players were also crucial to many League 
clubs. Aston Villa's plans to build a club house with billiard tables and reading and 
writing rooms during the 1890s clearly reflected a desire among the directors to 
control the social lives of their employees, and especially to shelter them from the bad 
influences that might result from them being left to their own devices. At Sheffield 
United the billiard room in the cricket pavilion was utilized for a similar purpose. All 
players living in the city were required to attend the billiard room on Wednesday, 
Thursday and Friday evenings and failure to do so without a legitimate excuse could 
lead to disciplinary action. 32 As late as the 1930s Millwall required all sick or injured 
players to be at home by 8 p. m. each evening while squad members were subject to a 
10 p. m. curfew the evening prior to match days. Here, as elsewhere, weekend leave 
" Fishwick, English Football, pp. 84-85; Minutes of AFPTU, 8 February 1937. 
30 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 24 March 1937. 
31 Catton Folders, C-D, Report on Suspension of William Cook, 19 April 1915, p. 291. 
32 Mason, Association Football, p. 107; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 10 September 
1902,6 December 1904. From Tottenham Hotspur's Southern League days, the club room at White 
Hart Lane seems to have served a similar purpose, and was allegedly used as a model by other clubs. 
james Cameron, 'The Tottenham Hotspur FC: Its Story and Progress', Book offootball, p. 82. 
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was permitted only under 'very special circumstances'. 33 Directors also used widely 
recognised paternal forms of management such as social evenings, whist drives and 
outings to improve personal relations between the employers and the workforce and 
encourage collective loyalty and commitment to the club. 34 For a short time Sheffield 
United even arranged for a local golf club to take on its players, directors and officials 
as winter members and organised regular club visits. By the 1930s many clubs were 
also arranging activities for players during the close season, possibly with the dual 
purpose of keeping them fit and under close supervision. West Ham players, for 
example, were competing in cricket, tennis and golf tournaments as well as swimming 
galas, often against rival football clubs, during July and August of each year. 3S 
However, while it is difficult to know exactly how they reacted to and interpreted 
these activities, it appears that, in the main, players' social lives remained in their own 
hands. The West Ham board itself recognised that club social evenings were difficult 
to organise as 'players had always shown a marked preference for arranging their own 
social afffirs'. 36 
Living arrangements were a fin-ther area in which League clubs sought to exert control 
over their workforces. Most players were encouraged to live within the immediate 
district so that they could attend training sessions throughout the week. West Ham 
preferred their men to live 'within distance of the ground' and Sheffield United 
actually ruled in 1908 that 'all players signed on in future must reside in the Sheffield 
37 district' but such proclamations proved difficult to maintain in practice. In 1920 the 
Aston Villa directors, employing a similar residency rule, found themselves in a 
protracted dispute with three of the club's senior players who refused to move to 
Birmingham. The directors were eventually forced to back down and allow the 
players to live at home. 38 In fact, compromises were generally struck in cases where 
33 PFA, File 35, Millwall FC Rules to Players, 1933 (see Appendix 11). 
34 See Whipp, Patterns oftabour, pp. 1404 1; John Griffiths, "'Give My Regards to Uncle Billy... ": 
The Rites and Rituals of Company Life at Lever Brothers, c. I 900-c. 1990', Business History, 37,4, 
1995, pp. 33-35. 
35 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 5,18 August 1937; Minutes of West Ham United, 
31 July, 14 August 1934; 13 August 1935. 
36 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 3 December 1934. 
37 Minutes of West Hain United FC, 28 March 1922; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 
19 August 1908. 
38 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, September-November 1920, passim. 
207 
the player had an established job, business interests or had to care for a sick relative 
but it was made clear to players that such allowances could not continue indefinitely. 
Players living within the stipulated area could also find themselves forced to move 
from accommodation which the club considered unsatisfactory. Aston Villa requested 
three of its players 'to change their present lodgings forthwith or be suspended', 
though the minutes provide no explanation as to why; and the same club reacted to 
information that seven employees were lodging together in a small double bedroomed 
house by pointing out that this 'was not conducive to good health' and ordering some 
to move. 39 West Ham United was not the only club which began to take direct 
responsibility for the housing of players in the inter-war period, a situation which Korr 
believes 'worked to the benefit of all concerned' and, moreover, exemplified the 
paternalism of the club . 
40 New players were often placed in lodgings with a team- 
mate or, if married, in a rented club house. 41 It was certainly another way for the 
board to play detective and keep the private activities of the players under close 
surveillance. Huddersfield Town, for instance, required all lodgings to be approved 
by the club and expected the landlord or landlady to report 'the hours kept and 
conduct of the players'. 42 
The control of players also involved steering them more directly away from immoral 
or antisocial behaviour, though the motive could be physical as well as moral. Many 
employers warned their players of the dangers of smoking, gambling or borrowing 
from loan sharks but some took more direct action. Possibly as a means of preventing 
overindulgence, the Sheffield United committee requested the trainer to monitor 
weekly changes in the weight of each player. 43 The Aston Villa directors were so 
concerned about their players 'drinking and misconducting themselves' that they 
employed a private detective to investigate the worst offenders. One player was found 
to have been drunk several times a week, once with a team-mate two days before an 
39 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 4 January 1900; 31 October 1911. 
40 Korr, West Ham United, P. 179. 
41 See AV, 52/82, Ramsay to G. N. Robinson, 22 July 1919; W. Askew to Mr. Lowes, 8 June 1937, 
Walsall Record Office, 522/1/66; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 2 May, 27 June, 18 July 1922; George F. 
Allison, Allison Calling, London, 1948, p. 76. 42 Minutes of Huddersfield Town FC, 12 April 1939. 
41 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 10 February 1904. 
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important match, and was disciplined accordingly. Two first team players involved in 
an assault case also received a 'severe reprimand' from the Villa chairman, though 
they got off lightly compared with the West Ham player who was suspended 
indefinitely and had his agreement cancelled after being sentenced to three months 
hard labour. 44 The former club also discouraged its players from betting on horses or 
45 visiting racetracks. Other clubs evidently kept less tight reins on their players. 
Leicester Fosse, for one, received criticism in the press for allowing its team to attend 
wedding celebrations the night before a match which it lost 12_0.46 Contracted 
employees at certain clubs were also prohibited from any involvement, as either 
workers or owners, with drinking or gambling establishments. As we have seen, 
League and FA officials were particularly strict when players became associated with 
gambling, and stepped in quickly to prevent stars like Andy Ducat and Ernest 
Needham (when he was a coach at Sheffield United) from taking jobs as newspaper 
tipsters. 47 The forecasting of match results was not the only right which League 
footballers were denied. During the late 1920s and 1930s the FA cracked down on 
'the growing practice of players contributing signed reports and articles containing 
criticisms of their colleagues and opponents, and giving interviews to the press' and 
encouraged League clubs to 'take the necessary steps' to stop the practice. Though 
such resolutions did not preclude players from writing for the press, they did seek to 
influence what was said, a situation which the Union secretary regarded as 'a further 
48 curtailment of the players' liberties' . The possible threat of injury and the 
provisions of the club's insurance policy also convinced the West Ham directors to 
forbid their players from using 'motor cycles, or [indulging] in aviation or any other 
dangerous pursuit', while Huddersfield Town placed a similar ban on its employees 
driving motor cars. 49 
44 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 28 December 1899,8 March 1900; 11 January 1900; Minutes of West 
Ham United FC, 17 November 1919. 
43 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 8 November 1910,5 September 1911. 
46 Athletic News, 10 May 1909. 
47 See Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 16 February 192 1; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 
8 December 1926,4 January 1927; PFA, File 35, Millwall FC Rules to Players, 1933. 4' Minutes of FA Council, 20 December 1920; Minutes of FA Emergency Committee, 21 June- 19 
August 1929; Minutes of FA Finance and General Purposes Committee, 27 June 1936; Minutes of AFPTU, 24 August 1936 (AGM). Also see Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 20 March 
1929. 
49 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 15 August 1933; Minutes of Huddersfield Town FC, 12 April 
1939. 
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Securing the co-operation and compliance of football labourers was always a more 
complicated matter than the alternate use of carrot and stick. While it is not intended 
to deal with the labour aristocracy debate in any detail here, it seems evident that 
considerable efforts were made throughout the period to improve the perceived 
respectability of the player. Respectability was obviously encouraged for practical 
purposes: most clubs sought to avoid recalcitrant employees or 'troublemakers' who 
might disrupt their team-mates and damage the team's playing prospects. The 
correspondence files of the Aston Villa secretary indicates that that club, for one, 
looked to recruit the 'right type' of player. It withdrew initial inquiries for a player 
whom it was rumoured was difficult to manage, along with another thought to be a 
'boozer', and informed one of its scouts that any prospective recruits should 'be 
steady and well behaved and solid in mind and body. We have a nice young well 
behaved lot of Boys and we should be sorry for any bad influence to get amongst 
50 them'. Indeed the character of prospective employees remained a major 
consideration in boardroom discussions and in the correspondence between clubs. 
This concern for respectability seems to have spread to professional players 
themselves, who were often eager to assert their middle-class credentials. Clapton 
Orient's H. Reason, for example, delivered a lengthy defence of the professional 
footballer in a newspaper article in 1909: 
The idea is abroad... that the general character of the footballer is surnmed 
up in the one word, "rotter! " Let me disabuse your minds of this 
ridiculous belief. Footballers can be, and are, as good citizens as any 
other class of men. Our life is not made up of drinking, squandering our 
hard-earned money and betting. We have something else to live for. 
A great change has come over the football world of recent years. The 
old habit of soaking has given way to more abstemious habits, not only 
because there is no place in the football world for men who cannot restrain 
themselves, but because men are becoming better educated. 
Most of us down Hackney way take a keen interest in politics, and 
follow everything connected with the constituency with the keenest 
interest. At local elections most of us vote, and we are far readier to 
" AV, 47/82, Ramsay to W. C. Cuff, 17 July, 14 August 1907; AV, 52/82, Ramsay to McIlroy, 19 
August 1921,1 February 1922. 
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discuss the social troubles of the time than spend our spare time in card- 
playing or drinking ... 
51 
Testimonies of this kind are of course prone to exaggeration and can hardly be used as 
a basis for generalisation, particularly as conflicting evidence of the problems of 
drinking and betting can be gleaned from club records as well as other articles written 
by fellow professionals and even Union representatives. 52 Yet by 1923 Sutcliffe 
himself was able to draw attention to a recently acquired respectability among top 
level footballers: 
Sometime ago the professional players were described as blackguards and 
guttersnipes; today they are welcomed in the company of the best society... 
the majority of footballers were unruly and prone to misconduct; today 
they deport themselves in a worthy fashion... To football clubs the doors 
of the best hotels were closed; now they are thrown wide open. The 
boozing, guzzling whiskey-swiper has gone, and the ale-can is practically 
unknown. The old order of shadowing a player during the week to see 
that he did not get locked up is merely a story to tell. Now they associate 
themselves with the directors and know full well how to take care of 
themselves. 53 
in subsequent articles Sutcliffe reiterated these points and called for the 
disengagement of all those players whose conduct was below the required standard of 
behaviour. 54 The extent to which League footballers as a whole rose to a new level of 
respectability remains unclear, particularly as little is still known of their broader life 
styles, whom they married and where they lived. Yet it is evident that the notion of 
the respectable footballer was employed within the League as a significant managerial 
strategy designed to minimise unrest by encouraging identification with the club and 
the employer. 
2. Unionism and Labour Protest 
The need to safeguard and improve the lot of professional footballers led to attempts 
at industrial action, though unionism, strikes and other submerged forms of labour 
31 The RedLefler, 17 April 1909. 
52 See the article by James Wilson in Thomsen's Weekly News, 24 April 1909. 
53 Topical Times, 7 April 1923. 
34 Topical Times, 2February 1924. 
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protest. In fact, by contrast with other sportsmen, football players were relatively 
successful at establishing a permanent union organisation, which, with the exception 
of 1915-18, functioned from 1907 until the end of the period. This section 
w ill not 
attempt an analysis of the union's development per se, as the work of Dabscheck, 
Mason, Vamplew and Harding have already done this adequately. 55 Rather, it will 
examine the nature of the union's changing relationship with the clubs and the League 
Management Committee and seek to evaluate its influence in structuring labour 
relations in the Football League. 
In general, the aims of the Association Football Players' Union formed in December 
1907 were consistent with those of other trade unions of the period, which acted 
simultaneously as friendly societies, providing welfare and financial assistance, and as 
trade societies, seeking to negotiate improved working conditions for their members. 
56 
Hence one arm of the Union's functions involved giving legal aid and assistance to 
players, helping members and their families in financial need and assisting transfer- 
listed or disengaged players in finding employment . 
57 However, the Union"s primary 
objective was undoubtedly to establish freedom of contract for players and abolish the 
maximum wage. Its self proclaimed intention was 'to promote and protect the 
interests of the members by endeavouring to come to amicable arrangements with the 
governing football authorities with a view to abolishing all restrictions which affect 
the social and financial position of players, and to safeguard their rights at all times'. 
58 
It would thus be wrong to assume, as Sutcliffe's prejudiced account does, that 
relations between the Union on one side, and the League and the FA on the other, 
were adversarial from the beginning. 
59 Indeed, the FA in particular, as well as certain 
club directors, were initially seen by the Union as allies in their quest to abolish the 
wage limit. At its first annual meeting in December 1908 it was resolved that 'The 
Players' Union cordially support the Council of the FA in their efforts to procure the 
5sDabscheck, 'Defensive Manchester'; Mason, Association Football, pp. 110-17; Vamplew, Pay Up, 
chapter 15; Harding, Good ofthe Game. 
56 Philip S. Bagwell, Industrial Relations, London, 1974, p. 3 1; Noel Whiteside, 'Social Welfare and 
Industrial Relations' in C. J. Wrigley (ed. ), A History ofBritish Industrial Relations, Volume 2: 1914. 
1939, Brighton, 1987. 
57 PFA, File 11, Rules of Association Football Players' Union, 1908, points 5,6 and 7. 
" Dabscheck, 'Defensive Manchester', p. 234. 
59 See Sutcliffe et at., Football League, p. 118. For a similar view see Young, History oftritish 
Football, p. 220. 
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deletion of the wages rule'. 60 Moreover, the Union established close contact with a 
number of the most prominent opponents of the maximum wage. Manchester 
United's chairman J. H. Davies was appointed president of the Union and John 
Bentley, League president, FA vice-president and a director of United, was evidently 
influential at a less formal level in the initial phase. Other prime movers in the 
campaigns of the 1900s against the maximum wage, such as Aston Villa's Fred 
Rinder, Liverpool's John McKenna and Newcastle United's John Cameron (the latter 
two also members of the League Management Committee) became vice-presidents of 
the Union, while Manchester City chairman W. A. Wilkinson was the first legal 
adviser. 61 
Recognition of the Union by the football authorities was therefore relatively quick and 
unproblematic. By March 1908 the FA had officially consented to the Union's 
formation and 'expressed their wish that it would be a success'. It had also sanctioned 
a match between League champions Manchester United and Newcastle United in aid 
of the Union's benevolent fund. 62 However, such recognition was not unconditional 
but dependent upon definite limits being placed on Union activity. Firstly, this 
involved the monitoring and, to a certain extent, the control of Union finances. The 
Union was required to submit its balance sheet annually to the FA while the allocation 
of funds was subject to a veto by the governing body. In particular, the FA became 
determined to financially separate the Union's welfare activities from its 
organisational work and hence in 1910, and again in 1912, stepped in to prohibit the 
transfer of Union money from the latter's benevolent fund to its general fund. 63 
Control could also be exercised over the Union's fund-raising activities. In 1912 the 
League Management Committee supported the FA's action by withdrawing 
permission for a benefit match to be played between the English and Scottish Union; 
and in 1921 it was similarly decided that the Union's benevolent finances were not 
sufficiently depleted to warrant a fund-raising match. 64 These attempts to impose 
60 Minutes of AFPU, 15 December 1908 (AGM). 
61 Minutes of AFPU, 23 December 1907,27 January 1908; Harding, Good ofthe Game, p. 45. 
62 Green, Football Association, p. 411. 
63 Minutes of AFPU, 21 March 1910,14 October 1912. 
64 Minutes of Football League, 22-23 October 1912; Minutes of AFPU, 29 April 1912; Minutes of 
AFPTU, 5 December 192 1. 
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restrictions on the use of Union funds were in keeping with the implications of the 
Osborne Judgement of 1909, and even the subsequent 1913 Trade Union Act, which 
to varying degrees restricted the functions of unions to the immediate protection of 
their members and discounted their involvement in broader political or legislative 
issues. 65 
A second and more important limit on Union recognition was the need to conform 
with the rules and procedures of the football authorities. Hence when the Union 
threatened in early 1909 to take legal action against clubs for the recovery of wages as 
well as compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act without their 
permission, the FA decided to withdraw recognition 'until they are satisfied that the 
Union is prepared to carry on its operations in accordance with FA rules'. 66 
Supporters of the FA pointed out that procedures for arbitration and settlement of such 
disputes existed within the laws of the parent body and that the players were therefore 
bringing themselves into conflict with an intermediary rather than quarreling directly 
with their employers. 67 Such arguments held little sway with the Union Committee, 
which rejected 'the opinion that a football player forfeits a common legal right on 
entering into a professional engagement with a football club' . 
68 For one of the 
Union's leaders, Billy Meredith, the issue was essentially about autonomy: 
the Football Association is composed of autocrats who demand that we 
shall surrender our rights of citizenship. We must not go to law without 
first obtaining their permission, they themselves clinging like limpets to 
the privilege of suspending and punishing us... without allowing us to 
appear and plead our own cause before them. What [is] the good of 
belonging to a union that is only recognised provided it observes the rules 
69 and practices of the FA . 
The 1909 dispute highlighted a fizther limit on recognition relating to strike action. In 
May the leaders of the Player's Union agreed to affiliate to the General Federation of 
Trade Unions (GFTU) and inserted a strike clause in its rules whereby members 
63 Henry Pelling, A History ofBritish Trade Unionism, Fourth Edition, London, 1987, pp. 120-22. "Minutes of FA Council, 8 March 1909. 
17 For expressions of this opinion see Athletic News, 15 March, 10 May 1909. 
68 Athletic News, 22 February 1909. 
69 Quoted in Mason, Association Football, p. 132. 
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would receive El per week strike pay if it was considered necessary to withdraw their 
labour. 70 Administrators and club directors argued that such a clause was 
impracticable and unnecessary for League footballers, who benefited from yearly 
contracts and were not subject to the usual risks of trade and fluctuating wages. 
Indeed William Pickford was not alone in pointing out that signing an agreement 
actually implied a moral duty not to strike. In addition to this, there was a difluse fear 
that footballers might be called to strike in support of fellow GFTU workers. 71 
Football League representatives were particularly vociferous in their objection to the 
involvement of the GFTU in the dispute. According to Bentley, 'the League clubs 
will never agree to players being connected with a union or an organisation of any sort 
in which there is a strike clause'. 72 In response to pressure throughout the late 
summer and early autumn to secede from the GFTU, the Union leadership continued 
to resist, even informing the FA that 'the power to withdraw members or to strike is 
not conceded by the Federation but by the Trade Disputes Act of 1906'. Yet 
eventually the pressure proved too much. A ballot of members in late October 
resulted in a majority of 470-172 voting to disaffiliate from the GFIU and 'in the 
interests of peace and harmony' the Union tendered its resignation. 73 Only then was 
the Union formally recognised again by the FA and the League. A similar policy was 
adopted by the League in early 1919 towards a London based Professional Football 
Players' and Trainers' Union, which had met and established preliminary contacts 
with mainstream union officials. At a joint meeting of players and officials, McKenna 
explicitly rejected the new union in the following terms: 
So long as you are organising along Trade Union lines the League cannot 
meet your representatives... [there is] a vast difference between football 
players and trade unionists. We will not accept a players' union on trade 
union principles and whose strength lies in the strike clause. 
The London union was then immediately disbanded and its members joined a revived 
version of the old pre-war Union, which subsequently committed itself to 'deal with 
70 Minutes of AFPU, 7 May 1909. 
71 See editorials and articles by Pickford and Sutcliffe in Athletic Arews, 11,18 October 1909. 72 Athletic News, II October 1909. 




the League on proper constitutional lines' without resorting to strike threats or links 
with the wider union movement. 74 
The League and the FA therefore sought to contain the Union's activities and secure 
its identification with groups within the football industry rather than outside. For this 
reason League officials and supporters placed a great deal of emphasis on the rhetoric 
of friendship and loyalty and eschewed references to conventional employer-employee 
relationships. During the 1909 dispute, for example, Athletic News continually 
referred to the GFTU as 'the third party' and advised players that it was their 'first 
duty' to be loyal to the FA: 
If the professional were an ordinary workman, a craftsman or a mechanic, 
we should be the first to say "Stand by your Federation". We have no 
doubt that the Federation has done and will render much excellent service 
to the cause of industry, and unionism has accomplished much in its own 
world. But that world does not happen to be football,. 75 
Similarly, in 1919 the paper's London correspondent reminded the League player that 
'his true friends are in football' and went on to talk of the need for mutual loyalty, 
harmony and 'friendly cooperation' between the Union and the League. " 
Antagonism and opposition to League decisions were rejected out of hand as 
inappropriate responses for a players' association. The Union was therefore charged 
with disloyalty when it encouraged its members to defy League instructions by 
wearing Union badges during matches. Similarly, when the Union issued a statement 
in April 1915 criticising alterations of League rules, the Management Committee 
responded by declaring that the Union had 'adopted a policy and attitude calculated to 
hinder us in our purpose to keep the game going and complete our Competition' and, 
ftu-thermore, was 'indisposed to be of any practical assistance to the clubs and the 
governing bodies'. 77 The Union was thus tolerated as long as it remained acquiescent; 
working alongside the League rather than against it. 
74 Report of Football League SGM in Athletic News, 20 January 1919. 
75 Athletic News, 18 October 1909. 
76 Athletic News, 13 January 19 19. 
77 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 119,122. 
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Notwithstanding national recognition by the League and FA, the Players' Union 
continued to face some resistance at club level. Although there is a lack of concrete 
evidence, it appears that certain clubs were regarded as staunchly anti-Union during 
much of the inter-war period. It has been suggested that the influence of powerful 
individuals such as Everton's chairman William Cuff and managers like Herbert 
Chapman of Arsenal and Major Frank Buckley of Wolverhampton Wanderers may 
explain the limited involvement of these clubs in Union activity. 78 Indeed the Union 
minutes note that on one occasion Chapman actually dictated a reply to a letter sent by 
the Union secretary Jimmy Fay to the Arsenal captain which had asked for an 
explanation of. his team-mates' refusal to join. Fay also found himself effectively 
barred from visiting certain League grounds to talk to non-Union players and 
considered it 'an insult' that in some cases he had not even received a reply to his 
correspondence. 79 Cases of the victimisation of Union members were also recorded, 
especially during the nadir of membership in the mid to late 1920s. It was recognised 
in 1928 that 'players seem afraid to be seen collecting Union subscriptions' although 
it remained difficult to prove that directors were specifically targeting Union 
collectors or members. In one case the Union threatened legal action against the 
directors of Luton Town, who had allegedly suspended and cancelled the agreements 
of a number of Union men without justifiable explanations. Yet while these instances 
'savoured of victimisation' there is no evidence of the Union taking the matter 
80 ftirther. 
In many industries union recognition was rapidly followed by the establishment of 
machinery for collective bargaining and resolving disputes between unions and 
employers. But in spite of prompting from the Players' Union, formal bargaining 
procedures were consistently resisted by the FA initially, and then the League. From 
its formation the Union had proposed that it should be entitled to representation on the 
FA Council and in 1909 advocated the creation of a Wages and Claims Board, 
consisting of an equal representation from both the FA and the Union, to adjudicate 
" Harding, Good ofthe Game, pp. 172-173; Walsh, Dixie Dean, pp. 46-47. According to Walsh (p. 
46), Everton 'thought it was unnecessary for its players to join the union' but there is no ftuther 
explanation of how the club's attitude worked in practice. 79 Minutes of AFPTU, 9 October 1933; 14 December 193 1. 
go Minutes of AFPTU, 17 December 1928 (AGM); 13 December 1926. 
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on the claims of players against clubs. 81 Not surprisingly, proposals of this kind 
involving direct Union influence on decision-making were rejected and the Union was 
excluded from formal involvement in the settling of players' disputes. Instead, 
disputes between individual players and clubs - from suspensions, dismissals and 
unpaid wages to applications for reductions in transfer fees - were normally referred to 
the League Management Committee and ultimately to an Appeals Committee 
consisting of three FA Council members. Unlike in Rugby League, where the newly- 
formed Players' Union was briefly represented during the early 1920s on the Board of 
Appeal, the football Union had no judicial power or influence at any stage in the 
Football League's procedures. 82 In fact, as we shall see in the following section, it 
was only to resolve disputes arising out of compensation for players' injuries that 
anything approaching permanent and formal arrangements were established between 
the League and the Union. 
Negotiations between the League Management Committee and the Players' Union 
over the fundamental issues of wages, contracts and conditions were largely informal 
and ad hoc. There were no football equivalents to the conciliation and arbitration 
boards which developed across a broad scope of industries during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. 83 Rather, the Union was forced to take the initiative in 
arranging specific meetings between the two bodies, or more often, deputations by a 
Union sub-committee to Management Committee meetings -a situation which itself 
emphasised the subordinate status attached to the Union. As no arrangements existed 
for periodic or annual meetings between the League and the Union, there were long 
periods in which formal negotiations ceased. Before 1923 meetings occurred on a 
fairly regular basis: according to Sutcliffe 'the Union representatives had always 
found the Management Committee of the Football League prepared to receive them 
and to reasonably and generously consider any proposals submitted to them'. 84 As 
Table 6.1 indicates, however, there were no formal meetings at all between 1923 and 
11 PFA, File 11, Rules of the Association Football Players' Union, 1908; Minutes of AFPTU, I April 
1908; PFA, File 6, Broomfield to James Ashcroft, 24 March 1909; Athletic News, 30 August 1909. 
82 Moorhouse, A People's Game, p. 136. 
93 Van Gore, 'Rank-and-File Dissent' in Chris Wrigley (ed. ), A History ofBritish Industrial Relations, 
Volume 1: 1875-1914, Massachusetts, 1982, pp. 64-67; Bagwell, Industrial Relations, chapter 5. 
" Athletic News, 7 March 192 1. 
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1937. This can partly be explained by a shift in Union policy away from attempts to 
effect major legislative change in the rules governing transfers and wages and towards 
an emphasis on internal reorganisation and the improvement of membership levels. 
However by 1929 the Union had resumed its pressure on the League to consider rule 
changes and it was primarily the obstinacy of the Management Committee which 
precluded collective bargaining on the major issues of dispute. Twice in 1930 and 
again in 1933 the Management Committee refused requests to meet a Union 
deputation and on several other occasions the agenda of Committee meetings were 
evidently not flexible enough to incorporate late Union requests. 85 As Sutcliffe wrote 
in his Jubilee history, 'the Management Committee... always replied that as they had 
no intention of suggesting to the clubs any alteration in the existing rules on the lines 
outlined by the union no useful purpose could be served by a conference on the 
86 subject'. When Preston finally acceded to a joint meeting in April 1938 to 'hear the 
case of the players' there was considerable anticipation within the Union that this 
would lead to ftirther negotiations but by the following February the Union still felt 
itself deliberately ostracised by the League. At an extraordinary meeting of southern 
members Fay again called for Union representation on football's governing bodies 
and suggested a return to collective bargaining: 'it was time players got together with 
employers, as was the case in other large business concerns, to discuss all financial 
matters'. 87 Eventually dissatisfaction with the League's obdurate attitude led to the 
decision in August 1939 to bypass the Management Committee entirely and negotiate 
directly with club chairmen as 'it was felt that the players... would be given a more 
sympathetic hearing'. 88 
's Minutes of AFPTU, 10 February, 10 November 1930,9 October 1933. 
86 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 125. 
87 Minutes of AFPTU, 20 April 1938; 27 February 1939 (EGM). 
8' Minutes of AFPTU, 21 August 1939 (AGM). 
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Table 61 Recorded Meetings Between Representatives of the Players' Union and the Football League, 
1908-39 











Note: There were no meetings in those years omitted. 
Source: Minutes of AFPTU; Minutes of Football League. 
Strained relations between League and Union officials undoubtedly contributed to the 
a bsence of mutual co-operation. The first major incident occurred in 1912 when the 
Management Committee accused Union secretary Syd Owen of deliberately 
misleading them over gaining FA permission for the proposed benefit match with the 
Scottish Union. To add to the ill feeling, Owen had also written a letter to the press 
which contained 'a serious reflection on the honour and honesty of the League 
Management Committee'. The League responded by demanding an official apology 
and refusing to recognise Owen as the Union secretary, which in turn forced the 
Union Committee to disassociate itself from Owen's remarks, censure him and thus 
prompt his resignation. 89 A year later the League could publicly acknowledge that the 
appointment of Owen's successor, Harry Newbould, had contributed to an 
improvement in relations between the two bodies9o, but by 1920 these had again 
deteriorated. In his annual report, Newbould complained of the 'austere attitude of the 
Football League', particularly its secretary Tom Charriley, and it was resolved that the 
Union viewed 
with dissatisfaction the tendency of the Football League to ignore the 
official, and other, communication forwarded in connection with the 
alleged grievances of players, and requests that in every case prompt 
replies should be forwarded to the secretary of the Union in order that a 
satisfactory relationship can be maintained. 91 
Minutes of Football League, 22-23 October, 15 November 1912; Minutes of AFPU, 2December 
1912,10 February 1913. Owen eventually resigned in February the following year and took up a 
coaching job in Budapest. 
Minutes of Football League, 26 May 1913 (AGM). 
Minutes of AFPTU, 23 August 1920 (AGM). 
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Additionally there was a feeling that certain League representatives, led by the 
ubiquitous Sutcliffe, were attempting to undermine the position of the Union. In 1923 
the Union executive publicly condemned an article by Sutcliffe in Topical Times 
which they believed 'was written with the object of damaging the status of the Union'; 
and it even considered a libel action against Sutcliffe and the co-authors of The Story 
ofthe Football League for a passage allegedly accusing the Union of dishonesty. 9' 
Union membership levels fluctuated significantly pre-1914, from a reported high of 
over 1,300 in December 1908 to 510 by September 1910, before a further increase to 
853 in April 1912 and a subsequent dip to 467 a year later. However, Football League 
players accounted for only about two-thirds of the total registrations while 
approximately a quarter of League clubs were unable to contribute a single Union 
member. 93 While unions generally underwent rapid growth during the First World 
War, the Players' Union was forced by circumstances to disband in October 1915 and 
was only revived in January 1920. Yet it too benefited from the immediate post-war 
boom, and more specifically from the wage rises of 1920, to record a membership of 
1,174 in 1921, increasing to 1,481 by 1922. And by this point, of course, the 
expansion of the Football League to four divisions meant the Union had become a 
virtual monopoly of League professionals. The general slide in union membership 
from 1920, though slightly delayed, was equally pronounced in the Players' Union, 
chiefly due to the wage reductions of April 1922. By February of the following year 
Newbould had to report a 'falling off' in membership to 994 from 39 clubs and 
appealed to first and second division players particularly to renew their support 94: the 
appeal was evidently unsuccessful as membership slumped to a low of 398 in 1924. 
Yet despite the depression and the overall decline in union membership during the late 
1920s and early 1930s, a successful membership drive led to a growth of over 60 per 
cent to 1,040 registered members by 1932. From this point membership rose 
92 Minutes of AFPTU, 12 February 1923; 23 January 1939. The offending Topical Times article, 
entitled 'Is Players' Union a Useless Body? ', was printed in the 10 February 1923 issue. 93 The first figure is from Mason, Association Football, p. I 11; the others are taken from the Union's 
subscription registers tabulated in Vamplew, Pay Up, Table IS. 1, p. 248. The inter-war membership 
figures are recorded in the annual reports and the minutes, though it must be remembered that 
membership could vary significantly at different stages of the season. " Minutes of AFPTU, 12 February 1923. 
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gradually to nearly 1,400 by 1937 and then more rapidly, so that in April 1939 the 
Players' Union could claim 1,850 Football League members and an extra 80 or so 
forced out of the League by excessive transfer fees. 95 Moreover, by now all but a 
handful of clubs were represented in the Union, normally by at least half a dozen 
players. Yet on balance the Union remained numerically a fairly weak and marginal 
organisation during this period. It could only confidently claim to represent the 
majority of League footballers for short spells in 1908-09,1921-22 and then from the 
mid-1930s. For the rest of the period union density rarely topped 40 percent and even 
dipped to below 20 per cent in the mid- I 920s. 
In certain ways the labour market and -the nature of employment in the Football 
League were clearly incompatible with strong union organisation. Though 
employment for most players was guaranteed for at least a season and was thus more 
secure than in trades like docking and building, labour mobility within the League was 
nonetheless substantial as the importance of the transfer market increased between the 
wars. 96 As playing-staffs constantly changed so it became more difficult to ensure 
long-term stability in Union membership, especially when collectors, the focus of 
union organisation within clubs, moved. This could produce erratic membership 
levels from year to year and, in extreme cases, the Union could lose a club's entire 
membership almost overnight, as happened with Aston Villa in 1938/39.97 Careers, 
moreover, were relatively short - lasting perhaps ten to fifteen years if the player was 
particulýrly lucky but generally much less - and thus the Players' Union could rarely 
rely on the type of 'permanent employees' who were crucial to the growth and 
stability of many other unions in this period. 
98 Another major problem was that, in 
common with other professional sports, the inherent pressures of competition could 
lead to divisions among players both within and between clubs. One of the Union's 
perennial headaches during the inter-war years was its failure to attract players 
associated with the more wealthy and successful clubs: a particularly ironic situation 
95 Minutes of AFPTU, 7 April 1939. 
96 H. A. Clegg, Alan Fox and A. F. Thompson, A History ofBritish Trade Unions since 1889, Volume 
1: 1889-1910, Oxford, 1964, p. 88. 
97 Harding, Good ofthe Game, pp. 170-7 1; Manchester Evening News, I March 1939. 
9' Dabscheck, 'Defensive Manchester', pp. 235-36; Clegg et at., British Trade Unions, pp. 87-88. For 
data on career lengths in the Football League during the 1890s and early 1900s, see Varnplew, Pay Up, 
chapter 14. 
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as the Union had been founded on the initiative and endeavour of stars like Billy 
Meredith, Charlie Roberts and Colin Veitch. - The Union was aggrieved that some 
players 'connected chiefly with the richer clubs... take a very selfish view, and have 
no consideration whatever for their Brother Professionals', a statement bome out by 
the fact that in 1936 only 271 of its total League membership of 1,250 were drawn 
from first division clubs. By contrast, the second division could boast 480 and the 
third division south had 413 members. 99 This lack of involvement at the elite level 
may have been because such players considered themselves reasonably well-paid and 
well-treated and thus saw no need to join a union. But it can also be partly explained 
by the individual nature of contract negotiations and other forms of bargaining. Each 
player's agreement with his club was conducted independently of his fellow workers 
and remained, theoretically at least, confidential. This probably encouraged 
selfishness and even envy at times; it could certainly preclude the development of 
solidarity among players. For example, when Alex James refused to re-sign for 
Arsenal at the end of the 1930/31 season, he did so not 'to right the wrongs of the 
oppressed brothers of my profession' but to convince the club to increase the terms 
offered. For James, 'football - off the field.... of course - must always be each man 
for himself. And professional footballers didn't invent that rule'. 100 
Many contemporaries certainly believed that professional footballers lacked collective 
strength. 41hletic News remained convinced that 'The footballer is not naturally 
inclined to be an ardent and staunch trade unionist' on the very eve of the threatened 
players' strike in August 1909.101 Charlie Roberts, a member of the Union executive, 
was also critical of the fundamental apathy and docility he had witnessed amongst 
League players: 
I know of no class of workpcople who arc less able to look after 
themselves than footballers; they are like a lot of sheep. A representative 
from the Union could go and speak to them on the why and wherefore 
they should join the Union, and they would immediately decide to join. 
" Minutes of AFPTU, 6 February 1933; 24 August 1936 (AGM). 
"0 Quoted in Harding, Alex James, p. 136. James was already in receipt of the maximum wage but his 
contract with Selfridges had ended, bringing his salary back to the basic LS per week. He was therefore 
effectively asking Arsenal to make illegal payments. Eventually, however, Selfridges made a new 
improved offer and James re-signed for Arsenal in time for the start of the new season. 
101 Athletic News, 30 August 1909. 
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Two minutes after a manager could go and say a few words to them, and 
then they decide not to join. 102 
Conventional forms of collective action like strikes were therefore extremely rare. 
The only major example took place 1909, significantly at the beginning of a period of 
widespread labour unrest and soaring strike activity in which vast numbers of 
unskilled workers became organised for the first time. The events of that year 
indicated the difficulties and risks involved in attempting an all-out national strike. 103 
The FA had ordered both officials and rank-and-file members to resign from the 
Union by the beginning of July or have their registrations cancelled and those who 
failed to do so also suffered the loss of possible summer pay and prospective benefits. 
Hence players had a great deal to lose by remaining defiant and the majority - as many 
as 800 of a 1,200 membership according to the FA - had complied with the parent 
body's wishes by the deadline. 104 
The letters received by Herbert Broomfield, the Union secretary, over the critical 
months of May, June and July provide a clear insight into the attitudes of the 
membership. Most resigned reluctantly: though they supported the Union and its 
demands, they were not convinced that they had the collective strength to withstand a 
protracted dispute. An Oldham Athletic player, for instance, wrote to Broomfield 
declaring that he was prepared to 'stand out' but thought it useless to do so alone: 'one 
in a team will not do much good'. 105 Jack Carr of Newcastle United similarly 
believed that the Union's case was doomed to failure because 'the players won't stick 
together and a handful's no good whatever'. Although Broomfield tried to convince 
him to cancel his resignation, Carr was unable to see 'why I or a few should risk our 
livelihood for the sake of a lot of football players who haven't pluck enough to fight 
for themselves'. 106 Self-interest was a clear motivation for Carr's seven team-mates 
and many others who broke with the union to protect their arranged benefits. 
102 Quoted in Mason, Association Football, p. 116. 
103 James Hinton, Labour and Socialism: A History ofthe British Labour Movement, 1867-1974, 
Brighton, 1983, pp. 83-95. For detailed accounts of the 1909 crisis see Dabscheck, 'Man or a 
Puppeff; 'Defensive Manchester', pp. 2374 1; Harding, Good ofthe Game, chapters 7-9; Tischler, 
Footballers and Businessmen, chapter 6. 
'" Minutes of FA Council, 10 July 1909. 
105 PFA, File 6, H. Butterworth to Broomfield, 1909, otherwise undated. 
106 PFA, File 7, Jack Carr to Broomfield, 29 June, 2 July 1909. 
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Additionally, the numerous requests for guidance and information on whether team 
colleagues had resigned illustrates the difficulties of collective action in the close 
season when players were necessarily scattered across the country. 107 In view of these 
circumstances it is hardly surprising that only Manchester United withdrew their 
labour collectively, though other 'militant' sides like Sunderland and Newcastle 
United agreed to rejoin the Union in time for the start of the season. Even so, 
Broomfield still believed that the Union was 'absolutely assured of success' if 'a few 
players in a few of the Principal Clubs' stood out for a fortnight and remained 
convinced 'that every man was a Unionist at heart, and would belong to us if no 
coercion was used to make them act differently'. 108 Eventually, however, a 
compromise was reached on the eve of the new season which saved the Union from 
testing Sutcliffe's belief that players would be unable to last even a month-long 
strike. 109 After 1909, the Union's general retreat from conflict with the authorities 
and the effective outlawing of strike action by the latter diminished the likelihood of 
another national dispute. According to Charles Buchan, a strike had been called by 
Union delegates at the end of the 1919/20 season, but this position soon became 
untenable when several teams re-signed with their clubs en bloc. Similarly, the 
possibility of striking in response to the wage cuts of 1922 was briefly debated at that 
year's annual meeting but the consensus was that the risk remained too high, one 
delegate pointing out that, as in 1909 and 1920, players 'would not stand out in the 
close season'. 110 
The absence of industry-wide strikes and other combative forms of industrial action 
does not mean that labour relations in the Football League were stable and free of 
conflict. First of all, collective action and mutual support among players, though 
difficult to uncover, did take place in spite of the individualism encouraged by 
employers. When Sheffield United suspended Kay in 1902 his fellow workers 
contributed, against the Committee's wishes, to a common fund to ensure that he 
107 See PFA, File 7, J. Johnson to Broomfield, 22 June 1909; W. McCombie to Broomfield, 29 June 
1909; File 8, Carr to Broomfield, 2 July 1909; Broomfield to A. Young, 5 July 1909. 
108 PFA, File 8, Broomfield to A. Collins, 24 July 1909; Broomfield to Harry Mairunan, I September 
1909. 
109 Athletic News, 8 March 1909. 
110 Buchan, Lifetime in Football, p. 64; Minutes of AFPTU, 20 August 1922 (AGM). 
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received his normal income. In 1920 nine first team players at the same club joined 
together to send a letter of protest to the Committee against the 'preferential 
treatment' given to the club captain over his benefit match. While this may be 
interpreted as a collective show of jealousy as much as unity, it did persuade the 
management to grant benefits which had previously been refused to a number of the 
protesters. "' More often, however, unrest was expressed through individual and 
submerged forms of protest. The most common example involved contract disputes 
where players would delay signing in the hope of gaining an improved offer. While it 
is true that average players especially were often in a weak position in such disputes, 
Korr is wrong to assume that 'pre-war players had been conditioned to accept wage 
terms'. 112 The absence of contract negotiations at West Ham until 1933 does appear 
to be an exception to the rule: the records of other League clubs indicate that 
bargaining was relatively common and reluctantly accepted by most directors as part 
of the signing-on process. Often the club would refuse to make improved offers, as 
was the case at Sheffield United in 1930 and at Arsenal during Alex James' close 
season 'strike' a year later, and in some cases players refusing to sign-on risked being 
placed on the transfer-list. 113 The Aston Villa board was similarly reluctant to accede 
to demands for extra wages or benefits, as Frank Barson and F. Moss were both to 
discover in 1922.1 14 Yet many players were able to successfully negotiate better 
terms. West Ham agreed to pay four of its players up to an extra El per week for the 
1935-36 season; Raynor, Smith, Oxley and Pickering similarly secured amended 
terms at Sheffield United in 1931. One player, Partridge, actually convinced the 
United Committee to pay him a basic wage of f. 6 per week after it had previously 
decided not to re-engage him at all and put him up for sale. ' 15 
Grievances might also be expressed through absenteeism, go-slows and other forms of 
non-cooperation or dissent. Potentially the most powerful weapon that footballers 
possessed was simply the refusal to play, although again it was generally only the 
"' Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 7 October 1902; 25 February, 2 March 1920. 
112 Korr, West Ham United, p. 174. 
... Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 30 April 1930; Harding, Alex James, pp. 135-39. 
Bennett suffered the latter fate at Walsall in 1935, Minutes of Walsall FC, 28 May, 2 July 1935. 
114 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 2 May, 13 June, 21 November 1922. 
115 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 2,9 April 1935; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 
9 May, 29 July 193 1; 7,16 May 1928. 
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most talented who could afford to aggravate their employers in this way. When two 
of Aston Villa's senior players, the aforementioned Barson and Clem Stephenson, 
declined to play in a League match because of a dispute concerning residency outside 
Birmingham, they were initially suspended for a fortnight by the club but eventually 
achieved a board climb down. Similar action by Christopher Buckley over a benefit 
dispute proved less successful: he was forced to apologise for his action and fall in 
line with the club's arrangements. 116 Historians of industrial relations have 
recognised that such examples of indiscipline can reasonably be interpreted as 
conscious forms of protest. Hence it is not implausible to speculate, as Mason does, 
that Stephen Bloomer's persistent insobriety and neglect of training during 1901 may 
have been an individual response to the restrictive maximum wage rules passed that 
year. 117 
Perhaps the best example of what might be called industrial sabotage in League 
football involved 'playing for one's papers' - the practice of intentionally playing 
badly in order to get a transfer. It is hard to know how widespread this was, though 
the press seemed to regard it as something of a phenomenon for much of the period. ' 18 
Certainly, Jimmy Seed noted that it was not uncommon in the 1930s for a player to 
suddenly lose form if his transfer request had been rejected and the Sunday Express in 
1931 similarly exposed what it referred to as the 'scandal' of directorates 'tapping' 
players at other clubs by offering them inducements, usually through a third party, to 
play badly and thus facilitate a transfer. ' 19 One obvious instance, involving Sheffield 
United's Fazackerley, can be gleaned from club records. Fazackerley had evidently 
been 'unsettled' for some time at the club and in October 1920 put in a transfer 
request which was refused. In response the player not only stopped training but 
generated considerable discontent among both team-mates and supporters by 'not 
doing his share of the work' during matches. Not surprisingly, the Committee chose 
116 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 14,22 September, 16 November 1920; Topical Times, 2 October 1920. 
On Buckley's dispute with Aston Villa, see chapter 5. 
117 Van Gore, 'Rank-and-File Dissent', p. 60; Tony Mason, "'Our Stephen and Our Harold": Edwardian 
Footballers as Local Heroes' in Richard Holt, J. A. Mangan and Pierre Lanfranchi (eds. ), European 
Heroes: Myth, Identity, Sport, London, 1996, p. 80. 
1 'a See Athletic News, 4 December 1911; Sutcliffe's comments in Topical Times, 17 March 1928. Also 
see Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 106. 
1'9 Seed, Jimmy Seed Story, p. 118; Sunday Express, 25 January 193 1. 
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to transfer 'with reluctance' a player who had become a disruptive influence and by 
November Fazackerley had moved on to Everton. 120 
3. Welfare and Trainin 
Welfare provision in the Football League at the beginning of the century can be 
described as rudimentary and sporadic. Without government or League intervention, 
there were no legal obligations upon club employers to provide for the sick or injured 
player who 'ran risks which often cost him his job and his capacity to earn a living'. 
121 
In practice, however, many clubs did make certain financial and medical arrangements 
to look after players who found themselves in such unfortimate circumstances. in 
minor cases, the player received his normal wage until he was declared fit; part-timers 
would likewise be paid for earnings lost owing to a footballing accident. Medical 
treatment was also necessary to get a man fit and playing again as quickly as possible. 
Hence clubs increasingly employed their own doctors, masseurs and other specialists 
to treat injuries and, with few exceptions, paid the costs of surgery and convalescence. 
West Ham were one club which established specific arrangements with a local 
hospital for treatment of its players. Others might send employees to hospitals 
specialising in football injuries, like the renowned Matlock House in Manchester, 
which was run by Mr Allison, a director of the City club, and was widely 
recommended to clubs by Bentley in his dual role as League president and Athletic 
News editor. 122 This concern with the physical well-being of players was sometimes 
extended to the organisation of recuperative visits to seaside resorts. This was 
especially popular with the Sheffield United Committee, which agreed to send Alf 
Common to Skegness for two weeks during the summer of 1902 and gave Lewis a 
similar fortnight's holiday on medical advice the following season. It is unclear 
whether this practice was followed at other, particularly poorer, clubs but at United it 
certainly lasted well into the 1930s. 123 
120 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 15 March, 13,20 October, 2,10 November 1920. 
121 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 126. 
122 See Minutes of West Ham United FC, 31 January 1933; M. Randal Roberts, 'A Footballer's 
Hospital', Windsor Magazine, 1904, pp. 511-16; John Hutchinson, The Football Industry, Glasgow, 
1982, p. 40. 
123 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 20 August 1902; 11 March 1903. Also see 
Minutes, 9,16,23 November 1932. 
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In common with many employers, League clubs preferred informal welfare 
arrangements which allowed them greater discrimination and control. Only as the 
costs and the scale of activities rose did they consider more institutionalised and 
formal schemes designed to financially protect both themselves and their employees 
against the constant threat of injury. 124 Aston Villa had evidently taken out an 
insurance policy against accidents to players even before joining the League and West 
Bromwich Albion had its players insured with Lloyds from the early 1900s. 125 These 
initiatives may have been partly prompted by the introduction of government 
measures such as the Employers' Liability Act of 1880 and the Workmen's 
Compensation Acts of 1897 and 1900, which, under certain conditions, made 
employers liable to compensate workers injured in the course of their employment. In 
fact, in 1902 the Football League took legal advice on the application of these laws to 
employers of football labour but were told that no such liability was attached to 
member clubs. 126 However, the authorities, this time the FA, were forced to seek 
counsel's opinion again following the introduction of a wider-ranging Workmen's 
Compensation Act in 1906. The original decision was reversed: professional 
footballers were deemed 'workmen' and thus entitled to compensation under the new 
Act. League officials and club directors envisaged being inundated with claims for 
compensation and it was this fear, rather than any emerging sense of moral 
responsibility for players, which convinced them to seek more comprehensive 
insurance cover. 127 The response to this was the creation in 1907 of the Football 
Mutual Insurance Federation (FMIF), a joint body composed of Football League, 
Southern League and Scottish League representatives, which attempted for the first 
time to provide a comprehensive, self-funding insurance scheme for clubs. Premiums 
began at El per player, subsequently reduced to 10s. in 1910/11, which were 
supplemented by additional levies to cover any possible loss on the season. 
Membership was not compulsory, but by July 1911 32 League clubs had joined, as 
well as 20 each from the Southern and Scottish Leagues, and in the preceding year the 
124 Hay, 'Employers and Social Policy', pp. 43 8-39. 
125 Mason, Association Foothall, p. 107; Athletic News, 6 November 1911. 
126 See Bagwell, Industrial Relations, chapter 10; Sutcliffe et al., Foothall League, pp. 126-28. 127 Athletic News, 29 April 1907; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, I May 1907. For 
details on the 1906 Act see Clegg et al., British Trade Unions, Vol 1, pp. 395-96. 
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FMIF settled 22 claims, mostly concerning Football League clubs and players. 128 
Those clubs who chose not to join the FMIF generally took out private insurance 
policies. Sheffield United, one of the eight League members going-it-alone, insured 
its entire playing staff from 1908 with the Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity 
Society, and despite higher premiums of up to 0 per player, continued to make 
separate arrangements outside the aegis of the FMIF. 129 
A further development came in 1912 and concerned the position of League footballers 
under the National Insurance Act of 1911, the cornerstone of the Asquith 
government's social legislation. 130 Following an inquiry by the League Management 
Committee, and evidently based on the decision in an earlier Workmen's 
Compensation case involving a Crystal Palace player, the National Health Insurance 
Commissioners ruled that 'a professional football player is employed by way of 
manual labour' and thus had to be insured under the Act 'whatever his 
remuneration'. 131 In effect, the ruling extended a club's involvement with the welfare 
of its employees beyond the football ground. Firstly, claims under the National 
Insurance Act were concerned with sickness or injury outside the course of one's 
employment, and hence covered cases to which the Workmen's Compensation Acts 
did not apply. Secondly, football clubs, like other employers, were now responsible 
for making small weekly contributions (initially 3d. per player) along with the 
employee and the government, as well as arranging for players to join approved 
societies and stamping their insurance cards. 132 Initially the League and most member 
clubs had opposed the scheme, despite the fact that it cost them little in time or 
money. According to Athletic News, 'League clubs do not take kindly to insurance': 
players, it was argued, were already employed throughout the year and given free 
medical attendance. Perhaps there was also a feeling that the Act threatened the 
autonomy of clubs in looking after their own players. Even after the Commissioners' 
verdict was given, Sheffield United recommended that the Management Committee 
128 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 129; Athletic News, 25 September 1911. 
129 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 13 May 1908,12 August 1909,6 August 1912. 
131 See Eric Midwinter, The Development ofSocial Wellare in Britain, Buckingham, 1994, pp. 76-78; 
Derek Fraser, The Evolution ofthe British Welfare State, London, 1973, pp. 154-55; H. A. Clegg, A 
History ofBritish Trade Unions, Volume 2: 1911-1933, Oxford, 1985, pp. 10 1-02. 
131 Minutes of Football League, 9 September 1912 (my emphasis). 
132 Athletic News, 9 September 1912. 
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test the opinion of the Court but was overruled by the executive body. 133 By 1920 
League players 'who are under a contract with their clubs and are not in civil 
employment' were also included in the government's unemployment insurance 
scheme, which was funded, like health insurance, by mixed contributions from the 
worker, employer and state. 134 
This legal clarification of the footballer as a manual worker, together with the 
unsatisfactory operation of the FMIF, persuaded the League in late 1912 to set up a 
new Football League Mutual Insurance Federation (FLMIF) 'with the object of 
insuring the clubs in membership with the Football League against all claims under 
the Workmen's Compensation Acts'. 135 Yet although the restriction to League clubs 
alone was intended to lessen the financial burden, the FLMIF was actually to be 
troubled throughout the period with financial and organisational difficulties which 
were never adequately resolved. The major dilemma the FLMIF faced was to keep 
premium rates affordable for all clubs while ensuring that sufficient funds remained to 
cover all claims in this notoriously unpredictable profession. Its predecessor, for 
example, found that its decision to reduce the premium in 1910-11 backfired owing to 
the number of heavy claims that season: E595 was paid out to League players alone 
and a further levy was needed to cover an adverse bank balance of over E200. By 
contrast, in the same season the Northern Rugby Union's Mutual Insurance Society 
was called upon to pay claims of just E46 and showed a credit balance of over L900 - 
a situation probably best explained not by the respective danger of the two sports but 
the fact that the Society only paid out for serious injuries lasting over thirteen 
weeks. 136 
With income tight and many League clubs temporarily out of action, the FLMIF not 
surprisingly struggled to pay its way during most of the First World War. Twice in 
1916 alone, extra levies were required from contributing clubs even though injury 
133 Athletic News, 12 August 1912; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 3 September 
1912; Minutes of Football League, 9 September 1912. 
134 Minutes of Football League, 10 November 1920; Clegg, British Trade Unions, Vol. 2, pp. 243-44. 135 Sutcliffe et aL, Foothall League, p. 130. 
136 Athletic News, 25 September, 27 November 1911. 
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claims were 'amazingly small'. 137 After the war, the rapid growth of the League and 
the corresponding increase in claims continued to stretch both the finances and 
manpower of the FLMIF. Indeed, from September 1922 the four remaining 
Management Committee members were permanently co-opted onto the FLMIF Board 
to help deal with the increasing work involved in investigating claims. 138 In each 
season from 1918/19 to 1921/22 claims easily outstripped premiums and by the end of 
1920/21 a considerable deficit of 1,800 was reported, necessitating a call of 21s. on 
each injured player. From this point the Management Committee's pressure on clubs 
to join the FLMIF became more explicit: not only did it 'feel that every Football 
League club should be in membership with the Federation' but also suggested that a 
portion of the general League funds should be applied to meet the FLMIF's present 
and future liabilities. 139 Aston Villa agreed that compulsory membership was the only 
way to save the Federation but Sheffield United, amongst others, continued to resist, 
maintaining that they were 'already insured with a reputable office' and believed the 
FLMIF 'ought to be self-supporting'. 140 Finances had deteriorated still fin-ther by 
1923, leading to a further levy on members and a renewed appeal for outside clubs to 
join and by the end of that year McKenna and Sutcliffe were busy considering 
alternative schemes and approaching leading insurance companies. The latter's terms 
were considered exorbitant, however, and so the League constructed a new scheme to 
be funded by percentages of gate revenue rather than the previous system of individual 
premiums for each player. Clubs were now effectively compelled to join: first and 
second division members were to contribute one per cent, and third division south and 
north clubs one and a half and two per cent respectively, of the net gate from each 
League match (extended in 1925 to include cup-ties). It was envisaged that this would 
raise between E 10- 11,000 per annum, of which just over half was to be set aside to 
cover the insurance of every professional player contracted to all 88 clubs, and the 
remainder used for the general running of the League. With no significant opposition 
forthcoming - even from Sheffield United who had run into difficulties with its own 
137 Athletic News, I May, 18 December 1916. 
133 Minutes of Football League, 8 September 1922. 
139 Financial Statement of FLMIF, December 1922; Minutes of Football League, 23 October 1922. 
140 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 31 October 1922; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 25 
October, I November 1922. 
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private insurance arrangements - the scheme was approved and came into operation 
for the 1924/25 season. 141 
The 1924 scheme also ironed out some of the anomalies which had previously existed 
in both club and Football League insurance schemes. Henceforth players and trainers 
were covered 'from the commencement of training to the end of the season', including 
all recognised first and second team fixtures, practice matches and training 
sessions. 142 Clubs could no longer claim that a player injured during non-competitive 
football was not in fact working, as Manchester City had in 1902 following the death 
of one of its employees from an injury sustained in a pre-season trial match. 143 The 
risk of travelling to and from matches was also covered by the FLMIF. However, 
players on continental club tours were not included and, in fact, it was not until 1930 
that the FA established a formal system for insuring all players chosen for 
international and representative matches, with the Scottish, Irish and Welsh FAs also 
agreeing to insure Football League players a year later. The FA's scheme was no 
doubt influenced by the serious injury sustained by Sheffield Wednesday's Marsden in 
an international fixture against Germany. Following a claim by Wednesday the FA 
paid the club E2,000 to cover the loss of the player and a ftirther E700 'for the benefit 
of Marsden and his family'. All players were then systematically insured for E2,000, a 
sum which was doubled in 1934.144 Nevertheless, some clubs evidently considered 
this cover inadequate, choosing to take out separate ad hoc policies for their 
international players. In 1932, for example, Sheffield United arranged accident and 
sickness insurance amounting to E5,000 each for Jack Pickering in an Inter-League 
match and Robert Barclay and Jimmy Dunne in international games. 145 The risk of 
accidents to employees away from the football field also convinced many clubs to take 
out extra insurance protection. West Ham arranged a policy in 1930 with the Motor 
Union Insurance Company covering all players and officials 'whilst on club business' 
but when the company denied liability for an accident o first team goalkeeper George 
14 1Football League Circular to Clubs, 31 August 1923; Minutes of Football League, 4 February, 2 June 
(AGM)1924; Athletic News, 9 June 1924. On Sheffield United's insurance problems, see Minutes, 27 
February, 12 March 1924. 
142 Minutes of Football League, 2 June 1924 (AGM); Athletic News, 9 June 1924. 
143 Harding, Good ofthe Game, pp. 38-39. 
'" Green, Football Association, pp. 416-17; Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 131,138-39. 
145 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 28 September, 12 October 1932. 
233 
Watson three years later, the club took out a more comprehensive policy covering all 
activities except aviation, motor cycling and football playing. 146 
In theory, then, an injured or sick player in the 1920s was not forced to rely on his 
employer's benevolence alone. As well as state health benefits, he was entitled to 
weekly compensation until he regained fitness or was forced to retire. Yet in practice 
players could often face a long and arduous struggle with the FLMIF before receiving 
compensation payments. While the Management Committee often portrayed itself as 
sympathetic to players, even exhorting them 'to trust the Committee as friends' 147 , its 
chief concern was to limit the financial liability of its clubs to a minimum. The vast 
majority of claims were conducted on the player's behalf by the Union, and more 
specifically by its solicitor from 1909, Thomas Hinchcliffe. Normally an injured 
player would receive full wages up until the end of his contract and then 
compensation of 3 Os. (f I before the First World War and briefly 3 5s. j ust after) but by 
the early 1920s Hinclicliffe and Sutcliffe, who acted as the FLMIF solicitor, had 
established a standard procedure for settling claims by lump sum payments. In certain 
cases the FLMIF chose to contest the player's claim by denying liability for the injury 
or reducing, and even stopping, compensation payments when it considered the player 
had recovered. In 1922 it advised every club 'to take an interest in its injured players 
and to see that there is no malingering' but, despite such concerns, liability was 
eventually admitted in most cases, sometimes on the eve of county court decisions. 148 
Even when the player's case seemed less convincing the FLMIF was generally forced 
or persuaded to make some form of payment. It was claimed that a Bournemouth 
player, for example, had played II League matches after an alleged injury without 
complaint and also that his position as a licensee and his ability to drive a car proved 
that 'he had not suffered any loss nor was he incapacitated' as a result of the injury. 
Despite this evidence, the FLMIF agreed to pay the ex-player f. 100 plus costs in 
settlement. And in other cases, such as those concerning Blackburn's Roxburgh and 
Barnsley's Archibald, payments were made even though both players were in their 
late thirties and thus in the last stage of their careers regardless of injury. 149 
146 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 28 October, I December 1930; 3,11 April, 8 August 1933. 
147 Quoted in Minutes of AFPTU, 22 August 1927 (AGM). 148 
Minutes of Football League, 8 September 1922. 149 
Minutes of AFPTU, 21 August 1933 (AGM); 24 August 1931 (AGM), 20 August 1934 (AGM). 
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The procedure for settling claims certainly set up an adversarial relationship between 
the FLMIF and the club on one side, and the Union and the injured player on the 
other. During one set of negotiations the Union was informed by the FLMIF that 'on 
no account will compensation be paid unless and until they are compelled to do so 
after a fight' and certain players were accused - occasionally with justification - of 
giving dishonest information or making fictitious claims. 150 The problems of re- 
registering players who had already received compensation exacerbated these 
conflicts. In 1926 the Management Committee notified clubs that it would neither 
register nor insure players who had received lump sum settlements unless they could 
prove complete recovery from their injuries and later ruled that those receiving over 
E100 compensation could not be registered for at least a year after the settlement 
date. 151 Following the application of this rule to a player seeking to resume his career 
with a month's trial at Darlington, the Union strongly attacked the League's treatment 
of injured players. It complained that the player, Cook, had got compensation of just 
025, which the FLMIF said should cover two years, but that his in ury prevented him j 
returning to his former occupation of mining. It was considered 'disgraceful that any 
man should be debarred from earning his livelihood' in both occupations. And Fay 
complained bitterly that with the Federation's final payment 'the door is locked, 
bolted and barred to the player should he recover and be fit to take his place in the 
game once more'. 152 On the other hand the Union was forced in 1934 to condemn the 
action of another member who had represented himself as fit to play League football 
less than two months after being awarded E400 compensation by the FLMIF. 
Sutcliffe implicitly warned the Union that a repetition of such action might lead to a 
toughening of the FLMIF's policy and. practice. 153 Tensions between the Union and 
the FLMIF over claims procedure had, however, probably peaked in 1927 over a case 
where a member settled his claim directly with the League after initiating proceedings 
"' Minutes of AFPTU, 22 August 1927 (AGM). 
151 Minutes of Football League, 13 March, 13 December 1926. 
152 Minutes of AFPTU, 22 August 1927 (AGM); PFA, File 3 5, James A. Fay, 'Star players career ended 
by injury: Offered L200 Compensation', Draft of Fourth Newspaper Article, 1938/39, otherwise 
undated, p. 2. 
153 Minutes of AFPTU, 8 October, 10 December 1934. 
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through the Union. Hinchcliffe considered this a calculated move to marginalise the 
influence of the Union: 
It is quite evident that the Football League are going to go behind our 
backs wherever they can, and not only deprive the Union of proving to 
players (non-members) of the brilliant services rendered by the Union, but 
also depriving me of your valuable work and making it more costly for the 
Union from a legal point of view. 154 
It would be wrong to assume, however, that incapacitated players were always paid 
the minimum possible compensation by clubs and discarded when they ceased to be of 
immediate use to the team. Even at a purely financial level, it may often have been 
less expensive to treat and compensate an injured player than to buy a replacement. 
This may explain Coventry City's 'good treatment' of Widdowson, who received his 
full weekly wage in addition to weekly compensation during his injury lay-off and, 
after an operation, was signed on full wages despite not yet being fully fit. 155 Such 
instances were certainly unusual but not unique and there is considerable evidence of 
clubs paying for operations or signing incapacitated players when neither the FLMIF 
nor the Workmen's Compensation legislation actually compelled them to do so. 
Moreover, from 1932 the League regulated the practice of re-signing injured players 
by allowing a special contract termination clause operable if the player had still not 
recovered within a month of the beginning of the new season. 156 Players forced to 
retire through injury similarly appeared to be treated generously by football 
employers. Benefit matches and/or payments were generally granted by the better off 
clubs. Blackwell received E500 from Sheffield United, even though the club was not 
legally liable, after abdominal trouble had 'rendered him incompetent to fulfil the 
terms of his contract'; Fulham similarly granted Dudley a benefit match which raised 
E280 in addition to the FLMIF's ex gratia payment of E150, while strenuously 
denying liability for the player's heart trouble. 157 
154 Minutes of AFPTU, 22 August 1927 (AGM). 
155 Minutes of AFPTU, 26 August 1929 (AGM). 
156 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 13 1. 
157 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 24 September, 2,7 October 1924; Minutes of 
AFPTU, 24 April 1933. 
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The death of an employee, however, provided the best opportunity for League and 
club to publicly assert their philanthropic tendencies. A good illustration of this was 
the collective response engendered by the death of the Chelsea player Tommy Meehan 
in August 1924. The League immediately donated ESO from its own benevolent fund, 
established a benefit fund for the player's dependents and organised a Football League 
team to play Chelsea in a benefit match in aid of the fund. By December the Meehan 
fund had raised over E1,800, including almost E600 subscribed separately by League 
clubs. 1 58 Meehan's relatives undoubtedly benefited from his having been a prominent 
representative player - appearing three times for the Football League XI between 1922 
and 1924 - because in most cases such public fund-raising was restricted for deceased 
League or club officials or the victims of colliery disasters rather than players (see 
chapter 9). Indeed by contrast, Henry Cunningham's elderly parents received just 
E300 from the FLMIF in 1929 when their son died from a football-related injury 
sustained in training, while the widow of another Cunningham, Peter of Crewe, was 
afforded small grants of only fIO each from the FA and League to cover the wages 
owed to her late husband after his entry into a sanatorium. 159 In the ma ority of cases, j 
then, even a seriously ill player could expect no more than a small ad hoc grant from 
his club, and perhaps from the benevolent fund of the FA, League or Union and 
though in the event of death the Union also provided aE 100 burial grant for members' 
families, even this was rudimentary when compared with the financial protection 
offered by an organisation like the actor's Royal General Theatrical Fund. 160 
Notwithstanding the FLMIF's determination to limit compensation payments 
whenever possible, the Union achieved a gradual increase in sums received by injured 
players during the inter-war period. As Table 6.2 indicates, seasonal figures were 
prone to fluctuation but the general trend was upwards, with over seven times more 
compensation being paid to players overall in the late 1930s than during the early 
1920s. It appears that this was due to increases in the number rather than the size of 
settlement claims, though precise data on this question is unavailable. In 1926 lump- 
sum settlements ranged from E50 to E300 and stayed fairly consistent throughout the 
Minutes of Football League, 5September, 15 December 1924. 
Minutes of AFPTU, 26 August 1929 (AGM); II March, 26 August 1935. 
On the RGTF see Sanderson, From Irving to Olivier, pp. 87-9 1. 
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late 1920s and early 1930s, even during a season like 1928/29 which witnessed a 
substantial leap in total compensation. By 1932 some players on higher earnings were 
able to secure up to E600 and, moreover, there were signs that by this point the FLMIF 
was actively searching for ways to reduce compensation payments. 161 The first such 
attempt was Sutcliffe's controversial contract clause which was considered, but 
eventually rejected, by the League clubs in 1934. The proposed clause threatened the 
established practice of players receiving full wages until their contract expired: 
henceforth the full salary was to be paid only for the first fortnight or month after the 
injury or sickness; half salary for the same consecutive period; and then after two 
months maximum the club was to be permitted to stop the players' wage and put him 
on compensation. In Sutcliffe's view the change was in keeping with broader 
employer practice: 'In every phase of work.. *. as soon as a workman is injured he is at 
once put on compensation, but in football, not so'. 162 But the Union angrily 
condemned the proposal and demanded its immediate withdrawal, stating: 
that the Football League Management Committee, for reasons best known 
to themselves, seem to be intent upon making the lives of players as 
difficult as possible; that the attempt to impose upon players such 
conditions of employment are tantamount to slavery; that, should players 
have the misfortune to be stricken with illness or cribpled physically, they 
also wish to cripple them financially. ' 63 
161 Minutes of AFPTU, I March 1926; 26 August 1929 (AGM); 18 January 1932. 
162 PFA, File 35, C. E. Sutcliffe, 'The Snag of the Injured Player', Draft of Newspaper article, 1934, 
otherwise undated, p. I- 
163 Minutes of AFPTU, 20 August 1934 (AGM). 
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Table 6.2 Payments made by the FLMIF to AFPTU members for compensation under the Worlanen's 
Compensation Act, 1920/21-1938/39 
Season Total Compensation* Season Total Compensation* 
(in pounds) (in pounds) 
1920/21 760 1930/31 5,101 
1921/22 1,250 193152 5,134 
1922/23 895 1932/33 4,087 
1923/24 1,132 1933/34 6,035 
1924/25 900 1930/31 7,583 
1925/26 2,876 1931/32 6,508 
1926/27 1,015 1936/37 5,637 
1927/28 1,360 1937/38 9,476 
1928/29 5,187 1938/39 7,154 
1929/30 4,365 
Lump sum payments and weekly compensation. 
Source: Annual Solicitor's Reports of AFPTU. 
At the same time the basic principles underlying both private and state insurance 
cover, which had been established back in 1912, were seriously disturbed by Justice 
Roach's verdict in April 1934 that professional footballers were no longer considered 
to be employed by way of manual labour. The whole question had been re-opened by 
the Ministry of Health and its direct relevance was to the health insurance of players 
by the state although it also had profound implications for the rights of players under 
the Workmen's Compensation Acts. Those League players who received over E250 
per yearý in wages and bonuses - undoubtedly a considerable majority - were now 
denied compulsory insurance and health, pension and unemployment benefits 
although the Ministry did make concessions to allow them to continue contributing to 
the scheme voluntarily-164 More importantly, perhaps, a parallel decision by Justice 
Roach in the Graham and Millwall FC case meant that any professional footballer 
whose annual remuneration exceeded E350 had no future claim against his club under 
the Workmen's Compensation Acts. Initially the FLMIF agreed to continue 'to treat 
all players alike' regardless of income but from 1935 it began to refuse compensation 
to a number of players forced to retire through injury. Sutcliffe informed the Union of 
the FLMIF's change of policy by stating that 'owing to the many calls during recent 
years it would not be possible in future to deal with any injured players who were 
'64 Minutes of AFPTU, 24 April 1933,20 August 1934 (AGM); Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 
39,131-32. 
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outside the Workmen's Compensation Acts'. 
165 Considerable opposition from the 
Union and certain club directorates, however, led the FLMIF to refer the question 
directly to the clubs, who agreed by a large majority to treat players receiving E350- 
plus salaries as if they came under the provisions of the Acts and make ex gratia 
payments accordingly. 
166 Though this represented a partial victory for the better paid 
players, the FLMIF continued to attempt to limit its liabilities by reducing weekly 
compensation payments when injuries had improved sufficiently to allow those 
players unable to play football to engage in some form of 'light work'. Again the 
Union responded angrily by pointing out that 'whilst the Federation are entitled to do 
this legally, at the same time it is unfair and unjust to take advantage of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act as though the player were an industrial worker'. 167 
Indeed the Union's general dissatisfaction with the levels of compensation led to a 
unsuccessful proposal in March 1939 that weekly compensation be increased from 
35s. to D per week and lump sum settlements be fixed, with a maximum pay-out of 
E1,000.168 
Yet despite the FLMIF's attempts to reduce costs and the accusation that players were 
inadequately compensated for their loss of employment, the League's insurance 
scheme continued to suffer financial problems in the years preceding the Second 
World War. In March 1937 the FA Finance and General Purposes Committee actually 
paid off the FLMIF's deficit of E5,446 which had built up over the previous ten years 
and agreed to contribute L660 annually over the following four years to cover its 
average deficit. 169 The compensation of in ured players, therefore, was still the major j 
financial burden for the League in 1939 that it had been when the FLMIF was 
established in 1912 and remained throughout a potential source of conflict between 
the axes of player-Union and club-League. 
165 Minutes of AFPTU, 26 August 1935 (AGM) 
166 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 129-30; Minutes of AFPTU, 14 October 1935. It is interesting 
to contrast the attitude of the West Ham board, which was anxious to make new arrangements to cover 
the 050-plus men, with that of Sheffield United, which replied curtly that it did not favour including 
these players in the insurance scheme. Minutes of West Ham United FC, 16 September 1935; Minutes 
of Sheffield United Football Committee, 18 September 1935. 
167 PFA, File 35, James A. Fay, 'A Job for Parliament', Draft of Third Newspaper Article, 1938/39, 
otherwise undated, pp. 2-3; Minutes of AFPTU, 22 August 1938; 
Minutes of AFPTU, 13 March 1939 (EGM). 
Minutes of FA Finance and General Purposes Committee, 8 March 1937. 
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Another important aspect of welfare provision involved the treatment of players after 
their footballing careers had ended. Typically League clubs, in common with most 
private companies, were discriminatory in arranging for the future well-being of 
retired employees. Ex-players who were destitute or down on their luck were 
sometimes able to secure ad hoc grants from the respective benevolent funds of the 
Union or governing bodies. A former Burnley player called Wallace, for instance, 
who 'found himself in distress' after being forced to stop playing through illness and 
failing to find other work, received grants totalling f. 25 from the Union in addition to 
E50 grants from both the League and FA. Aston Villa particularly prided itself on its 
record of assisting old players 'in poor circumstances' financially. And when Stephen 
Bloomer, the famous ex-Derby County and England forward, became seriously ill 
with asthma and bronchitis 23 years after his retirement, a public fund was established 
by the Derby manager and other local figures which raised over; E500 to send him on a 
cruise to Australia. 170 
Notwithstanding occasional instances of this kind, however, the League made no 
attempt to develop comprehensive schemes to provide financially for players on 
retirement or facilitate their movement towards other careers until the very end of the 
1930s. Professional footballers as insured workers were, of course, included in the 
provisions of the 1925 Old Age and Widows and Orphans Contributory Pensions Act 
but as the pension was to start at the age of 65 it was clearly of little immediate benefit 
for the player who retired in his 20s or 30s. Occupational pensions for footballers, 
however, were not considered until 1934 when Watson Hartley, a Liverpool solicitor, 
approached the League executive with a series of proposals, including a pension fund, 
which would be financed by his scheme to copyright the Football League fixture list. 
According to Hartley, the fund would enable all players 'with five or more years of 
service to be entitled to a pension, graded according to the years of service, payable on 
retiring from the game, and terminable by the League in the event of the player re- 
entering the game'. Yet the executive 'refused point-blank to consider the scheme', 
partly because the funding involved connections with the pools industry but also, as 
"' Minutes of AFPTU, 23 November 1936,10 May 1937; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 15 August 1922; 
25 August 1926; Mason, 'Our Stephen and Our Harold', p. 82. 
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both Hartley and Fay recognised, because of its obstinate opposition to any 
suggestions emanating from outside Preston. 171 This attitude had evidently changed 
by 1939, when a London insurance firm contacted the League and the Players' Union 
with plans for an endowment insurance policy for players. Although details of the 
proposed scheme are sketchy, it appears that the League, the Union, clubs and players 
were all expected to contribute to an endowment policy which was to mature when the 
player reached 32. Both the League and Union executives agreed to proceed with the 
scheme before the onset of hostilities left it in abeyance. 172 
There were opportunities to remain within League football at some level after 
finishing playing, mainly as a trainer, coach or scout but increasingly by the 1920s as a 
manager or what was contemporaneously called a 'players' manager'. Many trainers 
were former professionals and were often promoted directly from the playing to the 
training-staff. Yet it must be understood that in terms both of income and status, a 
training job was not markedly dissimilar from a playing engagement and was equally 
insecure. For example, the Irish international William Gillespie was engaged as a 
coach by Sheffield United in 1930 whilst still playing first team football. He then 
took up the coaching position full-time but within two seasons he was informed that 
the club 'had no, ftirther use for his services owing to the appointment of a new 
manager'. 173 There was also a tendency from the 1920s for clubs to appoint former 
players as professional managers in place of the directors or secretaries who had 
previously been responsible for team affairs. Though this transformation was gradual 
and uneven, by 1923 Sutcliffe was able to justify the introduction of players' 
managers at Preston, Stoke and Hull City 'not on the principle of set a thief to catch a 
thief, but because they have, or seem to have, the necessary qualities to make good'. 174 
But such positions were obviously limited and probably open only to the most able 
and reliable of former players. 
171 PFA, File 33, Watson Hartley to Fay, 21 August 1934; Fay to Hartley, 24 August 1934. 
171 See Minutes of AFPTU, 8,22 May, 21 August 1939 (AGM). 
173 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 26 February, 30 July 1930; 8 June 1932. 
11 Topical Times, 7 April 1923. On the development of professional managers ee Wagg, Football 
World, chapter 5; Fishwick, English Football, pp. 35-38. 
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Similarly, fully-fledged coaching jobs - as opposed to training jobs which really 
involved simply maintaining the physical fitness of players - were extremely scarce at 
Football League clubs even by the end of the period. As Wagg has shown, many 
League clubs, administrators and even players remained ideologically opposed to the 
concept of coaching football skills 
175 and the continent therefore offered far more, and 
better, opportunities for former League players who wished to coach. It is impossible 
to calculate exactly how many took this route but it seems certain that by the Second 
World War ex-League players were to be found coaching throughout most of Europe 
and beyond. Jimmy Hogan, for one, left Bolton Wanderers to coach in Holland 
during 1911 and continued to make his living coaching throughout Europe, including 
spells with the Austrian Olympic and Dutch national sides, before finally returning to 
England to coach Fulham in 1934. Another former League goalkeeper who had been 
coaching in France since 1911 noted in 1920 that 'it would not be possible to obtain a 
living wage in England for my services'. 176 The first step towards professional 
training and regulation of coaches in England was eventually taken by the FA, which 
from 1934 began to organise annual coaching courses which were attended by League 
trainers, managers and players, though amateurs also took part. Those who passed 
received official FA coaching certificates which were intended to help them secure 
positions at schools, colleges or even within the professional game: in fact, the FA's 
list of regional coaches in 1935/36 included a number of former elite players such T. 
Sampey in the Sheffield and Hallarnshire area and Jesse Pennington in 
Worcestershire, whose job it was to co-ordinate and supervise schoolboy coaching in 
their region. 177 Wagg has suggested that this initiative encountered considerable 
resistance at League and club level but there is little evidence to support this claim. In 
fact, Sheffield United and Oldham Athletic both sent their entire training-staff on the 
coaching course and Huddersfield Town, among others, also encouraged its players to 
attend. Even so, no comparable initiatives came from Preston, despite the fact that 
Hartley's 1934 scheme had included a proposal to establish several regional centres 
175 See Wagg, Football World, pp. 12,32-33,60-6 1. 
176 Catton Folders, B-C, Letter from Charles Bunyan to Catton, 2December 1920, p. 20 1. On Hogan 
see Tony Mason, 'Some Englishmen and Scotsmen Abroad: The Spread of World Football' in Alan 
Tomlinson and Garry Whannel (eds. ),Off The Ball: The Football World Cup, London, 1986, p. 74. 
'" See Report of the FA Instructional Classes for Boys in Association Football (ICBAF) Committee, 
1935/36. 
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for the coaching of young players under the supervision of 'well-known players of 
other years'. 178 
Training in areas outside football was also slow to develop with League and club 
officials tending to leave such matters to the individuals concerned. Occasionally 
clubs would assist players in acquiring business or other interests, such as when 
Sheffield United arranged for captain George Utley to become the tenant of a local 
sports shop with a five-year contract to supply equipment to the club, but generally 
players were given no help in providing for their lives after football. 179 In 1936 the 
FA contacted the Board of Education and London County Council in order to arrange 
educational classes for professional footballers in the capital. While the reaction of 
clubs was poor, with only Charlton Athletic and Clapton Orient agreeing to cooperate, 
it did represent a turning-point as regards management's awareness of its 
responsibility for something more than the football education and training of 
employees. Nine Clapton players were able to attend courses in commerce, general 
education and woodwork, while Charlton organised for courses in elementary 
accounts and business methods to be conducted at its ground and enrolled other 
players interested in learning technical subjects at the local Woolwich Polytechnic. 180 
It was not until 1938, however, that the League accepted some responsibility for the 
educational and vocational training of players with the launch of its Jubilee Trust 
Fund. The object was to raise E100,000 for the purpose of financially assisting 
players, ex-players and club officials in times of need and also developing 
arrangements for the re-training of former professionals in new trades or professions. 
To this end each first division club was compelled to contribute L1,000, with those in 
the second and third divisions giving E500 and E250 respectively, while a series of 
pre-season derby matches in August 1938 raised a ftirther E27,443, although even with 
extra donations and another series of Jubilee derbies the following year the fund was 
still some way short of the L100,000 mark. 181 Moreover, the League's delay in 
179 Wagg, Football World, p. 33; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, I June 1937; 
Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 29 June 1938; Minutes of Huddersfield Town FC, 24 May 1939; PFA, 
File 33, Hartley to Fay, 21 August 1934. 
179 Fishwick, English Football, p. 77. 
180 Report of FA ICBAF Committee, 1936/37. 
181 Football League Jubilee Souvenir Booklet, August 1938. On the fund's finances see Inglis, League 
Football, pp. 159,164. 
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deciding precisely how the money was to be distributed, and its reluctance to include 
the Players' Union on the fund Committee, led to accusations by early 1939 that the 
fund had proved 'a flop'. 182 Indeed, arrangements for the vocational element of the 
fund's activities were clearly only at the planning stage by September 1939. Club 
directorates had been asked in January to inquire into the suitability of local facilities 
for vocational training and the Management Committee had embarked on talks with 
the Players' Union as well as with teaching and educational authorities, including the 
Chief Inspector of the Board of Education, but there had been no practical 
achievements and no player was able to benefit from the fund until League football 
proper resumed after the war. 183 
Conclusion 
The change in the status of the professional player in the Football League between the 
turn of the century and the outbreak of the Second World War was more apparent than 
real. It is indeed possible to argue that the elite players were beginning to acquire 
&professional status' as defined by Harold Perkin as 'a career with security of tenure, 
rising scales of pay, and the customary white-collar fringe benefitS'. 184 Certainly, 
clubs were increasingly less likely to dismiss players at short notice as often occurred 
in manual work: almost all had annual contracts and, if incapacitated through injury or 
sickness, were paid until at least the end of their contract and sometimes longer. 
Moreover, the majority of players in the top two divisions and many below enjoyed 
what effectively amounted to fifteen weeks paid holiday during the close season and, 
though a scheme for occupational pensions was still being planned, they were given 
other customary rewards related to loyalty such as benefit payments. There were, 
additionally, indications that the League professional of the 1920s and 1930s had 
acquired a respectability that his predecessors lacked: he seems to have stayed more 
sober, to have been more disciplined and even occasionally to have taken on some of 
the habits of the middle class, like the playing of golf and the driving of motor cars. 
192 PFA, File 33, Hartley to Fay, 6 February 1939; Manchester Evening News, I March 1939. 
183 Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 18,25 January 1939; Minutes of AFPTU, 8 May 1939. 
184 Harold Perkin, The Rise ofProfessional Society England Since 1880, London, 1989, p. 314. 
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Yet in, general there is little doubt that League players were still perceived as 
subordinate employees, rather than self-confident professionals, and had little control 
over their own career structures. With the possible exception of the few star players 
whose outstanding talent gave them a degree of freedom in the labour market, 
Pickford's description of the professional footballer from 1906 was equally pertinent 
to 1939: once registered, he remained 'tied up, "cribbed, cabined, and confined"' and 
was ultimately forced 'to obey club instructioný and do what he is told'. 
185 For 
Sutcliffe and other members of the League executive or club directorates, it was still 
crucial that clubs should 'rule' players and remain 'masters' over their 'men' in every 
possible area of their employment. Indeed, we have seen that most of the benevolent 
and welfare arrangements which benefited players by the late 1930s had not been 
gained by players through their Union but were the product of 'the enlightened self- 
interest' of their employers. In the Football League as in other industries, the 
extension of welfare schemes to cover accidents, pensions, sickness or death was not 
the work of idealistic paternalists but of hard-headed employers intent on maximising 
the efficiency and ensuring the dependence of their workforces at the lowest possible 
cost. 186 
In spite of the institutionalisation of welfare arrangements and the faltering growth of 
unionism, Football League players in the 1930s were still subject to essentially the 
same forms of discipline and techniques of control established in the late nineteenth 
century. While their compliance to the wishes of club directors may be overstated in 
the existing literature, footballers remained nonetheless in a relatively weak position 
in negotiations and disputes with management. Even the arguments used by Union 
officials to force concessions from the League were often wrapped up in a vocabulary 
of paternalism. As late as 1939 Jimmy Fay could declare that club directors 'have a 
moral responsibility similar to the industrial employer to see that their employees are 
paid a fair and just wage, to enable them to live comfortably, and enable them to 
support the home, and if married, the wife and family'. 187 In this respect, the attitude 
of footballers was quite unlike that of actors, or even the less respectable music-hall 
"' Pickford and Gibson (eds), Association Football, vol. 2, p. 200. 
186 Perkin, Professional Society, p. 307; Hay, 'Employers and Social Policy', pp. 439-40. 
187 PFA, File 35, James A. Fay, 'Too Old at Thirty', Draft of Eighth Newspaper Article, 1938/39, 
otherwise undated, p. 3. 
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artistes, who considered themselves as joint partners in agreements with their 
employers. Even the leading football stars would not have regarded their relationship 
with management as the ventriloquist William Herbert Clemart did: 'The artiste is of 
equal importance to a manager as he is to us... I object to the word 'employer'. I am a 
party to a contract'. 188 This was a more complete form of professionalisation - related 
to social and contractual status more than earning power - which was out of place in 
the more regulated and hierarchical employment structure of the Football League. 
1 sg Rutherford, 'Managers in a small way', p. 109. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
'THE STRONG MUST HELP THE WEAK': 
LEAGUE POLICY AND THE EOUALITY QUESTION 
Competition is an inevitable and essential prerequisite for the survival of any modem 
sports club: without opponents there would be no product, no attendances and 
consequently no revenue. Even in their rudimentary stages, prior to the creation of 
cup competitions or leagues, clubs were necessarily dependent upon one other and had 
established economic as well as sporting ties which were crucial to their continued 
existence. At the most basic level, the creation of a league merely formalised these 
relations. But economists of sport both in North America and Europe have gone a 
step ftirther by arguing that professional sports leagues operate in the same 
ftindamental way as do industrial cartels. They can be seen as 'a coalition of teams 
with restrictive practices in both product and labour markets designed to protect the 
interests of member clubs' with 'a central structure... for developing rules and 
enforcing controls'! Where sports cartels arguably differ from industrial ones, 
however, are in their basic functions and objectives. P. J. Sloane has observed that 
while conventional firms usually combine in order to prevent potentially damaging 
price wars, the objective of combination among sports firms is to ensure both the 
production of the common product and the equality of playing competition between 
clubs. 2 
Both modem economists and conventional observers have stressed thý economic 
value of preserving a relative equality between clubs on a match-by-match and longer 
term basis. In short, it is assumed (though it has never been convincingly proven) that 
attendances are higher where the result of a match is uncertain and thus that a league's 
viability depends on keeping clubs as equal in terms of playing strength as possible. 3 
1 J. A. Schofield, 'The Development of First-Class Cricket in England: An Economic Analysis', 
Journal ofIndustrial Economics, 30,4,1982, p. 338. 
2 Sloane, 'Restriction of Competition', p. 6. 
' See P. J. Sloane, Sport in the Market?, Hobart Paper No. 85, London, 1980, pp. 25-6; James Quirk 
and Rodney D. Fort, Pay Dirt: The Business ofProfessional Team Sports, Princeton, 1992, p. 243; 
Arnold, 'Rich man, Poor man', pp. 50-5 1; Keith Sandiford and Wray Vamplew, 'The Peculiar 
Economics of English Cricket Before 1914', BJSH, 3,3,1986, p. 314. 
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Certainly many League officials, club directors and football writers appeared to 
subscribe to this 'uncertainty of outcome' hypothesis and positively encouraged the 
adoption of measures designed to minimise inequality. And, as we shall see, 
compared with the elite county cricket and rugby league tournaments, the Football 
League remained a highly competitive and relatively open championship throughout 
this period. 4 Yet it will be argued in this chapter that equalisation policies, though 
generally accepted and promoted at Committee level, encountered considerable 
resistance from those clubs who were inclined to put self-interest before group- 
interest. Individual clubs were perhaps quite naturally concerned with improving their 
own ground facilities, attendances, playing squad and bank balance: the finances of 
other clubs remained a secondary consideration so long as sufficient opponents 
existed to maintain the viability of the league. Only gradually, and largely through the 
necessary implementation of cross-subsidisation policies during the First World War, 
were the major clubs persuaded to accept the concept of equality as a central plank of 
League policy. It will also be stressed that the support for equalisation policies was 
not simply motivated by economic concerns. Historians have for too long ignored the 
possibility that crudely-defined notions of 'fair competition' and 'playing the game' 
could continue to influence the conduct and values of professional sport years after 
the presumed heyday of the gentleman amateur in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, 
for Sutcliffe, Bentley, Lewis and other important League administrators, whose 
association with football had begun as players in small amateur clubs (see chapter 1), 
an equal league competition was both economically and morally justifiable. In their 
view, every club should have a fair chance to reach the top of the table regardless of 
resources and if a club struggled it should be helped along by its fellow members. 
1. Equalitv and Economic Theorv 
The theoretical ideal of a completely equal and competitively balanced sporting league 
has never been achieved in reality. Economic analyses show that even North 
American sporting leagues, which have adopted equalisation policies throughout their 
histories, have been unable in practice to prevent competitive imbalance and the 
4 See Vamplew, Pay Up, chapter 9 for the pre-First World War period. 
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concentration of championships. Ibis has been most apparent in baseball, where the 
New York Yankees dominated the American League from the 1920s to the 1970s by 
winning 29 of the 50 available pennants, but is evident in all the major American 
professional team sports. Weak or 'problem' clubs also cause perennial difficulties 
for league administrators, though these have been eased in the long-term by changes 
in ownership or franchise moves to more viable cities. 
5 Restrictions in the 
distribution of player talent - mainly through the reserve clause and the player draft - 
have been combined in these leagues with various income-sharing arrangements 
between clubs with the intention of achieving some degree of playing equality. 
However, it is argued that these arrangements have been largely ineffective in 
'balancing playing strengths essentially because franchises are necessarily situated in 
cities with vast differences in population and thus in drawing potential. 
6 Playing 
equ ality has therefore proved to be an illusive and unobtainable ideal. 
Certainly, in the Football League no club reached the level of dominance achieved by 
the New York Yankees. In the 34 official seasons during this period only one club - 
Arsenal - won the first division championship 
five times while the Merseyside 
neighbours Liverpool and Everton were the only clubs to do so on four occasions; it is 
also noteworthy that thirteen clubs held the title at least once. As Table 7.3 shows, the 
most consistently successful club over the whole period, Sunderland, achieved just 15 
top-five finishes in 34 seasons; a poor record when compared with the leading 
Scottish League clubs Celtic and Rangers who were never out of the top-five. 
Moreover, Sunderland was the only leading English side (in Table 7.3) to avoid 
spending at least one season in the second division, suggesting that even the most 
successful clubs suffered periodic setbacks. That is not to deny, of course, that certain 
teams enjoyed short periods of dominance. One can point to Huddersfield Town's 
triple-championship victories from 1923/24 to 1925/26 and Arsenal's repeat of this in 
the early 1930s. Nevertheless, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate that long-term domination 
of the highest positions by either a single club or a group of clubs was rare. Only 
Sunderland, Aston Villa and Sheffield Wednesday appear on both the pre- and post- 
Quirk and FoM Pay Dirt, chapter 7; Sloane, 'Restriction of Competition', p. 15. 
See James Quirk and Mohamed El Hodiri, 'The Economic Theory of a Professional Sports League' in 
Roger G. Noll (ed. ), Government and the Sports Business, Washington, 1974, pp. 33-58. 
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1914 tables and, though this suggests that they enjoyed a disproportionate share of 
playing success, it hardly equates with a sustained period of superiority. Indeed, it 
might be argued from this evidence that no core group of elite clubs existed in the 
Football League before 1939. 
Table 7.1 Championship record of most successful Football League clubs, 1900/01-1914/15 
Ist 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Top Five 
Newcastle United 3 0 2 3 0 8 
Aston Villa 1 5 0 1 1 8 
Sunderland 2 1 3 0 1 7 
Blackburn Rovers 2 0 2 2 1 7 
Everton 1 4 1 1 0 7 
Sheff icid Wednesday 1 0 2 0 3 6 
Total 10 10 10 7 6 43 
Possible Maximum is is is is is 75 
Source: Jim Mallory (ed. ), Football League Tables, London, 1977. 
Table 7.2 Championship record of most successful Football League clubs, 1919/20-1938/39 
Ist 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Top Five 
Huddersfield Town 3 3 2 1 1 10 
Arsenal 5 2 1 0 1 9 
Sunderland 1 2 3 1 1 8 
Sheffield Wednesday 2 0 4 0 0 6 
Liverpool 2 0 0 3 1 6 
Aston Villa 0 2 1 1 2 6 
Total 13 9 11 6 6 45 
Possible Maximum 19 19 19 19 19 95 
Source: Mallory, League Tabks. 
Table 7.3 Competition Dominance of Football League and Scottish Football League Clubs, 1900/01- 
1938/39 
Football Leaeue 
Top Five Finishes 
Scottish Lcaeue 
Top Five Finishes* 
Sunderland 15 Celtic 38 
Aston Villa 13 Rangers 38 
Newcastle United 12 Hearts 19 
Sheffield Wednesday 12 Motherwell 16 
Everton II Airdrie II 
Liverpool 10 Falkirk 10 
Huddersfield Town 10 Aberdeen 8 
Total 83 140 
Possible Maximum 170 190* 
Scottish League continued for four seasons during the First World War 
Source: Mallory, League Tabks. 
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Variations in championship distribution and top-five places are of course not the only 
method of assessing league equality. Vamplew has attempted to calculate the degree 
of equality between clubs within each season from 1888/89 to 1914/15 by measuring 
7 the extent to which winning percentages deviated from the 50% ideal. The greater 
the deviations recorded, the higher the static equality of competition (S. E. C. ) and 
consequently the less equal the clubs in that particular competition are. Comparisons 
were made between the major football leagues in England and Scotland and with 
cricket's county championship and the Northern Rugby Football League, the main 
results of which are summarised in Table 7.4. On the basis of these calculations, the 
first and second divisions of the Football League both emerge as considerably more 
competitive than other sporting leagues before the First World War, with mean 
S. E. C. 's of 10.5 and 14.1 respectively compared with the next lowest S. E. C. of 17.2 
for county cricket. Tbrough measuring dynamic equality of competition (D. E. C. ), 
Vamplew has also shown that the first division of the League exhibited greater 
equality over time than did the other leagues; this, in turn, supports the view that long- 
term ascendancy was rare and that the constituency of the League elite was variable. 
Another method of measuring equality has been employed by Michael E. Canes in an 
analysis of American professional and college leagues. 8 His focus on the winning 
percentages 9 of each championship club and the percentage of successive 
championship victories has been applied (where possible) in Table 7.5 to each 
division of the FootbaH League along with the Scottish first division and the rival 
Southern League. Again the Football League first division championship emerges as 
the closest competition, although champions of the lower divisions were able to win 
slightly more often. The clearest contrast is with the Scottish League champions, who 
between 1900/0 1 and 193 8/3 9 recorded a mean winning percentage of 8 1.0 compared 
with just 68.1 for their English counterparts: in fact the mean figure for Scotland was 
greater than (or equal to) the highest winning percentages in all but the Football 
League second division. This relative inequality is also reflected by the fact that the 
Scottish champions were able to repeat their success the subsequent season over 50% 
7 Vamplew, Pay Up, chapter 9, especially Tables 9.2,9.5,9.12,9.13,9.14,9.15,9.20 and 9.2 1. 
8 Michael E. Canes, 'The Social Benefits of Restrictions on Team Quality' in Noll, Government and 
Sports, pp. 85-92. 
9 Canes actually looked at won-lost percentages as few American sports permit drawn games; this is less 
applicable to British football which has a high percentage of draws. 
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of the time, while the percentages were just 20 and 13.3 respectively for the top 
divisions of the Football and Southern Leagues. 
Tahle 7.4 Static and Dynamic equality of competition in British football, cricket and rugby league, 
1888-1915 
Competition Period Mean S. E. C. * D. E. C. " Range 
One-year lag Ten-ycar lag 
Football League First Division 1888/89-1914/15 10.5 0.23-0.64 0.19-0.26 
Football League Second Division 1892/93-1914/15 14.1 n/a n/a 
Scottish League First Division 1890/91-1914/15 18.3 0.54-0.61 0.2M. 33 
Scottish League Second Division 1896/97-1898/99 20.0 n/A n/a 
1902/03-1913/14 
Cricket County Championship 1892-1914 17.2 0.53-0.64 0.31-0.47 
Northern Rugby Football League 1905/06-1914/15 19.7 0.63 n1a 
As measured by the standard deviation of winning percentages each season. Draws were classed as a 50% win to both sides. 
00 As measured by the mean rank order correlation of championship positions. 
Source: Vamplew, Pay Up, chapter 9. 
Tahle 7.5 Winning Percentages* of Championship clubs and Successive Championship Victories in 














Football League First 1900/01-1914/15 67.6 79.4 60.5 6.7 
Division 1919/20-1938/39 69.5 78.6 61.9 30.0 
1900/01-1938/39 68.1 79.4 60.5 20.0 
Football League Second 1900/01-1914/15 75.6 86.8 68.4 n/a 
Division 1919/20-1938/39 69.1 83.3 63.1 n/a 
1900/01-1939/39 71.9 86.8 63.1 n1a 
Football League Third 1920/21-1938/39 70.6 81.0 64.3 n/a 
Division (S) 
Football League Third 1921/22-1938/39 71.4 79.9 66.7 n/a 
Division (N) 
Scottish League First 1900/01-1938/39 81.0 90.5 72.4 51.3 
Division 
Southern League First 1900/01-1914/15 71.0 80.0 65.8 13.3 
Division 
0 Draws classed as a 50% win. 
Sources: Calculated from data in Mallory, League Tables; Harrison, Southern League Football. 
The relative equality of competition in the Football League when compared with its 
competitors in football and other team sports has generally been explained by the 
success of four initiatives: the retain-and-transfer system; the maximum wage; central 
control over league quality; and pooling or income-sharing arrangements. Certainly 
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the lack of some form of stipulated maximum payment for players and the absence of 
a system for controlling the size and quality of the competing group - such as the 
promotion/relegation and election systems in the League - have both frequently been 
posited as reasons for the inequalities of the Scottish football, county cricket and 
rugby league championships. ' 0 Yet theoretical and empirical studies concerned with 
whether such arrangements actually bring about greater competition within leagues 
have often proved inconclusive. Economists have cast considerable doubt, for 
instance, on the utility of the reserve clause and other restrictions on player mobility in 
American team sports as a means of increasing closeness of sporting competition, an 
argument which has also been applied to the League's retain-and-transfer system. 
" 
There is similarly little conclusive evidence that these Football League initiatives had 
a significant equalising effect before 1939. Measurements of the effectiveness of the 
retain-and-transfer system in this respect are especially troublesome as it operated 
from the early 1890s. Some attempt can be made, however, to assess the impact of 
the maximum wage, introduced for the 1901/02 season. Table 7.6 shows that for the 
first division the mean S. E. C. and championship winning percentage was lower in the 
five seasons following the wage rule than before, suggesting a more equal 
competition. The contrast was less marked in the second division, where the winning 
percentage of the first-placed club actually increased after 1901/02 
12; and even in the 
first division there were seasons, such as 1904/05, in which equality of competition 
was worse than pre-maximum wage levels. 
'0 Sandiford and Vamplew, 'Economics of English Cricket', pp. 314-17; Schofield, 'Development of 
First-Class Cricket', pp. 341,357; Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 139-44,148-5 1. 
" See especially various essays in Noll, Government andSports; Quirk and Fort, Pay Dirt, pp. 268-93; 
Sloane, 'Restriction of Competition', pp. 14-17. 
12 The maximum wage probably had less impact in the second division as fewer clubs were able to pay 
L4 to many players either before or after 1901. 
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Table 7.6 Relative Equality of Football League first and second divisions before and after the 
introduction of the Maximum Wage Rule in 1901/02 
Season First Di Ision 




S. E. C* Winning percentage 
of championsbip 
clubs" 
1896/97 10.9 78.3 13.7 70.0 
1997/98 9.3 70.0 17.3 80.0 
1898/99 8.2 66.2 17.0 75.0 
1899/1900 10.9 73.5 17.6 79.4 
1900/01 9.0 66.2 11.6 72.1 
Mean Total 9.7 70.8 15.4 75.3 
1901/02 5.6 64.7 13.7 80.9 
1902/03 8.5 61.9 14.3 79.4 
1903/04 10.6 69.1 12.3 73.5 
1904/05 12.9 70.6 18.1 85.3 
1905/06 9.3 67.1 16.2 86.8 
Mean Total 9.2 66.5 14.9 81.2 
As measured in Table 7.4 
As measured in Table 7.5 
Source: Based on data in Vamplew, Pay Up. p. 134 (Table 9.12); Table 7.5 (above). 
Table 7.7 Performances of promoted and elected clubs in the Football League, 1900/01-1938/39 
First Division LA9 
Average Division* Average 
position of position of 
Clubs Clubs in promoted Clubs in division elected clubs 
Period promoted division clubs in first in first 
season Clubs elected season 
1900/01-1904/05 10 19 10 6 18 12 
1905/06-1914/15 20 20 12 13 20 9 
1919/20-1928/29 21 22 14 is 22** 13 
1929/30-1938/39 20 22 11 7 22 13 
First Division Last Division! 
Remained in 
Clubs division at least Remained in League at Promoted within two 
Period promoted two seasons Clubs elected least two seasons seasons 
1900/01-1909/10 22 19 15 13 2 
1910/11-1919/20 13 12 990 
1920/21-1929/30 Is 16 10 10 1 
1930/31-1937/38 18 17 550 
Second Division from 1900/01-1919/20. Third Division for 1920/21 and Third Divisions North and South 
thereafter. 
In its first two seasons (1921/22 and 1922/23) the Third Division (North) had only 20 clubs. 
Based on Table 9.7 in Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 127. 
Source: Calculated from data in Mallory, League Tables. 
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Sloane has suggested that an 'equal distribution of income is no less important than an 
equal distribution of playing talent in ensuring equality in terms of sporting 
competition'. 13 But, while approaching nothing like the ideal of pooling all gate 
receipts and club income, the introduction of income-sharing arrangements in the 
Football League from the First World War seems to have been relatively ineffective in 
this respect. As Table 7.5 indicates, there was no marked change in the winning 
percentages of first and second division champions in the inter-war period compared 
with those before the war: in fact, the mean first division figure actually suggests a 
less equal competition after the 20 per cent payment to visiting clubs was established. 
There is more convincing evidence to suggest that the promotion and election systems 
encouraged competition and equality. Table 7.7 shows that the majority of promoted 
or elected clubs performed well in their new positions and managed to survive for at 
least two seasons, and often much longer. The fact that both Liverpool and Everton 
were able to win the first division championship at the first attempt after promotion 
(in 1905/06 and 1931/32 respectively) supports the belief that the lower divisions 
acted as a reservoir of quality clubs capable of increasing competition at the higher 
level to replace weaker sides which dropped down. The election system in the lower 
divisions also worked in this way, although Cardiff City's achievement in the early 
1920s of gaining promotion to the first division in its first season and subsequently 
finishing fourth at the top level was comparatively rare. It may also be that the 'closed 
shop' which developed in the third division northern and southern sections for much 
of the inter-war period impeded equalisation of competition as consistently weak 
playing sides were generally not replaced by stronger clubs outside the League (see 
chapter 2). 14 
Notwithstanding the limited and unsophisticated nature of this statistical approach, the 
success of the equalisation measures employed between 1900 and 1939 has proved to 
be mixed. With the possible exception of the promotion system, there is little 
evidence that these policies substantially assisted the attainment of equality within the 
Football League. However, the important point for our purposes is that key figures 
13 Sloane, 'Restriction of Competition', p. 10. 
14 Barrow, for instance, finished bottom of the third division (north) on four occasions during the 1920s 
but still survived. 
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within the League hierarchy were convinced that they did. 15 The remainder of this 
chapter will thus concentrate on the attitudes and debates surrounding the introduction 
and development of policies designed to promote equality. It will also trace the 
evolution of what might be regarded as an ideology of equality within League circles, 
formed around notions of fair competition, mutual support and the ambivalent concept 
of 'friendship'. 
2. Equalitv of Plavina Talent: The Maximum Waae and the Transfer Svstem 
In most sports, the principal step taken to attain equality of competition has involved 
the distribution of the major resource - playing talent. The American sports of 
basketball and football have traditionally used direct measures like the college or 
rookie draft, which attempts to equalise performance by giving teams with weaker 
playing records first choice of new players. 16 However, indirect measures to control 
the mobility and payment of players have been more common on both sides of the 
Atlantic. First-class cricket developed a system of county qualifications from 1873 
which allowed a player to compete either for his county of birth or his county of 
residence, although he was required to complete a two-year qualifying period before 
playing for his residential county. But it has been recognised that this did little to 
reverse the fundamental disparity between counties with vastly contrasting population 
sizes and financial resources and even led to an increased concentration of playing 
talent. 17 Residential qualifications were occasionally advocated in the Football 
League as an alternative to the maximum wage in order to protect poorer clubs'8, but 
the fact that clubs were based around towns and cities rather than counties and that 
football players were more mobile from the very beginning, probably precluded 
serious discussion on this point. Rugby League authorities chose to impose a 
maximum player roster, similar to the team player limits in American baseball and ice 
hockey, but there is again little evidence that the high 75-man limit prevented the 
15 As Vamplew has noted, 'it is not calculated truths which determine a club's [or a League's] policy; 
what they believe to be true is far more significant'. Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 174. 
16 Tony Arnold and Ivor Benveniste, 'Cross Subsidisation and Competition Policy in English 
Professional Football', Journal ofIndustrial Affairs, vol. 15,1988, p. 2. 
17 Sandiford and Vamplew, 'Economics of English Cricket', p. 314; Sissons, The Players, pp. 85-89. 
" See Major Frank Buckley's comments in Catton Folders, B-C, Newspaper cutting, 13 January 1919, 
p. 196. 
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monopolisation of talent by the wealthier clubs. 19 In the Football League, however, 
the retain-and-transfer system and the maximum wage became the comerstones of 
equalisation policy before the First World War. 
For contemporaries, these measures served a dual purpose: they enabled clubs to 
control their employees and prevented the wealthier clubs buying up the best players. 
Many supporters of the transfer system believed its primary aim from the beginning 
was to maintain some degree of competitive balance within the League. Athletic 
News argued in 1895 that 'it will be a bad day for the League, the clubs, and the 
players when freedom all round is given. Teams must be comparatively level to 
sustain the interest - if they are not, receipts fall off, and without receipts players 
cannot be paid wages. 20 When a club signed a player he remained its property 'for 
League purposes forever, unless an arrangement is made for his transfer'. 21 Interested 
parties could be deterred by placing a prohibitive fee on the players' head but, if this 
proved unsuccessful, clubs still received compensation in the form of the transfer fee 
which could then be used to replace the lost player and improve the playing squad. By 
the 1900s League officials regarded the system as a fundamental and highly successful 
contribution to equalisation. Writing in 190 1, president John Bentley suggested that 
The chief object of the League is... to provide for an equality of strength as 
far as is practicable, and it is just here that the transfer law is of value, for 
anyone interested in the game knows perfectly well that if half a dozen 
wealthy organisations; snapped up all the best players, the interest in the 
League Championship would be reduced to a minimum. 22 
William Bassett, an international forward, future club director and League 
Committeeman, was convinced that without the considerable sums received from 
selling players, clubs like West Bromwich Albion, Barnsley and Bury would have 
been forced out of business. 23 Indeed, few commentators in the period doubted the 
orthodox view that the transfer system encouraged a levelling of playing performance. 
19 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 148. 
20 Quoted in Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 62. 
21 William 1. Bassen, 'Big Transfers and the Transfer System' in Book ofFoothall, London, 1906, p. 
160. 
22 Athletic News, 29 April 190 1. 
23 Bassett, 'Big Transfers', p. 160. 
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In response to the Southern League's decision to grant freedom of contract to its 
players in 1920, Charles Sutcliffe reaffirmed the overarching League ideology of 
equality. 'Freedom of contract' he argued, was 'contrary to the true League spirit. 
The strong must help the weak. Each for all and all for each. The gospel of the 
survival of the fittest is rotten in sport'. 24 
Limits on transfer fees were also recommended at various times by officials and club 
directors but the idea never received sufficient club or Committee support and, in fact, 
opinion was mixed as to whether such a limit would be an obstacle or an aid to 
equality. In 1905 dissatisfaction with escalating transfer prices had provoked the FA 
to enforce a E350 maximum fee but this was easily evaded when in came into 
25 operation in 1908 and lasted just three months. Athletic News advocated a fixed 
limit in 1911 on the grounds that high transfer prices negated the League's existing 
measures to equalise playing ability. 'The present system of allowing the highest 
bidder to capture the best player is a menace to the protection of the weaker club that 
has been the policy of The League for years. 26 Yet it was richer clubs like Arsenal 
and Everton who supported a limit in the 1920s, primarily in order to reduce transfer 
expenditure. 27 Arsenal's chairman, Sir Henry Norris, admitted that 'some of the 
poorer clubs could not exist without large transfer fees' but, in direct opposition to the 
rhetoric of Sutcliffe and others, suggested that 'football was not organised with that 
object, and those that could not carry on should cease'. In contrast, Derby County's 
W. Bendle Moore enunciated the orthodox viewpoint that 'Players were assets to 
small clubs and they should be paid for'. 28 Most clubs evidently agreed with him: 
Arsenal's proposals to set a transfer limit of E1,650 received only five votes out of 40 
in 1922 and ten the following year. 
From its introduction for the 1901/02 season the maximum wage (initially L4 per 
week) was a far more contentious measure within League circles. More than any 
other rule it polarised the rich and poor clubs, who fought an annual battle over the 
" Quoted in Sheffield United FC Programme, 17 April 1920, p. 11. 
25 Green, History ofthe FA, pp. 409-10. 
2'5 Athletic News, 13 November 1911. 
27 See Catton Folders, A-B, Arsenal FC Directors' Report, 1924, p. 2 1. 
28 Reports of Football League AGMs inAthletic News, 5June 1922,4 June 1923. 
259 
issue at the FA AGM for most of the subsequent decade. As we have seen, the wage 
limit was technically an FA rule but there is no doubt that Football League clubs were 
instrumental in its establishment and subsequent defence. Chief among these were 
representatives of Preston North End and Wolverhampton Wanderers, who could also 
rely on the support of League officials like Bentley and Sutcliffe. Fred Rinder, the 
leading opponent of the maximum, argued that initially neither the rich nor the poor 
clubs really wanted the rule; it had, in his view, been created in the interests of ten or 
so middle-sized clubs 'who could pay about 0 per week to a man' . 
29 There is little 
evidence to support this claim. Early attempts to rescind the rule were easily defeated 
and though no systematic data exists to indicate the voting patterns of clubs on the 
issue, it seems that most League members were prepared to experiment with the 
maximurn wage during the early 1900s. By the middle of the decade, however, 
criticisms of the operation of the wage rule were mounting. Many believed the rule 
had failed in its two basic objectives of reducing wage bills and encouraging equality 
of competition. According to Rinder, big city clubs were still able to dominate the 
championship by accumulating large squads and paying each player the ; E4 maximum. 
In addition, a number of clubs were clearly breaching wage and bonus regulations 
with many more undoubtedly going undetected (see chapter 5). 30 This was enough to 
convince Charles Clegg, FA chairman and a director of both Sheffield clubs, that even 
under the maximum wage wealthy clubs were still able to 'get the players they 
wanted' and hence that 'the inequality between the two classes of clubs [rich and 
poor] would not be greatly increased by the removal of the financial restrictions'. 31 
A very different interpretation of the maximum wage was offered by certain 
Committee members and club directors. John Lewis, for instance, League vice- 
president and a prominent authority on the game, had become convinced by 1907 of 
the direct link between the wage limit and increased public interest in League football. 
Though he had always objected to the rule in principle, there was little doubt in his 
mind that the clubs had collectively benefited from 
Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 27 May 190 1. 
10 Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 6 June 1904; Mason, Association Football, pp. 99-100. See 
chapter 5. 
31 Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, I June 1908. 
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the practical equality of the sides engaged in League combat. I don't say 
that the play is better than it was, or as good, but the teams are more equal, 
and therefore the games are more exciting than they would be if they were 
runaway affairs in favour of a few clubs... those who agitate for a return to 
the pre-limit days should consider whether concentration of playing talent 
would lead to unattractive games. 32 
Sutcliffe agreed that the maximum wage 'has done something to equalise opportunity 
and level up and strengthen interest in competition' while Tom Sidney of 
Wolverhampton Wanderers noted in 1908 that 'clubs were of a much more equal 
playing strength than ever they were before'. The wage rule by this stage was 
considered fundamental to the survival of the so-called weaker clubs in the short-term 
and the League itself in the long run. Equality here had both ideological and 
economic value: it gave clubs like Wolves 'a chance to carry off the highest honours 
in the football world' and ultimately saved them from financial ruin. 33 Although the 
advocates of the maximum wage eventually won through, they did not do so without 
mounting opposition from within the League. Indeed, when the issue was debated at 
the FA annual meeting of 1909 only 14 of the 40 League clubs (six from the first 
division and eight from the second) voted to keep the wage limit. Six months later the 
FA Council balloted the 75 clubs in membership of the Football and Southern 
Leagues and found from the replies that 12 clubs favoured the abolition of wage 
restrictions and 19 opposed it. 
34 For the first decade of the twentieth century, then, the 
League remained divided on the maximum wage issue, giving it neither unanimous 
support nor condemnation. But by 19 10 the richer clubs appear to have been prepared 
to tolerate its continuance and redirected their energies towards the introduction of 
bonus payments. 
Sporting leagues have generally chosen to avoid more direct forms of control over the 
playing strengths of their members which 'would require the league to act as a multi. 
plant firm which allocated staff to various parts of the country as circumstances 
dictated'. 35 In the Football League, as we noted above, belief in the ideology of 
32 Athletic News, 4 March 1907. 
33 Athletic News, 8 February 1909; Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, I June 1908. The idea of 
equality having 'economic value' is taken from Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 174. The case of Wolves was 
particularly apt as they had won the FA Cup in 1908 as a second division side by beating reigning 
League champions Newcastle United in the final. 
"' Minutes of FA Council, 17 January 1910; Athletic News, 13 September 1909. 
35 Sloane, 'Restriction of Competition', p. 17. 
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equality meant the exclusion of clubs with consistently substandard playing records 
through the relegation and re-election systems. But on the rare occasions when clubs 
were weakened through long-term player suspensions, the League executive 
encouraged a more direct method of equalisation. The case of Manchester City in 
1906 is instructive here. In the summer of that year an FA Commission found the 
club guilty of illegal payments to its players over a number of years and suspended 17 
of its squad from playing football until the following January while banning them 
permanently from appearing for the club. Given this situation, Bentley wrote to all 
first division clubs explaining that City had 'been permanently deprived of the 
services of the majority of its players' and that he thought it was 'unfair for the board 
to start the season without... funds and with but few players. ' He then issued an 
unprecedented appeal on behalf of the 'unfortunate' club: 
League clubs ought, according to the original first rule of the League, to 
support each other. This is their opportunity, and I would seriously and 
with the greatest confidence, ask them to assist Manchester City to the 
extent of offering the transfer of players nominally free, with the proviso 
that when the City is in a position to negotiate, the... Management 
Committee should be allowed to fix an equitable fee. 
I sincerely hope your directors will favourably consider the matter, and 
thus show that the Football League is not merely a name, but a body of 
clubs loyally banded together to assist and support each other, especially 
in times of need. 
Manchester City just now is greatly in need of assistance and 
encouragement. Let them have it. 36 
Although a majority of clubs apparently offered players or other assistance, some were 
highly critical of Bentley's intervention. An anonymous 'Director of a League Club' 
from Sheffield regarded Bentley's appeal as 'one of the most remarkable letters which 
has ever been written by one who holds a high position in football legislation'. The 
president was accused of acting as a 'special pleader' for a dishonest, rule-breaking 
club while 
to clubs who have loyally carried out the rules as they stand, and who 
owing to misfortune are on the bottom rung of the League table and have 
not the finances available to improve their position, he turns a deaf ear, 
36 John Bentley Circular to Football League Clubs, quoted in Athletic News, II June 1906. 
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and no helping hand in the shape of an appeal is issued, and he leaves 
them to sink. 
Significantly, Bentley responded to this criticism by pointing out that there were 
economic as well as sentimental reasons behind his appeal, because a club with novice 
playerswould be unable to compete at the required level and 'anyone conversant with 
club management is aware that a team beaten week after week ceases to be a drawing 
power, especially away'. 37 In general, however, the League steered away from this 
type of centralised control over player movement, leaving the transfer system and the 
maximum wage to limit the concentration of football talent which might otherwise 
develop in a free and unregulated labour market. 
3. Subsidising the Poor: Income Sharing and Mutual Support 
Like the maximum wage, income sharing became a highly contentious issue which 
tended to divide the wealthy big city clubs and their less well-off compatriots. The 
original Football League scheme drawn up by William McGregor and a small band of 
club representatives in March 1888 had included a rule stipulating that all gates be 
pooled but this was subsequently rejected in favour of home clubs keeping the gate 
38 
receipts and providing a small guarantee of E12 to the visitors. This arrangement, 
too, was abandoned within two years due to the massive increases in gate money and a 
series of proposals in the early 1890s and then again in 1901 and 1908 for gate 
receipts to be equally divided were similarly dismissed. 39 Indeed, it is evident that 
prior to the First World War there were relatively few calls to introduce income 
redistribution. James Catton certainly believed that the absence of gate-sharing was 
the League's primary weakness but even McGregor could accept by the mid-1900s 
that the pooling of gates would probably in the early days have created 'friction and 
unrest' between the richer and poorer clubs and that it would now 'lead to badly 
managed clubs being bailed out by the well-managed' . 
40 The Scottish Football 
37 Athletic News, 18 June, 2 July 1906. 
3' Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 3,5. 
39 Catton, The Real Foothall, p. 87; Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 20 May 190 1; 
Minutes of Football League, 29 May 1908. 
`0 Catton Folders, E-F, Notes for a speech on 'The Football League', undated, p. 500c; McGregor, 
'Origin and Future', p. 5. 
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League, in contrast, had adopted gate-sharing arrangements from the beginning, 
although the two-thirds home to one-third away distribution it initially settled for was 
evidently insufficient to save clubs with near village populations like Dumbarton, 
Renton and Vale of Leven from extinction. By 1905 it had opted for an equal division 
of gate-money in order to subsidise the clubs with low attendances and provide some 
competition for the dominant trio of Rangers, Celtic and Hearts .41 No doubt the 
relative equality of the Football League via wage and transfer restrictions persuaded 
the executive not to intervene in this sensitive area of gate-money for the time being. 
Opposition to the principle of gate-sharing was based largely on the long-standing 
assumption that this form of income was purely the product of the home club's 
endeavour. In this view, crowds came to watch the home side play - not the visitors - 
and thus it was logical that it should keep its own gate receipts as reward for 
investment in players, ground facilities and other good management practices. Indeed, 
the issue of ground facilities was particularly sensitive for those clubs who by the 
early 1900s were beginning to erect covered stands and make other ground 
improvements (see chapter 9). As a Liverpool director put it in 1901: 'clubs which 
had provided covered accommodation... should reap the rewards. Why should they be 
called upon to divide with, say Bury, who had little or no covered accommodation? 942 
W. R. Clayton of Everton -a club which had spent over E50,000 on two new stands 
and other developments between 1907 and 1909 alone to create 'by far the best 
equipped ground in England A3 - similarly objected to the idea of enterprising and 
modernising clubs paying 'out of their gates for the up-keep of the so-called weaker 
organisations'. 44 
It took the outbreak of war in 1914, however, to force the richer clubs to accept 
income redistribution, initially through the mechanism of the Relief Fund. The 
intention was that each club would pay two and a half per cent of its gate, and players 
between 5 and 15 per cent of their wages, to a central Fund administered by the 
Management Committee 'for the purpose of assisting necessitous clubs' who had 
41R. M. Connell, 'The Scottish Football League and its History' in Book OfFootball. p. 267. 
42 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 20 May 190 1. 
43 Inglis, Football Grounds, p. 214. 
" Athletic News, 7 August 1916. 
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particularly suffered from the drop in attendances. Sutcliffe estimated that E8,000 was 
needed to help 14 clubs who were in particular financial difficulties and indeed 18 of 
the 40 League members applied for assistance from the Fund at some point during the 
1914/15 season. 45 In introducing the scheme, the executive had returned to the 
established rhetoric of solidarity and mutual support: 
The loyalty of the League clubs cannot be questioned. At heart we are 
faithful adherents to the League spirit. In a critical period in the history of 
the game devotion to the League is of paramount importance. Our 
personal and individual interests must be sacrificed to the common good... 
The strong clubs must come to the help of the weak. 46 
Yet this rhetoric could at times appear flimsy in the light of the behaviour of clubs like 
Derby County, which was forced by the Committee to pay back a sum of E350 
received from the Relief Fund when it had actually made a profit that year of over 
E500.47 The Fund was dissolved at the end of the 1914/15 season and, for the first 
time, a system of pooling gate receipts was introduced in the newly organised 
Lancashire and Midland sections. 
In the Principal Competition which lasted the first half of the season, clubs retained 
their own gate receipts as before but the Subsidiary Competition from January to April 
was formulated on a more equitable basis, with the Midland section deciding to split 
the gate equally between the home and away club and the Lancashire group requiring 
each member to contribute half of the gate to a common pool to be shared equally by 
the 12 clubs at the end of the season. 4thletic News applauded the willingness of 
clubs to help 'each other to survive in times of peril' and enthusiastically backed such 
schemes which exemplified the 'the true League principle of mutual support'. 48 There 
is little doubt that the less wealthy clubs benefited substantially from these pooling 
arrangements. Table 7.8 shows that in the Lancashire Competition two-thirds of the 
members derived more income through pooling than they would have gained under 
the previous system. Indeed, Blackpool publicly thanked its richer neighbours for 
45 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 85-86; Inglis, League Football, p. 95. 
46 Quoted in Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 83. 
47 minutes of Sheffield United Football Conunittee, 28 June 1915; Report of Football League AGM in 
Athletic News, 26 July 1915. 
48 Athletic News, 21 February, 17 January 1916. 
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'falling into line over the pooling system' while the Preston chairman admitted that 
his club would have had to leave the League without the money received from the 
pool. 49 Everton, Liverpool and Manchester City, each of whom lost over E450 as a 
result of the pooling arrangement, were evidently less favourable. At the 1916 annual 
meeting these richer clubs masterminded a return to the pre-war system, partly by 
threatening to establish an independent breakaway section if pooling was continued 
(see chapter 4). For the Everton chairman, W. R. Clayton, pooling was contrary to 
established League principles and practices, whether its purpose was equality or 
survival: 
... from the 
inception of the League there has never, until the war started, 
been any pooling of gates. When clubs have applied for membership of 
the League, they have always been asked about the support they can 
guarantee, financial and otherwise. Had they for any moment expressed 
the slightest doubt as to the support upon which they could rely they 
would not have secured admission... Under these circumstances why 
should these clubs come to us now and ask for a proportion of our 
takings[? ]50 
By January, however, a series of extremely low gates led Bury to organise a 
conference of 'clubs with inadequate support' in Lancashire in an attempt to convince 
their wealthier rivals to agree to the re-introduction of gate pooling. They failed but 
the 'big three' Lancastrian clubs did make voluntary contributions of L200 each into a 
Fund administered by League president John McKenna to provide financial aid 'as 
occasion requires, to clubs in need'. 51 In the Midland section, Birmingham donated 
DOO while Rotherham County, Chesterfield, Sheffield Wednesday and Sheffield 
United gave E50 to a similar central Fund for clubs 'in financial difficulties'. 52 
49 Athletic News, 12 June, 29 May 1916. 
30 Athletic News, 7 August 1916. 
51 Athletic News, 1,15,22 January 1917. 
52 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 14 February 1917. 
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Table 7.8 Gains and losses under the Lancashire Subsidiary Competition pooling system, 1916. 
Club I Amount Paid into Pool (in pounds) Gain or loss* (in pounds) 
Liverpool 861 -513 
Everton 809 -461 
Manchester City 806 -458 
Manchester United 372 - 24 
Stockport 261 87 
Burnley 222 126 
Blackpool 213 135 
Bolton Wanderers 156 191 
Oldham Athletic 155 193 
Prcston North End 148 200 
Bury 134 214 
Southport 55 294 
Each club received E348 from the pool. 
Source: Alhkfic News. 8 May 1916. 
Despite this, the pressure from below to return to some form of pooling or division of 
gate-money for the 1917/18 season continued to mount. Although the Sheffield clubs, 
amongst others, remained convinced that there 'should be no Pooling whatever' 53 , the 
poorer clubs were able to enlist the support of McKenna and other members of the 
executive. In fact, it was McKenna who devised the scheme for 20 per cent of the 
home club's net gate (including stand charges) to be paid to the visitors in the main 
competition and the same percentage to be pooled in the supplementary matches. 
There is little doubt that without the president's advocacy of the scheme it would not 
have been accepted. 54 Clayton, for one, 'expressed his confirmed objection to pooling 
as a principle' but contended 'that the rich were consenting parties to the President's 
plan because it was wartime'; the Sheffield United Committee also assented to the 
scheme 'as a temporary arrangement'. 55 It is, moreover, worth noting that 
Nottingham Forest's more radical plan for one common pool for both sections was 
rejected by the Lancashire members, who were not prepared to extend financial aid to 
the midland clubs (see chapter 4). 
53 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 14 March 1917. 
54 See James Catton's retrospective comments on this in All Sports Weekly, II September 1926. 
35 Report of Football League AGM inAthletic News, 17 July 1917; Minutes of Sheffield United 
Football Committee, 25 June 1917. 
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The ideology of mutual support and co-operation was further cemented as official 
League policy when the competition proper resumed after the war. This became 
evident, firstly, in the arrangement established by Sutcliffe to enable the doubling of 
players' expenses to L2 in January 1919. The League executive was convinced that 
only a handful of clubs could afford such an increase but persuaded its members to 
accept a scheme whereby the ten best supported clubs sent in weekly contributions to 
subsidise 17 of the most 'needy clubs'. 56 According to Simon Inglis, this was 'the 
typical Sutcliffe formula: the rich helping the poor, to keep the family strong'. 57 
Secondly, Sutcliffe and others began to advocate the division of gate-money as both a 
permanent measure and, significantly, as a visiting club's right rather than as an act of 
benevolence on the part of the richer clubs. Sutcliffe certainly believed that 'the 
visiting team provided half the attraction. They do as much to draw the gate as the 
home team'. 58 When in early 1920 a Birmingham director proposed the creation of a 
'charitable pool' administered by the Management Committee instead of the 20 per 
cent to visitors, the idea was rejected outright by the executive and the majority of 
club representatives. Athletic News summed up this change in attitude: 'Clubs do not 
ask for charity. Every team that visits Birmingham helps Birmingham to draw its 
gate, and it is the acknowledgement of this right that clubs ask for. '59 However, at the 
same time the visitor's share of the gate was modified so that the 20 per cent applied 
only to the 9d. basic admission fee for each spectator and not also to the stand and 
enclosure receipts as had operated previously, a move aimed to pacify those clubs who 
had spent heavily on stand accommodation. This came as a major blow to clubs like 
Bury, who estimated that they were only likely to draw f 150 per season from the new 
system, compared with the E750 received the season before. 60 
By the mid-1920s the principle of gate pooling could no longer be considered an 
experiment: it had become enshrined as League policy. There was evidently some 
pressure to abandon the system in 1923 but McKenna was adamant that 'they ought to 
" Report of Football League SGM in Athletic News, 20 January 1919. 
57 Inglis, League Foothall, p. 112. 
" Athletic News, 13 January 1919. 
59 Athletic News, 22 March 1920. 
60 Sheffield United FC Programme, 3 April 1920. Home clubs were subsequently required to pay a 
small fee (initially I d. ) per head for all season tickets issued. 
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see the industrial cloud raised before they took away that assistance which the poorer 
clubs were wanting'. 61 At the next annual meeting the Management Committee 
formally proposed the continuation of the 20 per cent allocation to visifing sides and 
there was no concerted attempt to remove the rule during the remainder of the 
period. 62 It may be that the richer clubs were prepared to put up with the system 
because they were paying out relatively small sums. The account books of Sheffield 
United, for example, show that the club rarely paid out or received a balance of over 
E500 during the course of a season and even a poorly-supported club like Oldham 
Athletic - who spent time in the first, second and third division north between the 
wars - only made a profit of over fl, 000 on the pool exchange once (see Appendix 
12). After dropping into the third division in 1923/24, Wolverhampton Wanderers 
could bemoan the fact that it had to send out cheques to visitors twice as large as it 
received in return but such instances were rare, not least because pooling operated 
strictly within divisions and there was no attempt to redistribute income across the 
League as a whole. 63 Indeed, these limitations contributed to proposals in the early 
1930s aimed at increasing the percentage to visiting clubs. In 1931, Derby County 
attempted to have the 20 per cent increased to 40 per cent to help clubs suffering from 
reduced attendances as a result of industrial depression and as a general means of 
, levelling up things between clubs in more ways than one'. Although the Derby 
president considered his proposal 'both democratic and fair' it was subsequently 
withdrawn for technical reasons and when it was put to the next annual meeting 
Arsenal issued a counter-proposai to abolish pooling altogether; the Management 
Committee, in turn, successfully stepped in with its own conciliatory proposal to 
preserve the 20 per cent pool. 64 
Support for the idea of extended pooling arrangements was most pronounced among 
the associate members in the third division sections. As well as advocating the 
doubling of visitors' percentages in order to help out the 'poorer brethren' and keep 
the competitions going, both the northern and southern sections agreed to pool the 
61 Minutes of Football League, 28 May 1923 (AGM). 
62 Minutes of Football League, 12 May 1924. 
63 Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Programme, 6 October 1923. 
"Athletic News, 25 May 193 1; Minutes of Football League, I June 1931 (AGM); Topical Times, II 
June 1932. 
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expenses of match officials so as to reduce the burden on clubs like Plymouth Argyle 
and Carlisle United which were geographically isolated. 65 Tbroughout the period 
clubs were also entitled to make individual pooling arrangements, although this 
tended to be restricted to local rivals of corresponding wealth and support. Aston 
Villa and West Bromwich Albion, for instance, agreed to pool the receipts from their 
derby matches during the 1911/12 season while Arsenal and West Ham United made 
similar arrangements in 1925/26. Rather surprisingly, given their close relations with 
each other in most areas, the Sheffield clubs chose not to pool gates but instead made 
sure that home fixtures on holiday dates were alternated each season. 66 
Pooling aside, there was no formal mechanism for subsidising financially weak clubs. 
No attempt was made to adapt the Relief Fund to peacetime conditions and, unlike in 
the Northern Rugby Union, financial assistance to clubs in need continued to be 
resisted during the economic slump of the early 1920s and the depression of the 
1930S. 67 In general, the executive agreed with Clayton's view that each club should 
support itself financially. Sutcliffe even advised the prospective third division 
northern members in 1921 that 'Every club must be prepared to set their own house in 
order and rely on their own resources'. 68 But cross-subsidisation could also take more 
spontaneous forms, through direct financial assistance via cash transfers between 
League members. 69 Appeal funds organised by clubs with money problems were a 
particular feature of the period before 1914. The Aston Villa minute books indicate 
that that club was among the keenest of philanthropists, donating E50 to Wolves in 
1901 and 20 guineas to Burslem Port Vale a year later, although similar appeals by 
70 Bolton and Leicester Fosse apparently fell on deaf ears. When second division West 
Bromwich Albion launched an appeal in early 1905, a local correspondent wrote that 
it was 'the duty of every wealthy club in the League to assist the Albion to turn the 
comer'. 71 Villa had, by this point, already sent its neighbour a cheque for 100 guineas 
65 Sheffield United FC Programme, 5 March 1932; Minutes of Football League (Third Division 
Southern Section), 26 March 1923; Minutes of Football League (AGM), 8 June 1925. 
66 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 9 June 1925; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, I
September 1926; Athletic News, 3 July 1911. 
67 Moorhouse, A People's Game, p. 179. 
68 Athletic News, 21 March 192 1. 
69 See Arnold and Benveniste, 'Cross Subsidisation', p. 15. 
70 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 18 May 1900,14 March, 9 May 1901,26 March 1902. 
71 Athletic News, 6 February 1905. 
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with the wish that 'your good old club once more places [itselfl upon a sound footing 
financially'; Everton later donated 20 guineas while Small Heath, who were reputedly 
unable to afford a donation, contributed its share of the Birmingham Senior Cup Final 
gate receipts. 72 Sheffield United, on the other hand, refused to fund Albion, a stance 
the Committee maintained when faced with similar appeals from struggling clubs up 
to the 1930s. 73 In different ways, the actions of each of these clubs lent support to N. 
L. Jackson's assertion that 'only self-interest, or self-preservation will persuade the 
richer clubs to devote a portion of their wealth to keeping their poorer brethren 
alive'. 74 Indeed, the apparent selflessness of Aston Villa undoubtedly betrayed a 
fundamental economic logic: matches against local rivals drew some of the highest 
crowds and thus by subsidising Wolves and Albion, Villa was hoping to secure future 
financial rewards for itself. 75 
Clubs also often helped to relieve the financial burdens of fellow members less 
directly by conditionally loaning money or players, staggering the payment of transfer 
bills or agreeing to play fund-raising matches. In 1910 Aston Villa, for example, was 
prepared to loan neighbours Birmingham E250 while taking 'one or more, of 
Birmingham's players as a form of security until the loan was repaid. " Other clubs 
who were unable to afford large transfer fees were occasionally loaned players for 
short periods or offered favourable terms for their transfer, although such 
arrangements were again generally between members in the same city or district. 
While the Management Committee encouraged clubs to conduct transfer transactions 
by immediate cash payments and explicitly condemned those who gave post-dated 
cheques or paid in instalments, such practices remained widespread and generally 
accepted by both buyers and sellers. Hence when third division Hull City was unable 
to pay the full L1,000 fee for Matthews -a player on Sheffield United's retain list 
playing in Ireland for Shamrock Rovers - in October 1931 it was agreed that E350 
72 AV, 1905 File (uncatalogued), Ramsay to WBA Directors, 2 February 1905; Athletic News, 13 
February 1905. 
73 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 7 February 1905,24 September 1913 (Appeal by 
Bury), 15 June 1936 (Appeal by Notts County). 
74 Quoted in Tischler, Foothallers and Businessmen, p. 65. 
71 in the two seasons prior to their relegation, the visits of West Bromwich Albion provided the second 
highest home attendances for Aston Villa. David Goodyear and Tony Matthews, Aston Villa: A 
Complete Record, 1874-1992, Derby, 1992. 
76 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 8,15 February, I March 19 10. 
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would be paid up front and the remainder at the end of that season; likewise, in June 
1935 West Ham sold Anderson to Chester for E150, to be paid in three E50 
77 instalments at the end of September, October and November. The action in 1908 of 
the Sheffield United Committee in agreeing to Birmingham's request to delay the full 
payment of an outstanding transfer bill for six months 'on account of their financial 
position' was perhaps more surprising as both clubs were competing at the time to 
avoid relegation to the second division. 78 In other cases where direct subsidisation 
was considered improper or impracticable, clubs often followed Small Heath's 
example in donating a proportion of gate receipts to struggling neighbours or playing 
a friendly match for fund-raising purposes. In 1928 Burnley, for example, assisted 
Nelson by playing one of its prestigious close season ties against Scottish League 
opposition at the third division club's ground and donating all the proceeds to the 
survival fund. 79 
4. 'Friends and Rivals': Friendship, Mutuality and the Leai! ue Spirit 
These examples of financial assistance between League members must also be 
interpreted in the context of wider expressions of mutual support and friendship which 
permeated the private and public relationships between club officials and directors. in 
many ways the equalisation policies themselves, and the language used by officials to 
justify and defend them, can be tied in with the philosophy and practice of the friendly 
societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
80 Certainly the friendly society 
idea of pooling resources to protect all members of the group was popular amongst the 
League executive - if not with all its clubs - from the early part of the century and the 
rhetoric of the rich and strong helping the poor and weak was a common feature of the 
public statements and newspaper columns of Sutcliffe, Bentley, McKenna and others. 
To this extent, Tomlinson's metaphorical description of the Football League as a 
77 Minutes of Football League, II January 1926; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 21 
October 193 1; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 25 June 193 5. 
79 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 15 March 1908. By the 1920s the payment of 
transfer bills over a six month period (with an agreed rate of interest) had become established practice 
even among clubs competing directly in the same division. For examples ee Minutes of West Ham 
United FC, 3 May, 21 June 1927; Minutes of Walsall FC, 15 January 1935. 
79 Topical Times, 10 March 1929. 
80 See Tbompson, Making ofthe English Working Class, pp. 458-63; Morris, 'Clubs, societies and 
associations', pp. 416-17. 
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'family and friendly society' driven by a 'philosophy of mutual protection' has some 
validity. 81 Yet the sentiments of friendship and mutuality which undeniably did exist 
between clubs were rather more ambivalent than this suggests and were never simply 
imposed on clubs from above. 
In his account of an annual dinner of League managers and secretaries from the late 
1930s, the FA Councillor and former secretary William Pickford noted the importance 
of sociability and fellowship: 
Here were gathered together in the old British fashion some hundreds of 
men who run the clubs, the sergeants, orderlies and corporals of the 
League, plus a mixture of officers i. e. directors and rank and file. It was 
the 'close season' and these henchmen of the game... were greeting, each 
other like old friends, club rivalry temporarily suspended, slapping one 
another on the back and exchanging jokes and reminiscences... 
I really got a better idea of what the League meant than ever before 
during the many years in which I have watched the start and growth of that 
gigantic organisation. 82 
Peter Bailey has analysed the significance of similar occasions involving displays of 
friendship and its associated rhetoric in the business of music-hall management during 
the late nineteenth century. The benefit night, in particular, developed partly as 'a 
great celebration of fraternal good feeling' at which rival proprietors could meet, 
renew long-standing friendships or reconcile differences. 
83 In League football there 
were parallel social events arranged after a Cup or League success or to mark the 
anniversary of a club's foundation. Thus the West Ham directors attended a Jubilee 
dinner at Tottenham Hotspur in 1927 and celebratory dinners hosted by Arsenal in 
1933 and 1934 as well as a banquet in 1935 following the north London club's third 
consecutive championship success. 
84 
It was also common for letters of congratulation to be sent to the champions of each 
division and the cup winners and even notes of condolence to relegated sides. Aston 
Villa's congratulatory message to Newcastle United following the Tyneside club's 
81 Tomlinson, 'North and South', pp. 35,33. 
92 Pickford, A Glance Back at the FA Council, p. 52. 
83 Bailey, 'Community of Friends', p. 43. 
84 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 31 May 1927,2 May 1933,24 April 1934,29 April 1935. 
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victory over Villa in the 1924 FA Cup Final had a heightened significance due to the 
fact that relations had been soured by Newcastle's decision to send out a weakened 
team for a League fixture at Villa Park on the Monday before the final (see chapter 9). 
The secretary of the cup winners wrote back to assure his counterpart that 'through no 
fault of Newcastle United will our friendly relations be severed' and that 'fiiendly 
feeling will only be more cemented through the courteous action of your Club. 85 
West Bromwich Albion actually included a public message to Stoke - which was then 
second bottom of the first division - in its club programme of 27 January 1923: 
Stoke have our sympathies - we are hoping to see them rise considerably 
in the League table, for Stoke and the Albion have been friends and rivals 
for very many years, and we do not like to see any of our Staffordshire or 
local clubs in distress. 86 
This language of friendship was clearly important in emphasising the close ties and 
relations between clubs which, as we have seen, were both sporting competitors and 
economic partners. 87 And friendship was also publicly displayed at times of 
bereavement: representatives of the Liverpool, Blackburn Rovers, Manchester United, 
Oldham Athletic, Manchester City, Bury, Blackpool, Woolwich Arsenal and Fulham 
clubs all attended the funeral in 1912 of Preston director and short-time Management 
Committee member Tom Houghton, while five of these plus a ftu-ther nine clubs sent 
wreaths. Similarly, in spite of the history of personal animosity between the two 
directorates, when Liverpool chairman John Houlding died in 1905 the Everton team 
still wore black armbands during its next fixture. 99 
Some local clubs developed even closer links through mutual arrangements, regular 
meetings of directors and even joint policy initiatives. For example, the major 
Birmingham and Black Country League clubs - Aston Villa, Wolves, Birmingham and 
West Bromwich Albion - established an agreement that all officials and players were 
to have free entry to each other's ground if they wished on matchdays. 89 The 
25 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, Letter from Newcastle United FC to Ramsay, I May 1924. 
86 Albion News, 27 January 1923. 
87 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 112. 
88 Tom Houghton's obituary in Preston Guardian, 21 September 192 1; Mason, Blues and the Reds, p. 
18. 
"" Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 6 September 19 10. 
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Merseyside rivals went further by publishing a joint match programme called the 
'Everton and Liverpool Official Football Programme' which lasted from 1904 until 
1935.90 Relations between Sheffield United and Wednesday were perhaps closer still. 
Not only did they share the same chairman - FA president Charles Clegg - for most of 
the period but they tended to take joint decisions on the questions of bonuses and 
wages, voted together at League meetings and also ensured that entrance fees and 
season-ticket prices were uniform. 91 Hence Wednesday's decision in 1922 to depart 
from the mutual agreement on season-ticket prices and reserve match admission 
naturally brought forth immediate criticism from the United Committee. The club 
minute books indicate that it was unable to understand its neighbours' action in 
making such a change 'without instructing... us' and embarked on a series of 
negotiations to restore the status quo. Good relations were quickly resumed and in 
1932 the two clubs actually made enquiries into the possibility of joint United- 
92 Wednesday season-tickets although the idea was soon dropped as impracticable. 
The rhetoric of friendship, however, could not disguise occasional disagreements or 
the breakdown of club relations. When even neighbouring clubs came into conflict 
over issues like player transfers or compensation claims for rearranged fixtures, the 
philosophy of mutual protection often appeared illusory while the language of 
friendship could be easily discarded. Certainly Aston Villa and Birmingham could 
not hide their ill-feeling towards each other during a dispute over fixture allocation in 
1907. At Birmingham's annual meeting, W. W. Hart accused Villa of being inflexible 
in insisting that his club should not play on Christmas Day afternoon when Villa had a 
morning fixture; Fred Rinder countered by sarcastically speaking of Hart as 'the man 
who wants peace'. The dispute moved a local journalist to ask if it was not 'too much 
to expect [the two clubs] to be neighbourly'. 93 Enduring friendships also depend on 
mutual trust and this became an important element in inter-club relations, especially in 
cases where one club relied on the word of another regarding the character or fitness 
" Mason, Blues and the Reds, p. 18. 
91 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Conmittec, 9 September 1908,20 August 1912,3 June 1919,1 
July 1932. 
92 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 16 August, 13 September 1923; 23 November 
1932. 
93 4thletic News, 10 June 1907. 
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of a new player. In most instances, co-operation between clubs on matters of this kind 
ran smoothly. Aston Villa, for example, always wrote to clubs releasing a player 
whom it was interested in registering in order to gain insights into his suitability. One 
letter to Sheffield United relating to its former goalkeeper J. T. Mitchell read: 'As we 
know nothing of his ability or habits I am writing to you to find out all I can about him 
and whether you consider he would suit us. ' It added that 'anything you care to say 
94 
will be esteemed a favour and treated in strict confidence' . 
However, an interesting example of how this type of trust between clubs could break 
down involved a prolonged dispute between Nottingham Forest and Sheffield United 
in 1911. The acrimony began when the Forest board accused certain United directors 
of misleading them 'both as to the ability and character' of Jack Smith, an ex-United 
player whom Forest had bought without seeing play and on the basis of the 
recommendation of his former employers. After United had denied Forest's claim, 
the latter club refused to pay the agreed transfer fee and the matter was taken to an FA 
Commission which eventually ruled in favour of the Sheffield club. Relations became 
further embittered when the Forest secretary made public statements 'affecting the 
honour of the [United] directors', to which United demanded a formal withdrawal and 
apology. After months of public and private feuding, the Forest board eventually 
withdrew its accusations and paid Smith's fee. 95 
5. Conclusion 
Existing accounts of the internal dynamics of sporting leagues, especially in terms of 
the promotion of equalisation policies, have focused almost exclusively on economic 
relationships and motives. Admittedly, it is difficult to understand the dynamics of 
sporting combinations without perceiving them as cartels which effectively formalised 
the fundamental economic interdependence between individual clubs. Looked at 
historically, however, such interpretations are inadequate, as they provide only a 
partial picture of the complicated influences which led the Football League to adopt 
94 AV, 52/82, Ramsay to J. Nicholson, 13 June 1919. For a reply to a similar letter from another club 
see Ramsay to H. Allcock, 19 June 1919. 
9-' Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 4,26 April, 2,6 June 1911. 
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schemes designed to redistribute income among its membership and convinced clubs 
to assist others financially. Above all it is important to recognise that while economic 
considerations were often to the fore, the policy-makers at Preston and elsewhere were 
not economists but administrators, and even those who ran businesses outside football 
tended to adopt a different set of perspectives in their sporting activity. The 
promotion and relegation system, the maximum wage and the 20 per cent contribution 
to visiting teams were therefore not designed primarily to increase profits but rather to 
ensure the viability of competing clubs within the context of a fair competition. 
It is helpful here to relate the pursuit of these various informal and formal equalisation 
policies to the historiography of philanthropy as well as anthropological studies of 
'giving' behaviour. Most interpretations have stressed that philanthropic aid and the 
96 giving of gifts are invariably more complex than simple acts of kindness. As Alan J. 
Kidd has argued: 'although gifts might appear voluntary and freely given they are in 
fact obligatory and interested. There is no such thing as a disinterested or free gift: in 
this sense, giving is never altruistic'. 97 Indeed, reciprocity is seen as central to the 
process of giving, in that few gifts are sent without the hope of some form of material 
or moral return. While most forms of 'giving' between Football League clubs were 
wrapped up in formalised regulations, they appear nonetheless to follow this pattern. 
Reciprocity was, of course, central to the arrangement of the 20 per cent rule: each 
club knew that its 'gift' would be returned later the same season. More broadly 
speaking, the wealthier clubs were often prepared to accept policies which constrained 
their own economic dominance and to give directly to their poorer brethren precisely 
because the existence of these clubs as competitive rivals remained vital to their own 
long-term security. Such philanthropy was thus essentially self-interested. Assisting 
or supporting the weak was part of the broader notion of mutuality which permeated 
much of the League's policy from its beginnings, even though the periodic resistance 
of member clubs meant that it was never fully realised in practice. 
96 Alan J. Kidd, 'Philanthropy and the "Social History Paradigm"', Social History, 21,2,1996, pp. I SO- 
92. Also see Frank Prochaska, The Voluntary Impulse: Philanthropy in Modern Britain, London, 
1988; 'Philanthropy' in Cambridge Social History, vol. 3, pp. 357-93. 97 Kidd, 'Philanthropy', p. 183. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE LEAGUE AND INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL 
Although the Football League defined itself from the beginning as a self-contained, 
inward-looking and 'a frankly selfish' organisation', its very success spawned 
imitators in other countries and necessitated the development of international 
relationships. Before 1914 these were generally restricted to the home countries of 
Britain, especially Scotland and Ireland, whose leagues were both established in 1890. 
In the inter-war period, however, the growing popularity of the game led to its 
professionalisation and the creation of numerous regional and national competitions 
based on the league model throughout Europe, South and North America. Though 
recent work has qualified the notion of continental football as simply a British export, 
the influence of English (as well as Scottish) teams, players and coaches was 
undoubtedly central to these developments. 2 Nevertheless, the English football 
authorities themselves have been portrayed as aloof and marginal in this respect, 
paying little attention to the continental game and establishing only intermittent 
contact with international bodies. Indeed, in his history of British football, James 
3 Walvin described the years from 1915 to 1939 as the era of 'the insular game. The 
Football League, in many ways, exemplified this insularity. While it developed a 
formal dialogue, as well as administrative links, with the other British associations 
and leagues, it made no similar contacts outside Britain and, unlike the FA, did little 
to encourage its members to do so. In fact the Management Committee tended to 
regard international football as an irrelevance at best, and to perceive non-English 
clubs and associations in the first instance as rivals rather than friends; posing a 
potential threat to the League and its players. 
This chapter is not concerned only with the League's international relations at a 
formal, administrative level. In the context of the FA's self-imposed exclusion from 
'Comment of John Lewis in Football and Sports Special, 16 January 1909. 
2 Pierre Lanfranchi, 'Exporting Football: Notes on the Development of Football in Europe' in Richard 
Giulianotti and John Williams (eds), Game Without Frontiers: Football, Identity and Modernity, 
Aldershot, 1994, pp. 23-45; Mason, 'Some Englishmen and Scotsmen Abroad', pp. 67-82. ' Walvin, People's Game, chapter 6. 
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the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) before 1905, between 
1919 and 1924 and then from 1928 until the Second World War, Football League 
clubs were obliged to develop their own contacts and form individual networks of 
relationships on the international stage. This was facilitated through the practice of 
close season club tours to the Continent and sometimes beyond, and was increasingly 
complimented between the wars by the staging of international club and representative 
fixtures on home soil. It was the issue of labour migration, however, which remained 
the primary concern of the League and its clubs throughout this period and shaped 
their perceptions of the international game. The flow of football talent from the 
peripheral nations of the United Kingdom to English clubs had been a distinctive 
feature of the game prior to the creation of the Football League and Scottish players in 
particular became proportionately over-represented at most League clubs even before 
the turn of the century. While the movement of football labour within the United 
Kingdom tended to be a one-way flow towards England, the process was reversed as 
professional leagues developed outside Britain from the 1920s. The loss of registered 
players to the emerging leagues in the United States during the 1920s and France in 
the 1930s became a highly contentious issue among club and League officials mainly 
because no agreement or transfer payment was necessary. In this way, international 
developments threatened to undermine the Football League's control over its own 
labour force and to compromise its much-valued autonomy. 
1. The League and British 'International' Football: Scotland, Ireland, Wales 
In common with many other spheres of political, economic or social development, 
association football in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was 
emphatically not a purely English product, even if the administrative structures of the 
game developed there first. The structural anomaly of four separate associations and 
three individual (and nominally national) leagues within a single political state has 
naturally led most students of the game to adopt a type of 'four nations history' 
interpretation and to reject as misleading the very concept of British football. 4 Yet, it 
4 See H. F. Moorhouse, 'One State, Several Countries: Soccer and Identities in a "United" Kingdom'. 
EUI Colloquium Papers, Florence, 1989, pp. 1- 14. For the broader historical debate see the editorial 
by Raphael Samuel, 'British Dimensions: "Four Nations History"', History Workshop Journal, 40, 
1995, pp. iii-xxii. 
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is noteworthy that in football's rudimentary stage, prior to the League's creation in 
1888, associations and competitions in Britain were not separated according to 
national boundaries. The FA saw itself from its formation in 1863 as much more than 
an English national body. Hence in the same way as colonial clubs and associations 
were incorporated, the FA allowed Scottish, Welsh and even Irish clubs to affiliate, a 
situation which led in 1881 to a firm rejection of the proposal to rename it Me 
English Association'. Non-English clubs were also included in early FA Cup 
competitions. Scotland's premier club Queen's Park entered the inaugural 1871 
competition and Scottish clubs continued to participate until 1887 while Irish clubs 
only withdrew after the creation of their own league in 1890. Welsh clubs, in 
contrast, continued to enter English competitions and were even awarded a direct seat 
0n the FA Council up until the late 1880s. 5 
The Football League was likewise never conceived by its founding fathers as a 
national or a strictly English competition. The absence of the epithet 'English' in its 
title is instructive in this respect, as it indicated the League's willingness to include 
non-English, particularly Scottish or Welsh, members. The creation of the Scottish 
Football League two years later precluded the entry of clubs north of the border but 
for Welsh clubs there was no national league to divert their attention and many 
continued to look towards English competition. For the clubs from the larger towns 
and cities in the principality this initially involved membership of the Southern 
League but with the League's expansion after the First World War, Cardiff City were 
elected to the second division while Merthyr, Newport, Swansea Town and Wrexham 
became associate members in the new third division sections. Indeed, the 
Management Comrnittee had to insist in 1921 'that it was time their clubs ceased 
advertising their matches as English League matches. They were the Football League 
and they were proud of their title and what they had achieved'. 6 And the national 
constituency of these leagues apparently remained fluid enough to encourage 
Newcastle United to volunteer the inclusion of its reserve team along with another 
English. club, Berwick Rangers, when two members withdrew from the second 
3 Green, History ofthe FA, pp. 76,90. 
6 Minutes of Football League, 30 May 192 1. 
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division of the Scottish League during the 1932/33 season. 7 Moreover, both the 
administrative and footballing personnel of the Football League always contained a 
large non-English contingent. William McGregor, the founder and first president, was 
a Scot, as was Committeeman John Cameron, while the long-standing president of the 
pre- and inter-war years, John McKenna, hailed from Ireland. Similarly, the earliest 
League teams were composed of a mixture of indigenous talent and players from the 
other British nations. Clubs from Lancashire, the north-east and the midlands were 
engaging Scots in considerable numbers throughout he 1880s and 1890s and the most 
successful teams in the formative years of the League championship - such as 
Preston's 'Invincibles' of the 1888/89 and 1889/90 seasons, Aston Villa's double 
winners of 1896/97 and Sunderland's 'Team of All the Talents' which lasted from 
1889-98 - invariably included at least three or four non-English nationals! 
i) The Establishment of Administrative Relations 
For the Football League, recognition of its counterparts across both the border and the 
Irish Sea was marked initially by the arrangement of Inter-League representative 
fixtures. Such matches came to serve a dual function: they established and then 
consolidated good relations between the competing bodies and also generated 
additional income for administrative purposes. As Inter-League matches developed in 
the twentieth century into annual sporting events they also acquired important social 
dimensions. They became a means of acknowledging the administrative links and 
mutuality between the different leagues, with the arrangement of joint meetings and 
even luncheons, to which representatives of clubs and the relevant national 
associations were invited. 9 But these representative fixtures remained primarily a 
money-making venture. During the 1890s and well into the twentieth century the 
receipts from Inter-League matches constituted the major source of Football League 
income; for the Scottish and Irish Leagues they were indispensable in financial 
7 Crampsey, First 100 Years, p. 95. Both applications were rejected and the leaving clubs were not 
replaced. Berwick was eventually admitted for the 1955/56 season and remain the only English club 
competing in the Scottish League although others, including Gateshead in 1960, attempted to join. 
See Appleton, Hotbed ofSoccer, pp. 175-84; Walvin, People's Game, pp. 83-84. 
See Report of McKenna's speech prior to the Inter-League match against the Irish League in Athletic 
News, 23 October 1911; Minutes of FA International Selection Committee, 29 March 1920; Minutes of 
West Ham United FC, 28 October 1930. 
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terms. 10 Attendances were always higher when the fixture was held in Scotland, 
establishing it as probably 'the second most important game in the football calendar' 
north of the border, surpassed only by the Scotland-England international itself. " 
While the FA had stymied a proposed Inter-League match with the Scots in 1891, the 
following year the first in the series of annual games took place at Bolton and by 1894 
the Irish League had also been granted a match. 
Notwithstanding the establishment of contacts on the field of play, relations with the 
other British leagues during the 1890s remained unresolved and in a state of flux. 
Glasgow Celtic, for instance, found itself caught up in the Football League's boycott 
against outside clubs when it was accused of poaching a Lincoln City playe r in 1894, 
in spite of the fact that he was no longer engaged by the English club. 12 Indeed the 
constant movement of players across the border in both directions created 
considerable difficulties, especially in the many cases where players were registered 
(if not always contracted) by both Football and Scottish League clubs. These 
problems were partially resolved in 1897 when the two leagues agreed to 'the mutual 
recognition of players' registrations and clubs' rights in players'. 13 Henceforth 
Scottish players with English clubs could only move back north under regulated 
transfer procedures while those engaged with members of both Leagues became the 
joint property of those clubs. William Wilton, the Scottish League secretary, plainly 
acknowledged the significance of this agreement: it meant 'the practical 
amalgamation of two Leagues, involving 56 clubs and almost 2700 players'. 14 At the 
same time, the International Football League Board (popularly known as the Inter- 
League Board) was founded with the objective of settling disputes and co-ordinating 
joint initiatives and agreements. The Board's constitution allowed for an equal 
representation of four officials nominated by each league while the presidency was to 
alternate between England and Scotland on an annual basiS. 15 The notion of joint 
action enshrined in the Board's rules and bye-laws should not be seen as purely 
10 On the Football League's dependence on Inter-League revenue see chapter 4. 
Crampsey, First 100 Years, p. 245. 
Crwnpsey, First 100 Years, p. 29. 
'3 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 134. 
14 Quoted in Crampsey, First 100 Years, p. 39. 
13 Rules of International Football League Board, Football League Handbook, 1899/1900, p. 25. 
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cosmetic. While disagreements naturally continued to arise, it is evident that on major 
issues of mutual interest the leagues tended to act collectively. Indeed the Football 
and Scottish Leagues worked in close consultation during the 1899 transfer dispute 
with the FA while the Scottish body provided both administrative and financial 
support to the League in its battle to establish the legality of the retain-and-transfer 
system which culminated in the Kingaby case of 1912.16 Likewise, in the creation of 
the first insurance scheme for British clubs in 1907 and the crucial issue of whether to 
continue competitive football in 1915, the two senior league organisations (in the 
latter case with the assistance of the Southern and Irish Leagues) acted in unison. 17 
Agreement with the Irish League, always a more detached and antagonistic body in 
the mind of Football League officials, was slower to arrive. Indeed following the 
agreements with the Scottish and Southern Leagues (in 1910) over player 
registrations, increasing numbers of both disengaged and retained players crossed the 
Irish sea: Belfast, in particular, became known as 'a city of refuge for discontented 
footballers'. 18 So in 1914, with the intention of closing the Irish door, the League 
proposed the establishment of an Anglo-Irish Football League Board based on the 
Scottish model, incorporating the same recognition of club registration and transfer 
rights. 19 As the spokesman of the Management Committee, Sutcliffe explained that 
the objective was 
to protect their clubs against the migration of players who had been 
offered reasonable terms by their old clubs. It would prevent players 
holding a gun to their heads. They may have occasion to suspend players, 
and the latter, in such circumstance, had no right during the enforced 
period of idleness to leave this country, play for clubs in Ireland, and then 
return when their suspension was at an end. Under the agreement this 
would be stopped... The agreement would put an end to the friction which 
had existed, and which they hoped would be easily smoothed over, and he 
hoped their relations would continue to their mutual advantage. 20 
" See Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 116,135; Athletic News, 10 April 1916. The Scottish 
League contributed L 150 towards the cost of the Kingaby case. 
" Sharpe, 40 Years in Football, p. 158; Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 89,128-29. 
Athletic News, 16 January 1916. 
Rules and Bye-Laws of Anglo-Irish Football League Board, Football League Handbook, 1915/16, 
pp. 59-62. The only variation was that the Anglo-Irish Board consisted of two rather than four 
representatives from each league. 
20 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, I June 1914. 
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The agreement was eventually sanctioned, but not before those clubs which had 
recently lost players to Irish rivals attempted to persuade the executive to impose still 
tighter controls on the Irish poachers. The most prominent of these was Manchester 
United's suggested two-year limit on the service of registered players with Irish clubs. 
Clearly the Lancashire club intended to prevent a repetition of the recent departure of 
Irish forward Mickey Hamill, who had been signed by Belfast Celtic following a 
dispute over United's failure to guarantee him a benefit in writing. 
21 
As we have seen, there was no equivalent Welsh senior national league, though 
regional leagues comprising clubs from north and south Wales respectively emerged 
as early as 1890. A Welsh Football League was in fact formed after the First World 
War and it soon made tentative requests to establish a working relationship with the 
Football League. Yet neither the minor status of this body nor the limited interaction 
of its labour force with those of League clubs was considered sufficient to justify the 
type of formal agreement and consultation machinery arranged with the Scottish and 
Irish bodies. Indeed there is no evidence that the League Management Committee 
even debated the Welsh body's 1920 proposals to arrange Inter-League fixtures and 
allow automatic promotion of its two leading clubs into the newly-founded third 
division. 22 
ii) Controlling the Import and Export of Players 
Illegal poaching and the consequent administrative tensions did not cease with the 
creation of the Inter-League Boards. Neither were the English clubs necessarily the 
victims: quite the opposite, the minutes of the Football League indicate that its 
members were found guilty of contravening the Board's bye-laws more often than 
their Scottish counterparts, though this may have been a reflection of the higher 
proportion of players moving south. Heavy penalties for illegal approaches were not 
unknown. At the start of 1911, for instance, Middlesborough was fined f 100 by the 
2' Hamill stayed in Ireland for six years and when he did return to Manchester it was to join City rather 
than United. As he was still a registered United player, however, the club received 0,000 for this 
transfer. Garth Dykes, The UnitedAlphabet: A Complete Who's Who ofManchester UnitedFC, 
Leicester, 1994, p. 170. 
22 Alun Evans, 'Football on the Edge: The Relationship between Welsh Football Policy-Making and the 
British International Championship', Unpublished MA Dissertation, De Montfort University, 1996, pp. 
29,34. 
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Inter-League Board when it was revealed that the club secretary had travelled to 
Glasgow, arranged a meeting with, and attempted to sign, a registered Airdrieonians 
professional. The Management Committee subsequently imparted a ftu-ther penalty 
on the club by suspending the secretary for four weeks. 23 
But despite the 1914 agreement the major threat to the League's control over its 
labour force continued to come from Ireland. The modified wartime regulations 
operative from July 1915 accentuated these problems, as players were partially freed 
to turn out for a club other than their own. In these cases, however, they were obliged 
either to join a club close to their residence or work or to seek permission from their 
contracted club to play elsewhere. 24 Difficulties soon arose when Irish clubs, 
particularly the newly-formed Belfast United, began to sign Football League players 
without the agreement of their clubs. The League executive believed that one such 
player, Manchester United's George Anderson, had been induced to move overseas 
with the promise of accommodation and a job, if not direct payment, from the Belfast 
club and this at a time when professionalism was outlawed. One former Birmingham 
professional wrote anonymously to the president of the League, the FA and sections of 
the press informing them that he had been engaged for a season as a professional in 
Belfast under a pseudonym and challenging them to uncover his identity. 25 In August 
1916 the Irish FA finally suspended the Belfast United club when another League 
player, Grimsby Town's Thomas McKenna, was revealed to have been frequently 
paid as a professional under the name 'McGuiness': the League reacted immediately 
to these revelations by banning League professionals indefinitely from playing in 
Ireland. The administrative conflict escalated when the Irish FA insisted on 
sanctioning the movement of all Irish players to English clubs and Manchester United 
itself was accused of signing a registered Linfield player . As an astute editorial in 
Athletic News noted: 
Irishmen feel that what is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the 
gander. Years ago they... had their club ranks raided by some English 
managers and secretaries. Men had been taken away and trafficked with. 
23 Athletic News, 2,9 January 1911. 
24 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 89-90. 
2s Athletic News, 16,31 January, 6 March 1916. 
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If some of them have returned to Ireland there has been a hurly-burly, and 
much talk of League reprisals and other thoughts. We hear some strong 
language has been used across the water about the high-handedness of the 
English League in the past and even their more recent decrees... From 
what we can gather the English League and their clubs are not too popular 
in Ireland at the present time. 26 
While the League's veto on the movement of players to Ireland was soon rescinded, 
the return to peacetime conditions brought little change in Anglo-Irish relations. First 
of all, the Football League's decision to postpone the Inter-League match planned for 
October 1920 due to transport problems within England was publicly criticised by 
Irish League representatives and described as 'snobbish' by its president, Robert 
Barr. 27 More seriously, however, the two bodies came into bitter conflict later that 
year over Crystal Palace's signing of R. McCracken from the Belfast-based Distillery 
club. The Management Committee argued that as Palace had not technically been a 
member of the Football League when it engaged McCracken the previous June (and 
that, even then, they were associate rather than full members), the club was not bound 
by the Anglo-Irish agreement to respect the registration of players. Significantly, the 
Irish representatives rejected not only the League's argument but also its supporting 
documentary evidence and sought to refer the matter to the Scottish League for an 
independent judgement. The League, in turn, objected to this suggestion and 
informed its clubs that 
We can have no flifther negotiations with an organisation which declines 
to accept the truth and accuracy of official documents, but challenges them 
as if they were forgeries and fraudulent. 
We regret that though every opportunity was given to the Irish 
representatives to disclaim, explain, withdraw or intimate their regret for 
the unwarranted attack made upon you at a meeting of the Irish League 
clubs, nothing was said to justify or palliate that attack. 29 
Some members of the Management Committee reportedly felt that the Irish League's 
obdurate stance was motivated by a desire to end the agreement with the Football 
26 Athletic News, 14 August, II September 1916. 
27 Minutes of Football League, 13 September 1920; Athletic News, 13 December 1920. 
28 Minutes of Football League, 6 December 1920. 
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League. For one observer, the deadlock and open hostility in the McCracken case 
signalled that the 'two Leagues have virtually severýd their friendly relations'. 29 
Relations between the two bodies were patched up when the Irish League eventually 
accepted the position of the Football League's new associate members but the 
situation was complicated ftirther with political partition in 1922 and the creation of 
an Irish Free State in the south of the island. The question of the recognition of two 
separate football associations in Ireland developed into a major and largely unresolved 
problem for the FA and FIFA throughout the inter-war period and beyond but, for the 
Football League, partition meant that those clubs incorporated under the aegis of the 
new Football Association of Ireland (FAI) and the League of Ireland were no longer 
covered by the Anglo-Irish agreement. 30 Though these developments had little 
immediate impact on the English clubs, it was widely recognised that a potential 
gopen door' had been created for discontented League players otherwise constrained 
by the Scottish and Irish settlements. By the 1930s, however, Free State clubs were 
beginning to sign a number of top League players and in 1931 an Athletic News 
correspondent could proclaim the'Irish 'open door' as 'a menace, particularly to 
English clubs who have paid big sums of money for the transfer of players, and then 
find they have little control over them at the end of the season'. He went on to 
advocate that players who refused 'reasonable' terms with their League club and 
signed for an Irish Free State club should be prohibited from returning to League 
football .31A 
less drastic proposal to discourage this particular migration of labour 
came from the Sheffield United board, which in late 1931 suggested to the 
Management Committee that players with Free State clubs should have to start at the 
minimum wage on their return rather than the level reached when they moved away. 32 
Moreover, the Football League's hostility towards League of Ireland clubs was such 
that the latter body's proposal to formalise the mutual recognition of registrations in 
29 Athletic News, 13 December 1920. 
30 See Moorhouse, 'One State', pp. 3-7; John Sugden and Alan Baimer, 'Northern Ireland: Sport in a 
Divided Society' in Lincoln Allison (ed. ), The Politics ofSport, Manchester, 1986, pp. 108-09. 
31 Athletic News, 8 June 193 1. 
32 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 30 December 193 1. 
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1934 was opposed by the Management Committee and, in contrast with the Scottish 
League, representative fixtures were not arranged until after the Second World War. 33 
Even though Football League squads had always contained a mix of British 
nationalities, the issue of the importation of non-English, particularly Scottish, players 
increasingly came to the fore during the 1920s. Interestingly, there is little evidence 
that the long-standing movement of players from the peripheral British countries to 
England actually quickened significantly in the inter-war years. The overall 
percentage of non-English players engaged by Football League clubs stayed 
remarkably consistent at 22.6 per cent in 1910 and 22.5 per cent in 1925 (Tables 8.1 
and 8.2). Nevertheless some clubs were almost multi-national in their recruitment 
campaigns. The Arsenal squad which began the 1925/26 campaign, for instance, 
included seven Scots, two Irishmen and one Welshman from a total of 27 whose 
birthplace it has been possible to trace. At the beginning of the 1934/35 season 
34 Liverpool went ftirther by fielding a team including just two Englishmen. On the 
other hand, clubs like West Bromwich Albion and Wolverhampton Wanderers rarely 
had more than one or two non-English players on their books; Sheffield United's 1925 
FA Cup winning side, too, was entirely English with the exception of its Irish captain 
William Gillespie. 35 Yet the Scottish presence especially was felt in qualitative rather 
than quantitative terms. One commentator noted towards the end of 1926 that at least 
70 'front rank players' (presumably meaning those with international or representative 
experience) and many more with emerging reputations had journeyed south since the 
war. Two years later the Scottish team selected to meet England at Wembley was 
dominated for the first time by Anglo-Scots, with only three 'home' players selected. 36 
" Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 142; Crampsey, First 100 Years, p. 25 1. 
34 Athletic News, 24 August 1925; Young, Football in Merseyside, p. 13 1. 
35 Young, Football in Sheffield, p. 127. West Bromwich Albion developed a conscious policy not to 
sign Scottish professionals from as early as the 1900s. A thirty year period without Scots ended in 1937 
when centre-forward G. Dudley was bought from Albion Rovers. Golesworthy, Encyclopaedia of 
Association Football, pp. 13 8-3 9. 
36 H. F. Moorhouse, 'Blue Bonnets over the Border: Scotland and the Migration of Footballers' in John 
Bale and Joseph Maguire (eds), The Global Sports Arena: Athletic Talent Migration in an 
Interdependent World, London, 1994, p. 8 1; Paul Joannou, Wembley Wizards: The Story ofa Legend, 
Edinburgh, 1990, pp. 20-23. 
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English 382 72.5 291 84.8 673 77.4 
Scottish 124 23.5 44 12.8 168 19.3 
Welsh 11 2.1 4 1.2 15 1.7 
Irish 7 1.3 2 0.6 9 1.0 
Non-British 3 0.6 2 0.6 5 0.6 
Total traced 527 343 870 
0 Birthplace 
Source: Adapted from Vamplew, Pay Up, Table 13.1. p. 205. 
Tahle 8.2 Nationality of Football League Players, 1925. 
First Division Second Division Third Division Third Division Total 
Nationality* No. % No. % (S) (N) No. % 
No. % No. % 
English 379 74.9 404 76.4 341 75.6 387 83.6 1511 77.5 
Scottish 82 16.2 96 18.1 74 16.4 50 10.8 302 15.5 
Welsh 25 4.9 22 4.2 25 5.6 18 3.9 90 4.6 
Irish** 16 3.2 5 0.9 10 2.2 7 1.5 38 2.0 
Non-British 4 0.8 2 0.4 1 0.2 1 0.2 8 0.4 
Total Traced 506 529 451 463 1949 
* Birthplace 
Including Irish Free State nationals 
Source: Athletic News, 3,10,17,24 August 1925, 
The mid-1920s, in particular, witnessed a salient trend towards the acquisition of 
Scottish players, often for large transfer fees. Indeed four of the 'All Tartan' (entirely 
home-based) Scottish side which met England in 1925 had by 1926 been sold to 
League clubs for fees of between E4,500-5 '000.37 This activity, however, provoked a 
backlash among some Football League officials and club directors who wished to 
restrict the number of Scottish imports. In a series of newspaper articles written at the 
beginning of 1928, Charles Sutcliffe outlined a scheme to impose a f. 1,000 tax on 
each transfer from Scottish League to Football League clubs with a reduced tax when 
players were acquired from Scottish junior clubs. The fund thus created by this taxing 
system could then be used to aid the finances of struggling third division members. In 
this way, Sutcliffe argued, the leading clubs would be persuaded 'to turn their 
attention to the English players on their doorstep, and the English clubs needing help 
37 See H. F. Moorhouse, 'Scotland against England: Football and Popular Culture', International 
Journal of the History ofSport, 4,2,1987, p. 194 (Table 2). 
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and encouragement'. In addition, Sutcliffe raised the possibility of limiting the 
number of non-English nationals registered by Football League clubs, though the idea 
of prohibiting Scots from competing in the FA Cup competition was firmly rejected. 38 
In the event no such limitation was imposed but the discussion and contention created 
by the scheme indicates that, despite its long history, the importation of players from 
other British countries was not unproblematic. 
iii) The League and the British National Associations 
The hegemony of the Football League within British football was most clearly 
demonstrated in its relations with the national associations and the whole debate 
involving the release of players for international fixtures. At the centre of this debate 
were the competing claims to the player's services of the club who employed him and 
the national association to whom he was registered. Both assumed an effective 
ownership over labour but increasingly it was the League and its clubs which came to 
dictate which players could be released and even when international fixtures could 
take place within the football calendar. 
The origins of the debate can be located in the 1890s with the growing status of 
Football League clubs and their ability to attract the best Scottish, Welsh and Irish 
talent. As we can see from Tables 8.4 and 8.5, Football League clubs contributed a 
significant proportion of players to the Welsh and smaller numbers to the Irish and 
Scottish national teams even before 1900 and hence the English body was implicated 
in the organisation of international matches almost from its foundation. 39 From the 
1890s the teams selected by these national associations for representative and trial 
matches were open to the influence of Football League clubs who were often not 
prepared to. release players from important League fixtures on the same day. The 
Scottish FA responded in 1898 by recommending to the International Board 
comprising all four British associations that a player should be placed 'directly under 
the jurisdiction of the Association selecting him' while the FA of Wales claimed 'the 
38 See Topical Times, 18 February 1928; Athletic News, 30 January 1928. 
39 English-based players or 'Anglos' were not selected for the Scottish national side until 1896. 
Moorhouse, 'England against Scotland', p. 193. 
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right... to call on Welsh players with English clubs'. 40 Both proposals were checked 
by the FA, as was a similar joint Welsh-Scottish suggestion the following year which 
would additionally have enabled the selecting association to cross national boundaries 
of jurisdiction by punishing those clubs or players from other associations who failed 
to comply. The four associations instead constructed a less rigid agreement 
proclaiming that each should 'use their influence with Clubs to ensure to other 
National Associations the service of Players in International Matches'. 41 
While the FA of Wales, and increasingly the money-strapped Irish FA too, made 
habitual efforts to persuade its more powerful sister organisations to ensure the service 
of selected players, the League began to take counter steps to make sure that its 
programme remained free from the disruption of international and representative 
fixtures. In 1911 the Management Committee was instructed by a resolution of 
member clubs to arrange Inter-League matches - and to ask the FA to play all 
International games - on a week-day 'rather than the customary Saturday. The 
proposal's sponsor, Tom Harris of Notts County, argued that international calls on 
players often had 'a very prejudicial effect' on League fixtures while the playing of 
representative matches on a Saturday also prevented those clubs with town or city 
rivals from staging such fixtures . 
42 Though Inter-League matches were henceforth 
often moved to mid-week, the national associations were less willing to allow the 
Football League to intervene in their schedule and so the antagonism between League 
clubs and the minor British associations continued to build. In 1921 the Irish FA 
accentuated the existing tensions by independently inserting a clause in the 
registration agreement of any Irishman moving across the channel allowing it to 
appropriate the player's services whenever required. The Management Committee 
publicly opposed this initiative, though as the registration of players was technically 
beyond its jurisdiction it was left to the FA and the Scottish FA to force their Irish 
counterpart to back down. 43 
"0 Minutes of International Football Association Board, 20 June 1898; Evans, 'Football on the Edge', p. 
37. 
41 Minutes of International Football Association Board, 19 June 1899. 
42 Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 5 June 1911. 
43 Report of International Football League Board, 12 March 192 1; Minutes of International Football 
Association Board, 10 June 1922. 
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By the late 1920s, however, the increased number of British internationals playing in 
the Football League (Tables 8.3 to 8.6) led the FA to bow to concerted pressure from 
the elite professional clubs. In a letter to the Irish FA written in February 1929, the 
FA agreed that t4p next England-Ireland international should be played on a Saturday 
but intimated that they 
may have, in subsequent years, to consider playing the Match on a day 
other than a Saturday, in view of the many complaints from Clubs of 
being deprived of the services of players in important matches by reason 
of the players being chosen to play in Representative Games not only by 
the FA, but by other National Associations. " 
The Irish body rebuffed the suggestion on the grounds that 'it was extremely unwise, 
and against the interests of the game all over the Country [Ireland], to relegate 
International Matches to a subsidiary position' . 
45 Meanwhile Arsenal, perhaps the 
most cosmopolitan of the leading League clubs at the time, had issued a circular to 
each national association advocating that all international fixtures should be played in 
mid-week. Arsenal could by now count on the backing of some 45 League members 
as well as the Management Committee, which though proclaiming the loyalty of its 
clubs to their respective governing bodies was nonetheless determined to see that 
while Saturday internationals continued, each national association selected players 
strictly within its own jurisdiction. 46 At the next annual meeting, then, the 
Management Committee, backed by a majority of first and second division members, 
altered its own rules so that 'A Club shall not release any player for International 
games on a day on which it has a League fixture, except at the call of the National 
Association of which the Club is a member. ' The decision was not unanimous, 
however, as ten members voted against this interference in the international sphere 
and a twin proposal to change the FA's rules by prohibiting Saturday and holiday 
internationals was withdrawn. One opponent, Derby's W. Bendle Moore, described 
44 FA International Football Association Board Minute Book, 1886-1956, F. J. Wall to Chas. Watson, 
22 February 1929. 
45 FA International Football Association Board Minute Book, 1886-1956, Watson to Wall, IS April 
1929. 
46 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 30 October 1929; Moorhouse, 'One State', p. 12; 
Minutes of Football League, 29 November 1929. 
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the rule change as 'a retrograde step' and appealed to fellow members 'to consider the 
,7 
matter from the standpoint of the game and not the League position of Clubs, . 
Tahle 8.3 Distribution of Scottish International Caps, 1890-1939 
1890-99 1900-09 1910-19 1920-29 1930-39 
NO. % NO. % No. % NO. % No. % 
Scottish League 203 62.3 246 74.6 107 67.3 256 72.3 329 72.8 
Clubs 
Scottish Non- 107 32.9 5 1.5 
League Clubs 
Football League 15 4.6 79 23.9 43 27.0 97 27.4 123 27.2 
Clubs 





Other 1 0.3 
Total Traced 326 330 159 354 452 
Table &4 Distribution of Welsh International Caps, 1890-1939 
1890-99 1900-09 1910-19 1920-29 1930-39 
NO. % No. % No. % No. % NO. % 
Welsh Football n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 121 36.9 53 15.5 
League Clubs 
Welsh Non- 151 46.5 96 30.0 27 16.8 9 2.8 8 2.3 
League Clubs 
English Football 99 30.5 169 52.8 108 67.1 192 58.5 275 80.2 
League Clubs 
English Non- 68 20.9 52 16.3 26 16.1 6 1.8 
- - 
League Clubs 
Other 7 2.1 3 
. 
0.9 7 2.0 
Total Traced 325 320 161 328 343 
Source: As Table 8.3. 
Table 8.5 Distribution of Irish International Caps. 1890-1939 
1890-99 1900-09 1910-19 1920-29 1930-39 
No. % NO. % No. % No. % NO. % 
Irish Clubs 322 98.5 212 65.8 64 39.3 69 21.4 143 42.6 
Football League 4 1.2 68 21.1 88 54.0 201 62.2 167 49.7 
Clubs 
English Non- 1 0.3 29 9.0 1 0.6 1 0.3 1 0.3 
League Clubs 
Other 13 4.1 10 6.1 52 16.1 25 7.4 
Total Traced 327 322 163 323 336 
Source: As Table 9.3. 
47 Minutes of Football League, 2 June 1930 (AGM). 
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Table 8.6 Distribution of Irish Free State International Caps, 1922-39 
1922-29 1930-39 
NO. % No. % 
Irish Clubs 48 85.4 165 60.0 
Football Ltague Clubs 7 14.6 91 33.1 
Other 19 6.9 
Total Traced 49 275 
Source: As Table 8.3. 
The impact of the Football League's decision on the selection of Welsh and Irish 
teams was particularly significant, as they now had to pick from players engaged with 
clubs in their own less competitive leagues and tournaments. By October 1930 the FA 
was informed of 'the serious plight in which the FA of Wales has been placed by the 
recent action of The Football League' and asked to organise a conference with the 
League and the four national associations so as to reach a compromise 'in a final 
effort to save the International Tournament'. 
48 The League eventually acceded to this 
request and a conference was arranged for the beginning of January 193 1. The 
initiative was once again seized by the League representatives, whose proposals were 
accepted unanimously by the associations as 'a satisfactory solution to the 
International question'. The agreement consisted of three basic requirements for the 
release of players. Firstly, Saturdays fixtures were accepted so long as they took place 
before 14 December each season, with the exception of the customary end of season 
England-Scotland match. Secondly, the national associations were to apply to the 
executive 21 days in advance to obtain a League player, and even then his club was at 
liberty to refuse permission. Finally, a recognised insurance policy was to be taken 
out on each registered League player by the national association who, in addition, 
49 
were to pay his weekly wage if the match took place on a Saturday. While the 
concession of Saturday internationals generated opposition from some clubs who 
regarded it as representing a significant disruption of the League programme, the 
agreement was nevertheless widely recognised as a clear sign of the Football League's 
50 
dominating influence over British football as a whole. 
Minutes of FA International Selection Committee, 13 October 1930. 
Minutes of Football League, 12 January 193 1. 
50 See Minutes of Football League Shareholders' Meeting (First and Second Divisions), 6 March 193 1. 
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In practice, however, the agreement offered no permanent solution, as the 
discretionary release of players continued to cause friction between the League and the 
national associations. As we have seen, League clubs had always been entitled to 
block the release of players, but before 1914 few were prepared to disrupt the primacy 
of the home internationals for purely selfish club purposes. The 1920s, in contrast, 
witnessed a significant change in the club directors' perception of the status of 
internationals vis-a-vis the League programme. Indeed, clubs with hopes of winning 
the championship, gaining promotion or, conversely, those in danger of relegation, 
regularly pulled their employees out of international squads. Where fixtures clashed, 
most clubs claimed to allow the player to choose between club and country but there 
is some evidence that this was not an altogether free choice. It may not be a 
c oincidence, for instance, that West Ham's Welsh international R. W. Richards opted 
to assist his club rather than his country during its promotion campaign in March 1922 
or that in the midst of relegation worries William Gillespie 'preferred to play for 
[Sheffield] United and not in the International match' for Ireland scheduled for the 
same day. 5 1 Alex James was certainly pressurised by the Preston North End directors 
on a number of occasions to chose club over country: when Scotland's match with 
Ireland in February 1928 clashed with a vital second division game against 
Manchester City he reportedly left 'his' decision in the hands of the directors, who 
predictably elected to keep him. 52 The Huddersfield Town directors were probably 
more candid than most when, in response to a request to release their forward W. E. 
Hayes for a match against Hungary, they informed the FA of Ireland that 'we should 
do all on our power to help... but it would depend entirely on our [League] position'. 53 
It is clear, then, that by the late 1920s and early 1930s the League executive and the 
clubs exercised an effective veto over international team selection, though this was 
rarely possible for the England team. In March 1930 the Management Committee 
took the step of explicitly outlawing those agreements issued by certain clubs which 
51 Minutes of West Hain United FC, 12 March 1923; Minutes of Sheffleld United Football Committee, 
23 February 1921. 
52 See Harding, Alex James, pp. 84-85; Topical Times, 3 March 1928. 53 Minutes of Huddersfield Town FC, 6 February 1939. Hayes's release was eventually blocked by the 
club chairman and League Committee member Amos Brook Hirst. 
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gave the player 'the right to elect to play in International games'. 
54 Players hoping to 
establish international careers were thus forced to rely entirely on the benevolence of 
their board of directors. Those who were ruled out of international duty on a regular 
basis by their clubs, including James himself at Preston and Irishman Jimmy Dunne at 
Sheffield United, often attempted to find themselves employers who were more 
flexible and committed to international football. 
55 In many cases, too, clubs 
endeavoured to protect their star assets by prohibiting them from touring or playing 
matches in Ireland or parts of central Europe during periods of political and social 
unrest. 56 
In view of this general reluctance to release players, it is hardly surprising that the 
a greement of January 1931 was short-lived. In April 1932 the FA of Wales informed 
the League and its sister associations of its decision to break from the agreement 
because 'the position has become untenable through the unjust manner in which the 
Agreement has been carried out'. 57 A recent historian of Scottish football has 
underlined this mood of frustration, noting that while 'Anglo-Scots were usually 
released... the record of English clubs in so far as Irish and Welsh players were 
concerned was nothing short of disgraceful'. 
58 The Management Committee, in 
response, defended the action of its members, arguing in the face of considerable 
evidence that international releases had in fact been 'liberally given'. 
59 Yet by 1934 
the central issue of mid-week matches had surfaced again and in the course of a series 
of conferences with the four associations at the beginning of that year, the will of the 
League and its leading clubs finally won through. Significantly, both the FA and the 
Scottish FA had become convinced that Saturday matches were now an impracticality 
Minutes of Football League, II March 1930. 
Harding, Alex James, pp. 93-94; Young, Football in Sheffield, p. 13 8; Minutes of Sheffield United 
Football Committee, 30 August 1933. Both James and Dunne were transferred to Arsenal following 
disputes over their international availability. 
56 For example, in 1922 the Sheffield United Committee allowed Gillespie to play for Ireland 'if he 
expressed astrong desire to do so' but minuted its opinion that 'in its present disturbed state, he ought 
not to go'. In the event, Gillespie played. The Huddersfield directors were less flexible in 1939 when 
in reply to an application for Hayes to tour Hungary and Germany with the FA of Ireland, they replied 
that 'owing to the present state of unrest we are not prepared to let any of our players go into Germany'. 
Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 22 March 1922; Minutes of Huddersfield Town FC, 
17 April 1939. 
57 Minutes of FA International Selection Committee, 22 April 1932. 
58 Crampsey, First 100 Years, p. 97. 
'9 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 139. 
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and the latter body issued its own scheme for all internationals, except England- 
Scotland, to be played during the week. In a summary report to the FA Council, vice- 
president William Pickford lucidly identified the League's principal objections to the 
existing arrangements: 
Their contention is that their commitments are too serious to permit them 
to supply, particularly Wales and Ireland, with the bulk of their players for 
Saturday International Matches. Both these Associations make heavy 
demands on their nationals playing in England. If all International games 
were played on Saturdays the League Clubs would, if compelled to release 
players, provide on average 40 players for Scotland, Wales and Ireland in 
addition to 33 and 6 reserves to travel, for England. In practice, until a 
few years ago, the clubs, asked by the other Associations for players, were 
reasonable, but held their right to refuse. They are the employers of the 
players and insist on that right. A Club cannot be compelled to release a 
player for another Association, and what one Club may do a combination 
of Clubs may do. 60 
These sentiments were echoed by the Management Committee's own statement to the 
FA: 
Players are sought and signed on by clubs for the purpose of their own 
Competitions, and it must be readily appreciated that the players fit for 
International duty are the most attractive players on the clubs' books and, 
in these days of keen competition, cannot be replaced except after 
considerable negotiation and expense, if at all. 
61 
Though the FA of Wales were now prepared to accept mid-week matches, the Irish 
delegates refused and, with the League clubs intent on collectively withholding their 
players for all intemationals during the coming season, the negotiations appeared to 
have reached a deadlock. But at the 1934 annual meeting McKenna and the executive 
persuaded member clubs to compromise by allowing both the smaller associations one 
home Saturday fixture each season. To compensate for this additional loss of players, 
all future Inter-League games were to be moved to week-days from the weekend. 62 
" FA Minute Books, International Matches Memorandum: Summary of position by W. Pickford of 
matters discussed at 9 January and 16 March 1934 Conferences 
61 Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 140. 
62 Sutcliffe et aL, Football League, p. 14 1. 
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The foregoing discussion clearly demonstrates that the hegemony of the Football 
League over the professional game in Scotland, Wales and Ireland was established 
and then consolidated over the first four decades of this century. In the first place, 
these nations provided significant and increasing percentages of the League's labour 
force and, as a result of the establishment of mutual agreements with the Scottish and 
Irish Leagues for the registration of players with administrative boards to settle 
disputes, the control over footballers had been extended throughout the United 
Kingdom. Furthermore, once large numbers of non-English players had become 
employees of Football League clubs it was possible for Preston to dictate the 
timetabling of international matches, the selection of international teams and, 
indirectly, to control the finances of the Scottish, Welsh. and Irish national 
associations. This power remained latent until the 1920s when the in-flux of greater 
numbers of top quality footballers from these countries led the League executive and 
its leading clubs to adopt a number of policies which were broadly successful in 
asserting the primacy of the League competition over international fixtures. By 1939 
there is little doubt that the decisions made at the headquarters of the national 
associations in Glasgow, Cardiff and Belfast were increasingly subject to confirmation 
and agreement from Preston. 
2. The Leaaue and Overseas Football 
Studies of the interaction and relationship between British football and the game in 
the rest of the world in the early part of the twentieth century have revealed some 
fundamental contradictions. The isolation, insularity and sheer arrogance of the 
football authorities are generally taken as read: in his recent history of world football, 
Bill Murray has said of this period that 'much of the progress on the continent was 
passing unnoticed' in Britain 63 ; the action of the British governing bodies in 
distancing themselves from FIFA for much of this time appeared to symbolise this 
position. However, on a less formal level British clubs, players and coaches were 
instrumental in the development of the administrative and playing side of football in 
continental Europe, the Americas and parts of the British Empire. The inter-war 
period witnessed numerous British club and representative sides touring abroad each 
63 Murray, Foothall, p. 93. 
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year and the cementing of institutional and personal relations which in some cases 
proved to have a remarkably longevity. That influential figures in British football 
kept more than an eye on events beyond the Channel is also clear from the memoirs 
of, among others, the most successful manager of the inter-war era, Herbert Chapman, 
the journalist and former League amateur Ivan Sharpe, as well as the private archives 
of another leading journalist, James Catton-64 The close links with the British game 
established by 'the presiding geniuses of European football in the 1930s'65 , the 
Austrian manager and administrator Hugo Meisl and the Italian manager Vittorio 
Pozzo, also serve as a partial corrective to the idea that having given the game to the 
world Britain then bolted the door and ventured out only reluctantly. 66 
The Football League's stance reflected these contradictions perfectly. At first glance 
the League appears to have been willingly detached from all aspects of non-British 
football. Not only was it an essentially selfish body, concerned with the interests of 
its members and little else; it also exhibited a parochial and inward-looking sense of 
superiority which rendered even the inclusion of clubs from the south of England, and 
hence its transformation into a 'national' league, a long-drawn out and highly 
contested process (see chapter 2). With football in London marginalised for so long, 
it is hardly surprising that the game in Vienna, Budapest, Paris and New York was 
largely overlooked. Moreover, unlike the FA, the League felt no moral duty to 
popularise the game outside its own territory. FA tours to the continent and ftirther 
afield were generally regarded as a distraction by the Management Committee and the 
clubs. When the governing body appealed to members of the League to nominate 
players for a six month round trip to Australasia planned for 1925 it met with an 
almost uniformly negative response. 
67 The Management Committee, equally 
dismissive of the venture, was eventually persuaded to lean on its clubs and in 
October 1924 it issued a circular recommending that the FA's appeal should be 
64 See Herbert Chapman, Herbert Chapman on Football, London, 1934; Sharpe, 40 Years in Football, 
especially chapters 9,16 and 24; Catton Folders and Archives, held at Arsenal FC, Highbury Stadium, 
London. 
65 Murray, Football, p. 93. 
66 On Meisl, see the later account by his journalist brother Willi Meisl, Soccer Revolution, London, 
1956. 
67 See Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 2 January 1924; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 9 January 1924. 
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reconsidered, together with an uncharacteristic statement of support for the 
6missionary' trip: 
The Committee feel that the debt of gratitude and obligation we owe to 
Australia cannot be properly recognised except by sending out a tearn of 
International strength which will be a credit to this country, prove 
attractive to the Australian people, and be effective in encouraging and 
popularising the game. 68 
Such sentiments are notable precisely because they were so rare: indeed, in the 
administrative activity as well as the newspaper columns of Bentley, Sutcliffe, 
McKenna and Cuff, little interest was shown towards overseas developments, except 
where these impacted directly on the League. The only obvious exception to this rule 
was John Lewis, who until his death in 1926 was a well-known international referee 
and propagandist for football in Europe and the Empire. After retiring as a League 
referee in 1905, Lewis was recalled to officiate at the 1908 London Olympics and also 
took control of the controversial 1920 Olympic Final at Antwerp in which the Czech 
side left the field following a sending-off and he awarded the game to BelgiUM. 69 
Additionally, in his later years, Lewis undertook overseas trips as a travelling official 
with FA representative sides to South Africa and Australia (the aforementioned 1925 
trip). As Sutcliffe himself commented, Lewis threw everything into his work abroad, 
becoming 'a missionary for football' and 'devoting time and money to a ceaseless 
propaganda in our Colonies where football was in its infancy'. 70 
There is little indication that the League as a body or its officials individually were 
directly involved in the FA's stormy relationship with the world governing body, 
FIFA. Certainly the issues on which the two sides parted company in 1920 and 1928 - 
contacts with the defeated nations in the First World War and the question of 'broken 
time' payments and the definition of amateurism - might be considered of little 
68 Minutes of Football League, 3 October 1924. 
69 Miller, Blackburn Worthies, pp. 228-29; Jackman, Blackburn Rovers, p. 145. 70 Sutcliffe and Hargreaves, History ofthe Lancashire FA, p. 158. 
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immediate concern to the League. 71 But the broader fear that by the 1920s FIFA was 
increasingly intent on threatening the autonomy of the British associations, which in 
1927 developed into a debate over the pedantics of which body could call itself 'the 
final authority of the game' on a global scale, undoubtedly had implications for the 
status and power of the League. The recurring suggestion that the four British 
associations should have just a single vote at FIFA meetings had embittered relations 
since the FA was admitted to FIFA in 1905 but gained a resurgence in the mid- I 920s. 
At the same time, British authority was more dramatically threatened by those 
continental administrators and journalists who began to advocate the modification of 
Britain's majority vote on the International Board, a body with complete control over 
changes in the laws of the game. In turn, this raised the spectre of the Football League 
becoming subject to overseas interference and control. The possible repercussions for 
the elite professional game, as Athletic News noted, were momentous: 'We might 
have to accept fantastic alteration[s] of the laws of the game emanating from Thibet or 
Timbuctoo (sic. )- a development which our traditions and heavy financial 
commitments could not risk. 972 
Though hardly devotees of continental football or advocates of closer ties with 
overseas football bodies, League Committeemen did come into contact With 
continental administrators at conferences and on international committees. In his 
position as a vice-president of the FA, McKenna became a member of the 
International Board just in time to be involved in the formal exclusion of the two 
FIFA representatives in June 192073; Sutcliffe, meanwhile, was one of five FA 
representatives who voted to withdraw once more from FIFA at a conference of the 
United Kingdom associations in February 1928. One month prior to this conference, 
Sutcliffe had unambiguously informed Topical Times readers of his attitude towards 
the world governing body: 
I don't care a brass farthing about the improvement of the game in France, 
Belgium, Austria or Germany. The FIFA does not appeal to me. An 
"' On the rise of FIFA and its evolving relationship with the British governing bodies see G. Furrcr, P. 
C. Godoy and S. Blatter, FIFA 1904-1984, Zurich, 1984; Alan Tomlinson, 'Going Global: The FIFA 
Story' in Tomlinson and Whannel (eds), Off The Ball, pp. 87-93. 
72,4thletic News, 30 January 1928. 
73 See Minutes of International Football Association Board, 14 June 1920. 
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organisation where such football associations as those of Uruguay and 
Paraguay, Brazil and Egypt, Bohemia and Pan Russia, are co-equal with 
England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland seems to me to be a case of 
magnifying the midgets. If Central Europe or any other district want to 
govern football let them confine their powers and authority to themselves, 
and we can look after our own affairs. 
74 
Although it is impossible to identify Sutcliffe's precise contribution to the subsequent 
decision, the recorded minutes of the conference and the FA's formal letter of 
withdrawal clearly echo his earlier sentiments, if in a more diplomatic tone. While 
hoping to maintain 'friendly relations' with FIFA, the associations indicated their 
wish 'to conduct their affairs in the way their long experience has shown desirable', 
and informed the FIFA secretary that the 'comparatively recent formation' of most of 
the affiliated FIFA members rendered them ill-equipped to deal with the knotty issue 
of defining amateurism. Without the British, it was assumed that FIFA 'cannot have 
the knowledge which only experience can bring'. 75 Sutcliffe's high-minded disdain 
for FIFA was underlined later that year when in response to the rumoured prohibition 
of British tours on the continent he noted that 'In parting from the Federation we lose 
nothing, in slamming the door in our face they have lost. wisdom, guidance and 
help. ' 76 
As far as the growth of leagues in continental Europe and the Americas was 
concerned, the Football League provided no material or technical assistance. Yet in 
almost every case the League was used as a model of structure and policy. Few league 
competitions deviated much from what Lanfranchi has called the 'British model of 
championships', with promotion and relegation and movement up or down based on 
sporting merit. Those that did, particularly the American league, were influenced by 
an established tradition of sporting competition based on the principle of a 'fixed 
elite". 77 The French League was one which consciously 'borrowed' from the Football 
League in its formative stage, from regulations such as the maximum wage to the 
acquisition of many of its players (see below). But while the League may have 
74 Topical Times, 14 January 1928. 
75 FA Minute Books, Report of the Conference of Representatives of the Associations of the United 
Kingdom, 17 February 1928. 
76 Top ical Times 
, 
12 May 1928. 
77 Lanfranchi, 'Exporting Football', pp. 34,44. 
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provided a structure, the substance and style of the emerging continental competitions 
both nationally and internationally were filled in with almost no English assistance. 
The central European nations of Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in particular, 
developed their own competitions like the Mitropa Cup and schedules of international 
fixtures; even autonomous styles of play. 78 Thus the conventional picture of English 
and League football in this period is one of almost complete introversion and 
exclusion: while continental nations played each other, disseminated ideas and 
exchanged talent, the English 'put themselves... outside a vast, unprecedented network 
of exchanges'. 79 
Q Overseas Contacts and Foreign Tours 
To dwell on the institutional isolation and apparent hostility of the Football League 
towards overseas football, however, would be to ignore the multifarious activity 
which existed below the surface at an informal club and individual level. The close 
season tour was probably the earliest and most important aspect of this. The pioneers 
here were the southern amateur clubs who began arranging individual exhibition 
matches and even full-blown tours of continental Europe towards the late 1890s. 
League clubs were slower to take up the challenge, not due to worries about the cost 
but because prospective tours coincided with the signing-on process in late April and 
May and many players were unwilling to travel abroad after a long domestic season. 
Some clubs like Sheffield United were simply unable to raise a touring party as many 
of their players were either engaged in first class cricket or in other business pursuits 
during the summer. 80 Nevertheless, by the late 1900s a number of League clubs were 
making annual or bi-annual visits to the continent. Austria-Hungary appears to have 
been the most popular destination in these formative years: in the decade before the 
First World War, Everton, Manchester United, Sunderland, Barnsley, Blackburn 
Rovers, Oldham Athletic, Tottenham Hotspur and Burnley all played there. 81 Others 
travelled finther afield. Nottingham Forest 'followed the initiative of Southern 
78 Lanfranchi, 'Exporting Football', pp. 33-36. 
79 Pierre Lanfranchi, 'Bologna: The Team that Shook the World', IJHS, 8,3,1991, p. 338. 
'0 For these reasons plus a disinclination to play Sunday matches, the Sheffield United Committee 
declined numerous offers to tour continental Europe and South America before 1914. See Minutes of 
Sheffield United Football Committee, 1903-12 passim; Athletic News, 8 March 1909. 8' Meisl, Soccer Revolution, pp. 57-60. 
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Leaguers Southampton and the amateur Corinthians when it played a series of 
matches in Uruguay and Argentina in 1905. Everton and Tottenham Hotspur made 
the same journey in 1909, playing games against local clubs, Uruguayan and 
Argentinean League teams and even against each other in two exhibition matches. 82 
Tours of this kind received neither official promotion nor condemnation from the 
League executive. While the FA would often act as a go-between, receiving offers 
from foreign associations and clubs which were then passed on to selected League 
members, the Management Committee remained uninvolved. In fact its first 
intervention'came in 1912 when it responded to Newcastle United's action in paying 
players EI per day expenses while on tour by ruling that, in future tours, players 'must 
not be allowed to make a profit'. In addition, the Committee was to be notified of the 
terms, conditions and arrangements for any proposed tour and furnished with a 
thorough financial statement within two weeks of the clubs' return. 83 But it was the 
FA rather than the League which could officially sanction or veto overseas tours, even 
if the latter sometimes intervened to modify certain details and continued to set 
maximum limits on the tour expenses given to players. 
By the 1920s overseas tours were increasing in frequency as well as in terms of their 
significance in the sporting calendars of the leading League clubs. Club minute books 
reveal that offers to tour the continent were received almost every winter from 
overseas clubs or associations and tended to be accepted more often than before the 
war. In 1922 Arsenal and Everton visited Sweden and Denmark respectively while 
Newcastle United played in both these countries; Burnley and Liverpool, meanwhile, 
travelled to Italy and Notts County, Durham City and Hartlepools United undertook 
tours in Spain. Two years later the Management Committee provisionally sanctioned 
continental tours by eight first division, three second division and three southern third 
division clubs. 84 West Ham United was one of the most regular tourists, travelling to 
the Basque region of Spain in 1921, Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1923, Germany, 
Switzerland and France in 1924, Holland in 1925 and Spain again a year later. The 
" Mason, Passion ofthe People?, pp. 17-18,19; Kcates, History ofthe Everton Football Club, p. 132. 
13 Minutes of Football League, 9 August 1912. 
84 Minutes of Football League, 28 April 1922,11 April, 12 May 1924. 
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primary reasons behind this increased continental activity were clearly financial. If 
efficiently arranged, a close season tour could often turn a disappointing season's 
deficit into a profit. Everton's 1909 tour to South America had reportedly made a 
000 profit which itself was dwarfed three years later by the profit of over 20,000 
dollars received on a similar trip by the Southern League club Swindon Town. 85 
European tours generally grossed smaller but not insignificant sums. West Ham 
received E900 for the five matches on its 1923 post-FA Cup Final trip to central 
Europe while Aston Villa was guaranteed ; E2,000 for a six-match tour of Scandinavia 
in 1926.86 It must be added, however, that not every League club believed in the 
benefits of touring. The Sheffield United Committee continued to block tour 
proposals throughout the 1920s and much of the 1930s, even recording in its 1924 
minutes an official resolution not 'to entertain the idea of any Continental Tour'. The 
Committee finally agreed to its first overseas venture when a tour party was sent to 
Sweden in 1938.87 
In the process of arranging tours and individual matches, some clubs built up a 
network of institutional contacts on the continent. Often this led to return visits 
abroad or even return matches in England, as when West Ham entertained the Hakoah 
club of Vienna in September 1923 following the first meeting of the two on the 
Hammers' surnmer tour; or when Nice, managed by the former Notts County player 
Charlie Bell, played at Molineux the season after Wolverhampton Wanderers' 1933 
French tour. 88 Individuals like Hugo Meisl and his journalist brother Willi, who was 
based in London for part of the 1930s, were important in facilitating such links and 
organising matches, in their case with Austrian and Hungarian clubs; the League 
referee R. G. Rudd performed a similar function with the Scandinavian clubs. 89 But 
this did not prevent the clubs themselves forming close and sometimes long-standing 
relationships. There are indeed some indications that the idea of regular fixtures with 
85 Mason, Passion ofthe People 91 p. 23. 
86 Minutes of West Ham United, 24 April 1923; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 16 March 1926. 
87 See Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 12 November 1924; 9 February 1938. 
88 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 9 July, 13,20 August 1923; Matthews, The Wolves, p. 34; Dennis 
Turner and Alex White, Football Managers, Derby, 1993, p. 86. 
89 References to the role of Rudd in facilitating tours and matches with Scandinavian club sides can be 
found throughout the minute books of Aston Villa, West Ham United, Sheffield United and the other 
clubs. 
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overseas opposition was considered even before the First World War: Sheffield 
United, for instance, declined FC Bruges' suggestion to inaugurate an annual Easter 
match between the two sides in 1912.90 The best known series of matches, however, 
was undoubtedly Arsenal's annual Armistice day fixture against Racing Club de Paris 
which began in the mid-1920s and lasted through to the 1950s. These matches were 
considered to be extremely successful on both sides of the Channel, with crowds 
regularly topping the 50,000 mark. 91 Furthermore, by the 1930s the visits of club 
sides were no longer exclusively in one direction as more continental teams were 
invited to play on Football League grounds. The London clubs appear to have taken 
the lead here, especially Arsenal and Tottenham Hotspur, whose grounds also began 
to be used for England international matches at this time. But others soon followed, 
and not only those clubs from the highest division. Second division West Ham, for 
one, staged matches against AIK Stockholm, Austria FC and a Hungarian XI during 
the first half of the 1935/36 season. The Swedish club had visited Upton Park the 
previous season; an event which was recorded in the club's minutes as ta most happy 
occasion'. Representatives of the FA, the London FA, Swedish and English 
diplomats and even Prince Carl of Sweden were entertained at the match and an after- 
match dinner which for the club 'marked a further step in Diplomatic and Sporting 
relations' and 'would ever remain a delightfid memory at Upton Park'. 92 
It would be wrong, however, to assume that matches between Football League clubs 
and continental opposition were always regarded as mutually beneficial, 
unproblematic, celebratory occasions. There were in fact more voices calling for 
clubs to withdraw from the continent than to extend and strengthen relations. The 
perceived benefits of overseas excursions, which were never fully appreciated at 
executive level, were coming to be increasingly undermined by the late 1920s, 
primarily as a result of the damage done to the League's prestige by regular defeats. 
The large and easy victories recorded by many English teams before 1914 became 
more rare between the wars as superior coaching methods and administrative nous 
enabled continental sides to close the quality gap. Sunderland's 2-1 defeat by Vienna 
90 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 22November 1911. 91 See Allison, Allison Calling, p. 142; Ousti Jordan, Football European, Paris, 1947, p. 88. 92Minutes of West Ham United FC, 26 November 1934. 
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AC in 1909 after finishing third in the first division was the first Football League 
failure on the continent but was regarded as little more than an aberration: the 
superiority of the masters over the pupils was still taken for granted. 93 After the war 
things changed slowly but significantly: defeats became more common at club level, 
even if the ramifications of the 'Versailles mentality' in international football and the 
withdrawals from FIFA meant that England's national side was spared possible defeat 
by the stronger central European nations during the 1920s, particularly Germany and 
Austria. 94 Under these circumstances, tour matches gained an added resonance, 
offering as they did the only chance for aspiring continentals to pit their skills against 
the English masters. 
But Football League clubs treated these encounters rather differently, often sending 
weakened sides which were accused by the continental and British press alike of not 
treating tour matches as proper competitive fixtures. After a series of defeats in the 
summer of 1927, Athletic News mounted a campaign aimed at informing League clubs 
and the football authorities of 'how British prestige was suffering by the defeats of 
tired and holiday-making touring teams'-95 A year later the exit of the British 
associations from FIFA resulted in a retaliatory attempt by the latter to prohibit British 
tours of the continent. Sutcliffe's reaction to this probably reflected that of many 
League and club officials: 
I have always taken a very definite stand against Continental tours. They 
serve no good purpose to our football or footballers. The only description 
is Continental picnics, where football is very secondary. At times the 
games are played on grounds, and under conditions, with so-called 
referees, which reduce the game from that of contest to one of farce. Our 
players have got to face a keen effort on the part of their opponents 
determined to win, and players are subject to serious risk which may have 
an effect on the playing ability of some players in the next season... The 
close season should be a period of rest and recovery, and if the 
International Federation ban the visits of our clubs to meet Continental 
clubs, I shall be delighted. 96 
" Murray, Football, P. 66. 
94 Lanfranchi, 'Exporting football', p. 34. 
95 Athletic News, 6 June 1927. On Bumley's 4-2 defeat in Nuremburg in 1927 see Theo Riegler, Als 
Staulfauth noch im Tor Stand,... Ein Buch vom deutschen Füssball, Munich, 1953, p. 10 1. 96 Topical Times, 5 May 1928. 
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FIFA did subsequently issue a ban but this was quickly rescinded due to pressure from 
clubs in England and abroad who had already entered into tour contracts. That 
summer League prestige was fin-ther dented when the FA Cup holders Blackburn 
Rovers recorded five defeats in six games while touring Austria-Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. At that years' annual meeting McKenna 'expressed the hope that the 
League Clubs touring the Continent would maintain the prestige of the League' but, in 
concert with Sutcliffe, added that if clubs continued to be beaten match after match 'it 
would be better not to go'. 97 Certainly the League hierarchy was reluctant for its clubs 
to assume an ambassadorial role, especially if this adversely affected the smooth 
running and status of its own competition. 
In 1929 the debate intensified further as League clubs suffered ever more 
embarrassing tour defeats. Huddersfield Town lost four of its five matches in Austria- 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia which, upset by poor refereeing standards convinced 
Joseph Barlow, the director in charge of the party, not to 'go on tour again against 
professional Continental teams'; 98 Cup winners Bolton Wanderers, meanwhile, was 
trounced 4-0 by a Catalan Select XI at the opening of Barcelona's new 65,000 all- 
seater stadium in front of the Spanish King. 99 But the most bitter criticism was 
reserved for Newcastle United, who were beaten 8-1 by a 'second-rate Austrian team' 
called Pozsony and also lost matches in Bratislava and Prague. 100 After the clubs' 2-0 
defeat by the Vienna AC club, the local Neues Wiener Journal claimed that '10,000 
spectators were deceived of their money' and declared that: 'We need no more games 
with English teams. That is the nett result of the match with Newcastle and of most 
displays given by English teams in Vienna since the war. ' The Prague correspondent 
of the Berliner Zeitung am Mittag broadened the criticism by suggesting that 
The English professional teams have so far only brought disappointments, 
as practically all their matches in Vienna, Budapest, Prague, Leipsic (sic. ) 
etc., have suffered from the indifference shown by these guests in carrying 
out their fixtures, with the result that they have been defeated almost 
97 Minutes of Football League, 4 June 1928; Athletic News, II June 1928. 
98 Athletic News, 3 June 1929. 
" J. Garcia Castell, Historia del Futbol Catala, Barcelona, 1968, p. 19 1; Dean Hayes, Bolton 
Wanderers: An A-Z, Preston, 1994, p. 52. 
100 F. W. Carter and W. Capel-Kirby, The Mighty Kick: The History, Romance and Humour of 
Football, London, 1933, p. 64. 
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everywhere. For the organisers, at all events, an experience and 
. 1101 unprofitable pastime, and for the Englishmen a well-paid pleasure trip. 
The Hungarian FA even made a formal complaint to the FA about the performances 
of Newcastle and an FA commission (including McKenna in its ranks) judged that 
because of the 'indifferent displays given by the Newcastle United players during the 
tour... the Hungarian FA were justified in endeavouring to cancel the contract. 102 
Beyond this, however, nothing was done. One writer to Athletic News felt that the 
Foreign Office should refuse passports to those teams which were unable to uphold 
national prestige abroad, while Derby County's W. Bendle Moore informed his fellow 
League secretaries and managers that 'no one - whether it was the FA or the smallest 
club in the country - had the right to send a team abroad unless it was a competent 
team accompanied by plenty of reserves'. 103 
Meanwhile, the League itself took no action, despite the secretary of the FA of Wales' 
prediction that the Management Committee would be moved to prohibit further 
continental tours; neither was there any attempt to regulate the type of matches played, 
as the Scottish League did when it ruled that clubs touring Europe could play district 
teams but not national representative jeams, while those visiting the colonies or 
dominions could meet both. 104 In 1931 Arsenal proposed that the Football League's 
prestige abroad could best be protected by paying bonuses to players on the regular 
League scale 'if in the opinion of the Management Committee the games were of 
sufficient importance'. 105 Huddersfield Town, Chelsea and Port Vale, among others, 
shared Arsenal's views but the Committee opposed them and the proposal was 
defeated by 18 votes to 16. Ever mindftil of the League's reputation, McKenna felt 'it 
would be said on the Continent that we could not win matches without paying. The 
Arsenal had won their matches, and all players should be loyal to their county and 
their clubs'. 106 
101 Both extracts are quoted in Athletic News, 3 June 1929. 
"' Minutes of FA Emergency Committee, 8 October-9 December 1929. 
103 Athletic News, 20 May 1929; Report of Football League Secretaries' and Managers' Association 
AGM in Athletic News, 10 June 1929. 
104 Athletic News, 15 June 1929; Crampsey, First 100 Years, p. 100. 
105 Minutes of Football League, I June 1931 (AGM). 
106Report of Football League AGM in Athletic News, 8 June 193 1. 
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Little changed in the course of the 1930s. 1932 witnessed a further series of poor 
overseas performances, with Newcastle again criticised during a visit to France, along 
with the reigning first division champions Everton, who won only two of their four 
tour games. Moreover, the scale of press criticism at home both deepened and 
widened: British (and particularly Football League) clubs were now accused not only 
of damaging the prestige of the sport but of the nation as a whole. 'The people who 
let British football down are letting Britain down. There is no question about that. ' 107 
In spite of this public onslaught, and the occasional promise to remedy the problem, 
the League and the FA still refused to intervene. But this apparent inertia reveals a 
more important point about the purpose of overseas tours and matches in the eyes of 
League officials. Unlike the leading clubs in central Europe, Football League clubs 
did not need to tour extensively for financial or other reasons. They were not, except 
in the view of a rather nationalistic, metropolitan press, seen as ambassadors of the 
nation in the way that the clubs of Vienna, Budapest and Prague often were. 108 
Everything considered, overseas competition was always regarded simply as a 
temporary or seasonal distraction from the real business of life - domestic competition 
- and thus whatever happened abroad really did not matter much. In this context it is 
hardly surprising that Chelsea's defeat by Bologna in the final of the 1937 Paris 
Exhibition Competition caused hardly a stir at home, while in Fascist Italy it became 
the occasion for nationalistic outpourings and a symbol of national prestige. 109 
ii) Foreign Leagues and Alien Players 
Defeats while playing abroad, though damaging to the prestige and reputation of the 
League and its clubs, could easily be rationalised or simply swept under the carpet. 
However, when overseas progress impinged upon the League's domestic authority, 
the response was quite different. The growth of clubs and then leagues abroad did not 
necessarily represent a danger to the Football League but this changed in the inter-war 
period when clubs from two specific nations - the United States and France - 
endeavoured to recruit League players. There had been precursors of this type of 
107 Carter and Capel-Kirby, Mighty Kick, pp. 66-67. 
10' Lanfranchi, 'Exporting Football', pp. 35-36. The same can be said of France and Spain, where 
League matches were not so prestigious or well attended as friendly contests with international 
opposition. 
109 Lanfranchi, 'Bologna', pp. 336-37. 
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activity. As early as 1894 five players broke their League contracts and sailed to the 
United States where they were to be employed by clubs in the baseball-financed 
American League of Professional Clubs on comparatively generous terms of DO 
down and E4-5 per week. But the newly-formed league immediately faced 
immigration problems with the US government over its foreign imports and was 
forced to disband within just six weeks: the players 'discovered that in the New 
World disillusiom-nent was the consequence of insubstantial promises: they quickly 
came back'. ' 10 
A more important forerunner to the export of League players, however, was the export 
of ex-players as coaches. Though there is no data available on the number of ex- 
League players employed in coaching posts overseas at any one time, the fragmentary 
evidence seems to support Mason's view that they 'were to be found everywhere, 
from Spain to Hungary, to Italy and Uruguay' and often in considerable numbers. "' 
The high-point of the British coach abroad was probably immediately after the First 
World War and the 1020s, although some, including the most successful British coach 
of the period, Jimmy Hogan, began before 1914. Hogan coached national and club 
sides in Holland, Austria, Hungary, Germany, France and Switzerland between 1918 
and 1934 (see chapter 6); Manchester United's former full-back Herbert Burgess 
enjoyed a similarly lengthy coaching career in Hungary, Spain, Italy, Austria, 
Denmark and Sweden from 1920-32 and even applied for positions in Canadian 
football! 12 In 1927 Athletic News could report that Germany's two most powerful 
clubs were both coached by former League players: ex-England internationals Fred 
Spikesley with Nuremberg and Will Townley at Furth. ' 13 The Dutch FA employed a 
coterie of ex-League coaches in the early 1930s, including Bob Glendenning 
(Barnsley/Bolton Wanderers), Gus Smith (Sunderland) and Harry Marsden (Sheffield 
Wednesday). Yet by 1933 Carter and Capel-Kirby could detect a move away from 
110 Young, Football in Sheffield, p. 73. See also David Waldstein and Stephen Wagg, ' Unamerican 
Activity? Football in US and Canadian Society' in Stephen Wagg (ed. ), Giving the Game Away. 
Football, Politics and Culture on Five Continents, Leicester, 1995, p. 75. 
111 Mason, 'Some Englishmen and Scotsmen Abroad', p. 74. Carter and Capel-Kirby suggested in 1933 
that 'Hundreds of ex-players from England and beyond the Tweed have found lucrative and pleasant 
employment abroad [as coaches]'. Mighty Kick, p. 140. 
112 Mason, 'Some Englishmen and Scotsmen Abroad', p. 74; Dykes, UnitedAlphabet, pp. 60-6 1; 
Catton Folders, B-C, Herbert Burgess to James Catton, undated, p. 206. 
113 Athletic News, 6 June 1927. 
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British coaches on the continent, with only two out of some 500 in Germany and 
William Garbutt as the loan British representative amongst 45 Hungarians in Italy. 114 
The migration of former players - or those approaching retirement - as coaches caused 
little disruption in League circles. As the demand for coaching services within the 
League was limited, most club directors and League officials were willing to release 
players to the continent or any other destination. The Management Committee even 
allowed clubs to free players under contract for summer coaching engagements in 
preparation for their post-playing career, as when Everton's England international 
Sam Chedgzoy was permitted to take up such an appointment in Canada. ' 15 But it 
was when offers arrived for contracted footballers to play abroad that the League 
really stirred. The initial threat came from the United States when its American 
Soccer League was formed in 1921. Unrestricted by any registration agreement, 
American clubs were able to sign retained League players free of charge and without 
reference to their English clubs. By late 1923 the activities of American scouts had 
generated a minor panic amongst League clubs, even though it was the Scottish 
League which was particularly targeted. Some observers regarded this as a real 
menace to the ability of League clubs to hold on to their players and demand transfer 
fees. 116 Others, like Sutcliffe, believed the American 'menace' would be short-lived 
and that players would come to realise 'that to leave England with its definite benefits 
for America with its promises is taking a leap in the dark'. ' 17 
Sutcliffe's prognosis proved to be fairly accurate as the movement of players across 
the Atlantic failed to develop into more than a trickle. Even so, the capture of some 
prominent internationals such as Manchester City's Mickey Hamill in 1924 and 
Arsenal's Scottish goalkeeper William Harper in 1928 were considered serious 
enough for the League executive to enact certain deterrent measures. At the end of 
1926 it was ruled that players leaving a club for America or the continent could not be 
re-registered with the Football League 'until the Management Committee has had 
ample opportunity to investigate the circumstances under which the Player left and the 
114 Carter and Capel-Kirby, Mighty Kick, pp. 132,140. 
113 Minutes of Football League, 22 October 1923. 
:: 6 Topical TiMeS, 10 May 1924. 
7 Sports Pictures, 31 May 1924. 
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reasons for and conditions attendant on his return'. 118 A few months later the 
Committee suspended a former Bradford (Park Avenue) player engaged in America's 
New Bedford City Football League for alleged inducements to contracted League 
players and issued the warning that it would 'entirely prohibit all Tours to the United 
States so long as any American Club improperly attempts to interfere with any of our 
League clubs'. 119 Yet despite widespread fears of players being permanently 
suspended or banned for life, the League did in fact leave the door open and players 
did not generally stay away for long. Harper came back to Arsenal within two seasons 
before moving on to Plymouth Argyle, while after leaving Derby County for America, 
the Irish centre-back Mick O'Brien soon returned to find a new position at Watford. 120 
The American challenge really subsided when it was revealed in August 1928 that 
Everton's record goal-scorer 'Dixie' Dean had been offered, and refused, a move to 
the New York Giants for a reported wage of E25 per week. One correspondent 
concluded that 'the American menace has been grossly exaggerated by the scare- 
mongers' and that Dean's rejection could 'be taken as a symbol of defeat for the plans 
of our friends on the other side of the Atlantic'. 121 
While the threatened exodus of players to America failed to materialise, the French 
6menace" of the 1930s proved to have more substance. In 1932 a professional league 
was created in France which from its beginnings rested on a policy of importing 
foreign footballers. 122 British players were immediately seen as attractive 
acquisitions, partly because of their footballing abilities but mainly because no 
transfer fees were necessary due to the British exclusion from FIFA. In the close 
season of 1932 the spectre of French scouts signing up League professionals en masse 
dominated the sporting press. At first French clubs appeared to be targeting elite 
players like Chelsea's Scottish international pairing of Hughie Gallacher and Tommy 
Law, as well as Arsenal's David Jack, with offers of positions as player-coaches. 
With a maximum wage of only 2,000 francs a month (equivalent to just over E5 per 
week), however, it was impossible for French clubs to lure the best talent. The offers 
118 Minutes of Football League, 13 December 1926. 
119 Minutes of Football League, 7 March 1927. 
120 Carter and Capel-Kirby, Mighty Kick, pp. 119-20. 
12 1Topical Times, II August 1928. 
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for Gallacher, Law and Jack were thus rejected: a director of Sporting Club Nimes 
revealed to one newspaper that he was looking for second or third division players as 
'the big men are quite beyond our means'. 123 Even so, the League executive issued a 
resolution in April intended to frighten off both potential migrants and poachers: 
Players are warned that on taking Continental engagements without the 
consent of the Clubs retaining or offering to retain them, the Management 
Committee will ask the League to prohibit the registration of such players 
on seeking to return to a League Club in this country. 
Continental and all Clubs outside the jurisdiction of the Football 
Associations of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales interfering with 
players connected with Clubs of the Football League will be regarded as 
having committed an unfriendly act toward the League and all friendly 
relations will cease. 124 
In short, McKenna told reporters, players going to France 'would cease to have the 
right to play again in this country'. 125 This threat had only a limited effect because in 
May two Chelsea internationals - Andy Wilson and Alex Cheyne - travelled to France 
to join Nimes. By September they had been followed by a stream, if hardly a flood, of 
British professionals, many technically still attached to League clubs, although it must 
be added that others were unretained and were therefore entirely free to play wherever 
they wished. 126 
Table 8.7 British Players in the French Football League, 1932-39 































Total 43 47 40 41 27 23 14 
0 Including Third Division. 
Including the Complementary Group. 
Source: Calculated from data compiled by Pierre Lanfranchi, De Montfort University. 
122 See Pierre Lanfranchi, 'The Migration of Footballers: the Case of France, 1932-1982' in Bale and 
Maguire (eds), Global Sports Arena, p. 63. 
123 Daily Mail, 14 April 1932. 
124 Minutes of Football League, 22 April 1932. 
'25 Daily Mail, 14 April 1932. 
126 Carter and Capel-Kirby, Mighty Kick, pp. 116-19. 
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Table 8.8 British Players in the French First Division as a percentage of all players, 1932-39 
Season No. British Players As % Non-French Players As % All Players 
1932/33 43 40.7 11.9 
1933/34 26 27.6 9.6 
1934/35 15 14.3 4.5 
1935/36 15 15.2 4.9 
1936/37 10 9.4 2.9 
1937/38 9 8.8 2.8 
1938/39 5 6.9 1.5 
Source: Calculated from data compiled by Pierre Lanfranchi, De Montfort University-, Wahl and Lanfranchi, Les Footballeurs 
Professionnels, p. 79. 
In the first two seasons of the French first division the British were the dominant non- 
French national grouping, although it is difficult to calculate the precise proportion 
who arrived from Football League, as opposed to Scottish or lower league, clubs. 
Many players were signed for trial periods or on month-to-month contracts and some, 
like Bill Fraser at Marseilles, even returned home in time for the start of the English 
season. 127 In an article for Topical Times, Fraser indicated that his return to England 
was motivated by 'the danger of falling out of touch with football in this country' and, 
more specifically, by the FA and League wamings that players who deserted their 
clubs would never be allowed back. In reality, however, as with the American exiles, 
most were able to return to League football without too much trouble. 128 Though they 
first required League and FA sanction, both Wilson and Cheyne had re-signed for 
League clubs within two seasons, the latter actually returning to Chelsea. Even when 
complications arose, the football authorities did not bolt the door shut. In one telling 
case from 1937, G. E. Gibson returned to England in violation of his contract with 
Racing Club de Roubaix and, though the FA instructed him to go back to France to 
complete his agreement, Roubaix refused to remove the suspension or reinstate him. 
In these circumstances, the FA chose to protect the interests of the player by refusing 
the French FA's demand for a transfer fee and allowing Gibson to register as a 
professional with any English club he wished. 129 Indeed, notwithstanding the 
127 See Minutes of AFPTU, 22 August 1932 (AGM). T. L. Davis broke his one-and-a-half month 
contract at FC Metz afterjust two weeks in May 1935 and signed a contract with Oldham Athletic for 
the 1935/36 season. He was eventually suspended for three months in ajoint decision by the FA and 
the French FA. Minutes of FA Emergency Committee, 28 May-19 August 1935. 
"" Topical Times, 13 August 1932. 
129 Minutes of FA Consultative Committee, 12 January- 15 February 1937; Minutes of AFPTU, 22 
March 1937. 
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resolution of 1932, there is no evidence that the League or the FA ever refused to re- 
register a professional who had played in France. 
By the mid-1930s the French threat to League clubs was no longer considered 
particularly serious as migration slowed and some of the best known captures returned 
home. After 1934 the majority of British players were engaged in the second rather 
than the first tier of French football and the British presence in the top division 
dwindled from 11.9 to just 1.5 per cent over the seven year period from the creation of 
the League to the outbreak of war (Tables 8.7 and 8-8). There were both sporting and 
economic reasons behind this downturn. Even some of the most talented former 
League players found themselves unable to adapt to the very different culture of 
French football and society. The best example is provided by the sojourn of Peter 
O'Dowd, the only fully capped England international to play in France, who failed to 
secure a regular place in the Valenciennes side during the 1935/36 season and 
returned to League football with Torquay United in early 1937. Experiences of this 
kind clearly diminished the reputation of British players and managers, a factor which 
was compounded by the economic crisis in central Europe which allowed French 
clubs to acquire the very best Hungarian and Austrian players at relatively inexpensive 
prices. 1,30 
While the Football League struggled in te inter-war years to prevent its employees 
leaving Britain, it also colluded with the FA, the Players' Union and the Ministry of 
Labour to keep foreign players out. With the exception of a handful of colonial-bom 
players, non-British footballers had never featured in League sides. In 1910 Grimsby 
Town were playing a half-back called Max Seeburg, an assimilated German who had 
previously turned out for Tottenham, Chelsea and Burnley and later joined Reading. 
A Dane and an Italian also played in League football for one season before the First 
World War. 13 1 Liverpool, meanwhile, employed a number of South Africans from the 
mid-1920s and by the early 1930s had six on their books, but in general terms even 
"' See Pierre Lanfranchi and Matthew Taylor, 'British Footballers in France, 1932-39: A FailureT, 
unpublished paper presented at the Conference of the British Society of Sports Historians, 1997; 
Lanfranchi, 'Migration of Footballers', p. 69. Also see Tony Mason, 'Tbe Bogota Affair' in Bale and 
Maguire (eds), Global Sports Arena, pp. 39-48. 
13 1Athletic News, 14 August 1911; Golesworthy, Encyclopaedia ofAssociation Football, p. 65. 
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recruits from the empire and commonwealth were rare. Certainly there was nothing 
approaching the 'scramble for overseas talent' which took place in cricket's 
Lancashire League between the wars, even taking into account the fact that football 
did not have the same 'imperial connection'. 132 Indeed we can see from Tables 8.1 
and 8.2 that there were only five players born outside Britain in the two League 
divisions in 1911 and just eight in four divisions by 1925. This paucity of non-British 
talent may have reflected wider prejudices towards foreigners and overseas football 
but it was also undoubtedly the result of restrictive measures passed at central 
government level. Up until 1905 there was almost no legislative control over 
immigration into Britain but over the subsequent fifteen years a series of 
parliamentary acts placed considerable restriction on entry. The 1919 Aliens Act and 
the subsequent Orders in Council of 1920 and 1925, in particular, provided strict 
guidelines for the employment of aliens and left entry in the hands of immigration 
officials. 133 In this context, any attempt to import players from abroad faced 
significant obstacles and, in the event, few clubs tried. One or two, however, did. 
The best example is Arsenal's attempt in 1930 to sign the Austrian goalkeeper Rudy. 
Hiden. Negotiations between Herbert Chapman and Meisl, Hiden's club manager, 
had been successful; a fee was agreed and the player was even guaranteed a 
supplementary job in London as a chef Yet on his arrival Hiden was denied entry by 
immigration officials. He was subsequently signed by Racing Club de Paris, with 
whom he actually played at Highbury against Arsenal in the annual armistice match. 
At the same time the Belgian centre-forward Raymond Braine faced similar 
obstructions when he signed for Clapton Orient and was forced to return to Belgium 
before his League registration could be completed. 134 Both players had been refused 
entry according to the established Ministry of Labour criteria that their presence 
would have restricted the employment opportunities of British workers. 
132 Young, Football in Merseyside, pp. 130-3 1; Jeffrey Hill, 'Cricket and the Imperial Connection: 
Overseas Players in Lancashire in the Inter-war Years' in Bale and Maguire (eds), Global Sports Arena, 
p 
,; 352. Colin Holmes, John Bull's Island., Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971, London, 1988, pp. 
113-14. 
"" Carter and Capel-Kirby, Mighty Kick, p. 12 1. 
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The Hiden and Braine incidents caused considerable discussion within football circles 
and prompted the football authorities into taking action of their own. Not 
surprisingly, British players were unambiguous in their opposition to the idea of 
foreign imports. The Players' Union informed the Ministry of Labour of 'its 
disapproval of allowing Alien Professional Footballers into the country' and trusted 
that the Ministry would 'continue to follow its present principles' . 
135 Even one of 
Hiden's prospective team-mates, Eddie Hapgood, later admitted that the Ministry of 
Labour's action was perhaps a good thing: 'There's plenty enough good players in 
this country to go round without importing them from abroad. ' 136 Meanwhile, the FA, 
backed by League representatives, considered a number of measures aimed at 
restricting overseas professionals. In October 1930 Wreford-Brown, a former amateur 
international and representative of Oxford University, proposed to the FA Council that 
a two-year residential qualification should be imposed on non-British players wishing 
to compete in the FA Cup. His primary object was to nip in the bud a possible wave 
of continental imports: 'with talent becoming so highly developed on the Continent 
no one knows what may happen in the future'. 137 But the FA actually went one step 
further in 1931 by extending Wreford-Brown's residential qualification to 'all clubs 
and all competitions, including the League', with the stated objective of preventing 
, the importation of any players into England from abroad'. 138 Thus the regulations of 
the FA when combined with restrictive government legislation created for the Football 
League an almost impenetrable barrier which protected it from contact with 
continental playing talent during the 1930s. 
3. Conclusion: An Insular Leazue? 
For the Football League and its predominantly English membership, international 
football consisted of two distinct and fundamentally contrasting relationships. Close 
contacts between the FA and its sister associations in Scotland, Ireland and Wales 
preceded the creation of the League, while non-English players and administrators 
135 Minutes of AFPTU, 25 August 1930. 
136 Eddie Hapgood, Foothall Amhassador, London, 1944, p. 70. 
137 Catton Folders, B, Newspaper clipping on Wreford Brown's proposal to ban continental players, 9 
October 193 1, p. 174. 
138 AthletiC NeWS' 8 June 193 1. 
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were instrumental in the foundation and early progress of its leading clubs. Thus the 
League emerged in an environment where national footballing distinctions were fluid 
and boundaries largely ignored. From the beginnings, the Football League's 
perspective was British rather than strictly English and its horizons stretched beyond 
the territory of its membership and towards Glasgow, Belfast and Cardiff. The 
process of expansion, in which the League developed into the premier football 
competition not only in England, but in Britain also, reinforced the basic inequalities 
in the relationship between the British football organisations. By the inter-war period 
Football League clubs were employing the most talented players throughout the 
British Isles and, with their greater financial clout, were able to dictate the terms on 
which players would be released to play for their countries of birth. The League's 
hegemony over British football was widely acknowledged. W. E. Maley, a Celtic 
director, admitted that these players 'belong to English clubs, and Scotland has not the 
slightest claim over them. Self preservation is what matters now first and last in 
English professional club football'. 139 
While self-preservation encouraged Preston to effectively control the British game, it 
led to the opposite impulse in relation to overseas football. Historians have rightly 
emphasised the 'administrative isolationism' of British football, especially in the 
inter-war period, which was undoubtedly associated with a wider perspective of 
6splendid isolation' in the British economy, society and culture. 140 Moreover, the 
Football League, in concert with the FA, was successftilly able (in the main) to seal 
Britain off hermetically from the interchange of playing talent between different 
nations and leagues which was a feature of football in continental Europe and the 
Americas. Notwithstanding the importance of informal links between League clubs 
and their continental counterparts, which have been largely overlooked in previous 
studies, the League remained insulated from overseas developments and only glanced 
beyond British shores when its administrative or sporting authority became 
threatened. In contrast to its view of British 'international' football, the League 
139 Athletic News, 9 June 1930. 
"" Walvin, People's Game, p. 143; Raphael Samuel, 'Introduction: exciting to be English' in Raphael 
Samuel (ed. ), Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking ofBritish National Identity, Volume ]. - History 
and Politics, pp. xxii-xxviii. 
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considered the game overseas as a fundamentally alien affair which it neither wanted 
nor needed to involve itself in. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE LEAGUE, THE PUBLIC AND THE PROMOTION OF 
FOOTBALL 
We may not like it but football from the point of view of management is largely a 
business on a considerable scale... In these days you have to fetch them (the crowds) in 
by making an irresistible appeal and, in this respect at least, we do not differ greatly from 
other entertainment promoters. 
Herbert Chapman, Herbert Chapman on Football, London, 1934, p. 125. 
VvUle much of the early historiography on the commercialisation of sport and leisure 
has focused on the mid and late Victorian period and even before, recent studies have 
confirmed that the first half of the twentieth century represented an equally crucial 
phase of this commercial revolution! In football, certainly, the development of a fully 
regulated labour market, bureaucratic and administrative structures, and large-scale 
ground improvements were all prominent features of this period. Ancillary services 
such as the press and gambling also underwent a significant transformation, while the 
rise of the football pools and radio broadcasting in the late 1920s and 1930s 
contributed both to a widening of the potential football 'public' and increased 
opportunities for additional club and League income. The contemporary consensus 
was that elite professional football was 'big business' in the early twentieth century 
and had become an industry in its own right by 1939. Paradoxically, however, the 
role of the Football League and its member clubs in this area has tended to be 
downplayed: inertia if not obstinate conservatism has become the orthodox 
interpretation of the League's response to the commercialisation of the game.. 
According to this view, rising attendances and widespread financial prosperity 
necessitated against thorough commercial exploitation: the League did not expand the 
commercial side of its operations simply because there was no pressure to do so. 
More than this, the assumption is that the general increase in gates was a direct by. 
product of rising working-class prosperity and consumer spending. 2 Periods of 
'Jones, 'Economic Aspects', pp. 286-99; Sport, politics and the working-class. On the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries see J. H. Plumb, The Commercialisation ofteisure in Eighteenth-Century 
England, Reading, 1974; R. W. Malcolmson, Popular Recreations in English Society, 1700-1850, 
1973; Hugh Cunningham, Leisure in the Industrial Revolution, London, 1980. On the late nineteenth- 
century see Vamplew, Pay Up, 1988. For a recent restatement of eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
commercialisation, Neil Wigglesworth, The Evolution ofEnglish Sport, London, 1996. 
2 The best example of this viewpoint is Wagg, The Foothall World, pp. 3 0,37. 
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declining attendances, competition from other sports and entertainments, and the 
subsequent response of League clubs, are rarely brought into the equation. 
This chapter will attempt to present-a more balanced picture of the Football League's 
relationship with both its immediate spectating public and the broader general public, 
with whom it connected indirectly through the media, the pools and other non- 
sporting activities. The main chronological focus will be the period after the First 
World War. In particular, we will seek to determine how far opposition to some 
forms of commercial and popular penetration was modified by other attempts to 
widen the potential audience and effectively 'sell' the game. This, too, is tied to the 
whole issue of the League's perception of the product it 'manufactured' and the 
ostensibly contradictory arenas of sport and entertainment. Was the League 
competition seen by officials, directors and players as a form of entertainment 
comparable to the theatre, music-hall or the cinema? If so, to what extent did football 
clubs adopt techniques prevalent in other parts of the entertainment industry in order 
to stimulate demand and increase audiences? In essence, we will attempt to evaluate 
the degree to which the game's undisputed popularity at the outbreak of war in 1939 
occured because, or in spite, of the activity of the League executive and its clubs. 
1. Attendances, Gate Receipts and the Popularity of Lenue Football 
Notwithstanding the significant fluctuations and uneven development of the British 
economy as a whole, particularly in the inter-war years, the commercial growth of the 
Football League in this period was undoubtedly significant. The best illustration of 
this can be found in the rise of attendances and gate receipts. Data on both has proved 
to be notoriously patchy and unreliable for most of this period and historians have 
thus generally been forced to rely on press estimates or other impressionistic 
published material. Rather surprisingly the clubs' own statistics and those kept 
centrally by the League from 1925 have been largely neglected, though it must be 
acknowledged that these too are problematiC. 3 Yet taking these limitations into 
3 it should not be assumed that clubs were always honest about the attendances and gate receipts 
received. They may well have kept separate records for League inspection as many undoubtedly did for 
other financial matters. 
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account, it is still possible to outline the salient trends and to establish whether the 
period witnessed a basic expansion or contraction in spectator support. Mason has 
identified that the average attendance at first division matches in 1908/09 was just 
below 16,000 while Fishwick found that this had increased by approximately 1,000 by 
the 1911/12 season; Tischler's calculated average of over 23,000 for 1913/14 appears 
too high to fit with the gradual seasonal increase before the First World War. 4 
Between the wars average first division attendances rose again, from approximately 
22,000 in the immediate post-war season to over 25,000 in 1927/28 and then 30,000 
5 by 1937/38. The contrast appears to be marked: in 1908/09 six million people 
watched first division matches while the figure was nearly 14 million by 1938/3 9.6 
The problem with statistics of this kind is that they suggest an uninterrupted rise in 
popularity by ignoring examples of contraction and focusing solely on the top 
division. The picture is not in fact of a uniform upward curve in attendances and gate 
receipts but of uneven progress with cycles of rising and falling popular support. 
Attendances seem to have dropped in the mid-1920s and early 1930s in response to 
changes in the wider economic environment and there is evidence that gates dropped 
again towards the end of the 1930s after reaching a peak during the middle of the 
decade. Some clubs were certainly affected by the economic slumps of 1922 and the 
early 1930s more than others. The third division northern section suffered particularly 
in both periods. Inglis has calculated that most clubs in this section yielded between 
0-4,000 in the 1921/22 season although the receipts of five - Halifax Town, 
Rochdale, Nelson, Stalybridge Celtic and Durham City - dropped below this level. 7A 
decade later Accrington Stanley was surviving on home receipts of about E140 per 
match while Darlington's average gate was down by about 1,000 on the previous 
season to just 3,300. Of course, the financial position of clubs during the depression 
was also regionally differentiated: the Daily Mail could report in April 1932 that 
Middlesborough, Blackburn Rovers, Bolton Wanderers, Burnley, Preston North End 
' Mason, Association Football, pp. 141-43,168-69; Fishwick, English Football, p. 48; Tischler, 
Footballers and Businessmen, p. 84. 
5 Fishwick, English Football, p. 49. Fishwick's figures may overestimate attendance levels as they are 
based on the beginning of each season (September and October) when the largest gates were often 
recorded. 
6 Jones, 'Economic Aspects', p. 289. 
7 Inglis, League Football, pp. 126-27. Also see his analysis in Appendix 8, pp. 430-3 1. 
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and Oldham Athletic had all 'suffered grievously' during the preceding season in 
terms of falling attendances and gate receipts while the support for London clubs had 
held out and in some cases increased. 8 And as Table 9.1 suggests, the financial 
advances of the leading clubs were continually offset by the financial struggles of the 
lower division members as the economic gap between the top and the bottom grew. 
Thus while Arsenal's annual gate receipts were a little under three times those of third 
division Reading in 1925/26, they had leapt to nearly six times as much by 1935/36.9 
Tahle 9.1 Average Attendances and Gate Receipts of Selected Football League Clubs, 1925/26- 
1935/36 
-e-l-ub 1925/26 1930/31 1935/36 
Div. Div. Div. 
(POS. ) AM Gate (POL) Att. Gate (POL) AM Gate 
M* M* M* 
Arsenal 1(2) 31,432 1,609 1 (1) 36,650 1,892 1(6) 41,960 2,393 
Aston Villa 1(6) 25,879 1,237 1(2) 30,781 1,541 1(21) 40,864 1.966 
Huddersfield Town 1 (1) 19,567 863 1 (5) 13,929 581 1(3) 15,097 653 
Reading 3S(l) 12,765 588 2(21) 9,318 391 3S(3) 9,594 399 
* Net receipts 
Source: Calculated from data in Football League Attendance Books. 
The available evidence indicates that the popularity of the Football League measured 
by attendance figures and gate receipts did not in fact rise steadily or uniformly after 
the First World War but fluctuated both on an individual club and collective League 
level. This is not to deny the claim that more people watched Football League 
matches - and paid more to do so - in 1939 than in 1919 (notwithstanding the 
expansion from 44 to 88 clubs) but to qualify the conventional historical assumption 
that spectators simply 'turned up in droves"O at every ground throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s. Historians themselves are guilty here of being too easily dazzled by the 
big games and the record attendances of the top clubs to see the wider and more 
complicated picture-" More than this, it is important to relativise the popularity of 
League football by considering it alongside other sports and forms of entertainment. 
Jones has emphasised the broader demand'conditions which facilitated increases in 
spending on entertainment and recreation: expenditure on admissions to theatres, 
cinemas and sporting events rose from L56.2 million in 1920 to E64.9 million in 
1938.12 These conditions benefited the major team sports like cricket and rugby 
Daily Mail, 7 April 1932. 
Calculated from Football League Attendance Books. 
Wagg, Football World, p. 37. 
See, for example, Mason, 'Football'; Jones, Sport, politics and the working clxs, pp. 4546. 
12 Jones, 'Economic Aspects', p. 287. 
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league, which, however, never matched the attendance levels of football; and horse 
racing and greyhound racing, which sometimes did. Yet the public support for all 
these sports was dwarfed towards the end of our period by the growth of cinema; 
'indisputably', in Jeffrey Richards' words, 'the most popular form of entertainment in 
Britain in the 1930s'. 13 While the Football League was able to attract some 31.43 
million spectators paying E1.57 million in entry fees to all its matches during the 
course of the 1937/38 season, British cinema audiences hit 987 million with L41.5 
million in gross receipts. 14 It is essential to keep in mind, then, that the League did 
not develop in a commercial vacuum but as one part of a broader process of 
I recreational expansion from the nineteenth century and that it could never simply 
count on a broad base of support in view of the potential and real competition from 
other sporting activities and entertaimnents. ,, 
2. Selling the Game: The League and Popular Entertainment 
The precise connection between top level professional football and entertainment was 
as elusive for contemporaries as it has proved to be for historians. There has been a 
tendency amongst academics to perceive 'sport' and 'entertainment' as fundamentally 
separate spheres of activity although both are normally located within the broader 
categories of 'leisure' or 'recreation'. Notwithstanding the crucial importance of the 
spectating public for the League's financial security, contemporary observers 
generally tried to distance the game from comparisons with the entertainment 
industry. This was certainly the case before 1914 when the -notions of 'business 
football' and the importance of the spectators were habitually lambasted in the 
southern-based press, and often elsewhere, as contravening the basic tenets of sporting 
practice. Athletic News stood largely alone in 1901 when it objected to the decision of 
the governing body to cancel a week of fixtures because of the Queen's death by 
referring to the practice of theatres and music-halls: 
Surely there is a strong analogy between professional football and 
theatricals. Both are entertainments, and, in order to provide those of 
" Jeffrey Richards, The Age ofthe Dream Palace: Cinema and Society in Britain, 1930-1939, London, 
1984, p. 11. 
"' Jones, 'Economic Aspects', pp. 288-89; Richards, Dream Palace, p. 11. 
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good class, competent performers have to be engaged so that they can give 
their patrons a good show for their money. And with a large proportion of 
the theatres, music-halls and other houses of entertainment in the country 
open, does it not seem absurd to practically taboo football. 15 
Moreover, commercial motives and objectives were undoubtedly less thoroughly 
developed among Football League clubs than in comparable entertainment businesses. 
Peter Bailey, for example, has described the. Victorian music hall as 'a prototype 
modem entertainment industry, not just because its capital investment allowed 
economies of scale which secured it a mass paying audience, but because of the 
thorough-going commercialisation which accompanied all facets of its operation'. 16 
By comparison, the complex amalgam of club directors' motives and the restrictions 
on shareholders' dividends seem to suggest a different type of commercial orientation 
in League football. Vamplew and other historians have established that many sports 
clubs and investors did not fit neatly into the category of profit-maximisers, a category 
more ideally suited to music-hall and cinema entrepreneurs. In the Football League, 
certainly, there is ample evidence of profits being sacrificed for improved playing 
squads and ground facilities. 17 
There is little doubt that the place of entertainment in football was less easy to identify 
and define than at the cinema, for instance. For most club directors and supporters it 
is likely that winning matches took precedence over entertainment, though it must not 
be assumed that these two aims were mutually exclusive: a talented team or the 
acquisition of a renowned player would hopefully ensure both. Entertainment, in 
short, was regarded not as the essence but a by-product of sporting competition. This 
attitude was largely shared by the players. The Sunderland, Derby County and 
England international forward Raich Carter commented in his autobiography that 
An actor, for instance, sets out with the full knowledge that he has to hold 
and entertain a public audience. With the exception of one or two who 
15 Athletic News, 28 January 1901. The most prominent supporters of the FA and critics of the 
League's opposition in this matter were the Daily Mail, Daily Express and Truth. See Athletic News, 4 
February 1901. 
" Peter Bailey, Leisure and Class in Victorian Britain: Rational Recreation and the Contestfor 
Control, 1830-1885, London, 1987, p. 157. 
"' Vamplew, Pay Up, chapters 8-11; Fishwick, English Football, pp. 39-44. On music-hall 
entrepreneurs see Peter Bailey, 'Custom, Capital and Culture', pp. 180-208. For the cinema, see 
Richards, Dream Palace, chapter 2; Chanan, 'Emergence of an Industry', pp. 39-58. 
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deliberately play to the 
entertaining his spectators, 
of his ten colleagues. ' 8 
gallery, a footballer is never consciously 
His business is to win the match with the help 
Yet by the inter-war period it was becoming increasingly difficult to deny that at least 
one aspect of the Football League's purpose was to provide popular entertainment. At 
a basic level this was recognised by professional football's inclusion along with other 
sports in the government's entertainment tax regulations from 1916. The tax was 
applied to all tickets for entertainment events and even those clubs struggling to 
remain viable in the lower reaches of the League ladder were not exempt. The 
League's acceptance of the measure, albeit initially during the abnormal conditions of 
war, could be interpreted as a partial acceptance of its common interests with the 
entertainment industry. Indeed as the tax began to eat into the income of clubs after 
the war, alliances were made beyond the sporting world: hence the public support 
many clubs gave to the Provincial Entertainrnents Proprietors' and Managers' 
Association in its attempt to force the Chancellor to repeal the tax in 1930.19 
More than this, however, there is evidence that the 1920s and 1930s witnessed a 
subtle change in League attitudes towards the concept of entertaining the spectating 
public. This can be seen in three main areas: alterations in the laws of the game; 
changes in ground facilities and the accommodation of spectators; and attempts to 
improve the football match as a spectacle. First of all, it is important to recognise that 
the laws of the game throughout this period were under constant re-evaluation and 
underwent almost annual modification. The body responsible for rule changes was 
the international Board consisting of representatives of each of the British Football 
Associations and, intermittently from 1913, of FIFA. Thus alterations were not made 
specifically according to the wishes and concerns of professional football in general, 
or the Football League in particular, and it is indeed difficult to gauge the precise 
degree of influence which League representatives or club directors were able to wield. 
Certainly, there appears to have been relatively little concern in League circles about 
the need to produce attractive football at the beginning of the period, even though 
" Carter, Foothaller's Progress, pp. 50-5 1. 
19 See Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 26 February 1930. Also see Minutes of FA 
Finance and General Purposes Committee, 22 August 1938. 
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contemporary observations bear witness to the increasingly defensive style of play 
adopted by many sides. The pervasive use of the so-called 'one-back game' in which 
one full back would drop into a deep defensive position so as to limit long forward 
passing generated particular press criticism. Yet in answer to those critics who 
regarded the tactic as unsportsmanlike and unattractive, League representatives often 
emphasised a different set of priorities. Addressing the issue in December 1901, for 
example, John Lewis argued that while 'there was an element of the spectacular' in 
football and 'those who pay have a right to be considered', the foremost objective for 
every club was nevertheless to win and if the one-back game achieved this then there 
could be no objection to it. 20 It is indeed noteworthy, and perhaps a little surprising, 
that before 1914 League clubs were rarely at the forefront of movements to introduce 
laws aimed at making goals easier to score or improving the visual attraction by 
minimising stoppages in the game. For example, the League had no direct input into 
the rule changes of 1903 when the International Board permitted a goal to be scored 
direct from a free kick awarded for a penalty offence or, conversely, in 1914 when an 
attempt to reduce stoppages caused by injuries was blocked. 21 On the second 
occasion, W. A. Wilkinson of Manchester City opposed the proposal because he 
believed spectators would be more likely to object to seeing 'a man in agony left to 
pick himself up while play continued' than to the frequent halts in play caused by real 
and imaginary injuries. 22 The spectator was therefore given some consideration but 
this did not necessarily equate with a concern for his (or her) entertainment. 
The changing attitudes towards the offside law over the period reflected the way in 
which the entertainment of spectators shifted from a marginal to a central 
consideration within League circles. Attempts by the Scottish FA to alter the law so 
that two rather than three opponents were required to be between the forward and the 
goal when a pass was made generated strong opposition for more than a decade after 
an initial proposal had failed in 1913. On that occasion the presumed advantage of 
increased goal-scoring failed to convince League directors, who felt that the alteration 
would give forwards an unfair advantage and penalise good back play; the following 
20 Athletic News, 16 December 190 1. 
21 Mason, 'Football'. p. 155; Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, I June 1903. 
22 Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, I June 1914. 
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season vice-president John Lewis (in his capacity as representative of Blackburn 
Rovers) seconded another motion to oppose the Scottish proposals. 23 The 
development of defensive tactics including the offside trap, however, led to a change 
of opinion, fuelled by the low goal-scoring in League matches in the early 1920s 
(Appendix 13). In 1923 the FA Council attempted to amend the offside law by 
limiting the area in which a player could be caught offside to forty yards from each 
goal line on the grounds that 'it would largely reduce the number of stoppages and 
permit of the game being carried on more consecutively and with more satisfaction to 
the spectators'. 24 The proposal narrowly failed at this and the following annual 
meeting but by 1925 the support of a vast majority of League officials and club 
directors had bolstered the movement for change. For many the problem had now 
reached a crisis point. Charles Buchan claimed that matches were becoming 'a 
procession of free-kicks' and Sutcliffe agreed that players and referees were 'sick to 
death of the eternal whistle'. 25 But, significantly, for the first time the key interest 
group used to justify the change in the law from three to two defenders were the 
spectators. The League had arranged for the proposed new law to be tried as an 
experiment at a number of representative and practice matches with the positive result 
that the ball was in play longer than under the old rule and that play around the goal 
area was made more exciting. 26 During the debate at the FA annual meeting Sutcliffe 
emphasised the importance of not discrediting the game 'in the eyes of the public' by 
continuing with the present unsatisfactory offside law. Fred Rinder employed a 
similar argument when he told delegates that 
Football had attained it world-wide popularity by its attractiveness, its 
quick movements, its thrills and its minimum of stoppages. These must 
be maintained to command the support of the public, by which the game 
existed. The best player could not outmanoeuvre such tactics as he had 
seen employed in a cup-tie 'to spoil what is the most interesting feature of 
the game -a pretty passing run up the field. 927 
23 Reports of FA AGMs in Athletic News, 2 June 1913,1 June 1924. 
2' Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 4 June 1923. 
25 Buchan, Lifetime in Football, p. 30. 
26 Minutes of Football League, 12 January, 3 April 1925; Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Programme, 
29 August 1925. 
27 Report of FA AGM in Athletic News, 15 June 1925. 
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There was still considerable opposition to the change amongst mainly amateur clubs 
and associations but this was insufficient to prevent its acceptance and certainly, as 
Appendix 13 shows, it had the desired effect of improving goal ratios, even if some 
observers believed that as a consequence speed had been substituted for skill. 
Unlike in rugby league, however, there was no systematic effort to make the game 
more attractive for spectators. The alterations made in rugby league's rules between 
1898 and 1907 - including the abandonment of line-outs, the introduction of the play- 
the-ball rule and the reduction of the number of players on each side from 15 to 13 - 
were motivated partly by the rival attraction of football with its 'potentially flowing 
simplicities' . 
28 Football, as the premier winter sport, had no such model, so the 
changes which were made in the rules were intended to refine the game's fundamental 
attractions by reducing unnecessary stoppages and other factors which disrupted or 
slowed the pace of the game. Even then it must be remembered that the Football 
League was not able to change the game's laws unilaterally for its own purposes in the 
way that the Northern Rugby Football League was: the FA's broad authority meant 
that law changes had to be appropriate and acceptable to the amateur and lower levels 
of the administration and not just moulded for the purpose of League clubs with big 
crowds; and the machinery of the International Board also made it necessary to gain 
Scottish, Irish and Welsh approval for any proposed change. Thus even on occasions 
when its influence appeared to be paramount, as in 1925, the League's control over 
the rules of the game was really never more than partial. 
As well as attempting to improve the product on offer, there were some signs of 
Football League clubs trying to improve the manner in which it was consumed. Ibis 
took the form, firstly, of better ground facilities and spectating conditions. The first 
major wave of ground building and development took place in the 1889-1910 period, 
with clubs either moving into established recreational and sporting venues or 
transforming sites of open land. Vast sums were spent in this direction: Everton 
invested some E41,000 on two large stands between 1907 and 1909 and a further 
; C12,000 improving the terracing and other features of the ground; Middlesborough 
spent EIO-I 1,000 on its new Ayresome Park ground in 1903 and Birmingham laid out 
Is Moorhouse, A People's Game, p. 65. Also see Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 15 1. 
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a similar sum building St. Andrews three years later. 29 Such developments often 
allowed clubs not only to cater for larger numbers of spectators but to provide an 
improved view of the match in more palatial surroundings. Manchester United's new 
Old Trafford ground which was opened in 1909 at the cost of E36,000 was described 
by one writer as 'a wonder to behold': as well as features designed for players and 
directors, the ground provided cover for 12,000 in its grandstand and a further 24,000 
standing, out of a total capacity of 80,000.30 Additionally, the club boasted that the 
numerous entrances and exits allowed spectators to move easily to the particular 
portion of the ground desired and that, with no a cycling or running track, the 
sightseers are brought as near as possible to the playing portion'; the rectangular shape 
of the ground with curved comers was also designed 'so that everybody will be able to 
see'. 31 Not every club, of course, had the financial resources to undertake such 
developments and those that did often had to convert themselves into limited liability 
companies or issue debenture schemes to do so. While the Oldham Athletic 
directors, for example, recognised the importance of 'a well-equipped ground' to the 
club's future success, they struggled to find the capital needed to finance a new stand 
and were forced to hurriedly construct one costing just fl, 750 following the club's 
unexpected admission to the League in 1907.32 
The extent to which ground improvements were undertaken as a response to demand 
from spectators remains a matter for conjecture. Sutcliffe thought that there had been 
&an outcry for more comfortable accommodation' prior to the First World War and 
that the new imposing covered grandstands at many clubs 'had been erected in answer 
to popular clamour'. 33 The circumstances which led to the building of 
Wolverhampton Wanderers' first major stand in 1925 certainly seems to accord with 
29 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 64; Allison, 'Rise of Middlesborough FC'; Athletic News, 16 July 1906. 
30 Inglis, Football Grounds, p. 57; Athletic News, 8 March 1909. 
31 Athletic News, 8 March 1909. The design of League grounds as far as improved visibility was 
concerned lagged far behind developments in Italy and the Americas. The first major cantilever stands, 
with no supporting uprights to obscure the supporters' view, were not built until the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. In contrast, the architect Pier Luigi Nervi built self-supporting cantilever stands at 
Florence's Berta Stadium in 1933 specifically to allow supporters a completely free view of the pitch. 
See Francesco Varrasi, 'Economia, Politica e Sport in Italia, 1925-35, Tesi di Laurea, Florence, 1996, 
pp. 353 , 360,503-07; Inglis, Football 
Grounds, pp. 19-20. 
32 Circular Letter from E. L. Thompson to Oldham Athletic Shareholders, 6 December 1906; Minutes 
of Oldhain Athletic FC, 30 July 1907. 
33 Athletic News, 9 January 1911. 
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this view. In December 1922 the club admitted that the lack of stand accommodation 
at Molineux had been 'commented upon and deplored' but encouraged supporters to 
be patient as the club had recently bought the ground and planned to undertake major 
ground improvements. A year later Wolves had slipped into the third division, 
finances were tight and the club, backed by the mayor and other local dignitaries, 
launched a share appeal amongst supporters to help fund the proposed 
developments. 34 Finally, with the clubs' promotion in 1925 the stand was opened. 
Yet the club programme's comments at the time of the official opening illustrate the 
way in which the rhetoric of service to the spectator was intermeshed with notions of 
supporter loyalty and financial profit: 
With the opening of the New Stand we are provided with a means to a 
most desirable end, and so long as the public appreciate it, there are no 
limitations to its possibilities for affording comfort- and enjoyment, 
recreation and pleasure, and at the same time yielding revenue which in 
course of time will bring the cost to an irreducible minimum and set it on 
its mission as a profit-producing concern pure and simple. 35 
There was clearly no altruism at work here: improving facilities was widely regarded 
as a vital means of improving gates. Despite this, however, it appears that many clubs 
were reluctant to commit themselves to large-scale ground developments and that the 
initiative - and indeed the finance - for such schemes often came from supporters 
rather than the club. This is particularly true of the inter-war period and the provision 
of covered accommodation for standing spectators, who unlike those sitting in 
grandstands were generally offered no protection from the elements. Supporters clubs 
were especially active here in raising funds for roofs or shelters to be built on the 
6popuIar' sides of grounds. 36 Yet many club directorates remained insensitive and 
slow to react to appeals for better provision. The minute books of Sheffield United 
record a number of appeals from spectators for more covered accommodation at 
Bramall Lane during the 1920s and 1930s but it was not until 1937 that a sub- 
committee was appointed to consider the question, with the result that a shelter was 
34 Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Programme, 9 December 1922,15,29 December 1923. 
35 Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Programme, 19 September 1925. 
36 Minutes of Walsall FC, 28 November 1933; Rogan Taylor, Football and Its Fans: Supporters and 
their Relations with the Game, 1885-1985, Leicester, 1992, pp. 28-3 1. 
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built on the 'Spion' Kop in time for the 1938/39 season. 37 Jimmy Seed, likewise, 
regretted the decision of his directors at Charlton Athletic not to build better covered 
and seated accommodation when the club reached the first division in 1937, a decision 
which he believed accounted for the club's subsequent poor gates. 
39 
Secondly, there were efforts to improve the spectacle of visiting a football match, 
though these were often limited, uneven and differed from club to club. At the 
majority of League grounds the only entertainment provided besides the match itself 
consisted of a musical programme by a local band before the kick-off and at half-time. 
Few clubs experimented with alternative methods of drawing spectators: the 
attraction of football was considered to be the game itself and so directorates tended to 
have little time for peripheral distractions. Aston Villa agreed to a local newspaper's 
request to have community singing at some derby matches but only on the proviso that 
it would cost the club nothing. 39 But plans to establish more extensive programmes of 
entertainment - including athletic and musical events to amuse the standing spectators 
in the hour or so prior to kick-off - were generally rejected or left undeveloped. 40 It is 
possible, however, to detect an increased accent on pre-match entertainment from the 
late 1920s. In 1930, for instance, the Sheffield United chairman and secretary 
interviewed the bandmaster of the resident Imperial Band 'with a view to improving 
the calibre of the Band and also a more acceptable programme being rendered'. It was 
subsequently decided that while the Band would still receive the annual E20 grant, its 
continued services would be subject to a month's trial. 41 West Ham United's 
matchday band was less fortunate in finding itself dismissed due to the installation of 
public service radio equipment at Upton Park at around the same time. The east 
London club was not alone in replacing live music with recorded music, though the 
cost of installation and the acquisition of a phonographic licence turned out to be 
considerably higher. 42 Indeed such was the heavy investment on the radio equipment 
37 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 6 September 1927,28 October 1936,17 March 
1937,24 August 1938. 
38 Seed, Jimmy Seed Story, pp. 4445. 
39 Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 15 March 1927. 
40 See Topical Times, 18 August 1923. 
41 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 2,9 July 1930. 
42 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 28 October 1928,13,19 September 1932,11 September 1934. 
Also Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 27 December 1927. 
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that when public requests were made to replace it again with a live band, the directors 
refused on the grounds that they 'did not consider the extra expense for musical 
entertainment warranted'. 43 
Technological advances offered opportunities to enhance the spectating experience in 
a variety of ways, but here again progress was cautious and partial. The erection of 
results boards, clocks and floodlighting were all contemplated at different times and 
yet generated considerable opposition in League circles. The purpose of results or 
score boards was initially to display the score of the match actually being played but 
could potentially be used to keep the spectator informed of developments throughout 
the country. By the early 1920s advances in telephonic communications together with 
press co-operation had persuaded some clubs, such as Sheffield United, to build 
results boards giving the half and full-time scores of selected League matches, 
although other clubs were reluctant to follow. 44 To boost reserve team attendances 
many clubs decided to keep spectators in touch with the progress of the first team in 
away matches by providing updates every fifteen minutes; Walsall did the same with 
the scores of its more prestigious neighbours Wolves and Aston Villa during first 
team games. 45 Another innovation intended to facilitate the crowd's ability to follow 
the game was the introduction of the 45-minute football clock. %ile Herbert 
Chapman, most famously, had a large 12-foot diameter clock attached to the North 
Stand at Highbury, other clubs refused similar proposals from watch companies. The 
FA, in any case, decided in October 1930 that such clocks compromised the time- 
keeping authority of referees and therefore ruled that they should be immediately 
removed. 46 
The potential benefits of floodlit football for both clubs and spectators were also slow 
to receive official recognition. Experiments took place as early as the late nineteenth 
Minutes of West Ham United FC, 5 November 1934. 
Sheffield United's result board was erected in 1922, Aston Villa's followed in 1923 and West Ham 
United two years later. Minutes of Aston Vifla, 5 December 1922,14 August 1923; Minutes of West 
Ham United FC, 21,28 July 1925. 
45 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 26 March 1935; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 
I December 193 1; Minutes of Walsall FC, 27 November 1934. 
46 Stephen Studd, Herbert Chapman, Football Emperor: A Studý in the Origins of Modern soccer, 
London, 198 1, p. 109; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 2 June 1930; Minutes of FA 
Council, 13 October 1930. 
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century but until the 1920s artificial lighting could only be used for friendlies, 
practices or exhibition games. By this time, however, advances in electrical lighting 
had proven the viability of floodlit sports events, which were already commonplace in 
South American football and some American sports. 47 But the immediate inspiration 
for renewed British experiments came from visits to continental Europe 'where 
floodlighting was developing at professional and amateur levels; after one such visit 
Chapman installed floodlights on Arsenal's West Stand . 
48 This and other examples 
provoked the FA Council to respond in 1930 by prohibiting its members from taking 
part in competitive matches under artificial light, apparently on the grounds that clubs 
might be pushed into spending large sums on floodlighting which they could ill 
afford . 
49 However, over the next few years a number of club directors and journalists 
began to suggest that, these possible high costs could be more than balanced by the 
financial benefits. In this view, floodlighting offered, above all, the chance to 
diversify the consumption of League football by establishing it as an evening as well 
as an afternoon event; a particularly important step in the context of the success of dog 
racing and speedway as evening attractions. By the summer of 1932 a leading 
advocate of floodlighting, James Catton, could detect a groundswell of support 
amongst English and Scottish clubs, especially those who had played under lights 
during overseas tours. J. G. Hickling, secretary of third division Mansfield Town, 
believed that a relaxation of the governing body's restriction would be a 'boon' to 
clubs: 
just imagine the gates we should have if we could have the kick-offs in the 
evening at 7: 30 p. m. in the winter, instead of say 2: 30 or 3 when the 
workers cannot get [out]. If we could have football played under arc light 
conditions it is my positive opinion that in no less than five years we 
should nearly double the followers of football, in consequence of which, 
overdrafts at banks, the bugbear of nearly all clubs, would sooner or later 
50 vanish. 
Though few contemporaries shared Hickling's optimistic view of floodlighting as a 
financial panacea, it was nevertheless widely agreed that spectators would benefit 
47 Inglis, Football Grounds, p. 42. 
48 Studd, Herbert Chapman, pp. II 1- 12. 
49 Minutes of FA Council, 25 August 1930; Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 112. 
5' Catton Folders, E-F, J. G. Hickley to Catton, 5 September 1932, p. 506. 
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from the greater flexibility and variety which it provided. 51 In an endeavour to exploit 
these opportunities, then, Tottenham Hotspur orchestrated a movement of 
metropolitan clubs whose lobbying of the FA led to the temporary removal of the ban 
so as to allow a special exhibition match to be played under artificial lights at White 
City stadium in early 1933. The match, however, drew a disappointing crowd and a 
number of clubs, including West Ham, subsequently withdrew their support for a 
permanent removal of the ban. 52 
The reluctance of the Football League to embrace innovations which complimented 
the football-watching experience can be best illustrated by the debate over the 
numbering of players' shirts. While the idea had been advocated numerous times 
from the beginning of the century, it continued to divide clubs and administrators 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Club colours, of course, had to be registered with 
the League secretary (see chapter 4) but additions to kits were not prohibited, so on 25 
August 1928, Arsenal and Chelsea agreed to take the field simultaneously in different 
matches with numbers on the back of each players' shirt. On the day of the 
experiment, Catton issued an extended defence of shirt numbering, arguing that it was 
one aspect of the fundamental obligation which each League club should have towards 
its audience: 
Modem football cannot exist without the spectator. The objects of every 
Association football club, engaged in League football, should be to play 
the game and give the greatest possible pleasure to those who throng the 
seats and terraces. Therefore let League clubs do all they possibly can for 
the convenience and comfort of their legions of followers... Hence tip-up 
chairs, covered accommodation, result boards, programmes, and many 
other devices that were never dreamed of 40 years ago. 
For this reason he found it 
difficult to understand why some clubs are strongly objecting to a 
proposed change which is of great help to everybody on all occasions. 
The convenience of the public should be paramount. 53 
" See Catton Folders, E-F, William Struth (Glasgow Rangers) to Catton, 5 September 1932, p. 506. 
52 Minutes of FA Council, 12 December 1932; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 5 December 1932,6 
March 1933. 
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The Chelsea directors even conducted their own market research and found that every 
one of the 700 fans questioned after the club's match at Swansea expressed support 
for numbering. 54 Yet despite the apparent success of the Arsenal-Chelsea experiment, 
opposition to the idea stayed firm. The League executive stepped in immediately to 
prevent a repetition of the incident, by 'instructing' clubs not to number shirts until 
55 the question had been discussed at a general meeting. At subsequent annual 
meetings in 1929 and 1933 proposals to introduce compulsory numbering were 
rejected by large majorities. The FA had agreed to players sporting shirt numbers at 
the 1933 Cup Final and the cup winners Everton continued the experiment in a 
subsequent League match but many clubs continued to consider the cost in terms of 
money as well as the loss of team spirit too great; Sutcliffe himself noted that each 
club would probably require eight sets of numbered shirts. By the mid-1930s, 
however, the League stood largely alone in not permitting numbering, as many reserve 
competitions and junior leagues had sanctioned the idea. It finally relented in 1939, 
largely due to pressure from a core group of lobbyists and the support of new 
president William Cuff, who dismissed the notion of optional (as opposed to 
compulsory) numbering and carried the proposal as an instruction to clubs even 
though it had failed to reach the required three-quarters majority as a rule change. 56 
It is fair to conclude, then, that the Management Committee was slow to incorporate 
and diffuse techniques designed to improve both the intrinsic and the peripheral 
attractions of League football. The majority of innovations, from club programmes to 
floodlighting, were conceived and refined at club level and often met with the 
considerable obstacles of executive conservatism and the in-built inertia of the 
legislative system. In the eyes of League administrators, football spectators or the so- 
called football public were a rather shadowy and ill-defined group whom they 
ultimately relied on for financial survival but really knew very little about. There is 
certainly little evidence that the League made more than token efforts to respond to 
spectator demands or that it encouraged its members to make the football-watching 
public their paramount concern. Indeed, spectators were rarely the subject of 
54 Inglis, League Football, p. 140. 
33 Minutes of Football League, 27 August 1928. 5' Inglis, League Football, pp. 140,164-65. 
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committee discussions or newspaper columns and in this sense remained marginalised 
by administrators and directors throughout the period. The League's own rules and 
regulations made only two significant concessions to supporters. First, the executive 
insisted that clubs fielded full strength teams whenever possible and fined those who 
failed to do so. Initially fines were limited to E150 but after Newcastle United was 
fined the unprecedented sum of E750 for playing weakened teams in no less than 
seven League matches prior to its FA Cup Final appearance in 1924, the executive 
was empowered to penalise guilty clubs according to its discretion. 57 The Newcastle 
case particularly enraged League officials, who regarded it as a serious affront to the 
primacy of the League in respect of all other competitions, including the FA Cup. But 
it also raised the matter of the responsibility of clubs to their audience. . 4thletic News 
reported that spectators who had watched the Tyneside club's heavy 6-1 and 4-1 
defeats at Aston Villa and Birmingham respectively 'were much aggrieved that they 
had paid the full admission money to watch the reserves of Newcastle' . 
58 For these 
reasons the executive also took pre-emptive action on occasions when clubs were 
rumoured to be fielding second rather than first choice elevens in League fixtures. 59 
Second, clubs were forced to comply with the pre-arranged kick-off times agreed by 
the League collectively and advertised in the press. Before World War One the 
Management Committee issued a series of warnings to clubs who began games before 
the scheduled starting time - 'thus breaking faith with their supporters' - but drew 
back from penalising them formally. 60 In 1920 Southend was explicitly ordered to 
advertise the kick-off time of home matches and to ensure that this was adhered to but 
other clubs evidently continued to start matches 'some minutes before the advertised 
time of kick-off. 61 Most of these irregularities had been stamped out by the 1930s 
but it is instructive that League clubs still assumed some flexibility to modify the 
timing of matches irrespective of the likely demand of supporters for fixed and routine 
kick-offs. 
57 Minutes of Football League, 12 May 1924; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 13 May 1924; Athletic News, 
9 June 1924. 
58 Athletic News, 26 May 1924. 
59 See Minutes of Football League, 22 April 1932. 
60 Minutes of Football League, 9 February 1914. 
61 Minutes of Football League, 20 December 1920; 2 October 1925. 
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3. Advertising, Broadeastina and the Press 
Away from the game itself and the arena in which it was played, clubs attempted to 
attract spectators using a variety of methods employed by conventional firms. Tbough 
it is difficult to assess its precise impact, advertising became a particularly important 
means of stimulating demand and thereby increasing crowds. It had developed from 
its rudimentary stages in the early to mid-nineteenth century into a full-scale industry 
by the turn of the century and though football clubs preferred to distance themselves 
from the overt commercialism of Pear's soap or Bovril, they nevertheless operated in 
an environment where advertising 'had become essential for any firm seeking to break 
into a market, to move from a local to a national market, or, in many cases, to hold on 
to its existing market'. 62 Elaborate promotional techniques certainly filtered through 
to sectors of the entertainment industry. Cinema owners, in particular, often erected 
huge displays in the foyer or the environs of their buildings specifically to advertise 
new features, and incorporated the showmanship and theatrical tactics used by 
department stores in the inter-war period to pull in more customers. All this was then 
supplemented by carefully constructed newspaper advertisements designed by 
professional advertising firms and writers. 63 
The use of advertising by Football League clubs, however, was far less sophisticated. 
Promotional activity was generally based around bill-posting and newspaper 
advertising of forthcoming matches and directorates tried to keep this form of 
expenditure within strict limits. Walsall spentjust E144 of a total expenditure of well 
over E8,000 on printing and advertising in 1933/34 and the more successful clubs 
devoted an even smaller percentage. " Money was often saved by arranging a form of 
mutual advertising with local theatres or other entertainment venues. At the 
beginning of the century Sheffield United, for instance, allowed three local theatres to 
send sandwich boards around the pitch on Saturdays in return for the announcement of 
the club's next match on a bioscopc or in the theatre programme each evening. Such 
arrangements evidently lasted into the 1930s, though the increasing competitiveness 
62 W. Hamish Fraser, The Coming ofthe Mass Market, 1850-1914, London, 198 1, p. 146. 
63 See Richards, Dream Palace, pp. 21-22; Bill Lancaster, The Department Store: A Social History, 
London, 1995, pp. 74,96-98. 
" Walsall FC, Annual Report of Directors for AGM, 1934,522/l/23. 
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of football advertising was reflected in West Ham's agreement with the Stratford 
Empire that it would pay a small fee to have the details of forthcoming games 
exhibited on a slide, providing no other club was permitted to advertise. 65 Another 
popular outlet for advertising football matches was the railway station or similar 
transport facilities. Arrangements were invariably made with railway companies to 
display bill posters of first teams matches. In preparation for the 1933/34 season 
Sheffield United arranged with the London and North Eastern Railway Company to 
have 50 posters at 4 d. each displayed at stations in and around Sheffield. 66 West 
Ham was one of a number of League clubs in the capital with long-standing 
advertising rights on the underground railway network but from 1934 London clubs 
were no longer entitled to individual advertisements at mainline stations and paid 
i. nstead for inclusion on a shared 'Football' notice. 67 
Yet throughout this period newspapers continued to be the major area for advertising. 
Clubs had used small newspaper advertisements to publicise matches even before the 
establishment of the Football League but the close relationship forged between many 
League clubs and their local newspapers had by the twentieth century created broader 
promotional opportunities. First of all, mutual advertising arrangements were often 
established between clubs and local newspapers. The Sheffield Telegraph, for 
example, charged United half the usual price for first team advertisements in return 
for the display of its sandwich board at these fixtures: a perfect illustration of the 
symbiotic relationship between sport and the press . 
68 By 1932 the Sheffield club had 
expanded its first team advertisements from single to double columns in both the 
Sheffield Telegraph and the Sheffield Independent and at the same time re-designed its 
bill-posters. The board went further by taking out a special whole page advertisement 
in the Green 'Un for the opening matches of the 1938/39 season. 69 It must be 
remembered, however, that while Sheffield United and others were able to advertise 
65 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 13 November 1907; 9 September, 21 October 
1908; 20 August 1912; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 12 June 1934. 
66 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 5 September, 30 August 1933. 
67 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 17 November 1919; 13 August 1923; 4 September 1934. 
68 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 22 February, I March 1911. 
69 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 30 November 1932; 24 August 1938. 
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throughout the season, clubs with smaller budgets had to target their advertising at 
specific games. 70 
League clubs did not of course gain publicity in the press simply by buying official 
advertising space. Match reports and results, discussion columns and other features 
all undoubtedly contributed to a form of free advertising for clubs and this was as true 
71 of the local, and increasingly the national, dailies as the specialist sporting press. In 
short, by the turn of the century clubs relied on press coverage of League football to 
generate interest and stimulate demand and therefore made various efforts to 
accommodate them. By 1911 Sheffield United was granting free press tickets to local 
newspapers (the Sheffield Telegraph and the Sheffield Independent), to specialist 
sporting papers (Athletic News, Sporting News) and to national dailies and weeklies 
(the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror and Reynold's News), although photographic privileges 
were more tightly guarded. 72 Reporting was also facilitated by the construction of 
press boxes and the installation of private telephones at the club's expense. Even the 
lower division clubs were expected to have these facilities: one of the first building 
projects planned by the Ipswich Town directorate following election to the third 
division was a press box. 73 There is indeed considerable evidence to support 
Fishwick's view that there existed a cosy and almost 'special relationship' between 
local journalism and the major clubs in a given area. The inclusion of local journalists 
in the club's travel party to away matches was common and there can be little doubt 
that certain journalists were privy to inside information obtained directly from club 
directors and officials. 74 Moreover, West Ham United was arranging 'press nights' -a 
rudimentary forerunner of the modem press conference - to officially unveil new 
stands or new signings during the 1920s. This seems to have been the first step in a 
new systematic attitude towards publicity within the club. From January 1931 
members of the press were to be issued with a 'news bulletin' the day after board 
meetings by the assistant secretary Alan Searles and by 1933 the new player's 
70 See Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 4 January 1938. 
71 See Tony Mason, 'All the Winners and Half-Times', The Sports Historian, 13, May 1993, pp. 3-13. 72 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 23,30 August, 5 September 1911. 
73 Minutes of Ipswich Town FC, 8 August 1939. For the development of telephones, boxes and other 
facilities for the press see Minutes of West Ham United FC, 14 August 1922; 6 August 1925; Minutes 
of Sheffield United Football Committee, 9,15 November 1904. 
74 Fishwick, English Football, p. 98. 
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manager Charlie Paynter had been given sole responsibility to 'give and seek publicity 
on team matters', with Searles controlling administrative, financial and other 
publicity. 75 
But it would be wrong to assume that changes of this kind were motivated by a new 
atmosphere of openness and co-operation: quite the opposite, they were intended to 
control more tightly the flow of information to the press and to avoid negative 
publicity. At West Ham the reorganisation of publicity matters was a reaction to 'the 
surfeit of publicity' caused by the acrimonious dismissal of long-standing secretary 
Syd King, which the board agreed 'should in future be avoided'. 76 The Oldham 
Athletic directors similarly tried to determine the information given to the press about 
the club's financial problems in 1939 through official statements but tended instead to 
be drawn into denying inaccurate stories or misleading articles. 77 Moreover, the 
League itself attempted to keep certain confidential matters - such as the precise size 
of transfer fees and the contents of retain and transfer lists together with attendances 
and gate receipts - from the gaze of the press. Clubs were instructed by the 
Management Committee not to disclose such information to newspapers and held 
them responsible for breach of confidence if they did so; they were even encouraged 
to send communications relating to transfers under sealed cover. 78 But this did not 
prevent regular leaks and so in April 1930 the first and second division clubs pledged 
'themselves not to divulge confidential matters' and requested the Committee 'to take 
the strongest measures possible to suppress the practice'. Less than a year later the 
president had to admit that the League itself 'could do nothing' to stop the press 
gathering private information and instead advised the clubs to prevent this 
themselves. 79 By the 1930s, however, it was becoming more and more difficult to 
ration the information given to the press. Newspapers like the People and the News of 
75 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 28 July 1925; 6 January 193 1; 20 December 1932,24 January 
1933. 
76 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 15 November 1932. 
77 Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 1,8 March 1939. 
71 Minutes of Football League, 3 June 1912; 2 February 1914; 11 November 1927. 
7' Report of Meeting of Football League Clubs, First and Second Division, 4 April 1930; Minutes of 
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the World, which were increasingly eager to secure a transfer exclusive, were clearly 
less likely to respect confidentiality than were local journalists. 80 
While the League executive could hardly ignore this mounting clamour for 
information, its relationship with the press remained restricted and awkward. Press 
representatives were permitted to attend most ordinary and extraordinary general 
meetings from the 1890s but the meetings of the Management Committee and 
gatherings of sub-groups like the third division sections and the unofficial ad hoc 
regional club meetings (see chapter 4) were kept strictly private. Journalists were 
normally excluded when contentious issues were being discussed, such as during the 
'Pools War' meetings in February and March 1936. In a passage from his Jubilee 
History, Sutcliffe described how in the course of one of these meetings 
a shadow was seen to pass across the glass lights on a floor above, where a 
window was discovered to be open, and investigations resulted in the 
discovery of a photographer and reporter from a prominent newspaper, 
who had succeeded in getting shots and notes of what had been 
transpiring. These gentlemen afterwards appeared in the meeting, 
apologised for their action, and surrendered their notes and plates. 81 
It is indeed evident that the League was slow to advance public relations at its 
meetings. The Athletic News reporter noted that at the 1930 annual meeting 'The 
room was far too small, and the arrangements for the visitors unworthy of an 
organisation of such importance as the League, who might also remember that it is 
essential that the Press should be in a position to hear. '82 Yet close relationships were 
fostered with favoured sections of the press - particularly Athletic News and other 
northern sporting papers - as welFas with individual reporters. James Catton was 
certainly in regular correspondence with members of the Management Committee 
during and after his editorship of the Manchester weekly, while Ivan Sharpe was 
similarly close to Sutcliffe and other League figures. Sharpe's memoirs reveal that 
Sutcliffe often discussed future plans with the journalist and trusted him with 
confidential information. The two travelled to football functions together and 
So Fishwick, English Football, pp. 98,100-07. 
Sutcliffe et al., Football League, p. 4 1. 
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throughout the 1930s met regularly for coffee, when Sutcliffe would provide 
exclusive stories for Sharpe's column in the Sunday Chronicle. Sharpe was also 
gamong the last of his football friends to talk to Charles Sutcliffe'. 83 
But close associations of this kind were hardly the norm: the League executive 
generally distrusted the press, especially those southern newspapers which remained 
staunchly critical of its policy and objectives. Periodicals such as C B. Fry's 
Magazine and The Rapid Review continued to regard elite professional football with 
distaste well into the twentieth century and to identify the League as the professional 
game's primary exemplar. 94 And even newspapers with established sympathies 
towards the League could at times be critical of its policy. Athletic News, which by its 
own admission had 'stood by The League and done all in its power to support the 
game, the clubs and the players' 85 was nevertheless prepared to oppose the 
Management Committee when it saw fit and, under Sharpe's editorship from 1924 
(notwithstanding his personal friendship with Sutcliffe and others), certainly became a 
less faithful apologist for the League. 
Press criticism was also perceived by directors and Committeemen as a perennial 
problem. Most clubs were highly sensitive to newspaper articles which called into 
question team' selection or financial and administrative decisions. In extreme cases 
this could lead to reporters being banned from the ground but more commonly clubs 
would simply inform the newspaper of its objections. The directors of Sheffield 
United took criticism particularly seriously, meeting the proprietors of the Telegraph 
in 1913 to discuss a series of adverse reports and actually ensuring in 1930 that the 
same proprietors agreed to an 'alteration of their attitude to the Club'. 86 Even a brief 
survey of club minute books reveals that instances of this kind were hardly 
exceptional: West Ham had similar problems with misrepresentative articles while 
Oldham Athletic informed the editor of the Oldham Chronicle in early 1939 that it 
83 Catton Folders, passim.; Sharpe, 40 Years in Football, pp. 157-59; PFA, File 33, Hartley to Fay, 6 
February 1939. 
94 See Athletic News, 25 March 1907. 
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was 'very dissatisfied with the local reporter and his adverse criticisms and reports'. 87 
The club's mistrust of the Chronicle was compounded three months later when the 
Friday evening edition told readers incorrectly that there was no match at Boundary 
Park the following day. 88 
Even in the face of their undoubted interlocking interests, there were various ways in 
which the relationship between League football and the press could become strained. 
First, the display of half-time, full-time and fifteen minute scores on results boards 
necessitated a degree of co-operation with those press agencies and newspapers which 
had acquired the appropriate technology. The Sheffield clubs encountered some 
difficulties in 1923 when the local manager of the Express News Agency which 
supplied the final scores at Bramall Lane and Hillsborough was told by his head office 
to discontinue the arrangement so as not to damage the sales of football specials. 
After appeals to the FA and the League and long negotiations, the Telegraph and 
Independent newspapers eventually arranged with United and Wednesday directors to 
take over the supply of final results. 89 This scenario was repeated at many clubs 
across the country, where the aim to inform supporters of the latest scores at the 
ground itself seemed to collide head-on with the interests of the press. 90 In general, 
workable forms of co-operation were reached, even if these sometimes involved small 
payments by the club. Second, the importance of press coverage to the continued 
growth and prosperity of the League enabled newspapers to wield a small but 
significant degree of influence in the scheduling of fixtures. In fact, the move towards 
standardised kick-off times was in part prompted by an appeal made to the 
Management Committee in 1921 by the Newspaper Press Ltd. to begin matches 
before 3 p. m. on Saturdays so that the football specials could include full reports in 
addition to final scores. The Committee agreed to the request in principle but at the 
subsequent annual meeting the London members, who argued that an earlier kick-off 
would effect their gate revenue, forced a compromise that the latest time of kick-off 
should be 3: 15; the following year the Committee was given discretionary power to 
87 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 9 April 1923; Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 4 January 1939. 
Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 19 April 1939. 
Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 4,12,19,26 September, 10 October 1923. 
90 For instance, Minutes of West Ham United FC, 29 September 1925. 
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sanction later starts on application but 2: 45,3 or 3: 15 remained the standard kick-off 
times. 91 
The rapid growth of film and radio broadcasting in the second half of the period 
generated a further influential medium intent on using top level football to increase 
audiences. Unlike with the press, however, the attitude of the football authorities 
towards broadcasting remained ambivalent, because while it offered unprecedented 
opportunities to promote the game to larger sections of the public than could feasibly 
visit a football ground, it carried at the same time the potential to damage existing 
support. Why, it was widely asked, would people pay to attend matches when they 
could watch or listen to them elsewhere? Indeed, for the League and many of its clubs 
broadcasting was perceived more as a problem than an opportunity and thus the 
natural response was to oppose rather than co-operate. 
Film companies had used football material from the early days of the Football League 
but the role of newsreels in the cinema boom of the 1920s and 1930s increased its 
importance. By the latter decade almost all cinema performances were preceded by 
Pathe or British Movietone newsreels and it has been estimated that some 30 per cent 
of these featured highlights of sporting events, a significant portion of which we can 
speculate were football matches. In the main, clubs do not appear to have opposed 
these developments, mainly because newsreels offered only brief highlights and could 
only be shown after the match: as Fishwick notes, they 'complemented rather than 
92 competed with football' . Thus the major issue for clubs was not the filming itself 
but payment. As early as 1910 Aston Villa allowed the local Aston Theatre to film a 
League match as a special privilege but thereafter established a standard charge of 5 
guineas. 93 The West Ham United board decided to charge 3 guineas from 1920 but 
this was essentially to cover the minor costs involved in accommodating the 
cinernatographical equipment. But by 1933 the east London club had changed tack by 
attempting to sell cinema rights to cup-ties for at least L20, again ostensibly because 
91 Minutes of Football League, 11,30 May 1921 (AGM); 29 May 1922 (AGM). Sheffield United 
arranged for a significant number of its League matches to kick-off at 2: 45. For example, Minutes, 24 
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of 'the inconvenience caused by the apparatus'. 94 The board had to reduce the fee to 
L5 when the newsreel companies reftised to pay and the following year Paramount 
News even objected to paying this 'as they had been granted free facilities 
95 elsewhere'. Huddersfield Town and Sheffield United evidently felt that co- 
operation could benefit and promote the club and thus tended to grant unconditional 
filming permission whenever they were asked. 96 
Radio broadcasting was an altogether more contentious issue, partly because its 
impact was felt across the four divisions of the League and not just at the leading 
clubs. Initially the BBC's educative mandate made it reluctant to broadcast sport in 
general, and professional football in particular, and the concentration of wireless sets 
and licences within the broadly defined middle class probably underlined this 
tendency. Things changed, however, as radio came within the grasp of lower-income 
families while at the same time the BBC's national profile together with its attitude to 
popular entertainment became more defined. The sale of wireless licences rose from 
just two million in 1927 to nine million in 1939, and of this number the corporation 
estimated that some 6.2 million were owned by families with annual incomes of L208 
and below. 97 Similarly, pressed by public demand, the BBC extended its transmission 
of entertainment programmes in the mid to late 1920s, and though sport was not 
regarded in this sense specifically as entertainment, its national focus made it an ideal 
target for a corporation anxious to highlight its national credentials. So from 1925 the 
BBC developed its first proposals to broadcast live sports events and within two years 
the first live outside broadcast of a League match had taken place, closely followed by 
98 the 1927 FA Cup Final. 
At first the response of clubs was extremely cautious. The BBC applied directly to the 
clubs themselves for broadcast rights and the decision was always left in the hands of 
94 Minutes of West Ham United FC, 16 August 1920; 24 January 1933. 
95 Minutes of West Hain United FC, 27 February 1933; 2,16 January 1934. 
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the hosts. Sheffield United, which had been the visiting team for the first commentary 
broadcast at Arsenal in January, agreed to a broadcast from Bramall Lane in February 
but refused a similar request a month later. Birmingham, too, acceded at first but in 
October 1927 it prohibited further broadcasts, feeling that 'on wet days at any rate' it 
could be harmful to gates. 99 Other clubs tried a number of methods to ensure that they 
would suffer no financial loss. Aston Villa's directors reftised to allow the BBC to 
broadcast from their ground unless the club was paid a fee of L20, while Huddersfield 
Town attempted unsuccessfully to include a no publicity clause in its agreement with 
the corporation so that spectators would not be aware of the broadcast and thus 
attendances would remain unaffected. 100 By early 1929 the Huddersfield board too 
had informed BBC representatives that running commentaries of matches would cease 
'unless a monetary offer was forthcoming'. 101 The BBC recognised the widespread 
opposition to broadcasting and directed Gerald Cock, its Director of Outside 
Broadcasting, to make personal visits to pacify the so-called 'antagonistic clubs'. 102 
Influence within the football world was also used in an unsuccessful attempt to 
convince Huddersfield to rethink its policy towards broadcasting when Herbert 
Chapman, a personal friend of Cock's, was asked to make an expenses-paid trip to his 
former club in order to explain the BBC's viewpoint. 103 
Nevertheless the BBC was unable to convince the League executive and most clubs of 
the benefits of broadcasting as a means of popularising the game. As a BBC 
representative in Sheffield noted, 'the point of view of the clubs is that we are getting 
something for nothing at the risk of a falling off of their gate money'. 104 Sutcliffe's 
opposition to broadcasting was similarly unequivocal: 
99 Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 9 February, 30 March, 6 September 1927; S. D. 
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I could never understand football clubs having anything to do with 
broadcasting football games Whilst the game is in progress. A few tried it 
on but soon found that broadcasting football did not... attract... listeners in 
to becoming supporters of the game (sic. ). How could it? When the 
weather is cold and the elements unkind, a man must be an enthusiast to 
turn up at the match, but it really needs no enthusiasm to sit at ease with 
slippers on, peacefully smoking and listening in. 105 
Moreover, in his view it was 'absurd to expect clubs to build stands and spend money 
to attract the public and then arrange for a broadcast especially designed to keep them 
at home'. 106 The fear of reduced gate receipts was felt hardest by the poorer clubs, 
especially those in the third division north. By May 1928 they had requested the 
Management Committee and the FA Council to prohibit broadcasting entirely and 
reacted angrily against the FA's decision to allow the transmission of the 1930 Cup 
Final after a ban in 1929. E. Clayton, spokesmen for the northern clubs, protested to 
the FA that the broadcast 'will cause a very serious loss to our Clubs... as when the 
Final was last broadcasted (sic. ) our gate receipts were considerably below the 
average'. 107 Opposition mounted until by early 1931 few clubs were prepared to 
openly condone broadcasts. In March of that year a large majority of League 
members declared themselves 'against broadcasting' and at the annual meeting it was 
agreed that 'in the interest of the smaller Clubs, Broadcasting of League matches be 
prohibited'. At the same time an official request was sent to the FA Council to 
likewise prohibit cup-tie broadcasts. 108 
The advocates of broadcasting, led by the BBC, launched a powerful counter- 
offensive with the aim of pressuring the League into a climb down. Cock wrote 
letters to the League and the FA emphasising the BBC's principal claims for a reversal 
of the ban: that broadcasting provided the blind, incapacitated and elderly the chance 
to experience the excitement of the game; that it did not, in fact, affect the gates of the 
clubs involved in commentaries, those situated nearby or smaller clubs struggling for 
gate revenue; and, conversely, that running commentaries could actually stimulate 
105 Topical Times, 19 May 1928. 
106Topical Times, II June 1932. 
Minutes of FA Finance and General Purposes Committee, 25April 1930. 
minutes of Football League, 6 March 193 1 (SGM); I June 1931 (AGM). 
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interest in the game. 109 He also included a summary of figures purporting to prove 
conclusively that crowds in all four division of the League had not in fact dropped on 
those Saturdays when matches had been transmitted, though Sutcliffe later argued that 
the figures were based on newspaper estimates 'which were all wrong and seriously 
wrong'. 110 In addition, the BBC claimed to have the backing of both the general 
public in the form of thousands of listeners as well as regular football spectators and 
club shareholders. Yet the League was hardly likely to be convinced by arguments 
stressing its moral responsibility to the public or those implying that the BBC, like the 
League, was fundamentally interested in widening public interest in football. Indeed, 
Sutcliffe and others had already doubted that the BBC's interest in the game stretched 
beyond immediate listening audiences. Significantly, however, there were some 
voices within the League who defended broadcasting on the grounds of its unique 
publicity value. Arsenal's George Allison, a veteran of nearly 100 commentaries at 
the time of the League ban, was probably its leading critic, reminding his colleagues 
in newspaper columns and numerous after-dinner speeches that 
any national advertiser would jump at the opportunity of a two-hour talk 
about his product on a Saturday afternoon. Soccer football... was allowing 
Rugby Football to steal its advertising medium, because Rugby was 
getting on the air. Revenues would not be affected, the circulations of 
newspapers would not diminish, and tens of thousands would be happier 
for the thrill a soccer broadcast gave them. 111 
But Allison's propaganda campaign was never powerful enough to alter the obstinacy 
of the Football League. The ban on League broadcasting remained operative 
throughout the 1930s and, in fact, both the Management Committee and many of its 
clubs agitated extensively to end the Cup Final broadcast. Attempts in 1933 failed 
and during the 1935/36 season Sutcliffe led another unsuccessful movement through 
the machinery of the FA Council to prohibit live transmission of the tie or, as an 
alternative, to enable clubs to re-diffuse the commentary at their grounds so that 
attendances would be less likely to suffer. 
112 
Gerald Cock to Frederick Wall, 3 September 193 1, FA Minute Book 1931/32. 
Topical Times, II June 1932. 
Allison, Allison Calling, pp. 56-58. 
112 Minutes of FA Council, 24 June 1933; 7 October, 16 December 1935,13,30 January 1936; Minutes 
of West Ham United FC, 18 July 1933; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 3 July 1933. 
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For the most part, the relationship between the League and the BBC remained strained 
throughout this period. In 1934 Cock reminded the BBC Controller of Programming 
of the need to distinguish between the FA, who co-operated with broadcasting plans 
and were thus 'our friends', and the obstructionist 'enemy', the League: 'They will 
neither allow (nor give reasons for refusing) their matches to be broadcast. ' 113 Certain 
concessions were made by Preston, such as the granting of broadcasts to Empire 
listeners after 1936, but even here the Management Committee insisted that the BBC 
should reapply for permission each year. 114 The Committee's insistence on its right to 
prohibit the broadcasting of any match involving a League club or player, including 
cup-ties and international fixtures, continually frustrated BBC officials, making it 
difficult to construct reliable programming schedules. In January 1938, for instance, 
the League executive stepped in to scupper arrangements to broadcast a number of 
cup replays on Wednesday afternoons on the grounds that this would clash with 
rearranged League fixtures. It is significant that this decision appeared to overturn 
both a previous FA resolution and the wishes of the clubs, who had informally 
indicated their agreement to the BBC's proposal by a clear majority. 115 Yet while it 
was generally admitted within Shepherd's Bush that the League 'have always been 
difficult', this did nothing to dampen attempts to improve relations. Indeed, it was 
decided in 193 8 that the corporation would donate 100 guineas to the League's Jubilee 
Fund, although a League request to broadcast part of the Jubilee Banquet was 
eventually turned down after considerable debate. 116 The outbreak of war finally 
persuaded the Management Committee to permit broadcasts so as to boost morale at 
home but even under these circumstances it was noted that some clubs were reluctant 
to co-operate, believing 'that this may be the thin end of the wedge and that we [the 
BBC] shall try to take advantage of the situation after the war is over'. 117 
I" Gerald Cock, Internal Memo, 20 November 1934, BBC OB, Football File 1,1933-1946. 
114 Football League Circular, November 1936; Fred Howarth to S. J. de'Lotbiniere, 15 December 1936; 
Howarth to John Snagge, 16 July 1937, BBC OB, Football League Ltd. File I a, 1936-1946; Minutes of 
Sheffield United Football Committee, 25 November 1936. 
"5 de' Lotbiniere to Howarth, 7 January 1938; Howarth to de'Lotbiniere, 8 January 1938; de' 
Lotbiniere to Howarth, 10 January, 1938, BBC OB, Football League Ltd File la, 1936-1946. 
116 S. J. de' Lotbiniere, Internal Memos, 18 January, 8 March, 17 June 193 8; de' Lotbiniere to Howarth, 
31 March 1938, BBC OB, Football League Ltd File la, 1936-1946. 
117 Michael Standing to Howarth, 16 October 1939, BBC OB, Football League Ltd File I a, 1936-1946. 
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It is essential to point out that the Football League's attitude to broadcasting was not 
the aberration it is sometimes presented as, but had parallels in other sectors of the 
entertainment industry. Few theatre or variety proprietors were sufficiently far- 
sighted at first to adopt the equivalent of the Allison viewpoint: that broadcasting 
would stimulate interest in entertainment and lead to an increase rather than a decline 
in live attendance. As early as 1923 a coalition of theatre managers and employees 
together with composers, music publishers and copyright owners had been formed to 
campaign for the prohibition of live broadcasts. Even where agreements were 
reached, broadcasting was strictly limited so as to avoid damaging audiences. Tbus in 
1925 a group of West End theatre managers sanctioned brief stage broadcasts at 
specified times but banned the transmission of cabaret performances during theatre 
hours. But the industry as a whole remained aloof and important theatrical agencies, 
such as Moss Empires, and the General Tbeatre Corporation, along with major theatre 
chains like Oswald Stoll's, continued to place periodic bans on broadcasts by their 
contracted artistes or on their stages. So, in common with the Football League, 
opposition to broadcasting in general, and the BBC in particular, continued 
throughout the 1920s and much of the 1930s and only declined as the BBC began to 
develop its own material and star performers within a separate Variety Department; an 
option obviously less appropriate to the broadcasting of sport. ' 1g 
4. Bevond Preston: The Promotion of the Leaeue in Enalish Societv 
Though the Football League was essentially an administrative body concerned with 
organising a sporting competition, its ambit was never confined solely to the football 
or sporting world. League clubs were in one sense members of a national sporting 
competition or an economic cartel but they were also located within communities, 
cities and regions and so interacted with a myriad of different voluntary, commercial 
and governmental bodies. At an executive level the League also operated in-a wider 
social sphere through its negotiations with transport authorities, government 
departments and other bodies in an attempt to improve conditions for its member 
clubs. Moreover, like any other organisation in the public eye, the League 
118 Briggs, The BBC, pp. 70-7 1; Scannell and Cardiff, 'Serving the Nation', pp. 178-82 
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endeavoured to maintain a positive image by contributing to charities and other good 
causes. In this sense the Football League really was a social and not purely a sporting 
institution. 
From the start the League relied on a viable transport infrastructure to take spectators, 
players, officials and journalists to and from matches easily and cheaply. At an 
individual club level this meant the development of an adequate municipal tramway or 
bus system which could transport spectators from outlying districts directly or as 
conveniently as possible to the ground. To this end clubs negotiated with local 
authorities on a regular basis. Thus when it was announced in 1902 that the Sheffield 
Tramways system was to be extended from both railway stations, the United club 
lobbied the City Tramways Committee to ensure that the route was changed to pass 
close to Bramall Lane. 119 In an attempt to broaden its base of support, Oldham 
Athletic requested the neighbouring Rochdale and Ashton Corporation to run special 
football trams to the ground on matchdays and Walsall similarly called for extra buses 
to be provided for particularly important games. 120 Yet the lobbying of the larger . 
transport companies and national bodies required a more organised and centralised 
approach for which the Management Committee came to assume responsibility. In 
1913 the Committee presented a memorial to the Clearing House of Railway 
Companies requesting cheaper railway fares for football parties and subsequently 
secured excursion rates on most trips. 12 1 Transport difficulties multiplied after the 
First World War when petrol shortages and a railway strike seriously threatened the 
fixture schedule and many clubs were forced to travel via the more expensive and less 
convenient road network. The importance of gaining concessions on ticket rates in 
this context led to more concerted pressure being placed on the railway companies and 
also the Ministry of Transport, leading to a number of official meetings, secured by 
the MP and Arsenal chairman Sir Henry Norris; a crucial figure of contact for the 
League with the wider governmental and political arena. 122 
"" Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 12 November 1902. 120 Minutes of Oldham Athletic FC, 20 August 1907; Minutes of Walsall FC, 20 March 1934. " Minutes of Football League, 26 May 1913. 
122.4thletic News, 7,14 March 192 1. 
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Thus during the early 1920s the League executive lobbied hard to ensure its 
recognition by the railway companies for special treatment. In October 1919 Fred 
Rinder produced a meticulous dossier detailing the average mileage travelled on the 
rail network by each League club and its supporters in an attempt to convince the 
companies of the economic value of football travel. 123 But the Railway Executive 
Committee initially refused even to meet League representatives and it took the 
influence of Norris, as well as technical improvements in the availability of rolling 
stock, to secure the return in June 1921 to the pre-war arrangement of excursion rates 
for football club parties. 124 Along with prices, the issues of conditions of travel and 
comfort were ones which clubs individually, and the League collectively, sought to 
emphasise. Rinder had noted that while reduced fares were crucial to the poorer 
clubs, 'our great point should be to endeavour to obtain greater facilities in the actual 
journeys, by Saloons if this can be possibly done, but at all events by means of 
reserved compartments'. 125 Although Rinder's aims were partly achieved and after 
1921 few clubs had still to endure a situation whereby players would have to stand for 
long journeys in smoking compartments, bad railway journeys remained a major 
source of complaint to the Management Committee. In early 1926, for example, it 
was decided that the League secretary should contact all relevant railway companies 
on the general issue of 'unsatisfactory Saloon arrangements', especially the 
widespread problem of inadequate heating, and log all future complaints from 
clubs. 126 But while the League had an indirect line to the railway authorities, initially 
through Norris and later as a result of the FA's inclusion on committees and panels 
concerned with travel rates, its influence was always limited. At the level of central or 
national government, independent action rarely had much effect and so it had to act in 
concert with other sporting associations, as it did in 1919, in order to achieve its 
aims. 127 
123 Catton Folders, A-B, Chart showing Railway Mileage of Football League Clubs and Spectators, 
October 1919, p. 36; Athletic News, 13 October 1919. 
124 Minutes of Football League, I April, 17 June 1921. 
123 Catton Folders, A-B, Fred Rinder to Catton, 6 October 1919, p. 36. 
126 Minutes of Football League, II January 1926. Also see Minutes of Sheffield United Football 
Committee, I December 1925; Minutes of Aston Villa FC, 27 December 1927. 
127 Minutes of FA Finance and General Purposes Committee, 6 June 1932; Athletic News, 13 October 
1919. 
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It was not uncommon for the Football League to lobby government agencies or 
authorities on a number of issues which impinged in some way on its activity. In 
general, this would take the form simply of encouraging member clubs to contact the 
relevant departments or to attempt to influence the local MP, as it did with the Ready 
Money Betting Bill in 1920, the Daylight Saving Bill four years later and Norris' 
endeavours to have the Entertainment Tax reduced. 129 Sometimes, however, the 
Management Committee would actually take up the case of a member in difficulties, 
as it did on a number of occasions when clubs came into conflict with the Inland 
Revenue on tax issues. Thus the executive stepped in when Tottenham was 
threatened with action by the Inland Revenue Commissioners on the question of 
ground depreciation. During the war, the Committee again conducted a year long 
fight with the Inland Revenue - ending in a successful court case - on behalf of those 
clubs who had been charged tax on the small five per cent contributions they paid to 
the League for administrative and charitable purposes. 129 
Nowhere was the Football League's wider public profile more salient than in its 
charitable activities. The emphasis placed by the League on giving to the distressed 
and needy outside football was perfectly consistent with the actions of private bodies 
and prominent individuals at the time, for whom philanthropy represented an 
important public gesture. As James Walvin has argued of the earlier Victorian era: 
'Charitable activity became a characteristic feature of propertied life: to be broadcast 
aloud, emblazoned in the press, and chiseled onto the side of public places and 
monuments... It was almost as if the act of giving had to be public to be effective'. 130 
Yet for the League there was an additional dimension: by giving to charity it was 
hoped that the 'myth' of the League as a purely selfish and businesslike institution 
could be exploded once and for all; an objective which gained additional intensity in 
the context of the negative press and public reaction to the League's decision to 
complete the 1914/15 season when other sports bodies had stopped playing 
128 Athletic News, 14 June 1920; Minutes of Football League, 12 April 1922; 10 March 1924. 
129 Minutes of Football League, 3,24 February 1913; Minutes of Sheffield United Football Committee, 
November 1917-December 1918, passim. 
"' James Walvin, Victorian Values, London, 1987, p. 96. Also see Prochaska, Voluntary Impulse, p. 
60. 
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immediately the war began in June 1914.13 1 By giving to charity, and being seen to do 
so, the League was attempting to establish its respectability and consolidate its public 
status. 
Individual clubs had a long tradition of donating money to local charities. As well as 
collections at League and cup matches, most directorates responded to formal appeals 
by donating small sums of money. As Korr has noted of West Ham, clubs reliant on 
the support of specific communities 'did not want to be accused of being oblivious to 
the needs of the poor and infirm', especially when the popular perception was that all 
clubs were making large profits. 132 The club allocated the gate receipts from practice 
matches to local hospitals and other charities and even organised special benefit 
matches, such as that against Tottenham Hotspur and attended by the Duke and 
Duchess of York in March 1924, in aid of the Docklands Settlement. 133 But West 
Hain's support of local causes and charities was hardly unique. Indeed every Football 
League club donated the proceeds of its August practice matches to local charities, 
and the contributions made were recorded in the minutes of the FA and the League 
and printed in the press. Some clubs were especially proud of their philanthropic 
record: Rinder informed his fellow club directors and Management Committee 
members in 1912 that Aston Villa had 'been responsible for collecting and 
distributing' over E25,000 for charitable purposes in the previous 25 years. Surely, he 
believed, this 'was a sufficient refutation of the view that football was no good'. 134 
For the League itself charitable giving assumed a similar significance. The 
motivations for such action were perfectly illustrated in 1909 when Athletic News, 
supported by president John Bentley, Sutcliffe and others, launched a campaign for 
the League to establish a systematic scheme for the relief of distressed individuals and 
groups to coincide with the 'Coming-of-Age' celebrations that year. It was suggested 
that the allocation of one per cent from each gross gate in the competition would be 
131 Veitch, 'Football, the Nation and the First World War,; Arnold, 'Leeds City', pp. 112-13,117. 
132 Korr, West Ham United, p. 196. 
133 Korr, West Ham United, pp. 195-99; Minutes of West Ham United FC, 29 October, 5 November 
1923. 
13" Report of the unveiling of the William McGregor Bed Memorial in Birmingham Daily Gazette, 29 
June 1912. Also see Minutes of Football League, 28 June 1912. 
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'the best possible means for marking the gratitude of the clubs to the communities 
which have built them up into powerful organisations. 135 Though plans for the 
scheme subsequently became sidetracked that spring and summer by crises and 
negotiations involving the FA, the Southern League and the Players' Union, the idea 
was finally realised during the First World War. From the beginning of the regional 
competitions in the 1915/16 season, each competing club contributed five per cent of 
its net gate receipts to the League's National and Charity Fund. Out of this the 
Management Committee allocated approximately half to national charities and 
returned to the clubs the remainder to distribute to local charities as they saw fit. The 
largest donations were made to the Red Cross, which received an ambulance car 
worth E600 inscribed with the name 'The Football League', while a E250 'Football 
League' tent was given to the YMCA. In all, over E8,000 was raised by the League 
for national and local wartime charities: contributions which were, significantly, 
publicised widely in the press and meticulously detailed in the 1938 Jubilee 
History. 136 
But charity was not simply a product of the unique circumstances of wartime. The 
League had displayed its philanthropic credentials before the war when in 1912 it 
arranged for a bed to be purchased for Birmingham General Hospital as a memorial to 
the founder, William McGregor, who had died the previous year. The bed was paid 
for by collections amounting to some E1,253 from its forty member clubs along with 
the Scottish League. Numerous League and club representatives attended the 
ceremonial presentation of the cheque at the Grand Hotel in Birmingham, which 
helped cement the League's status as a public benefactor rather than a private 
company. J. B. Clarke, the chairman of the hospital board, emphasised the point by 
suggesting that: 'It must be pleasant for those connected with the League to know that 
their money was helping the ailing and permanently sick. ' 137 For the most part, the 
League's charity was focused on public disasters which affected industrial 
communities. Donations were made to the funds for the sufferers of the colliery 
disasters in Wales in 1913, Maltby Main in 1923 and Gresford in 1934 and the floods 
135 Athletic News, II January 1909. 
136 See Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 88-93; Athletic News, 10 January, 6 November 1916. 
131 Report of the Unveiling of the William McGregor Bed Memorial in Birmingham Daily Gazette, 29 
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at Fleetwood in 1927.138 Appeals from sporting bodies was less favoured. The 
Management Committee rejected a request from the British Olympic Association in 
1913 because the fund 'did not appeal to them as calling for any action on the part of 
the League or its clubs'. Ten years later the Committee felt sufficiently responsible to 
donate 100 guineas to a similar fund for British Olympians and in 1931 encouraged its 
members to contribute to an appeal by the Playing Fields Association. 139 But in the 
main the League's benevolence was targeted at social rather than sporting needs, 
reflecting its concern to be perceived as a national social institution and not a 
narrowly focused sporting body. 
5. Conclusion 
The Football League's relationship with the general public was fundamentally 
contradictory. On the one hand, it was an intrinsically public organisation, engaging 
with thousands of spectators, wireless listeners and pools punters on a weekly basis 
through its vast programme of sporting fixtures. Yet on the other hand, it remained a 
highly secretive and private body; guarded with the press and outsiders and reluctant 
to experiment in order to increase revenue for its clubs and itself. It has been shown 
that League clubs were not as reluctant to innovate by improving the quality of the 
'football product' as was previously suggested and that the activities of Chapman at 
Arsenal were in fact less exceptional than some historians would have us believe. "' 
But it can nonetheless hardly be denied that by the Second World War the facilities of 
grounds, the nature and scope of advertising and other attempts to stimulate spectator 
demand through broadcasting were rudimentary in comparison with the techniques of 
mainstream retailers, cinema owners and even other sporting enterprises. While there 
was clearly a considerable demand for League football, at least in the higher divisions, 
it is difficult to see how this was significantly affected by the policies of the executive 
or the clubs, except inasmuch as winning teams (or close matches) generally brought 
in bigger crowds. Indeed club directors and League officials hardly fitted the model 
139 Minutes of Football League, 3 November 1913; 10 August 1923; 11 November 1927; 
Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Programme, 6 October, 3 November 1934. 
131 Minutes of Football League, I October 1913; 26 March 1923; 16 February, 24 April 193 1. 
. 
140 See Wagg, Football World, pp. 37-39; Walvin, People's Game, pp. 137-39. 
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of the ideal entrepreneur who 'sought to increase the supply, reduce the cost and 
widen the range of goods and services available to the consumer'. 141 
The attitude of spectators towards the League and its wider profile amongst those who 
never visited football grounds remains similarly elusive. As the bulk of the football 
audience were probably supporters of specific teams rather than neutral spectators, 
their relationships, loyalties and grievances were invariably with the club and not the 
League. It is indeed more than likely that many were unaware of the League's 
existence as an autonomous organisation. But while such considerations wam us 
against overestimating the public impact of the League, it is equally important to 
recognise that the organisation's tentacles spread far beyond the football world. The 
M anagement Committee, in particular, acted throughout the period as an effective 
pressure group for its clubs at various levels of government while the clubs 
themselves were centrally involved in civic life in much the same way as any 
conventional firm or enterprise. 
141 John Benson, The Rise of Consumer Society in Britain, 1880-1980, London, 1994, p. 44. 
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CONCLUSION 
A study of any specific organisation necessarily provides only a limited view of the 
industry of which it is a part and the broader social and economic environment within 
which it operates. This might be regarded as particularly true of the Football League, 
which as well as establishing regulations like the retain-and-transfer system with no 
apparent parallel in industrial life, was perceived as a fundamentally insular and 
introverted body. What is more, football itself came to be regarded as a separate 
world in which 'normal' economic and administrative assumptions were 
inappropriate. In certain respects, the football industry was simply not like other 
industries: its clubs were intrinsically both partners and competitors; they did not 
pursue profits above all else; and many were able to survive in the face of the sort of 
long-term losses and debts which would have meant bankrupcy for any other type of 
company. ' We should therefore be wary of extrapolating too much about changes and 
developments in English sport and recreation, or society in general, from the activities 
of an organisation which was in many respects peculiar and unique. 
That said, it is contended that this thesis provides a number of important insights into 
the progress of elite, professional sport in England in the first four decades of the 
twentieth century as well as the broader nexus between sport and society. First of all, 
much has been made of the parallels between the growth of the League and other 
sports and entertainments or recreations, like theatre, the music-hall and the cinema. 
The nature of the labour market, trends towards industrial concentration and the 
application of new managerial ideas such as advertising and marketing, all seem to 
reflect a fundamental generic similarity which has been overlooked by academics 
2 intent on analysing the development of a distinct 'football world'. Second, the 
6story' of the Football League certainly reflects various aspects of social and economic 
history: issues of regional and national identity, class relations, work and labour, 
business practice, and the interconnections between the state and private bodies have 
all been touched upon in the preceding chapters. In this sense, the thesis fits the type 
' Although Jones, 'Economic Aspects' offers a slightly different perspetive. 
2 See Jones, Workers at Play, pp. 41-54, for an analysis of the development of the 'leisure industry' as a 
whole between the wars. 
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of 'reflectivist' approach recently identified by Jeff Hill as one of British sports 
history's outstanding methodological characteristics. 3 Yet professional football was 
not simply a reflection of wider social realities: it was capable of affecting the world 
around it and making a significant social, cultural and economic impact in its own 
right. The sheer scale of the Football League's operations before the Second World 
War certainly ensured that it was able to do so. Thus, while locating the League's 
history within these broad contextual parameters, the thesis has also been concerned 
with analysing its complex infrastructure, an area largely neglected up to now by 
historians. 
A number of prominent themes have emerged from this approach. In the first place, it 
has been stressed that the development of the Football League in the period was not an 
uncomplicated or unilinear process. References to the 'rise' or 'progress' of the 
League in the (mainly official) literature are misleading as they tend to skate over the 
various debates and disagreements which accompanied its expansion. On one level, 
these arguments were strictly concerned with rational issues of economic control and 
organisational structure. Should the League extend its boundaries by incorporating 
more clubs and absorbing rival leagues so as to ensure monopolistic and 
monopsonistic ontrol over English professional football? Or should it remain one of 
a number of senior organisations which could, nonetheless, establish oligopolistic 
power through collusion with its rivaIS? 4 Such debates were not peculiar to football. 
The ma or railways companies were confronted with similar questions after 1900, 
even though they faced the ftirther complications of government intervention. 5 On a 
more ftiridamental level, however, the issue of expansion was linked to broader 
questions of regional and national identity. The Football League was rooted in the 
north and the midlands of England and developed in its early stages as a parochial 
organisation, comprising mostly of northern clubs, players and administrators and 
backed by a sympathetic sporting press based around northern weeklies like the highly 
Jeffrey Hill, 'British Sports History: A Post-Modem Future', Journal ofSport History, 23,1,1996, p. 
14. 
4 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 113. A clear explanation of the position sports monopolies from an American 
perspective, but applicable to the English case, is provided in Charles C. Euchner, P4ing the Field: 
why sports teams move and citiesfight to keep them, Baltimore, 1994, pp. 35-37. 
5 See Cain, 'Railways 1870-1914', pp. 117-2 1. 
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influential Athletic News. As such, it did not regard itself as a 'national' league, even 
as its geographical boundaries were pushed back by the election of Woolwich Arsenal 
and Luton in the 1890s and a coterie of metropolitan and southern clubs during the 
1900s. Opposition to the 'national league' idea informed the staunch resistance of 
officials and member clubs to the periodic proposals of amalgamation with the 
Southern League and it was only after the First World War, in the context of relative 
prosperity, good gates and a general mood of optimism, that the national league was 
finally established under the Football League's aegis through the creation of a new 
southem-based third division. 
Yet this transformation of the League into a body with a genuinely national 
constituency can be seen as part of a broader 'nationalisation of culture' in Britain, in 
which the variegated, provincial focus of life in the mid-nineteenth century gradually 
shifted towards 'a more centralised, homogeneous national society'. 6 Accompanied 
and driven by the growth of national transport and communication networks, the 
League arguably became one of many factors which contributed to a broadening of 
horizons and the binding together of various local and regional communities into a 
national state. While few supporters physically travelled with their teams to away 
matches, most could still follow their progress at grounds located in cities across 
England and Wales and monitor their changing league position in the press. If Eric 
Hobsbawrn could emphasise the importance before 1914 of professional football as a 
point of reference or a common culture which bound working-class males together 
, irrespective of local and regional differenceS'7 , then this was even more true of the 
inter-war period, when the League's boundaries spread to encompass communities in 
almost every region and county in England, and a number in Wales. This is not to 
say, however, that the growth and consolidation of a national Football League ought 
to be seen as an 'invented tradition' which contributed to the foundation of an English 
6national identity'. English football, at League as at international level, was always 
6 Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit, p. 17. 
7 Eric Hobsbawm, 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914' in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds), 
invention of Tradition, p. 301. 
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too wrapped up in local and regional loyalties to advance perceptions of the nation 
itself. 8 
Indeed the League's regional identity, and what might be called its 'northemness', 
remained one of its defining characteristics for the whole of this period. This brings 
us into a territory which historians have only just begun to explore. The close 
relationship between sport and a whole range of national, regional and local identities 
is now generally accepted, but these identities hiive tended to be associated with a 
particular sports team or the individual sportsmen and sportswomen themselves. 9 It 
certainly appears less evident that a regional identity could be invested in, or 
constructed around, a sporting organisation, especially one as nebulous as the Football 
League often seems to have been. It could indeed be argued that what the League 
really represented was a collection of competing local identities derived from the 
interconnections of its member clubs rather than a single identity of its own. There is, 
moreover, the problem of defining and separating 'northernness' from other sub-forms 
of loyalty and identification, built in the League's case particularly around the north- 
west and Lancashire. As Hill and Williams concluded in the introduction to their 
study of Sport and Identity in the North ofEngland. 'the North and Northernness have 
had very many meanings. The North is an imagined territory with no fixed boundaries 
and the range of qualities which have been seen as characteristic if Northernness are 
so diverse as to defy neat definition. " 0 
Despite these reservations, however, there is little doubt that the Football League was 
both objectively and subjectively a northern organisation. The decision to locate its 
permanent offices in Preston from 1902 was partly a matter of logistics, given that the 
new secretary Tom Charnley was based in the town, but it also reflected and 
reinforced the League's emergent identity as a parochial organisation, fiercely 
independent of the governing body whose headquarters remained in the capital. 
Likewise, the dominance of northern representatives on the Management Committee, 
' See Hugh Cunningham, 'Leisure and Culture' in F. M. L. Thompson (ed. ), The Cambridge Social 
History ofBritain, 1750-195q, Volume 2: People and their Environment, Cambridge, 1990, p. 337; 
Holt, Sport and the British, p. 273. 
' See Holt, Sport and the British, pp. 159-79. 
10 Jeff Hill and Jack Williams, 'Introduction' in Hill and Williams (ed. ), Sport and Identity, p. 11. 
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especially in the inter-war period, was both a highly significant symbol and a tangible 
means of ensuring the hegemony of the provincial north over the metropolitan south at 
a time when Arsenal's ascendancy was challenging northern dominance on the field of 
play. From Bentley and Lewis through to McKenna and Cuff, with the ubiquitous 
figure of Sutcliffe straddling the entire period, the League's senior administration was 
essentially a northern clique, aided by a small supporting cast of officials from 
midlands clubs. The 'northernness' of the League also shone through clearly in its 
relationship with southern organisations like the FA. The tensions and antagonism 
between the two bodies up until 1939 were unquestionably underpinned by north- 
south rivalries which, as Mason has shown, had their origins in the struggle to legalise 
professionalism in 1885.11 But the League's attitude towards the parent body also 
d rew on a range of wider social resentments and political grievances. The perceived 
indifference and neglect of the north by central government had a long history, which 
was only partially modified by the enhancement of its national significance in the 
course of the industrial revolution. 12 While the FA had rarely shown indifference 
towards the League and its largely northern membership, there was nevertheless a 
powerful feeling that the north had been marginalised in Council meetings and the 
League denied the consideration which such a powerftil organisation deserved. In this 
repect, the League's attitude towards the FA fitted into a broader northern. self-image 
as a people 'whose misfortune it was to be governed by the aristocratic, agrarian 
South where so much was perceived to depend on public school and family 
connections'. 13 Between the wars, therefore, the League struggled to reconcile its 
parochial identity with its national constituency in an effort to represent both the north 
and the nation. 
The Football League was a very different type of organisation in 1939 than it had been 
in 1900. The changes in its duties and responsibilities completely transformed the 
nature of the organisation itself. In the first decade or so of the League's existence, it 
was little more than a representative body of members charged with organising a 
sporting competition. Only at annual and special meetings, and gatherings of the 
11 Mason, 'Football, Sport of the NorthT, pp. 44-45. 
12 Jewell, North-South Divide, pp. 135-36,208-10. 
13 Holt, 'Heroes of the North', p. 138. 
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Management Committee, did the League have real meaning as a tangible organisation. 
For many clubs, players and spectators it had an almost abstract existence as a entity 
which bound them together for a common purpose. Even in the inter-war period, few 
ever visited the offices at Preston: their understanding of the Football League was 
gained through the fixture list, the signing-on form and the circular letter. But the 
League had nevertheless become by this time a powerful bureaucracy with a power- 
base independent of its constituent clubs. Few aspects of club activity lay outside its 
ambit and, while there were periodic movements by the leading clubs reaffirming their 
status as separate enterprises, the overall authority of the Management Committee was 
rarely questioned. It is telling that previous accounts have almost entirely ignored the 
growth of the Football League as a central regulatory and administering body - far 
more important to its professional membership than the FA - and have consequently 
underplayed its significance in the broader development of the professional game. 
Reactionary and remote as it may have been from its employees and its audience, 
Wagg's description of the League in the 1920s as 'a moribund organisation' whose 
tsignificance... as a bureaucracy' had dwindled, is simply inaccurate. 14 
The League's bureaucratic expansion is connected to a ftirther theme centred around 
the phenomenon of professionalisation. There are obvious conceptual difficulties in 
perceiving the football player as a 'professional' in the sense that doctors, lawyers and 
even some actors were by the twentieth century. Footballers did not have the type of 
job security or long-term career structure enjoyed by many professionals; players 
themselves were not able to control entry into the profession; and other fringe benefits 
like pensions were slow to develop. Football was a job rather than a profession and in 
most aspects of his employment the player remained associated with the wage-eamer 
and not the salaried professional man. Despite this, it is evident that the increased 
bureaucratic control of the League regularised the working conditions of football 
employees and standardised the relations between player and club. By the 1930s a 
player who moved from one club to another was in certain respects only changing 
'branch' within a national company structure. Moreover, the structure of the League 
professionalised the game by marginalising the amateur and the part-time or semi- 
14 Wagg, Football World, p. 30. 
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professional player at the highest level. Although a paucity of data makes it difficult 
to be precise about the changing number of amateur and part-time in relation to full- 
time players in the League, the available evidence indicates that by 1939 players who 
had other jobs were exceptional. One newspaper correspondent noted in 1928 that the 
strict application of training regulations, together with the mounting intensity of mid- 
week matches, replays and re-arranged games during the second half of the season had 
made it virtually impossible for most players to have other occupations. 15 This also 
had fundamental implications for the capacity of League and club employers to 
control the players, as it inevitably increased the latter's dependence on football as an 
occupation. In short, the structure of the League and its competition provided the 
framework for the elevation of the professional footballer and contributed to the 
development of the close association between professional and elite football in 
England. 
More significantly still, the Football League was clearly implicated in the growth of 
football's popularity and its rise to the status of the 'national' winter game. Most of 
those major landmarks in the game's pre-Second World War history which have been 
recorded by historians - from the record attendances to the expanding transfer fees - 
took place within the structure of the League. Even those great events which 
subsequently became mythologised in popular and sporting history - such as the 1923 
White Horse Cup Final and the success of Scotland's 'Wembley Wizards' in 1928 - 
involved League clubs and players. In addition, the transformation of the game from a 
negative to a positive social phenomenon in the inter-war years, so that 'it was no 
longer... out of favour with "public opinion" and seemed if anything to stand for much 
that was good in society' was in reality a transformation in attitudes towards League 
football and the working-class culture which surrounded it. 16 But there is an evident 
paradox here: the unquestioned national popularity of football by 1939 was in large 
part achieved through the activities of a conservative organisation which eschewed 
attempts both to popularise and to nationalise the game. The League and its decision- 
makers were extremely reluctant to exploit the opportunities provided by the rise of 
cinema and radio or to promote their product through advertising or other intrinsic 
'5 Topical Times, 14 April 1928. 
16 Fishwick, English Foothall, pp. 14647. 
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methods. The steps that were taken tended to emanate from the clubs themselves, 
who experimented with improved ground facilities, floodlit matches, shirt numbering 
and other innovations. And, as we have seen, the League rarely ventured from its 
parochial viewpoint and its narrow range of responsibilities, which precluded any 
involvement in spreading and popularising the game itself, both at home and abroad. 
This, it was felt, was the job of the governing body not of a self-contained 
organisation: the League's role was to look after the League, not the game of football. 
As Walvin has noted, football was in a remarkably healthy and buoyant state 
immediately prior to the Second World War. The popular support for the game was 
visible in the 'packed stadiums, [with] annies of satisfied listeners huddled close to 
their radio sets, with millions ticking their football pools weekly and with the press 
replete with footballing interest. 17 At a lower level, the growth in players and clubs 
during this part of the twentieth century was enormous. The number of registered 
players rose from 750,000 before the First World War to a million by the late 1930s, 
while clubs increased 12,000 in 1910 to some 35,000 in 1937.18 The Football 
League's contribution to these achievements eems to have been largely unwitting. It 
provided the context and the framework for football's mounting popularity but was 
rarely consciously involved in the process. In actual fact, its policies towards the 
outside world and football in general were usually defensive and reactive rather than 
proactive. 
Yet firms conclusions on the role of the Football League in the development of 
professional football's infrastructure before the Second World War must await further 
work. Although Hill has urged historians studying sport to adopt a "from below" 
approach to their subjects, it is evident that our knowledge of the internal politics of 
English sport - the institutions and the leaders who established and consolidated the 
infrastructures - is seriously lacking. While football was essentially built around clubs 
and local communities, it also developed within regional, national and international 
networks which significantly affected, and at certain times determined, the processes 
of change and continuity at the local level. Furthermore, work of this type does not 
" Walvin, People's Game, p. 142. 
18 Fishwick, English Football, p. 1. 
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need to reject the importance of identities, traditions and the experiences of the 
sporting public. Organisations like the Football League may have been for the most 
part remote and uninterested in the concerns of its audience, but they were not always 
neutral bureaucracies. Like sports teams and star players, sporting organisations were 
invested with a range of different and often competing identities, from which they 





Manaaement Committee members, 1900-39 
Name Positions Club Occupation Occupational Class 
William McGregor Chairman 1888-92 Aston Villa Draper 2A 
President 1892-94 
Life Member 1895- 
1911 
John Bentley Committee 1888-93 Bolton Wanderers and Journalist IA 




Life Member 1912-18 




David Haigh Vice-President 1895- Sheffield United Not Known n/a 
1901 
William Bellamy Committee 1896-1900 Grimsby Town Partner in Mineral 2A 
Water Business 
Tom Sidney Vice-President 1897- Wolverhampton Corporation Official 2B 
1905 Wanderers 
Harty Radford Committee 1898-1905 Nottingham Forest Corporation Official 2B 
Vice-President 1905- 
08 
Charles Sutcliffe Committee 1898-1902 Burnley and Oldham Solicitor IA 




Life Member 1938-39 
Walter Hart Committee 1899-1903 Small Heath Metal Ware 2A 
Manufacturer 
George Leavey Committee 1901-04 Woolwich Arsenal Men's Outfitter 2A 




Life Member 1923-36 
James Baxter Committee 1904-19 Everton Doctor IA 
Henry Keys Committee 1905-10 West Bromwich Albion Bicycle Agent 2A 
Vice-President 1910- 
29 
John Cameron Committee 1907-16 Newcastle United and Clothing Trader and 2A 
Leeds City Publican 
Arthur Dickinson Committee 1909-29 Sheffield Wednesday Cutlery Salesman 2B 
Vice-President 1929- 
30 
Tom Harris Committee 1909-17 Notts County Football Club Secretary 2B 
Tom Houghton Committee 1912-13 Preston North End Brewery Agent 2A 
William Hall Committee 1913-27 Arsenal Metal Merchant 2A 
John Peel Oliver Committee 1917-28 Newcastle United Wine Spirit Merchant 2A 
Fred Rinder Committee 1917-30 Aston Villa and Bristol Corporation Surveyor 2B 
Vice-President 1930- Rovers 
38 
Life Member 1938 
Tom Barcroft Committee 1919-25 Blackpool Retired Banker and 2B 
and 1927-43 Football Club Secretary 





Morton Cadman Committee 1927-39 Tottenham Hotspur Rate Collector 2B 
Vice-President 1939- 
41 
Phil Bach Committee 1929-37 Middlesborough Ex-Professional 2A 
Footballer and 
Licensed Victualler 
William Bassett Committee 1930-37 West Bromwich Albion Ex-Professional 2A 
Footballer and Cinema 
Director 
Amos Brook Hirst Committee 1931-39 Huddersfield Town Solicitor IA 
Vice-President 1939- 
41 
John Edwards Committee 1936-40 Arsenal Solicitor IA 
Walter Tempest Committee 1939-41 Blackburn Rovers Managing Director 2B 
Arthur Oakley Committee 1937-41 Wolverhampton Coal Merchant 2A 
Wanderers 
George Rutherford Committee 1938-50 Newcastle United Coal Mine Owner 2A 




IA Higher Professional 
IB Lower Professional 
2A Employers and Proprietors 
2B Managers and Administrators 
3 Clerical Workers 
4 Foreman, Inspectors and Supervisors 
5 Skilled Manual Workers 
6 Semi-Skifled Manual Workers 
7 Unskilled Manual Workers 
Sources: Athletic News; All Sports Weekly; Birmingham Weekly Post, Birmingham Mail; Blackpool 
Gazette; Burnley Express; Huddersfield Weekly Examiner; The Lancashire Review; Liverpool Daily 
Post, Liverpool Echo; The Ltverpolitan; Midland Chronicle and Free Press; Wolverhampton Express 
and Star; Kelly's Directory of Lancashire; Barrett's Directory of Preston and Flyde Districts; Barrett's 
Directory of Burnley and District; Gore's Liverpool Directory; Ward's Directory of Newcastle-on- 
Tyne; Wright's Directory of Nottingham; Kelly's Directory of Nottinghamshire; Post Office London 
Directory; Kelly's Directory of Staffordshire; Huddersfield County Borough Directory; FA, Register of 
Directors and Managers; Sutcliffe and Hargreaves, History of the Lancashire FA; Pickford and Gibson 
(eds. ), Association Football, vol. 3; Inglis, League Football, pp. 387-95. 
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APPENDIX 2 
A. Football and Southern League Clubs Reaching the FA Cup Quarter-Final 
Statze, 1894-1919 
Year Football League Southern League 
1895 8 0 
1896 8 0 
1897 8 0 
1898 6 1 
1899 7 1 
1900 6 2 
1901 6 2 
1902 6 2 
1903 6 2 
1904 7 1 
1905 6 2 
1906 7 1 
1907 7 1 
1908 7 1 
1909 8 0 
1910 5 3 
1911 6 2 
1912 7 1 
1913 8 0 
1914 7 1 
1915 8 0 
1920 8 0 
Source: Calculatcd from data in Mallory (cd. ), League Tables. 
372 
B. Football Leazue and Southern Leazue Plavers Selected for Enaland 
International Teams, 1894/95-1919/20 
Year Caps Awarded Football League Soutbern League 
1894/95 33 18 0 
1895/96 33 15 0 
1896/97 33 26 0 
1897/98 33 23 0 
1898/99 33 27 2 
1899/1900 33 16 8 
1900/01 33 21 4 
1901/02 33 30 1 
1902103 33 23 9 
1903/04 33 29 3 
1904/05 33 26 5 
1905/06 33 22 4 
1906/07 33 32 1 
1907/08 77 67 10 
1908/09 66 62 2 
1909/10 33 31 2 
1910/11 33 27 6 
1911/12 33 32 1 
1912/13 33 31 2 
1913/14 33 31 1 
1919/20 33 30 1 
Source: Calculated from data in Rothman's Football Yearbook, 1989190. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Proposed Scheme for a Third Division, April 1909 
1. That a Third Division of the Football League be formed, such Division to consist of 20 clubs. 
2. That the Southern League shall nominate 18 clubs to form part of such Third Division. 
3. That the entrance fee to the Third Division shall be 0-5-0; annual subscription, 0-5-0; and the fee 
on promotion from Division 3 to Division 2, LIOO. Two clubs shall be promoted and two retire, but to 
be eligible for re-election. 
4. That all clubs joining the Football League shall pay transfer fees in the usual way except that where 
immediate payment is impossible the Management Committee shall have power to order a club to pay 
to the League to a special fund to the credit of such club a sum not exceeding 10 % of its gross gates 
until the fund shall be sufficient to meet the club's transfer liabilities. The Management Committee 
shall also have power to order the payment or allocation of any part of a transfer fee received for a 
player to the special transfer club of the club entitled to receive the same. No transfer fees for players 
who have been 5 years with their present club. 
5. The Third Division to have one representative on the Management Committee. 
6. The Third Division to be allowed 10 votes at General Meetings for the first season, the Southern 
League to settle which of the clubs shall be entitled to vote, but thereafter the top 10 clubs in the Third 
Division shall have the voting power. In ascertaining the top 10 clubs, the bottom two in the Second 
Division shall be deemed to have exchanged places with the top two in the Third. 
7. No Southern League club shall be eligible for election to the Second Division of the Football League 
at the next AGM of the Football League. 
Source: Football League Circular to Clubs, April 1909. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Proposed Scheme for a Third Division, Mav 1920 
That, subject to the consent of the Football Association, a Third Division of the League be formed. 
That the clubs at present forming the First Division of the Southern Football League shall comprise the 
Third Division for the season 1920/2 1. 
The top club at the end of the season's Competition shall be promoted to the Second Division and the 
bottom club in the Second Division relegated to the Third. 
The Management Committee shall consider the formation of a Northern Section of the Third Division 
for the season 1921/22 with similar rights of promotion and, if sufficient clubs of suitable playing and 
financial strength are available, a Special General Meeting of the League shall be held in February, 
192 1, to elect the clubs. 
The following special rules shall apply to the Third Division when fully constituted and so far as is 
applicable until fully constituted, and the clubs comprising the same shall be known as Associate 
Members. 
The League shall admit to Associate Membership not more than 44 clubs upon the terms and subject as 
follows: 
1. The entrance fee shall be f 100 for each club. 
2. The annual subscription shall be JE 10 1 Os., payable on or before the first day of June in each year. 
3. All new clubs shall pay the entrance fee and first annual subscription on election. 
4. The clubs shall have no rights or votes as members and shall not be called upon to pay transfer fees 
for players except as hereinafter mentioned. 
5. The 44 clubs or such lesser numbers as shall be elected to Associate Membership shall constitute and 
be known as the Third Division and shall, if and when necessary, be divided into two sections, North 
and South, for Competition purposes. 
6. The clubs shall be allocated to the respective sections by the Management Committee of the Football 
League. 
7. A Competition shall be conducted for each section on the same lines as to the Competitions in the 
League and the Championship club in each section ascertained in the same manner as the 
Championship club in the First Division of the League. At the end of each season the Championship 
clubs shall be promoted to the Second Division, taking the places vacated by the bottom two clubs. 
Until fully constituted the Championship club of the Third Division shall take the place of the bottom 
club of the Second Division. 
8. On earning promotion the club or clubs shall become Members of the Football League, enjoying all 
the privileges of membership and shall become responsible for the obligations of members under the 
General Rules and shall, in particular, 
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a) Pay a further entrance fee of L200, thus making a total entrance fee of L300 in accordance 
with the General Rule 1, two-thirds of such sum of E200 being placed to a suspense account 
returnable in accordance with such rules. 
b) Discharge the obligations of transfer rights for players registered and held by the members of 
the League or the Management Committee. 
c) Be subject to the payment of percentage of gate in lieu of annual subscription. 
9. All players hitherto registered by a member of the First or Second Division or held by the 
Management Committee on behalf of a former club in membership with the League shall be regarded as 
joint players until the joint holding shall be ended by transfer or the cancellation on the part of one of 
the clubs; players registered by Associate Members and not previously registered by a member shall be 
the League player of the club registering him, and the Associate Member shall have all the rights and 
privileges of members under Rule 6 of the General Rules. 
10. At the end of each season's Competition the bottom two clubs in the Second Division who by virtue 
of such position cease to be members of the Football League shall become automatically Associate 
Members. Until the Northern Section of the Third Division is formed this rule shall only apply to the 
bottom club in the Second Division. 
11. At the end of each season the bottom two clubs in each section of the Third Division as shall be in 
operation shall retire from Associate Membership but be eligible for re-election. Clubs dropping into 
the Third Division and subsequently gaining promotion to the Second Division shall pay a promotion 
fee of E20, clubs re-elected to the Third Division shall pay an entrance fee of L5 5s. 
12. New clubs may apply for Associate Membership. The application to be made in accordance with 
the General Rules. 
13. The Management Committee of the League shall manage the affairs and Competition of such Third 
Division and shall make any necessary rearrangements of clubs to constitute the two sections after the 
election of the new clubs. 
14. The Management Committee shall hold the transfer rights of all players of clubs ceasing Associate 
Membership in accordance with General Rule 29, except in the case of joint registration when the 
registration of the club retiring shall be cancelled. 
Source: Sutcliffe el al., Football League, pp. 95-96. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Oldham Athletic FC Election Circular to Clubs, April 1907 




It is the intention of this Club to again apply, at the forthcoming Annual Meeting, for 
admission to the Second Division of the League, and on behalf of the Directors and Members we desire 
to lay before you the reasons why we consider our admittance will be beneficial not only to the League, 
but to Association Football, its followers and supporters generally; with the object of gaining your 
assistance and support at the Annual Meeting of the League. 
Population of the Town and District 
In the first place, Oldham has a population of 150,000 in the Municipal, and over 200,000 in the 
Parliamentary Borough. Within five miles of the centre of town there is a population of 650,000, and 
within ten miles of the same centre the population is over Two-and-a-half-Millions. 
Accessibility and Travelling Facilities 
The town is easily accessible to all the Clubs in the Second Division of the League, and its 
easy access from Manchester, into which all railways run, makes it a most desirable acquisition to the 
League. Between Manchester and Oldham there is a twenty-minutes' train service, and the Manchester 
Corporation Electric Cars run from the centre of that city through to Oldham and the Ground for a 5d. 
fare. 
In addition to this, the various Railway Companies run a frequent service of trains into the 
town direct from Huddersfield and Leeds (L. & N. W. ), Stockport (L. & N. W. ), Guide Bridge (G. C. ), 
and Rochdale (L. & Y. ). 
Further, the whole of the district for a radius of twelve miles is a network of electric systems, it 
being not only possible but exceedingly convenient to get from any town in that area into Oldham by 
electric car at nominal fares. 
Oldham as a Sporting Centre 
The town is situate in the very centre of that most densely-populated district known as South. 
East Lancashire, which has a national reputation as a sporting centre. It has held a foremost position in 
Rugby football for a large number of years, and the thousands who follow the Rugby club week by 
week testifies to the popularity of football in the district. 
Progress of the Association Game 
Whilst it is not the intention of this Club to enter into improper competition with the Rugby 
Club, there has of late years been a noticeable inclination on the part of football enthusiasts to follow 
the Association game (this inclination has been more noticeable during the present season than in any 
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one previously), and since the formation of the "Oldham Athletic" that tendency has been fostered until 
it has now grown into a determined emand for a better-class Association football. When this Club was 
formed there was no Association club in the district, whilst now at the present moment here are ninety- 
eight clubs (affiliated to various Leagues) playing Association football, against six playing Rugby. In 
addition, the whole of the schools in the district are playing the Association code, all having changed 
from Rugby. 
Record of the "Oldham Athletic" 
The Oldham Athletic Association Football Club was established nine years ago. It first 
became associated with the Manchester Alliance, and afterwards the Manchester League, and, during 
the connection with the latter, won the Manchester Junior Cup. 
The next mark of progress was in joining the Lancashire Combination B Division (Season 
1904/05), in which it won its way to the First Division in one season. During the same season the Club 
also won the Ashton Charity Cup, after being runners-up the previous year. This year we are running 
strongly for the Championship of the First Division... 
In regard to gates, we have been able to obtain 8,000 spectators regularly, and with the 
contemplated improvement in the team, a corresponding increased support is reasonably expected. 
Below will be found the record of our principal gates for the present season: - 
Attendance Gate 
Liverpool (English Cup Tie) 21,538 L670-12-9 
Kidderminster H. (English Cup Tie) 13,102 L245-8-9 
Bolton Wanderers Res. (Comb. Match) 12,405 
Liverpool Reserves (Comb. Match) 10,961* 
Bury Reserves (Comb. Match) 9,8170 
Accrington Stanley (Comb. Match) 8,397* 
Excluding Members, who are not checked by turnstiles. 
We also give you our chief results, and would remind you that in next season's Cup 
Competition we have been exempted to the Last Qualifýring Round - an honour we believe due to our 
success in the Cup Competition this season, which you will find set out herein. 
The Club a Limited Company 
The Club has been formed into a Limited Liability Company, with the object of placing it on 
an approved financial basis, with a capital of 12,000. 
The Membership of 1,000, spread over all parts of the district, proves the popularity of the 
Club to be both genuine and widespread, and leaves no possible room for doubt, whilst the Directors 
have promises of financial assistance to an unlimited extent on gaining admission to the League. 
The Ground 
The Ground is suitable and convenient, and capable of holding at least 50,000 spectators, 
which, with the addition of further stand accommodation, will make an ideal ground. It is situate within 
a1d. car ride of the centre of the town, or of Central, Werneth, or Royton (L. & Y. ), and Clegg Street 
(L. & N. W. and G. C. ) Stations. 
Trusting to receive your support and vote at the forthcoming meeting, 
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We are, Gentlemen, 
Yours faithfLflly, 
JOHN GRIME, Chairman. 
WILLIAM HEATH, Vice-Chairman. 
EGBERT L. THOMPSON, Secretary. 
D. G. ASHWORTH, Manager. 
ENGLISH CUP RECORD 
1906/07 
OLDHAM ATHLETIC 
For Against Ground 
Hyde 5 0 Oldham 
Newton Heath 4 1 Oldham 
Buxton 3 1 Buxton 
Atherton I I Atherton 
Atherton (Replay) 4 1 Oldham 
Southbank (Intermediate 9 1 Oldham 
Round) 
Kidderminster H. (I St. 5 0 Oldham 
Round) 
Liverpool (2nd. Round) 0 1 Oldham 
TOTAL 31 6 
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APPENDIX 6 
RAILWAY FACILITIES OF FOOTBALL LEAGUE CLUBS, 1909/10 AND 
1919/20 
1909/10 1919/20 
Club Stations Companies Stations Companies 
(Woolwich) Arsenal Plumstead Gillespie Road Tube 
Drayton Park (GNR 
Finsbury Park (Piccadilly Tube 
Aston Villa Witton Birmingham 
Witton 
Aston 




Birmingham Birmingham Birmingham (New UNWR 
Street) Midland 
Birmingham (Snow GWR 
Hill) 
Blackburn Rovers Blackburn Blackburn 
Lower Darwen Lower Darwen 
Mill Hill 
Blackpool Central Central 
Waterloo 
Bolton Wanderers Bolton L&YR Trinity Street LAYR 
UNW Great Moor Street LANWR 






Bradford (PA) Bradford Midland Bradford Midland 
NER NER 




Bristol City Bristol Bristol GWR 
Midland 
Burnley Bank Top Bank Top 
Manchester Road Manchester Road 
Bury Knowsley Road Knowsley Road 
Bolton Street Bolton Street 
Chelsea Chelsea West London Walham Green District Tube 
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Extension 
Walham Green District Tube 
Clapton Orient Homerton Homerton NLR 
Clapton GER Clapton GER 
Coventry City Coventry L&NWR 
Derby County Derby Midland Derby Midland 
GNR GNR 
Everton Walton LA&NWR All Stations in 
Kirkdale L&YR Liverpool 
Fulham Putney Bridge District Railway Putney Bridge District Railway 
Hammersmith District Railway or Hammersmith District Railway or 
Tube Tube 
Gainsborough Gainsborough GCR 
Trinity GNR 
GER 
Glossop Glossop GCR. 
Grimsby Town New Clee New Clee 
Huddersfleld Town Huddersfield (one 
mile) 














Liverpool All Stations in AJ I Stations in 
Liverpool Liverpool 
Manchester City Hyde Road All Stations in 
Ardwick Manchester 
Manchester 
Manchester United All Stations in All Stations in 
Manchester Manchester 
Middicsborough Middlesborough Middlcsborough 
Newcastle United Central Central 
Notts County Midland Midland 
GNR GNR 
GCR GCR 
Nottingham Forest GNR Victoria GCR I I 
GNR 
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Midland Nottingham Midland 
Oldham Athletic Wemeth L&YR Werneth L&YR 
Clegg Street L&NWR Clegg Street L&NWR 
GCR 
Preston North End Central Central 
Deepdale 
Rotherham County Rotherharn Midland 
GCR 
Sheffield United Sheffield Midland Sheffield Midland 
GCR GCR 
GNR 
Sheffield Wednesday Sheffield Midland Sheffield Midland 
GCR GCR 
South Shields South Shields 
Stockport County Stockport L&NWR Edgeley L&NWR 
Teviot Dale, Cheadle Midland Teviot Dale Cheshire Lines 
Heath Midland 
Stoke Stoke 
Sunderland Sunderland Sunderland 
Monkwearmouth Monkwearmouth 
Tottenham Hotspur White Hart Lane GER White Hart Lane GER 
West Bromwich Smethwick LA&NWR Smethwick L&NWR 





West Ham United Upton Park 
Tilbury Section 
Wolverhampton Wolverhampton L&NWR Wolverhampton L&NWR 
Wanderers Midland Midland 
GWR GWR 
Source: Footba ll Leazue Handbooks. 1909/10- 1919/20 
GCR - Great Central Railway 
GER - Great Eastern Railway 
GNR - Great Northern Railway 
GWR - Great Western Railway 
UNWR - London and North Western Railway 
UYR - Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway 
NER - North Eastern Railway 
NLR -North London Railway 
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APPENDIX 7 
Exit and Entry of Clubs in the Football Leazue, 1900-39 
Club Exiting Reason for Exiting Club Entering 
1900 Luton Town Resigned Stockport County 
Loughborough Voted Out Blackpool 
1901 Walsall Voted Out Bristol City 
New Brighton Tower Resigned Doncaster Rovers 
1902 
1903 Doncaster Rovers Voted Out Bradford City 
1904 Stockport County Voted Out Doncaster Rovers 
1905 League extended by 4 Clubs 
(Chelsea, Clapton Orientý Leeds 
City, Stockport County) 
1906 
1907 Burton United Voted Out Fulham 
Burslem Port Vale Resigned Oldham Athletic 
1908 Lincoln City Voted Out Bradford Park Avenue 
Stoke Resigned Tottenham Hotspur 
1909 Chesterfield Voted Out Lincoln City 
1910 Grimsby Town Voted Out Huddersfield Town 
1911 Lincoln City Voted Out Grimsby Town 
1912 Gainsborough Trinity Voted Out Lincoln City 
1913 
1914 
1915 Glossop North End Voted Out Stoke 
i9i9 Leeds City Expelled Burslem Port Vale 
League extended by 4 Clubs 
(Coventry City, West Ham United. 
Rotherham County, South Shields) 
1920 Grimsby Town Voted Out Leeds United 
Lincoln City Voted Out Cardiff City 
Third Division Southern Section 
of 22 Clubs added* 
1921 Southern Section expanded by 2 
Clubs (Aberdare Athletic, 
Chariton Athletic). Third Division 
Northern Section of 20 Clubs 
added* 
1922 
1923 Stalybridge Celtic Resigned Bournemouth & Boscombe 
Athletic. Northern Section 
expanded by 2 Clubs (Doncaster 





1927 Aberdare Athletic Voted Out Torquay United 
1928 Durham City Voted Out Carlisle United 
1929 Ashington Voted Out York City 
1930 Merthyr Town Voted Out Thames 
1931 Newport County Voted Out Mansfield Town 
Nelson Voted Out Chester City 
1932 Wigan Borough Resigned Newport County 





1938 Gillingham Voted Out Ipswich Town 
1939 
* Brcntford, Brighton & Hove Albion, Bristol Rovers, Crystal Palace, Exeter City, Gillingham, Grimsby Town, Luton Town, 
Merthyr Town, Millwall, Newport County, Northampton Town, Norwich City, Plymouth Argyle, Portsmouth, Queen's Park 
Rangers, Reading, Southampton, Southend United, Swansea Town, Swindon Town and Watford. 
Accrington Stanley, Ashington, Barrow, Chesterfield, Crewe Alexandra, Darlington, Durham City, Grimsby Town, Halifax 
Town, Harlepools United, Lincoln City, Nelson, Rochdale, Southport, Stalybridge Celtic, Stockport City, Tranmere Rovers, 
Walsall, Wigan Borough and Wrexham. 
Source: Sutcliffe et al., Football League, pp. 108-12. 
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APPENDIX8 
Representation of League Management Committee Members on FA Standing 
Committees, 1910/11-1937/38 
Committee 1910/ 1913/ 1919/ 1922/ 1925/ 19281 1931/ 1934/ 1937/ 
J-1 J4 20 23 ;69 L 22 















Henceforth no Councillor could be 
*0 
1 011 Is* I I I I 
0 000 1 1 1 1 n/a 
2 222 4 3 4 5 5 
121 2 1 3 1 1 
002 l*** 0 1 2 1 
11 1 1 1 1 0 
13 2 1 3 3 2 
2 111 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
0 000 0 0 0 0 0 
0 10 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 0 1 0 1 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 
12 9 13 11 13 8 15 14 13 
represented on more than 2 Committees (with exception of the Emergency Committee) 
Renamed Finance and General Purposes Committee 
* Renamed Permit Committee 
Source: FA Minute Books. 
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APPENDIX 9 
SMALL HEATH FC PLAYERSAGREEMENT, 1896 
An agreement made this Fifth day of May 1896 between THE SMALL HEATH FOOTBALL CLUB 
LIMITED, whose Registered Office is at Small Heath, in the City of Birmingham (hereinafter called the 
said Club), of the one part, and 
Edwin Joseph Fountain 
of I Highgate Terrace, Darwin St., Birmingham 
(hereinafter called the said player) of the other part. 
Now it is hereby agreed by and between the said parties hereto as follows: 
1. The said Club shall engage the said player, and the said player shall serve the said Club on the terms 
and in manner hereinafter mentioned. 
2. The engagement shall continue from September Ist. 1896 until April 30th. next. 
3. The said Club shall pay the said player the weekly sum of Ll (and if played with First Team to be 
paid EI 10s. per week when playing) and the same shall be paid on Tuesday of each week during the 
term of engagement. 
4. The said player shall play whenever and wherever required so to do by the said Club; he shall at all 
times render a true and faithful service, and use his best endeavours to win the matches in which he 
plays, and maintain the reputation of the Club, and shall be on the field, or at the place named for 
meeting by the said club, promptly at the time named by the said Club (except in case of sudden or 
serious personal illness); and when selected as reserve man shall be at the place named by the said 
Club, with all the necessary outfit for playing. 
5. The said player shall behave himself on the field in a proper and seemly manner, and shall not use 
any offensive or indecent language; and also shall at all times during this engagement conduct himself 
in a proper and seemly manner. 
6. The said player shall at all times keep himself sober, fit, well and in a proper condition to play such 
football as is played by the said Club. 
7. The said player shall train whenever and wherever required so to do by the said Club, under the 
supervision of the trainer, and shall obey him in every particular. 
8. The said player shall not play football for any other club in any contest or match whatsoever, without 
having first obtained the consent of the said Club in writing. 
9. The said player shall always obey the captain of the team in which he is playing, and shall be 
obedient to his orders and commands. 
10. The said player shall not bet or wager upon the result of any game, or match, in which he is playing, 
nor in any way whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, be concerned in betting or wagering upon 
football matches. 
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11. If the said player shall not observe, or shall commit a breach of any of the conditions and 
stipulations hereinbefore set forth and contained, then the said Club may summarily dismiss the said 
player upon paying him such proportion of the wages as is due to him up to the time of such breach or 
non-observance; or may, at the option of the said Club, suspend the said player for the whole or part of 
his engagement; and the said player shall not be entitled to any wages or payment during such 
suspension. 
Source: PFA, File 2. 
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APPENDIX10 
MILLWALL FC PLAYERS' AGREEMENT, 1933 
AN AGREEMENT made the Third day of May 1933 between Angus Gillies of New Cross in the 
COUNTY OF LONDON, the Secretary of and acting pursuant to Resolution and Authority for and on 
behalf of the MILLWALL FOOTBALL CLUB of New Cross (hereinafter referred to as the Club) of 
the one part and Leonard Graham of Leyton in the County of London, Professional Football Player, 
(hereinafter referred to as the Player) of the other part WHEREBY it is agreed as follows: 
1. The Player hereby agrees to play in an efficient manner and to the best of his ability for the Club. 
2. The Player shall attend the Club's ground for the purposes of or in connection with his training as a 
Player pursuant to the instructions of the Secretary, Manager, or Trainer of the Club, or of such other 
person, or persons, as the Club may appoint. (This provision shall not apply if the player is engaged by 
the Club at a weekly wage of less than One Pound, or at a wage per match). 
3. The Player shall do everything necessary to get and keep himself in the best possible condition so as 
to render the most efficient service to the Club, and will carry out all the training and other instructions 
of the Club through its representative officials. 
4. The Player shall observe and be subject to all Rules, Regulations, and Bye-Laws of the Football 
Association, and any other Association, League or Combination of which the Club shall be a member. 
And this Agreement shall be subject to any action which shall be taken by The Football Association 
under their Rules for the suspension or termination of the Football Season, and if any such suspension 
or termination shall be decided upon the payment of wages shall likewise be suspended or terminated, 
as the case may be. 
5. The Player shall not engage in any business or live in any place which the Directors (or Committee) 
of the Club may deem unsuitable. 
6. If the Player shall prove palpably inefficient, or shall be guilty of serious misconduct or breach of the 
disciplinary Rules of the Club, the Club may, on giving 14 days' notice to the said Player, or the Club 
may, on giving 28 days' notice to the said Player, on any reasonable grounds, terminate this Agreement 
and dispense with the services of the Player (without prejudice to the Club's right for transfer fees) in 
pursuance of the Rules of all such Associations, Leagues, and Combinations of which the Club may be 
a member. Such notice or notices shall be in writing, and shall specify the reason for the same being 
given, and shall also set forth the rights of appeal to which the Player is entitled under the Rules of the 
Football Association. 
The Rights of Appeal are as follow: 
Any League or other Combination of Clubs may, subject to these Rules, make some regulations 
between their Clubs and Players as they may deem necessary. Where Leagues and Combinations are 
sanctioned direct by this Association an Appeals Committee shall be appointed by this Association. 
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Where Leagues and Combinations are sanctioned by County Associations an Appeals Committee shall 
be appointed by the sanctioning County Associations. Where an agreement between a Club and a 
Player in any League or other Combination provides for the Club terminating by notice the Player of the 
Agreement between the Club and Player any reasonable ground the following practice shall prevail. A 
Player shall have the right to appeal to the Management Committee of the League or Combination and a 
ftirther right of appeal to the Appeals Committee of that body. A Club on giving notice to a Player to 
terminate his Agreement must state in the notice the name of the League or Combination to which he 
may appeal, and must also at the same time give notice to the League or Combination of which the Club 
is a member. A copy of the notice sent to the Player must at the same time be forwarded to the 
Secretary of this Association. The Player shall have right the right of appeal to the League or 
Combination, but such appeal must be made within 7 days of the receipt of the Notice from the Club. 
The appeal shall be heard by the Management Committee within 10 days of the receipt of the Notice 
from the Player. If either party is dissatisfied with the decision, there shall be a right of fin-ther appeal 
to the Appeals Committee of the League or Combination, but such appeal must be made within 7 days 
of the receipt of the decision of the Management Committee, and must be heard by the Appeals 
Committee within 10 days of the receipt of the Notice of Appeal. The League or Combination shall 
report to this Association when the matter is finally determined, and the Agreement and Registration 
shall be cancelled by this Association where necessary. Agreements between Clubs and Players shall 
contain a clause showing the provision made for dealing with such disputes and for the cancelling of the 
Agreements and Registrations by this Association. Clubs not belonging to any League or Combination 
before referred to may, upon obtaining the approval of this Association, make similar regulations. Such 
regulations to provide a right of appeal by either party to the County Association, or to this Association. 
7. This Agreement and the terms and conditions thereof shall be as to its suspension and termination 
subject to the Rules of the The Football Association and to any action which may be taken by the 
Council of The Football Association or any deputed Committee, and in any proceedings by the Player 
against the Club it shall be a sufficient and complete defence and answer by and on the part of the Club 
that such suspension or termination hereof is due to the action of The Football Association, or any Sub- 
Committee thereof to whom the power may be delegated. 
8. In consideration of the observance by the said player of the terms, provisions and conditions of this 
Agreement, the said Angus Gillies onbehalf of the Club hereby agrees that the said Club shall pay to 
the said Player the sum of f Six per week during the close season and f Seven per week during the 
playing season. 
9. This Agreement (subject o the Rules of the Football Association) shall cease and determine on 5th. 
May 1934 unless the same shall have been previously determined in accordance with the provisions 
hereinbefore set forth. 
one pound per week extra when playing in the First Team. 
Source: PFA, File 35. 
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Appendix 11 
Millwall FC Rules to Plavers, 1933 
Players, except those in employment, are requested to attend at the Ground (except where otherwise 
advised) each morning not later than 10 o'clock, and in the afternoon no later than 2.30 o'clock for 
training purposes, and to obtain the Manager's or Trainer's permission before leaving. 
All players to sign the Training Book each morning and afternoon (when requested to attend) with the 
correct time of their arrival. 
No player during his engagement with this club - close and playing season - shall be allowed to ride on 
or drive a motor cycle and/ or side car. 
No player shall be permitted to reside on, or be engaged in any capacity on Licensed Premises. 
Players in employment are likewise requested to attend the ground on Tuesday and Thursday Evenings, 
from 5 to 8 p. m. for training, or such evenings as arranged with the Trainers. 
ALL players must be indoors at their home or lodgings by 10 p. m. on the evening preceding match 
days. Players on the sick or injured list must produce a Doctor's Certificate, and be indoors (home or 
lodgings) not later than 8 P. M. 
Illness as an excuse for non-attendance to the provisions of this notice will not be accepted unless a 
Doctor's Certificate is produced. 
Week-end leave not allowed except under very special circumstances. 
All players will be supplied with their football outfit, and will be held responsible for the loss of same. 
All such outfits to be returned to the Trainer when requested. 
Any case of infectious disease to be notified at once. 
Anyone not complying with the above rules will be dealt with by the Directors 
NOTE. The above rules will be strictly enforced. 
By order of the Directors, 
R. HUNTER. 
Source: PFA, File 35. 
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APPENDIX12 
Gain and loss on Football League Pooling Arrangements, 1917/18- 1938/39 
Sheffield United Oldham Athletic 






Division Paid Received Balance 
1917/18 Regional 760 430 -330 
1918/19 Regional 1085 494 -591 
1919/20 1 3832 4116 284 
1920/21 1 3916 3931 15 
1921/22 1 3122 3117 .5 1 2425 3409 984 
1922123 1 3006 3195 189 1 2026 3004 978 
1923/24 1 3256 3307 51 2 1585 1897 312 
1924t25 1 3215 2776 439 2 1491 2229 737 
1925/26 1 3066 3154 88 2 1778 2126 347 
1926/27 1 3548 3308 -240 2 1846 2133 286 
1927/28 1 3057 3270 213 2 2135 2154 19 
1928/29 1 3524 3275 -249 2 1937 2072 135 
1929/30 1 3069 3560 491 2 2466 2430 -36 
1930/31 1 3180 3156 -24 2 1675 2118 443 
1931/32 1 3156 3226 70 2 1138 1716 578 
1932/33 1 2140 2794 654 2 693 1423 729 
1933/34 1 2364 2966 602 2 1302 1325 23 
1934/35 2 2067 2110 43 2 1588 2603 1016 
1935/36 2 3056 2486 -570 3N Soo 889 89 
1936/37 2 3241 2756 485 3N 890 816 -74 
1937/38 2 3588 3449 -139 3N 1356 1025 -331 
1938/39 2 4015 3100 -915 3N 976 993 17 
0 To nearest pound 




Average Goals Scored in Football League Matches, 1900/01-1937/38 
Season First Division Second Division Third Division South Third Division North 
1900/01 2.75 2.35 
1901/02 2.70 2.45 
1902/03 2.90 3.14 
1903/04 3.30 3.14 
1904/05 2.95 2.94 
1905/06 3.26 2.93 
1906/07 3.02 3.02 
1907/08 3.09 3.12 
1908/09 3.11 2.70 
1909/10 3.14 3.06 
1910/11 2.70 2.76 
1911/12 2.78 2.71 
1912/13 3.03 2.95 
1913/14 2.90 2.66 
1914/15 3.16 2.98 
1919/20 2.88 2.78 
1920/21 2.76 2.29 2.45 
1921/22 2.71 2.29 2.41 3.02 
1922/23 2.62 2.28 2.46 2.68 
1923/24 2.47 2.43 2.54 2.48 
1924/25 2.58 2.31 2.42 2.85 
1925/26 3.68 3.21 3.36 3.52 
1926/27 3.61 3.61 3.44 3.65 
1927/28 3.82 3.47 3.63 3.62 
1928/29 3.65 3.38 3.49 3.07 
1929/30 3.80 3.27 3.53 3.63 
1930/31 3.94 3.48 3.61 3.70 
1931/32 3.73 3.38 3.66 3.59 
1932/33 3.56 3.33 3.53 3.65 
1933/34 3.29 3.11 3.30 3.89 
1934/35 3.62 3.25 3.31 3.44 
1935/36 3.36 3.31 3.24 3.31 
1936/37 3.36 3.20 3.23 3.46 
1937/38 3.09 2.91 2.73 3.03 
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